

The Asia Foundation

A Survey of the Afghan People

AFGHANISTAN IN 2015

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Project Direction

The Asia Foundation

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About The Asia Foundation

The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our programs address critical issues affecting Asia in the 21st century – governance and law, economic development, women’s empowerment, environment, and regional cooperation. In addition, our Books for Asia and professional exchange programs are among the ways we encourage Asia’s continued development as a peaceful, just, and thriving region of the world.

Headquartered in San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through a network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in Washington, DC. Working with public and private partners, the Foundation receives funding from a diverse group of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals.

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PREFACE

The Asia Foundation is pleased to present *Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People*. Since 2004, our annual surveys have gathered the opinions of more than 75,000 Afghan men and women on issues of paramount importance to their country's social, economic, and political development. This past June, 939 expert Afghan male and female enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews with 9,586 Afghans from 14 different ethnic groups in all 34 provinces of the country, including insecure and physically challenging environments.

It is a time of historic transition in Afghanistan, and the new government is inevitably grappling with simultaneous security, political, and economic challenges. Much has happened since we conducted our last survey, in 2014, immediately following Afghanistan's June presidential runoff election. The national mood was high and closely correlated with the perception that the presidential election would improve lives. Since then, Afghanistan has seen the formation of the National Unity Government after a contentious election process, a deteriorating economy in the face of declining international aid and foreign military spending, and the full assumption of security responsibilities by Afghan forces amid increasing attacks by armed opposition groups. Against this backdrop, our 2015 survey reflects Afghans' understandable concerns about these challenges, and increased skepticism about the government's ability to address them.

This year's survey shows that Afghan optimism about the overall direction of the country fell to the lowest point in a decade, after steadily rising through 2014. Afghans are particularly concerned about security, and the proportion who fear for their personal safety is at the highest point in the past decade. The economy and unemployment have also emerged as major concerns, especially for youth and for women. Many Afghans say their employment opportunities have declined over the past year. There has been a sharp decline in the level of satisfaction with and confidence in different levels of government and public institutions, and the number of Afghans who are satisfied with how democracy works in their country hit an all-time low in 2015. While anti-corruption efforts at the highest levels have increased, the proportion of Afghans who say that corruption is a problem in their daily lives is at the highest point in a decade.

During this rapid transition period in Afghan society, the survey also reflects some ambivalence about full integration of women in public life. On the positive side, 2015 was a year of wins for women in Afghan politics: the cabinet now includes four female ministers and the government appointed two new female provincial governors. Afghan women are increasingly aware of their rights and aware of institutions to contact in a domestic conflict—rural women are more likely than urban to turn to an organization that assists them if they have a family problem. Over time, there has been a gradual erosion in the proportion of Afghans who say that women should make their own voting decisions, work outside the home, and have the same educational opportunities as men. However, when asked whether women should be able to pursue specific educational opportunities from the primary to university level, or whether it is appropriate for women to work in a variety of specific professional settings, a significant proportion of Afghans agree.

Encouragingly, even in the face of the overall downturn in national mood this year, 75% of Afghans say they are generally happy in their lives. Long-term survey data since 2004 shows that Afghans have seen progress in the delivery of basic government services that most developed countries take for granted. Education is absolutely crucial for Afghans, and two-thirds of respondents report satisfaction with the quality of education for children. Nearly three out of four Afghans report satisfaction with access to drinking water, a long-term improvement since 2006. Year after year, the survey and others interested in Afghanistan's development remind us that the steady gains in the delivery of basic public services—health, education, roads, drinking water, sanitation—make an enormous difference in people's lives and are an antidote to extremism, instability, and vulnerability.

A Survey of the Afghan People is unique in its long duration and broad scope. This annual survey provides a picture of a nation undergoing extraordinary change, and the concerns, hopes, and experiences that accompany such change. For a country that has endured decades of loss and unrest, the survey findings serve as a valuable resource to inform the policies and programs of the Afghan government as it strives to fulfill national aspirations for self-sufficiency. The survey is also a useful reminder for the international community to remain a steady and patient partner in Afghanistan's ongoing struggle to achieve peace and prosperity for its people.

David D. Arnold

President, The Asia Foundation

November 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A Survey of the Afghan People is a major project of The Asia Foundation each year, requiring coordination of multiple inputs and of numerous Asia Foundation staff and Foundation partners. The survey report was produced under the guidance of Afghanistan Country Representative Abdullah Ahmadzai, and led by a team of Afghan data analysts, including Sayed Masood Sadat, Shamim Sarabi, and Shahim Kabuli, working with the Director of Research Zachary Warren. Report design was led by Rohullah Mohammadi and Kristin Colombano, data visualization was constructed by Jaime Medrano, and editorial and production support provided by The Asia Foundation's Global Communications team and Washington DC office.

ACSOR-Surveys, a subsidiary of D3 Systems, Inc., worked closely with the Foundation to conduct all survey fieldwork, and the Foundation is grateful for their partnership in executing best practices in quality control within one of the world's most challenging research environments. Special thanks is due to Nicholas Malouta, ACSOR's project manager, for compiling the survey's 1000+ questions over 10 years into a single merged document and dataset. Sayara Research, Inc., provided reliable third-party monitoring support for fieldwork and enumerator trainings.

The Asia Foundation thanks the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Australian government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and the German government (Deutsche Zusammenarbeit) for their support to this survey and for supporting Afghan capacity in research and analysis.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People is The Asia Foundation's eleventh annual public opinion survey in Afghanistan. The longest-running barometer of Afghan opinions, the survey has gathered the views of 75,144 Afghans nationwide on a wide range of issues central to the country's growth and development since 2004. All data is free to the public, available on The Asia Foundation website.

This year witnessed major changes in national mood, reflecting rising concern over insecurity and a struggling economy. One year ago, as the results of the presidential election were due to be announced, the majority of respondents were optimistic about the direction of the country. Since then, a contentious election was followed by the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) in September 2014, and political struggles have been compounded by rising security threats, as well as unemployment and economic shocks caused by the reduced foreign military footprint and declining development funding by the international community.

This year's survey polled 9,586 Afghan citizens, including 50.6% male and 49.4% female respondents, representing 14 ethnic groups and all 34 provinces in the country. Face-to-face interviews were conducted between June 11 and June 28, 2015, by a team of 939 trained Afghan enumerators matched with respondents by gender (i.e., men interviewed men, and women interviewed women). All enumerators are residents of the provinces where they conduct interviews. Survey results are weighted to be nationally representative using the most recent population data (2015-2016) released by the Afghan Central Statistics Organization (CSO). The total sample consisted of 18% urban households and 82% rural households. This year, the complex margin of error is +/-1.6% for the probability sample, based on a design effect of 2.53 and a confidence interval of 95%.

The Foundation's longstanding research partner, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), conducted all survey fieldwork and logistics, while its parent company, D3 Systems, Inc., provided analytical and methodological support. As was the case for the 2013 and 2014 surveys, Sayara Research conducted third-party validation of fieldwork, a best practice for survey research in challenging environments. Together with its partners, the Foundation is committed to quality control processes guided by principles of validity and reliability.

This year's *Survey of the Afghan People* includes several new questions proposed by key users of the survey findings. New questions explore Afghans' views on problems facing youth, reconciliation with the Taliban, the organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS), landmine incidents and government care for people injured by landmines and the conflict, women in leadership positions, and access to social media on mobile phones. An in-depth discussion of the survey methodology is provided in Appendix 1 of this report.

NATIONAL MOOD

- **Direction of the country.** In 2015, 36.7% of respondents nationwide say their country is moving in the right direction, down from 54.7% in 2014. This represents the lowest level of optimism

recorded over the past 10 years, following last year's record high during the presidential runoff election. Overall optimism has decreased across all regions, and is lowest in the Central/Kabul (27.8%) and North West (30.5%) regions. This year, Afghans in Helmand province (62.1%) are the most optimistic about the overall direction of the country, and residents of Kabul province (22.5%) are the least optimistic.

- Reasons for optimism.** Those who say the country is moving in the right direction cite reasons of reconstruction (31.8%), followed by good security (28.5%). The percentage of respondents citing good government (10.5%) has increased four percentage points since 2014. Good security is most likely to be cited as a reason by Afghans in the Central/Hazarajat (39.9%), South West (33.7%), and East (29.9%) regions, while other regions are more likely to cite reconstruction as their top reason for optimism.
- Reasons for pessimism.** Among the 57.5% of Afghans who say their country is moving in the wrong direction, the most frequently cited reason is insecurity (44.6%, up six percentage points from 2014), followed by unemployment (25.4%), corruption in general (13.0%), a bad economy (12.4%), and bad government (11.4%). The percentage citing bad government increased from 4.9% in 2014, while the percentage citing administrative corruption decreased from 9.6% in 2014 to 4.6% in 2015.
- Afghanistan's biggest problems: national and local.** The most frequently cited national problem is insecurity (42.7%), up from 34.1% in 2014 and at its highest level since 2007. The most frequently cited local level problem is unemployment (31.2%). However, the percentage of Afghans citing insecurity as a local problem (22.0%) is at its highest level since the survey began.
- Biggest problems facing women.** As in previous years, Afghans identify education and illiteracy (20.4%) and unemployment/lack of job opportunities (11.3%) as the two main problems facing women. However, the frequency with which they have been cited has declined since 2014, while the percentage of Afghans who cite a lack of women's rights has increased from 6.2% in 2014 to 8.7% in 2015. In general, men and women point to the same challenges facing Afghan women, with the exception of the issue of domestic violence, which is more often mentioned by women (13.0%) than men (8.1%).
- Biggest problems facing youth.** In all individual provinces and also at the national level, unemployment (71.4%) is the most commonly cited problem facing youth. At the national level, this is followed by illiteracy (26.5%), a poor economy (15.9%), lack of higher education opportunities (15.3%), and drug addiction (14.2%). Afghans who live in the Central/Kabul (23.5%) and North East (20.2%) regions are more likely to cite the need for opportunities in higher education, while residents of the East (36.9%) and South West (33.3%) regions cite the more basic challenge of illiteracy.
- Self-reported happiness.** Despite a major drop in national optimism about the direction of the country since 2014, Afghans report general happiness at roughly the same rate in 2015 as in 2014.

This year, 74.9% of Afghans say that they are either very happy (28.6%) or somewhat happy (46.3%). While men (75.6%) and women (74.3%) report happiness at similar rates, Afghans in urban areas are significantly more likely to say they are happy (81.2%) compared to residents of rural areas (72.8%).

SECURITY

- **Fear for personal safety.** More than two-thirds (67.4%) of Afghans report that they always, often, or sometimes fear for their personal safety, the highest percentage in a decade. This rate is highest in the South West (84.6%) and South East (81.1%) regions, where clashes with AOGs have been most frequent. In the West region, however, the percentage of Afghans reporting fear for their safety has decreased by more than 10 percentage points (to 68.5%) since 2014.
- **Experience and reporting of violence or crime.** Approximately 18.2% of Afghans say that they or a member of their family experienced violence or crime within the past year, up from 15.6% in 2014. The most frequently mentioned types of violence or crime are physical attacks (30.9%), livestock theft (19.4%), suicide attacks (19.3%), racketeering or extortion (17.6%), and murder (17.0%). Among victims of an incident of violence or crime, nearly two-thirds (62.0%) reported the incident to an external authority. The percentage of Afghans reporting incidents to *shuras* or elders has increased over time (from 16.0% in 2006 to 37.2% in 2015), but the Afghan National Police (ANP) (44.7%) remains the preferred institution for reporting.
- **Confidence in Afghan security forces.** Using a composite measure of overall confidence, this year's survey shows higher confidence in the Afghan National Army (ANA) (80.8%) than in the ANP (70.0%). Compared to last year, confidence in the ANA dropped less than a percentage point, down from 81.6% in 2014, while confidence in the ANP dropped three percentage points, down from 73.2% in 2014. A large majority of Afghans say the ANA (82.8%) and ANP (80.1%) need foreign support to do their job, an increase of more than five percentage points for each since last year.
- **Reconciliation.** When asked whether the Afghan government's efforts to reconcile with Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) will help stabilize the country, 62.6% of Afghans say yes, a significant decrease from 72.5% in 2014. The percentage of Afghans who say they have sympathy for AOGs has decreased steadily over the years, from 55.7% in 2009 to 27.5% in 2015. When asked why AOGs are fighting the government, the most common answer from 2011-2014 was the presence of foreign forces. This year, however, the most common answer is that AOGs want to gain power.
- **Fear encountering armed forces.** Afghans report experiencing the highest rates of fear when they encounter the Taliban (92.0%), followed by Western forces (79.5%). They report experiencing the lowest rates of fear when encountering the ANP (45.3%) or ANA (42.2%).
- **Knowledge and threat of ISIS.** Of the 74.3% of Afghans who say they have heard of ISIS, approximately half (54.2%) also say the group poses a current or future threat to the security of their district.

- **Landmines.** Roughly one-third (33.8%) of Afghans say that landmines or unexploded devices have caused accidents in their community at least several times a year. The highest frequencies of mine- or unexploded device-related incidents are in the South West and East regions.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

- **Household financial situation.** More Afghans say that over the past year the financial situation of their household has grown worse (29.7%), rather than better (21.0%); a remaining 49.3% say their situation is unchanged.
- **Employment opportunities.** More than half of respondents (55.4%) say that employment opportunities for their household are worse this year compared to last year, while 36.5% say they are the same, and 7.6% say they are better. Areas most affected include cities, particularly Kabul (73.6% reporting worsened job opportunities), where the number of higher-wage jobs have decreased, and in districts surrounding, supplying, or contracting from foreign military installations, particularly Balkh, Parwan, and Panjshir. Areas least affected include rural provinces with agriculture-based economies, such as Wardak and Laghman, but not in Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah, where poppy production decreased due to crop disease.
- **Availability of goods.** Over one-third of Afghans (38.0%) say the availability of goods in their local market has declined since last year, consistent with reports of decreased trade with Pakistan in particular.
- **Assets.** Half of respondents (53.7%) say they own land, and 82.3% say they have at least one mobile phone in their household. Rural and urban Afghans report having different kinds of assets, reflecting different levels of access to electricity as well as different levels of exposure to markets. Compared to those living in rural areas, urban Afghans are more likely to own consumer appliances such as a television, refrigerator, and washing machine. Rural Afghans are more likely to own land and livestock.

DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

- **Water.** When asked about a range of public services, Afghans report the highest level of satisfaction (71.8%) with access to drinking water, with rural and urban residents reporting satisfaction at similar rates. Most Afghans obtain their water from personal or communal wells, which have increased in number nationwide. Satisfaction with irrigation water has decreased over time, which is of major concern, given that agriculture is the largest source of Afghan livelihoods and nutrition.
- **Electricity.** Overall, 40.2% of respondents report satisfaction with electricity, with a major gap in satisfaction between urban (73.4%) and rural (29.3%) residents. In the violence-affected South West and South East regions, a majority of Afghans say that, on average, access to electricity has grown worse over the past year (56.0% and 54.0% respectively). Kabul and Kunduz are the only two provinces where over 60% of Afghans report satisfaction with electricity.

- **Roads.** Satisfaction with roads (45.6%) is concentrated around urban areas and the ring road that connects the country. A majority of Afghans in Kabul and the surrounding provinces say they are satisfied with their access to roads. Overall, a majority of people in 13 provinces say they are satisfied with road infrastructure, whereas a majority in the remaining 21 provinces say they are not satisfied.
- **Education.** Education is critical to Afghanistan's economic and social development, yet 54.5% of respondents report having no formal or home schooling, with a significant gender gap (37.8% of men compared to 69.3% of women). On average, 67.8% of respondents report satisfaction with the quality of education for children in their area. Afghans in urban areas (80.1%) are more likely to say they are satisfied than people in rural areas (63.7%). Satisfaction with education has decreased in all regions in 2015 compared to 2014. Afghans in the Central/Kabul region (77.9% down from 87.1%) are the most likely to report satisfaction with education for children. Overall, the majority of respondents in all but four provinces report being somewhat or very satisfied with children's education. Satisfaction is lowest in Nooristan (41.4%), Ghor (47.8%), and Farah (48.5%) provinces.
- **Healthcare.** Overall, 49.1% of respondents say they are somewhat or very satisfied with their access to clinics and hospitals, and 42.4% report satisfaction with their access to medicine. Among rural Afghans, just 44.3% of respondents are satisfied with clinics and hospitals in their area, while 38.3% are satisfied with access to medicine. In contrast, a majority of urban Afghans are satisfied with clinics and hospitals (63.5%) and availability of medicine (54.6%). Many (26.7%) Afghans say that their family's health is worse this year than last year.
- **Awareness of development projects and donors.** Overall, 58.4% of respondents know of at least one type of development project (from a long list of types of sector-specific projects provided by the surveyors) implemented in their area in the previous 12 months. Roads and bridges (30.3%), drinking water projects (23.2%), and new mosques (21.9%) are the most common types of projects recognized by respondents. Provinces where respondents report higher awareness of multiple local development projects include Kunduz, Samangan, Ghor, Laghman, and Logar. When asked to identify the funder for local development projects, Afghans are most likely to cite the Afghan government (24.5%), followed by the United States (22.6%), Japan (11.9%), and India (11.1%). An additional 10.9% attribute funding for projects to the people themselves.
- **Migration.** Starting in 2011, the survey has asked respondents if they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This year, 39.9% of Afghans say yes, an increase from 33.8% in 2011, while 57.9% say no. Afghans most likely to say yes live in the Central/Kabul (47.4%) and West (44.2%) regions; those least likely live in the South West (26.2%).

GOVERNANCE

- **Satisfaction with government performance.** Respondents report a sharp decline in their satisfaction with nearly all types of government institutions. The proportion of Afghans who say

that the national government is doing a good job has fallen from 75.3% in 2014 to 57.8% in 2015. Satisfaction with the performance of provincial, municipal, and district governments has also declined. The percentage of Afghans who say the municipal government is doing a good job decreased from 61.0% in 2014 to 47.2% in 2015, a record low. Reported confidence in various public officials also decreased. Afghans report less confidence in parliament this year (42.4%) compared to last year (51.0%), and also less confidence in their own member of parliament (from 51.5% in 2014 to 42.9% in 2015). By comparison, confidence in the media (66.6%) and in religious leaders (64.3%) is much higher.

- Electoral institutions.** Confidence in the Independent Election Commission dropped nearly in half over the past year, from 66.4% in 2014 to 36.4% in 2015. The 2014 survey was conducted prior to the 2014 presidential election results and ensuing ballot recount, and before the National Unity Government was formed. Reported confidence in the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) is even lower (34.7%). Confidence in the IECC is slightly higher among rural (38.3%) compared to urban (30.1%) respondents.
- Corruption.** Despite government efforts to curb corruption, 89.9% of Afghans say that corruption is a problem in their daily lives, the highest percentage reported in a decade, with 61.1% saying it is a major problem and 28.8% saying it is a minor problem. Helmand (84.8%) and Kabul (81.3%) are the two provinces where the highest proportion of residents say that corruption is a major problem, and Panjshir (11.0%) is the lowest. This year, over half (53.3%) of Afghans who had contact with police within the past year say they paid a bribe, up from 45.1% in 2014 and exceeding the previous high of 53.4% in 2011. The frequency of bribes paid to officials in the municipality/district office (66.0%), the judiciary and courts (63.4%), customs office (61.2%), provincial governor's office (60.9%), when applying for a job (58.7%), state electricity supply (54.9%), ANP (53.3%), public health services (52.6%), ANA (43.2%), and admissions to school/university (43.0%) all rose in 2015.
- Dispute resolution.** Since 2007 there has been a slow but steady increase in the reported usage of state courts for dispute resolution services. However, Afghans approach a range of formal and informal actors for dispute resolution, depending upon the dispute or problem. For problems involving land or water, respondents most frequently say they would go to local elders of the *shura* (47.0% and 24.4% of respondents, respectively). For family problems, they most frequently say they would ask friends and family for assistance (29.9% of respondents). For problems with healthcare, respondents most frequently say would approach formal authorities, with 30.3% citing government departments and 10.5% saying the district authorities. This year 21.5% of respondents had a dispute or formal case that they could not resolve internally and had to take to the *Huquq* Department or a *shural/jirga*. The most prevalent type of case was a dispute over land (42.2%), followed by family problems (16.7%).

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- **Basic political freedoms.** In the 2014 survey, which was conducted immediately after the presidential runoff election, Afghans reported a comparatively low level of fear while voting (45.8%). This year (a non-election year) the percentage has risen to 55.6%, a rate that approaches the highest previously recorded (59.5% in 2010). Fear while voting ranges from a low of 32.2% in the Central/Hazarajat region to a high of 68.7% in the South West region. Like fear while voting, the percentage of Afghans who say they would experience fear while participating in a peaceful demonstration (69.1%) increased slightly compared to 2014. The percentage of Afghans who say they would experience fear while running for office (72.8%) is similar in 2015 to levels of fear reported in recent years.
- **Satisfaction with democracy and influence over local government.** The percentage of Afghans who say they are satisfied with the democratic process in Afghanistan (57.2%) has declined sharply since 2014 (73.1%), marking the lowest percentage of support in a decade. The percentage of Afghans who say they can impact local government decisions has also decreased, from 55.9% in 2014 to 44.5% in 2015, the lowest recorded in 10 years.
- **Religion and politics.** Most Afghans (62.8%) say that religious scholars should be involved in politics. In all regions, the percentage of residents who support mixing religion and politics declined in 2015 compared to 2014 (64.9%). However, responses to this question have varied considerably over the past 10 years.
- **Women and elections.** Nationwide, 50.1% (down from 56.0% in 2014) of respondents say that women should decide on their own when making voting decisions, 27.4% say women should consult with men, and 21.9% say men should decide for women. The percentage of respondents who support women making their own electoral decisions ranges from a low of 29.8% in the South West region to a high of 68.4% in the Central/Hazarajat region. Even greater variations emerge when responses are analyzed at the provincial level, ranging from 80.9% of Panjshir residents who support for women deciding for themselves to 10.5% of respondents living in Zabul province.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

- **Sources of news and information.** Radio remains the most widely used mean of obtaining news and information in Afghanistan (75.7%), followed by television (61.6%), mobile phones (50.3%), the mosque (48.3%), and community *shuras* (37.4%). Over time, reliance on television and the internet for information has gradually increased. Women report using these various sources of news and information at lower rates than men, with the exception of television, which men and women use at equal rates.
- **Mobile phone ownership:** A majority (82.3%) of respondents report owning at least one mobile phone in their household, compared to only 41.5% in 2007. Many more men (70.7%) than women (31.1%) report owning a mobile phone primarily for personal use.

- **Television ownership and viewership.** The percent of respondents who own a television has increased from 36.9% in 2007 to 62.1% in 2015. When asked which television shows they watch the most, Afghans cite the six o'clock news (33.8%), followed by serials (25.8%), religious programs (4.0%), and sports (3.1%).
- **Internet access.** Approximately one-fifth (21.0%) of respondents nationwide report having someone in their household who has access to the internet. Internet use continues to grow. In 2013, 3.2% said they use the internet for news and information. This year, 9.6% say the same.

WOMEN AND SOCIETY

- **Assistance for women.** Nearly one quarter (23.4%) of respondents know of an organization that assists women with their problems, an increase over previous years. More urban respondents (28.1%) than rural (21.9%) are aware of places where women can seek assistance. Almost half of respondents (45.7%) identify the Directorate of Women's Affairs, while 9.7% identify the District Governor's Office and 9.0 % identify the Human Rights Council/Office.
- **Access to justice.** Overall, 47.0% of Afghans who have taken a case to the state courts agree that the state courts treat men and women equally. Notably more women (51.1%) than men (43.1%) say that there is equal treatment of men and women by the state courts. Among respondents who took a case forward for resolution by a *jirga* or *shura*, 67.2% agree there should be local women's *jirgas* and *shuras*.
- **Customs and cultural practices:** Most Afghans (80.5%) disagree with the practice of *baad*, where a daughter is given to another party as a penalty or payment for some offense. Fewer, but still a majority (64.7%), disagree with the practice of *baddal*, the exchange of daughters between families for marriage. In both cases, the human rights concern is that the daughters may be forced to marry without their consent. Meanwhile, 87.8% of respondents agree that a daughter is entitled to part of her deceased father's inheritance (*miras*), a right guaranteed by Islamic law.
- **Women's attire in public.** Over a third (35.1%) of Afghans say that the *burqa* (a full-body covering) is the most appropriate public dress for women, followed by 27.7% who say the *niqab* (a veil that covers the full face, with the exception of the eyes). Only 1.2% of Afghans say it is appropriate for a woman to be unveiled in public.
- **Leadership.** Among an array of leadership positions, Afghans are most likely to agree that a woman should be allowed to sit on a community development council (74.4%) and least likely to agree that a woman can run for president (52.9%). A majority of Afghans agree that women should be eligible to serve as a government minister or cabinet member (58.5%), as a governor of a province (57.6%), or chief executive officer of a large company (56.3%). However, support for the idea of equal representation of men and women in political leadership positions has been steadily declining, from 51.1% in 2008 to 43.6% in 2015.

- **Education.** A majority of Afghans (78.2%) say they agree that women should have the same educational opportunities as men. At the same time, there has been a measurable decrease in the level of support for gender equality in education between 2006 (58.5%) and 2015 (37.8%). Most Afghans (93.6%) are either strongly or somewhat supportive of women's equal access to education in Islamic *madrasas*, in primary school (84.5%), in high school (82.8%), and in university in a women's home province (73.8%). Respondents are less supportive of education opportunities that involve studying outside a women's home province (48.0%) or abroad (35.5%).
- **Work.** Two-thirds of Afghans (64.0%) say women should be allowed to work outside the home, including 72.9% of women and 53.8% of men. This percentage has slowly declined over time, from a high of 70.9% in 2006. The percentage of respondents who say women contribute to the family/household income has steadily increased from 13.6% in 2009 to 22.6% in 2015.
- **Employment venues.** When asked where it is appropriate for women to work, most Afghans (85.7%) say that female-only schools are acceptable, followed by employment in hospitals or clinics (83.7%), government offices (70.7%), and co-ed schools (66.5%). Fewer support women working in NGOs (44.2%), the army or police (41.4%), or in a private company where men and women work together (34.8%).



1. NATIONAL MOOD

Each year, the survey begins by asking Afghans whether the country is moving in the right direction or in the wrong direction. After a steady rise in national optimism since 2008, the percentage of Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction dropped sharply over the past year, from 54.7% in 2014 to 36.7% in 2015. The survey also asks Afghans to reflect on the country's biggest problems, including the specific problems facing women and youth. As in previous years, the prevailing national-level concern this year is security. Regarding local-level concerns, Afghans list a number of problems with public services, such as roads and electricity, along with unemployment and insecurity.

The declining optimism about the country's future and increasing concern for security that Afghans express in this year's survey reflect the significant political, security, and economic transitions that Afghanistan experienced during the past year. In the spring of 2014, Afghans participated in a landmark national election to select a successor to President Hamid Karzai. However, the election was marred by allegations of corruption, resulting in a United Nations-supervised recount of the ballots. Ultimately, the two candidates agreed to a U.S.-brokered deal to end the stalemate. Dr. Ashraf Ghani became president, while Dr. Abdullah Abdullah assumed a newly created role of chief executive officer, a position created by presidential decree. This marked the first peaceful transition of executive power within Afghanistan in several decades. However, the resulting National Unity Government (NUG) has faced several challenges, including opposition in parliament that contributed to delays in cabinet nominations. The NUG formed a full cabinet by April 2015, eight months after it was established.

One of President Ghani's first initiatives was to sign a bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the United States. The BSA, alongside a similar agreement with NATO, outlines the training and advisory roles of the limited number of foreign forces that have remained in the country following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission at the end of 2014. As the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have assumed responsibility for their country's security, they have been challenged by armed opposition groups (AOGs), which have increased attacks throughout the country.

The ongoing political and military transition has also had a significant impact on Afghanistan's economy. The high number of Afghans who say unemployment is a problem, particularly for women and youth, underscores the role of economic development in shaping Afghan perceptions of their country's progress. Uncertainty surrounding the election and the withdrawal of foreign forces has resulted in lower investment in the country's private sector. At the same time, external aid, which makes up a large portion of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product, has already declined and is expected to decline further in coming years. This chapter explores the regional and demographic variations in national mood during this time of national change.

1.1 DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY

Key Questions

Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

Q-2. (Asked if answered “right direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q-3. (Asked if answered “wrong direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Afghans are more pessimistic about the direction of their country in 2015 compared to previous years of the survey. This year, 36.7% of Afghans say their country is moving in the right direction, down from 54.7% in 2014. This represents the lowest level of optimism recorded over the past 10 years (Fig. 1.1).

In particular, residents of urban areas (27.2%) are less likely to say their country is moving in the right direction when compared to residents of rural areas (39.8%). In a separate sample of “intercept interviews”¹ from highly insecure areas of the country, only 28.0% of respondents say the country is moving in the right direction. Nationwide, men and women report similarly low rates of optimism (37.7% and 35.9%, respectively).




FIG. 1.1: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

The regions of the country that report the lowest levels of optimism are the Central/Kabul (27.8%) and North West (30.5%) regions. Of all regions in Afghanistan, these two regions also experienced the greatest decrease in optimism since 2014 (Fig. 1.2). Within these regions, the provinces that experienced the greatest declines are Farah (down 35.2 percentage points to 28.9%), Kabul (down 32.3 percentage points to 22.5%), Sari-i-Pul (down 30.7 percentage points to 23.4%), and Nangarhar (down 30.3 percentage points to 30.0%). Notably, these provinces were among those that reported the highest

rates of optimism in 2014. This year, the provinces that report the highest levels of optimism about the overall direction of the country are Helmand (62.1%), Khost (58.7%), and Paktika (54.7%).

RIGHT DIRECTION: REGIONAL TRENDS




FIG. 1.2: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? (percentage who respond “right direction”)

The percentage of respondents who say the country is moving in the right direction has fallen across all ethnic groups since 2014. However the decline is greatest among Tajiks (down 19.6 percentage points to 32.1%), Uzbeks (down 19.0 percentage points to 33.2%), and Hazaras (down 17.4 percentage points to 37.1%). Relatively larger declines among these specific ethnic groups may be due to the outcome of the 2014 presidential election. Tajiks and Hazaras were more likely to support the runner-up, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. By comparison, Pashtuns, who favored Dr. Ashraf Ghani in the 2014 presidential election at a higher rate than other groups, report optimism at the rate of 41.7%.

Additional analysis reveals several factors that significantly align with respondents’ perception of whether the country is moving in the right direction. Residents of rural areas, those who say the presidential election was free and fair, those who support the current government’s negotiation with the Taliban, and those who say they are generally happy in life are significantly more likely to say that the country is moving in the right direction. In addition, Afghans who say they have confidence in the Afghan National Army (ANA), fear of participating in political activities (e.g. voting or joining in a peaceful demonstration), confidence in formal and informal authorities, and an improved household situation (e.g., better health, finances, employment) are also more likely to say the country is moving in the right direction. Meanwhile, those who say that the ANSF require foreign support to do their job, and those who say corruption is a major problem are significantly more likely to say the country is moving in the wrong direction.²

To explore the reasons for optimism or pessimism about the direction the country, the survey then asked respondents to specify the reasons for their outlook. Among Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction, the most frequent reasons are similar to last year: reconstruction/rebuilding (31.8%), good security (28.5%), peace/end of war (11.2%), improvement in the education system (10.1%), having an active ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) (10.3%), good government (10.5%), economic revival (7.9%), and democracy/elections (6.8%) (Fig. 1.3). Compared to last year, all of these figures declined slightly with the exception of good government, which increased from 6.0% in 2014 to 10.5% in 2015.




FIG. 1.3: Q-2A/B. (Ask if answered “right direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (Q-2A and Q-2B responses combined)

Over the past 10 years of surveys, reconstruction/rebuilding and good security have consistently remained the most commonly mentioned reasons for why the country is moving in the right direction (Fig. 1.4). The percentage of Afghans citing the establishment of schools for girls, as well as improvement in education, has decreased in recent years. As fewer respondents cite good security compared to previous years, the percentage of responses distributed among other reasons has increased. Notably, the percentage of Afghans who cite good government and peace/end of the war has increased in 2015. While violent attacks increased in 2015, and the NUG faced major challenges, some Afghans cite a reduction in administrative corruption (5.2%) and national unity (2.8%) as reasons for optimism.

REASONS FOR RIGHT DIRECTION: BY YEAR

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
GOOD SECURITY	31	34	39	44	38	39	41	24	33	29
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	21	39	32	36	35	40	35	33	36	32
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	16	19	19	21	15	10	13	12	8	9
PEACE / END OF THE WAR	29	16	21	9	12	7	7	7	6	11
HAVING ACTIVE ANA AND ANP	0	7	7	7	6	11	13	12	10	10
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION	0	0	0	0	10	16	13	13	15	10
GOOD GOVERNMENT	9	9	9	12	9	9	5	5	6	10
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	7	9	5	6	10	8	8	6	9	8
DEMOCRACY / ELECTIONS	10	9	7	10	7	3	3	6	9	7

FIG. 1.4: Q-2A/B. (Ask if answered “right direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (Q-2A and Q-2B responses combined)

When analyzed at the geographic level, a few variations appear. Urban respondents cite reconstruction as a reason for optimism more often than rural respondents (35.5% vs. 31.0%), while rural respondents are more likely (11.1%) than urban respondents (6.5%) to cite having an active ANA and ANP. Residents in the East, South West, and Central/Hazarajat regions are more likely to cite good security, rather than reconstruction, as a reason the country is moving in the right direction (Fig. 1.5).

REASONS FOR RIGHT DIRECTION: BY REGION

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	32	25	28	24	32	42	31	39
GOOD SECURITY	31	30	20	34	23	31	40	27
DON'T KNOW	16	6	7	17	12	17	20	12
PEACE / END OF WAR	6	16	13	13	14	9	9	13
GOOD GOVERNMENT	14	12	13	8	6	9	13	10
HAVING ACTIVE ANA AND ANP	8	14	18	16	5	7	2	7
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEM	9	7	11	21	6	6	13	7
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	9	3	12	8	16	7	11	9
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	8	10	7	6	11	9	3	5
DEMOCRACY / ELECTIONS	10	10	8	3	5	7	3	5

FIG. 1.5: Q-2. (Ask if answered “right direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (Q-2A and Q-2B responses combined)

As was the case last year, security appears to be a major driver of public perception. Afghans who say their country is moving in the right direction cite good security as a top reason, and Afghans who say their country is moving in the wrong direction cite insecurity as the leading reason (44.6%) (Fig. 1.6).




FIG. 1.6: Q-3A/B. (Ask if answered “wrong direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (Q-3A and Q-3B responses combined)

Longitudinal analysis shows that Afghans increasingly view unemployment, and decreasingly view corruption, as the primary reasons for why the country is going in the wrong direction (Fig. 1.7). The percentage of Afghans who cite unemployment (25.4%) this year has increased by more than 10 percentage points since 2007 (14.7%), while the percentage citing administrative corruption decreased 10 percentage points since 2007. Those citing corruption more generally has dropped 10 percentage points since 2013. However, the percentage of respondents who report paying a bribe (defined to include money, favors or gifts) to a government authority in the past year has increased each year of the survey, suggesting increased tolerance for the existence of corruption.

REASONS: WRONG DIRECTION BY YEAR

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
INSECURITY	48	50	42	44	45	38	24	38	45
UNEMPLOYMENT	15	15	15	16	13	18	20	23	25
CORRUPTION	13	19	17	12	16	14	23	15	13
BAD GOVERNMENT	15	12	25	18	15	11	7	5	11
BAD ECONOMY	12	17	11	8	10	10	8	10	12
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	15	9	10	15	4	10	6	10	5
SUICIDE ATTACKS	0	0	6	8	11	11	11	7	7
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	9	8	7	6	7	6	8	6	6

FIG. 1.7: Q-3. (Ask if answered “wrong direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (Q-3A and Q-3B responses combined)

Among those who say the country is moving in the wrong direction, insecurity and unemployment are the primary reasons cited across all geographic regions. However, geographic analysis reveals considerable variation in the extent to which residents emphasize these reasons. For example, residents of the Central/Hazarajat region are most likely to cite insecurity (57.9%), unemployment (38.9%), and a bad economy (12.6%) (Fig. 1.8). Residents of the South East and West regions cite insecurity and unemployment less frequently, and responses in these regions are more evenly distributed across other issue areas, such as corruption, bad government, and suicide attacks. In particular, 13.7% of residents in the South East region (higher than any other region) cite the presence of the Taliban as a reason for why the country is moving in the wrong direction.

REASONS: WRONG DIRECTION BY REGION

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST	ALL REGIONS
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
INSECURITY	49	47	33	43	38	47	58	44	45
UNEMPLOYMENT	36	24	16	21	20	23	39	19	25
CORRUPTION	12	13	9	13	13	18	5	16	13
BAD ECONOMY	12	9	11	11	12	13	13	17	12
BAD GOVERNMENT	13	7	10	6	10	15	5	14	11
DON'T KNOW	10	4	5	14	9	8	10	6	8
SUICIDE ATTACKS	7	11	13	2	6	5	4	8	7
NO RECONSTRUCTION HAS HAPPENED	5	3	12	7	9	4	8	10	7
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	2	8	14	7	6	5	3	8	6

FIG 1.8: Q-3A/B. (Ask if answered “wrong direction” to Q-1) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (Q-3A and Q-3B responses combined)

1.2 AFGHANISTAN'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS: NATIONAL LEVEL

Key Question

Q-5A/B. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole?*

After assessing views on the overall direction of the country, the survey then asked an open-ended question about the biggest problems facing the country at the national level. This open-ended question resulted in 96 different problems cited, which were manually organized into the general categories of security, economy, governance, and public services. The prevalence of security concerns is again predominant:

- Security concerns: insecurity (42.7%), presence of Taliban (5.6%), suicide attacks (5.5%), drug smuggling (2.6%), presence of ISIL/ISIS (2.7%), presence of warlords (2.5%), and crime (2.1%).
- Economic concerns: unemployment (22.4%), poor economy (13.1%), poverty (5.9%), and high prices (3.6%).
- Governance concerns: corruption (24.3%), bad government (7.6%), injustice (4.1%), and tribal issues (2.4%).
- Public service concerns: education and literacy (5.8%) and scarcity of electricity (2.4%).

The most frequent responses constituting this “other” category include interference of Pakistan (5.5%) and interference by foreign countries (5.2%).³

Analysis of the individual responses to this question about national-level problems reveals the specific issues of concern within the Afghan population. The seven most frequently cited answers to this question in the 2015 survey are similar to the top responses in the 2014 survey (Fig. 1.9), and approaching the highest rate recorded during the past decade (up from 45.8% in 2007). All other responses presented in Fig. 1.9 show a decreasing trend over the past 10 years, with the exception of insecurity.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS: NATIONAL LEVEL




FIG. 1.9: Q-5A/B. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-5A and Q-5B responses combined)*

Analysis of intercept interviews with Afghans residing in highly insecure areas reveals that corruption is cited at a higher rate (35.8%) in insecure areas compared to more secure areas (24.3%). Women cite insecurity at a slightly lower rate (39.5%) than men (46.2%), and in previous surveys women report less exposure to corruption generally (see Chapter 5, Governance, for more information on Afghan views about corruption).

Analyzed by region, insecurity remains the most commonly cited problem nationwide, with the exception of the South West region where residents more frequently cite corruption (36.0%) (Fig. 1.10). Economic concerns – including unemployment, a poor economy, and poverty – are most prevalent in the Central/Kabul and Central/Hazarajat regions.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS: NATIONAL LEVEL BY REGION

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
INSECURITY	55	47	41	28	38	40	53	37
CORRUPTION	17	26	25	36	24	26	18	25
UNEMPLOYMENT	34	14	13	16	21	20	31	21
POOR ECONOMY	13	20	14	12	11	10	9	14
EDUCATION	4	6	6	10	5	4	4	8
TALIBAN	3	4	10	4	7	6	9	7
POVERTY	7	4	3	3	6	6	10	8

Fig. 1.10: Q-5A/B. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-5A and Q-5B responses combined)*

1.3 AFGHANISTAN'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS: LOCAL LEVEL

Key Question

Q-4A/B. *In your view what are the two biggest problems in your local area?*

When asked about local problems, Afghans again cited a wide range of specific concerns that were grouped into general categories. These categories include:

- **Public services:** electricity (20.5%), roads (17.8%), drinking water (16.8%), education/literacy (11.0%), healthcare (9.6%), and water for irrigation (2.9%).
- **Economy:** unemployment (31.2%), poor economy (6.7%), poverty (5.9%), high prices (5.5%), and reconstruction (2.4%).
- **Security:** insecurity (22.0%), crime (3.1), and Taliban (2.1%).
- **Governance:** corruption (3.7%) and weak government (1.4%).⁴

Public services emerged as the most commonly cited local problem and most respondents (56.3%) cite public services as one of their two responses.

The most frequently cited specific problem is unemployment (31.2%), at a rate similar to that of 2014 (33.1%) (Fig. 1.11). However, insecurity increased from 14.2% of responses in 2014 to 22.0% in 2015, the highest rate recorded since the survey began. After unemployment and insecurity, Afghans cite several specific deficiencies in public services, including electricity (20.5%), roads (17.8%), and drinking water (16.8%).




FIG. 1.11: Q-4A/B. *In your view what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Q-4A and Q-4B responses combined)*

1.4 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN

Key Question

Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? (single response)*

When asked what they believe is the biggest problem facing women, Afghan men and women provide a wide range of responses. One in five (20.4%) say education/illiteracy, and a further 11.3% say lack of job opportunities/unemployment (Fig. 1.12). The percentage of Afghans who cite a lack of women's rights has increased from 6.2% in 2014 to 8.7% in 2015, possibly revealing a rise in awareness of women's rights. Meanwhile, citations of a lack of education/illiteracy and a lack of job opportunities have declined since 2014.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN




FIG. 1.12: Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? (single response)*

In general, men and women point to the same kinds of challenges facing Afghan women. One exception is on the issue of domestic violence, where women (13.0%) are more likely than men (8.1%) to mention it as a problem. A few significant variations emerge when responses are analyzed at the regional level (Fig. 1.13). Education remains the most frequently cited problem by Afghans except in the South West and the West, where tribal customs, including forced marriages, access to inheritance rights, and practices of *baad* and *baddal* are more frequent concerns. *Baad* is the traditional practice of giving away a daughter to another party as penalty or payment for an offense, while *baddal* is the exchange of daughters between families for marriage, often for economic reasons. Across several years, responses from the Central/Hazarajat region, an area with historically low levels of access to education, reveal the highest level of concern about women's education/illiteracy (42.4% in 2015).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN BY REGION

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
EDUCATION / ILLITERACY	20	27	22	13	13	22	42	22
LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES	12	7	3	4	10	19	15	18
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	10	9	10	16	14	9	8	8
LACK OF RIGHTS / WOMEN'S RIGHTS	5	10	9	18	7	7	6	9
FORCED MARRIAGES / DOWRY	3	12	16	16	8	3	1	5

FIG. 1.13: Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? (single response)*

1.5 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH

Key Question

Q6A/B. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in Afghanistan? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

In 2015, the survey introduced a new question on the biggest problems facing Afghan youth. A majority of respondents (71.4%) say unemployment. Other top reasons include illiteracy (26.5%), a poor economy (15.9%), lack of higher education opportunities (15.3%), and drug addiction (14.2%). There are no significant variations in responses between residents of rural and urban areas, nor between residents of insecure areas and the rest of the Afghan population.

Unemployment and illiteracy are the most frequently cited problems across all regions. However, there are significant regional variations (Fig. 1.14). More than one in four residents of the South East region (26.2%) say drug addiction is a problem, the highest rate in the country, while Afghans in the Central/Kabul (23.5%) and North East (20.2%) regions are more likely to cite the need for opportunities in higher education. Residents of the East (36.9%) and South West (33.3%) regions are more likely to cite the much more basic challenge of illiteracy.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST	OVERALL
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
UNEMPLOYMENT	72	74	65	64	76	75	68	73	71
ILLITERACY	24	37	27	33	21	23	25	27	26
POOR ECONOMY	15	13	15	14	17	18	32	16	16
NO HIGHER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH	23	8	12	4	10	20	14	18	15
BECOMING DRUG ADDICTS	14	11	26	22	11	11	6	9	14
INSECURITY	11	16	10	11	12	6	5	8	10
LACK OF YOUTH'S RIGHTS	4	6	4	7	7	7	7	5	6
LACK OF SCHOOLS	7	2	9	3	4	3	10	5	5

FIG. 1.14: Q6A/B. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in Afghanistan? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. (Q-6A and Q-6B responses combined)*

1.6 SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS

Key Question

D-24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

This year reveals a surprising trend in the level of happiness reported by Afghans. Despite a major drop in national optimism, when Afghans were asked about their general level of happiness, no significant changes appear. Afghans report general happiness at roughly the same rate in 2015 as in 2014 (Fig. 1.15). In total, 74.9% of Afghans say that they are either very happy (28.6%) or somewhat happy (46.3%). Men (75.6%) and women (74.3%) report happiness at similar rates, while residents of urban areas are more likely to report they are happy (81.2%) compared to residents of rural areas (72.8%), even though urban respondents have higher rates of reported unemployment.

Broken down by province, Afghans are most likely to say they are somewhat or very happy if they live in Badakhshan (90.0%), Kunar (86.1%), and Samangan (85.5%). Afghans are most likely to say they are unhappy (i.e., not very happy or not at all happy) if they live in Faryab (45.6%), Zabul (45.3%), and Wardak (38.0%) provinces.




FIG. 1.15: D-24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

Multivariate analysis reveals several factors and conditions that may correspond with happiness. Overall, Afghans reporting higher household welfare,⁵ lower levels of fear in various situations,⁶ and a higher level of education are most likely to report higher levels of happiness. Other corresponding characteristics include optimism about the direction of the country, playing a sport, having a higher household income, and reporting a higher level of confidence in ANA and ANP. Factors most likely to predict decreased happiness include using a television for news and information and reporting an experience with corruption within the past year.⁷

End Notes

¹ Intercept interviews are a technique used to access volatile, insecure, and inaccessible districts. Afghans who live in these districts are “intercepted” while traveling in a bazaar or district that is secure. Because this group cannot be chosen using random household selection, it is distinguished from the main sample. Responses given during intercept interviews are a valuable point of comparison because they indicate whether security has an impact on responses, and in what direction. Intercept interviews were conducted in 25 provinces. Provinces with the highest use of intercepts were Helmand (23.3% of the sample), Badghis (22.5%), Logar (20.2%), Ghor (20.6%), and Uruzghan (19.3%).

² Probit regression was used to regress perceived direction of Afghanistan (q1) onto gender (d1), age (d2), urban/rural (m6b), income (d18), education (d10), perception that election was free and fair (q46), perception that the current government negotiation with Taliban is a good idea or a bad idea (q49), a confidence in ANP scale (alpha=0.8202), a confidence in ANA scale (=0.843), a perception scale for whether the ANSF need foreign support (alpha=0.8316), a perception of corruption as a problem scale (alpha=0.7697), a scale for fear when participating in different social and political activities (alpha=0.7713), a confidence in formal and informal authorities scale (alpha=0.8945), self-reported happiness (d24), and a household well-being scale (alpha=0.749). A 95% confidence level of was imposed for all coefficients in the model. The full model explained 11.45% of the variance in the perceived direction of the Afghanistan ($R^2=0.1145$, LR $\chi^2(15)=973.90$, $p < 0.0001$).

³ The bulleted text lists all reasons cited by more than 2 percent of total respondents.

⁴ The bulleted text lists all reasons cited by more than 2 percent of total respondents.

⁵ Household well-being is a scale (alpha= 0.749) that consists of question items q9a, q9b, q9c, q9d, q9e, q9f, q9g and q9h, and measures the changes compared to last year in terms of the the household financial situation, employment opportunities, the availability of products in the market, the quality of food in the household's diet, the physical condition of the house/ dwelling, the health of family members, perceived change in electricity supply, and perceived change in access to schools.

⁶ Fear is a scale (alpha=0.7713) using questions q33a, q33b, q33c, q33d, q33e and q33g, which measures the extent to which an Afghan says he or she experiences fear while voting, while participating in a peaceful demonstration, while running for a public office (as a hypothetical, for most), while encountering ANA and ANP while traveling to another part of the country, and when encountering international forces.

⁷ Using OLS regression, reported happiness (d24) was regressed on gender (d1), age (d2), income (a composite of d18a and d18b), education (d10), area of residence (i.e. urban / rural) (m6b), playing sport (d21), perception about direction of the country (q1), television viewership (d8a), the household well-being scale (alpha=0.749), the confidence in ANA scale (alpha=0.843), the confidence in ANP scale (alpha=0.8202), the experience of corruption scale (alpha=0.9023), and the fear scale (alpha=0.7713). The model was weighted by province and urban/rural strata, and excluded intercept interviews. The full model explained 12.9% of variance in how happy Afghans feel ($R^2=0.129$, $F(13,6400)=63.89$, $p<0.0001$).



2 SECURITY

As Western troops continue to withdraw from Afghanistan, the ability of the ANSF to retain power across the country has been put to the test. ISAF, the NATO-led security mission that had operated in Afghanistan since December 2001, officially completed its mission at the end of December 2014. However, under agreements with the United States and NATO, some international troops remain in the country as trainers and advisers to support the ANSF.¹ As of May 2015, a total of 13,199 NATO troops remained in Afghanistan, including 6,827 U.S. military personnel as part of Operation Resolute Support, the follow-on mission to ISAF.² In October 2015, the U.S. announced that its forces will remain in Afghanistan at their current levels throughout much of 2016. Many areas continue to face significant threats by Taliban fighters, such as in Helmand and Kunduz provinces. In the first half of 2015 before the survey took place, civilian casualties from war reached a record high, with more than 70% of the casualties attributed to actions by the Taliban and other anti-government groups, according to the United Nations. While ground engagements and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain the leading cause of casualties, an increasing proportion of conflict-related casualties were caused by complex³ or suicide attacks.⁴ Since UNAMA began recording civilian casualties in January, 2009, until June 30, 2015, more than 19,000 civilians have been killed, and more than 33,000 injured.⁵

In this year's survey, more than two-thirds (67.4%) of Afghans report that they always, often, or sometimes fear for their personal safety. This is the highest rate since 2006. At the same time, while a majority of Afghans express fear for personal safety, only 18.2% report that they or a member of their family suffered from violence or crime in the past year. However, this increased prevalence of fear in 2015 developed as AOGs have increased attacks across the country, including several high-casualty attacks in Kabul.

Recently, ISIL/ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) developed a presence in Afghanistan, and have been reported in Kunduz, Helmand, Faryab, and the provinces along the Afghan border with Pakistan. While the influence of ISIS in Afghanistan remains scattered, several Taliban leaders have pledged allegiance to the group. The survey reveals that ISIS has had a significant impact on Afghan perceptions of their safety. Nearly three out of four respondents say they have heard of ISIS, of whom 54.2% say the group currently poses, or could in the future pose, a threat to the security of their district. Some analysts worry that the recently announced death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar in April 2013, and the ensuing uncertainty surrounding political leadership within the Taliban, is leading some disaffected Taliban to join ISIS.⁶ Reports also suggest that ISIS is recruiting Mullah Omar's advisors and offering salaries to Afghan recruits.^{7 8}

Meanwhile, President Ashraf Ghani has made reconciliation with the Taliban a top priority. One of President Ghani's first official trips as president was to Pakistan. The Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was credited for bringing Taliban leaders to secret negotiations in China in May 2015.⁹ However, political support for President Ghani's reconciliation efforts have waned as Taliban attacks have increased.¹⁰ Observers are now looking toward the 2016 parliamentary elections, which are expected to test both the National Unity Government's political power and the ability of Afghanistan's security forces to ensure a safe and secure election.

This chapter explores Afghan perceptions about safety and security in their country, including confidence in the ANSF and views on AOGs, issues of violence and crime, and the government's peace and reconciliation efforts.

2.1 FEAR FOR SAFETY

Key Questions

Q-14. *Have you heard of the group called ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh?*

Q-15. *In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district?*

Q-19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

Q-33. *Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? a) Voting in a national/provincial election; b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; c) Running for public office; d) Encountering ANP; e) Encountering ANA; f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country; g) Encountering international forces (Western military forces only); h) Encountering the Taliban.*

More than two-thirds (67.4%) of Afghans report that they always, often, or sometimes fear for their personal safety. The percentage of Afghans who fear for their personal safety has risen significantly since the survey began in 2006, when 39.6% reported fear for personal safety (Fig. 2.1).




FIG. 2.1: Q-19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? (percentage of respondents who answered “always,” “often,” or “sometimes”)*

The percentage of residents who report some level of fear for personal safety is highest in the South West (84.6%) and South East (81.1%) regions, where clashes with AOGs have been most frequent. This prevalence of fear is similar to the rate of fear reported by residents of the country's most insecure areas (80.6%), who were surveyed through intercept interviews. Notably, there is significant variation in both the rate and direction of level of fear across regions and individual provinces. The percentage of residents in the South West region who reported some level of fear for personal safety increased by more than 11 percentage points when compared to 2014, while the percentage of residents of the West region who report some level of fear decreased by more than 10 percentage points (to 68.5%) during the same period.

The provinces most likely to report some level of fear for personal safety are Wardak (96.2%), Logar (90.6%), and Uruzghan (90.4%). For several years, these provinces have faced significantly higher levels of violence and armed insurgency than other areas. Provinces least likely to report some level of fear are Panjshir (7.2%), Bamyan (18.4%), and Badakhshan (21.7%). The Taliban maintain little to no presence in Panjshir and Bamyan relative to other provinces. Both provinces are populated by ethnic minority groups with little support for the Taliban. Bamyan consists primarily of Hazaras,¹¹ who were persecuted under the Taliban regime. Panjshir and Badakhshan are primarily populated by Tajiks and supportive of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of commanders opposed to the Taliban.

Among Afghanistan's major ethnic groups, Pashtuns continue to be most likely to report experiencing fear (77.3%), as violent attacks are more concentrated in predominantly Pashtun areas, particularly along the border with Pakistan. This represents a significant increase from 2013, when 66.5% of Pashtuns reported experiencing fear (either sometimes, often, or always). The corresponding level of fear in 2015 among other ethnic groups is 65.3% for Uzbeks, 59.8% for Tajiks, and 58.3% for Hazaras.

Other demographic factors, including gender, education, marital status, and income also influence the level of perceived safety. Women (71.8%) are more likely than men (62.4%) to report feeling some fear for their personal safety. Afghans are significantly more likely to cite fear for personal safety if they have more education, if they are married, and if their household income has declined relative to last year. As expected, Afghans who report lower confidence in the ability of the ANSF to keep their district safe are more likely to report some level of fear for personal safety. The same is true for respondents living in regions with more frequent accidents from mines or unexploded devices. Reported fear for personal safety also correlates strongly with the view that current negotiations with the Taliban are a bad idea, and increased perception that ISIS poses a threat in the respondent's district.¹²

The survey asks Afghans to estimate how much fear they would experience when engaging in eight specific situations or activities (Fig. 2.2). This year, the situations that provoke both the lowest and highest rates of fear involve encountering different groups of armed forces. Afghans report experiencing the highest rates of fear when they encounter the Taliban (92.0%), followed by Western forces (79.5%). They report experiencing the lowest rates of fear when encountering the ANP (45.3%) or the ANA (42.2%).

The greatest regional variation in fear for personal safety appears in the context of voting in a national or provincial election. Overall, 55.6% of Afghans say they would experience fear while heading to the polls, a rate close to the 10-year high of 59.5% in 2010 (the 10-year low was 43.9% in 2006). Regionally, fear when voting is highest in the South West, West, and South East regions, where more than two-thirds of Afghans say they would be afraid to vote. In the country's most insecure areas, represented by intercept interviews, the level of fear experienced when voting is significantly higher (70.0%) than the national average (55.6%).

LEVEL OF FEAR BY ACTIVITY

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH	NATIONAL AVERAGE
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
VOTING IN A NATIONAL / PROVINCIAL ELECTION	46	61	68	69	69	42	32	57	56
PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	55	75	76	81	77	67	55	74	69
RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	64	77	79	78	76	77	52	76	73
ENCOUNTERING ANP	32	54	51	66	58	39	27	41	45
ENCOUNTERING ANA	28	51	46	64	54	35	30	41	42
TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	78	73	86	80	83	79	72	80	80
ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY FORCES ONLY)	74	84	86	86	80	77	60	83	79
ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	90	91	94	88	91	94	94	96	92

FIG. 2.2: Q-33. Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (percentage who say "some fear" or "a lot of fear")

The 2015 survey includes new questions about ISIS. Nearly three in four Afghans report that they have heard of ISIS (74.3%). Men and women report knowledge of ISIS at similar rates (75.3% of men, 73.5% of women), but regional variations reflect different levels of exposure and proximity to ISIS activity.¹³ The percent of respondents who say they have heard of ISIS is highest in the Central/Kabul (84.3%) and South East (79.8%) regions and lowest in the Central/Hazarajat (54.7%) region, which is one of the country's most remote (Fig. 2.3).

Approximately half (54.2%) of Afghans who report knowledge of ISIS also say the group poses a threat to the security of their district. However, Afghans' perceived threat of ISIS to their district varies widely. Respondents in Parwan (3.3%) and Panjshir (13.6%) province are least likely to say they view ISIS as a threat. People are most likely to say they see ISIS as a threat in Farah (77.6%) and Helmand (77.4%) provinces.




FIG. 2.3: Q-14. *Have you heard of the group called ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh?* **Q-15.** *(If responded "Yes" to Q-14) In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district? (percentage of respondents who say "yes" for each question)*

2.2 CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Key Questions

Q-20. *How often, if at all, are there accidents caused by mines and unexploded devices in your community?*

Q-21. *Has anyone in your household been physically injured as a result of violence, such as by a bullet, rocket, or unexploded ordinance?*

Q-22. *Do you think the care provided by the government or by NGOs to people in your community who are disabled or seriously injured as a result of conflict, violence, mines or unexploded objects is very adequate, somewhat adequate, somewhat inadequate, or very inadequate?*

Q-23. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year?*

Q-24. *What kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

Q-25. *Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?*

Q-26. *Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?*

While a majority of Afghans cite experiences of fear for personal safety on some level, only 18.2% report that they or a member of their family suffered from violence or crime in the past year. This percentage represents a slight increase from 2014, when 15.6% of Afghans reported experiencing violence or crime. Not surprisingly, Afghans who report having experienced violence or crime are more likely to say they fear for their personal safety (80.3%) than those who reported no experience of violence or crime (64.6%). This pattern was observed among the provinces as well. The three provinces with the lowest rates of fear for personal safety (Panjshir, Bamyan, and Badakhshan) are also among the provinces with the lowest reported experience of violence or crime.

In many countries, violence and crime tend to be higher in urban environments. However, in Afghanistan, the reverse appears true. As in previous years, respondents in 2015 are more likely to report experiencing violence or crime if they live in a rural area (20.9%) than if they live in an urban area (9.7%). Crime may trend along regional and transportation lines as well, such as in areas where drug trafficking takes place, or along roads (the percentage of Afghans who report experiencing fear when traveling from one part of the country to another is 79.5%). Residents of provinces that border Pakistan (23.7%) or Iran (19.7%) are slightly more likely to report experiencing violence or crime than residents of provinces that do not border either country (15.7%) (Fig. 2.4). However, this pattern is not clear-cut. For example, the province with the highest percentage of residents reporting experience of violence or crime is Wardak (51.4%), which does not have an international border. Second highest is Helmand province (50.4%), which borders Pakistan, remains a major area for poppy production, and where public confidence in the ANP's ability to provide security remains low. Due to the concentration of different ethnic groups in specific regions with higher or lower levels of crime and violence, Pashtun respondents are most likely to be victims of violence or crime (25.4%), followed by Tajiks (14.3%), Uzbeks (12.7%), and Hazaras (11.3%).



FIG. 2.4: Q-23. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year? (percentage of respondents who say “yes”)*

Among those Afghans who say that they or a member of their family experienced violence or crime, the most frequently mentioned types of violence are physical attacks (30.9%), livestock theft (19.4%), suicide attacks (19.3%), racketeering or extortion (17.6%), and murder (17.0%). Compared to Afghans who live in more secure areas, residents of insecure areas are more likely to report experiences of murder (22.2%) or attacks by militants/insurgents (15.6%).

Nearly two-thirds (62.0%) of Afghans who say they experienced violence or crime say they reported the incident to an authority or justice dispute mechanism outside of their family. Reporting rates are similar across regions (between 56.8% and 65.4%), with the exception of the Central/Hazarajat region, where only 30.0% of respondents experiencing violence or crime say they reported the incident outside of their family. The institutions to which Afghans most frequently reported incidents are the ANP (44.7%), *shuras* or elders (37.2%), a tribal leader/*malik* (20.1%), district governor’s office (19.5%), the ANA (18.0%), and tribal leaders (*mullah*) (12.7%) (Fig. 2.5). The percentage of Afghans reporting incidents to *shuras* or elders has increased over time, from 16.0% to 37.2% in 2015, but the ANP remains the preferred institution for reporting crime.

INSTITUTIONS: REPORTING CRIME




FIG. 2.5: Q-26. *Who did you report the crime to? (percentage who reported the crime to each institution or authority)*

This year, the survey asked a new question about Afghans' experience with conflict-related injuries from bullets, rockets, or unexploded ordinances (with no time period specified for when these injuries were sustained). Overall, 24.3% of Afghans say that they or someone in their household has suffered conflict-related injuries. As expected, rates of conflict-related injuries are highest in provinces that have experienced the most intense conflict. Residents of Helmand (77.6%), Zabul (63.9%), and Logar (63.2%) are most likely to have suffered conflict-related injuries, compared to a very low level of reported injuries in Badakhshan (0.6%), Panjshir (1.0%), and Bamyan (2.9%). Also as expected, exposure to injury affects perceptions of security. Afghans who report conflict-related injuries within their household tend to report higher fear for personal safety than those who report no such injuries.¹⁴

The survey also asked Afghans how often, if at all, their community as a whole experiences incidents of mines or unexploded devices. Roughly one-third (33.8%) of Afghans say that landmines or unexploded devices have caused accidents in their community at least several times a year. The highest frequencies of mine- or unexploded device-related incidents are in the South West and East regions, where recorded IEDs have been most concentrated¹⁵ (Fig. 2.6).

FREQUENCY OF LANDMINE ACCIDENTS




FIG. 2.6: Q-20. How often, if at all, are there accidents caused by mines and unexploded devices in your community? Do they happen once a month or more often, several times a year, once a year or less, or do they never happen in your community?

Meanwhile, fewer than one in three Afghans (30.6%) say that the government and NGOs provide adequate support (whether somewhat or very) for individuals who are seriously injured by mines or unexploded objects. Regional variations are significant, however. Only 17.1% of Kabul residents and 17.4% of Herat residents say mine victims receive sufficient support, compared to 59.1% of residents in Logar and 59.0% of residents in Samangan.

2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Key Questions

Q-13. There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar? a) Foreign army; b) National army; c) Local police; d) National police; e) Armed opposition groups.

Q-16. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. c) The ANA protects civilians.

Q-17. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP soldiers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. c) The ANP protects civilians.*

Q-18. *Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to job properly at the moment? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? a) Afghan National Army, b) Afghan National Police, c) Afghan Local Police*

In order to help respondents identify various armed security forces by their uniforms, survey interviewers showed respondents a picture of each fighting force, including figures of a foreign soldier, an ANA officer, a member of the village-based self-defense force known as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), an ANP officer, and an anti-government fighter (Fig. 2.7). Respondents were then asked to point to the figure most responsible for providing security in their area. Overall, 47.5% of respondents point to the ANP, while one-fourth (26.2%) credit the ANA, and 20.7% credit the ALP. In the East and South West regions, Afghans are more likely to credit the ANA for maintaining security in their area (43.2% and 38.1%, respectively), while in all other regions, the majority of respondents credit the ANP. Residents of the country's most insecure areas, polled using intercept interviews, are most likely to credit the ANA (39.0%).

SECURITY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN



FIG. 2.7: Q-13. *There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar? [Images used by enumerators to help respondents identify different security forces: 1) Foreign armies; 2) Afghan National Army; 3) Afghan Local Police; 4) Afghan National Police; 5) Armed opposition groups.*

Provision of security is highly dependent on the provincial-level context, and significant provincial variations emerge (Fig. 2.8). For example, nationwide, only 2.2% of Afghans say AOGs provide security in their village, while in Zabul province, 59.5% of residents say AOGs provide their security. Among Zabul residents from highly insecure areas, this figure rises to 70.8%. Meanwhile, residents of Wardak province are most likely to say foreign forces provide local security (25.2%), compared to the national average of 1.7%.




FIG. 2.8: Q-13. *There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar? (percentage of respondents who identify each group)*

Each year, the survey asks Afghans about their perceptions of the ANA and ANP along several dimensions: whether they are honest and fair, improve security, and protect civilians. In the 2014 survey, perceptions of each institution as honest and fair, and as providing security, increased significantly over 2013. In 2015, responses reveal a slight decrease in perceptions of both the ANA and ANP as honest and fair (60.5% and 44.1%, respectively) (Figs. 2.9 and 2.10).




FIG 2.9: Q-16A/B. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people, b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan (percentage of respondents who "strongly agree")*




FIG. 2.10: Q-17. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (percentage of respondents who say "strongly agree")*

Across all years and across different types of perception questions, the ANA has tended to receive higher ratings than the ANP. Using a composite measure of overall confidence in ANA and ANP, this year's survey responses again show a higher overall confidence in the ANA (80.8%) than in the ANP (70.0%).¹⁶ This difference may be related to several factors, including exposure to corruption and perceptions of the roles of each force. Consistently across years, Afghans are more likely to report paying a bribe to an ANP officer than an ANA officer, and inferential analysis suggests that exposure to corruption may decrease public confidence in state institutions. Another factor may be the perception of who the ANA and ANP serve. The ANA is often perceived as serving national interests, whereas the ANP focus on local affairs and local justice dispute resolution.

Overall perceptions of the ANA and ANP have improved over the period of time the *Survey of the Afghan People* has been conducted. This year, however, confidence in the ANA dropped less than a percentage point from 81.6% in 2014, while confidence in the ANP dropped three percentage points, from 73.2% in 2014. Parwan (98.7%), Kabul (94.8%), and Baghlan (94.2%) provinces have the highest level of confidence in the ANA, while Ghor (30.2%), Wardak (31.8%), and Zabul (35.7%) provinces have the lowest levels of the same. Confidence in the ANP is highest in Panjshir (98.1%), Baghlan (87.9%), and Bamyán (86.2%) provinces, and lowest in Wardak (28.6%), Ghor (33.7%), and Zabul (35.7%) provinces (Fig. 2.11).

PROVINCES WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST CONFIDENCE IN ANA AND ANP

HIGHEST CONFIDENCE IN		LOWEST CONFIDENCE IN	
ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP
PARWAN	PANJSHIR	GHOR	WARDAK
KABUL	BAGHLAN	WARDAK	GHOR
BAGHLAN	BAMYAN	ZABUL	ZABUL
GHAZNI	TAKHAR	PAKTIKA	PAKTIKA
NANGARHAR	KABUL	DAIKUNDI	LOGAR

FIG. 2.11: Q-16. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. c) The ANA protects civilians. Q-17. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. c) The ANP protects civilians.*

Since 2007, the perception that the ANSF need foreign support to operate has increased. Specifically, 82.8% of Afghans say they believe the ANA needs foreign support (up from 77.6% in 2014), 80.1% say ANP needs foreign support (up from 73.5% in 2014), and 70.4% say the ALP needs foreign support (marginally up from 66.8% in 2014). Between the ALP, the ANA, and the ANP, 89.7% of respondents agree that at least one of these ANSF branches needs foreign support to operate, while over half (61.7%) of the respondents say that all three forces need foreign support. Overall, the perception that all the three forces (i.e. ANA, ANP, ALP) need foreign support is highest in the East and the Central/Hazarajat regions (71.7% and 67.2%, respectively) and lowest in the South East region (55.5%).

2.4 PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

Key Questions

Q-47. *Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?*

Q-48. *Do you think that a peace agreement between the government and armed opposition groups will help stabilize the country, or not?*

Q-49. *Do you think the current government negotiation with Taliban is a good idea, a bad idea, or do you not have an opinion?*

Q-50. *In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government?*

Q-51. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups?*

When asked whether the Afghan government's efforts to reconcile with AOGs will help stabilize the country, 62.6% of Afghans say yes. This represents a significant decrease in optimism compared to 2014, when 72.5% of Afghans said that reconciliation efforts can help stabilize the country. However, the percentage of Afghans who are optimistic about reconciliation has varied over the past four years, and across regions (Fig. 2.12).

CONFIDENCE IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS: BY REGION

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
CENTRAL / KABUL	73	69	69	52	69	57
EAST	73	80	82	77	84	74
SOUTH EAST	76	75	72	67	73	71
SOUTH WEST	71	74	76	78	76	72
WEST	73	68	64	51	73	61
NORTH EAST	70	76	76	68	74	62
CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	84	68	56	53	56	46
NORTH WEST	76	75	72	66	69	58
ALL REGIONS	73	73	72	63	73	63

FIG. 2.12: Q-47. *Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not? (percentage of respondents who say "yes")*

The East, South East, and South West generally appear more optimistic about the possibility of reconciliation than other regions. These regions are also historically associated with the Taliban's early power centers, and the Taliban continue to exert more influence in these regions compared to others. In particular, residents of Zabul (87.7%), Logar (87.7%), Laghman (82.0%), and Khost (81.3%) are most likely to report confidence in the government's reconciliation efforts (Fig. 2.13). Residents of Panjshir (32.5%), Samangan (40.3%), and Daikundi (44.1%) are least likely to report confidence, and are historically associated with resistance to the Taliban.

CONFIDENCE IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS: BY PROVINCE




FIG. 2.13: Q-47. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not? (percentage of respondents who say “yes”)

Several variations of the same question about reconciliation were introduced this year to cross-validate the results. Respondents were asked specifically if a peace agreement with AOGs will help to stabilize the country, and then they were asked whether or not they think the Afghan government’s efforts to negotiate with the Taliban are a good idea or not. Responses to the question about a peace agreement were virtually identical to the original question about reconciliation efforts, and demonstrated the same regional and demographic patterns. In response to the second new question about negotiations with the Taliban, 52.4% of Afghans say negotiations are a good idea, 24.1% say they are a bad idea, and 20.9% say they have no opinion. This question specifies the Taliban in particular, rather than AOGs in general, which may include unaffiliated commanders and a variety of other militant groups who are adversarial toward the Afghan government, with a wide range of political and social agendas. Notably fewer Afghans report confidence in negotiations with the Taliban than in reconciliation efforts with AOGs more generally. This discrepancy is most pronounced in the West, North East, and North West regions.

Since 2009, the survey has asked respondents whether or not they have sympathy for AOGs, after asking them to consider the reasons that AOGs are fighting with the government. The percentage of Afghans who say they have a little or a lot of sympathy for AOGs has decreased steadily over the years, from 55.7% in 2009 to 27.5% in 2015 (Fig. 2.14).




FIG. 2.14: Q-51. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups? (percentage of respondents who say they have “a lot” or “a little” sympathy)*

Afghans in the East (43.0%) and South West (55.0%) regions report the highest and the Central/Kabul region (17.3%) report the lowest concentration of sympathy for AOGs (Fig. 2.15), and sympathy is higher among people from insecure areas reached through intercept interviews, compared to the national random sample (46.4% compared to 27.5%). In this year’s survey, as in all previous years, Afghans living in rural areas were significantly more likely (30.4%) to express support for AOGs compared to residents of urban areas (18.6%). The Taliban, as well as other AOGs, tend to maintain their power bases in rural areas where government power is more decentralized compared to within major cities.

Further analysis of responses to this question reveals several other characteristics that correspond with increased sympathy for AOGs. For example, respondents who do not use a television for information, and who have lower levels of education, are more likely to report sympathy with AOGs compared to their counterparts. Higher sympathy for AOGs also appears to correspond with higher confidence that a guilty party in a criminal incident will be punished.¹⁷

SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS: BY PROVINCE




FIG. 2.15: Q-51. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups? (percentage of respondents who say they have “a little” or “a lot” of sympathy)*

Afghans cite a wide range of reasons to explain why AOGs are fighting the Afghan government (Fig. 2.16). Responses this year mark a shift from previous years. Until 2015, the most frequently cited reason was the presence of foreign troops. This year, the most frequent reason (18.9% of respondents) is that AOGs want to gain power, and the second most common reason is the ongoing presence of foreign forces (14.8%). Additional reasons cited include support from Pakistan (9.2%), corruption in the government (6.9%), and unemployment (6.0%).




FIG. 2.16: Q-50. *In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (percentage of respondents citing each reason)*

End Notes

¹ Raghavan, S. and K. DeYoung. “U.S. and Afghanistan sign long-delayed security pact.” *Washington Post*, 30 September 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-afghanistan-sign-security-pact-to-allow-american-forces-to-remain-in-country/2014/09/30/48f555ce-4879-11e4-a046-120a8a855cca_story.html

² “Troop Numbers and Contributions.” NATO, 31 May 2015. <http://www.rs.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php>

³ See UNAMA’s *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Midyear Report 2015*. For information about ANSF casualties see Michaels, J. “Afghan security forces suffer record casualties.” *USA Today*, 3 May 2015. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/05/03/afghan-security-forces-suffer-record-casualties/26828193/> Note: The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) notes that available data on ANSF troop strength is unreliable, and actual troop numbers may be several thousands below 350,000. See: Sopko, J. “Why ANSF Numbers Matter: Inaccurate and Unreliable Data, and Limited Oversight of On- Budget Assistance Put Millions of U.S. Taxpayer Dollars at Risk,” testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 29 April 2015. <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-15-56-TY.pdf>

⁴ Complex attacks refer to coordinated armed assaults, such as the combination of suicide attacks, assault weapons, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

⁵ “Midyear Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, August 2015, pp. 1-8. http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/PoC%20Report%202015/UNAMA%20Protection%20of%20Civilians%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%20Midyear%20Report%202015_FINAL_%205%20August-new.pdf

⁶ Rasmussen, S.E. “ISIS stands to gain from a Taliban crisis.” *The Guardian*, 10 August 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/10/isis-stands-to-gain-from-taliban-crisis>

⁷ Associated Press. “ISIS actively recruiting in Afghanistan.” *The Guardian*. 23 May, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/23/isis-actively-recruiting-afghanistan-us-general>.

⁸ PressTV (Farsi). “The UN report suggests recruiting Islamic State in Afghanistan.” 4 Mehr 1391 (Persian calendar). <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/Fa/2015/09/26/430786/Afghanistan-Daesh-UN-Takfris-Taliban>.

⁹ Stancati, M. “Afghan Peace Envoy Met Taliban in Secret China Talks.” *Wall Street Journal*, 24 May 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-peace-envoy-met-taliban-in-secret-china-talks-1432486585>

¹⁰ Felbab-Brown, V. “Blood and Hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 Update.” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, May 26, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown#ftnref32>

¹¹ Hazaras represent 80.9% of the sample drawn from Bamyan across all waves of the survey (2006-2015; n=1,805).

¹² Using OLS regression, fear for personal safety (q19) was regressed on a variety of demographic and attitudinal measures including gender (d1), age (d2), income (d18), education (d10), general happiness (d24), marital status (d13), perceived direction of Afghanistan (q1), perceived condition of household compared to last year scale (alpha=0.749), thinking ISIS pose a security threat (q15), confidence in ANA scale (alpha=0.843), confidence in ANP scale (alpha=0.8202), perception that Afghan National Security Forces need foreign support (alpha=0.8316), frequency of occurrence of accidents caused by mines and unexploded devices (q20), perception about the government’s negotiation with Taliban (q49), and sympathy with armed opposition groups (q51). The model was weighted using sampling weight by urban/rural and excluding intercepts. A 95% confidence level was imposed for all coefficients. The full model explained 18.21% of the variance in fear for personal safety (R²=.1821, F(15,4294)=59.91, p<.0001).

¹³ r=0.1954, p<0.0001

¹⁴ r=0.2211, p<0.0001

¹⁵ See for example: “Wikileaks Afghanistan files: every IED attack, with co-ordinates.” *The Guardian*, 26 July 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2010/jul/26/wikileaks-afghanistan-ied-attacks>

¹⁶ Percentage of respondents who “agree” or “strongly agree” with all three statements in Q-16 (ANA), and for three statements in Q-17 (ANP).

¹⁷ OLS regression was used to regress sympathy toward armed opposition groups (q51) on demographic indicators such as gender (d1), age (d2), income (d18), education (d10), and geographical area (m6b), and attitudinal indicators such as source of obtaining information radio and TV (q6a, q6b), household situation compared to last year’s scale (=0.749), considering ISIS to be a security threat (q15), confidence in ANA scale (=0.843), confidence in ANP scale (=0.8202), fear of participating in various socio-political activities scale (=), fear for personal safety (q19), frequency of accidents caused by mines and unexploded devices (q20), confidence in seeing guilty party punished (q27), corruption being a problem scale (=0.7697), having confidence in formal and informal authorities scale (=0.8945), perception of having religious leaders and politics mixing (q31), and perception of influence on local government’s decisions. Full model explains 17.32% of variance in sympathy toward armed opposition group (R²=0.1732, LR chi2 F(19,4698)=51.81, p < 0.0001).



3 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

While Afghanistan has seen improvements in private sector infrastructure since 2003, including increased access to electricity and the construction or repair of many roads, the country's economy remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance.¹ A largely agriculture-based economy, Afghanistan is vulnerable to economic shocks caused by crop disease and drought. Exports are weak, and the country lacks robust mining and manufacturing sectors. One of its largest revenue streams is an illicit industry. The value of Afghanistan's drug economy, based primarily on the production of poppy, exceeds \$2.6 billion, or 12.6% of the country's GDP.²

The World Bank estimates that Gross Domestic Product growth slowed to 1.4% in 2015, down from a high of 14% in 2012. In contrast to previous years, when international aid soared, Afghanistan now faces major reductions in both. These reductions present challenges both to the government's ability to meet its current budget commitments for core government operations as well as its revenue collection mechanisms through value-chains connected to foreign aid.

This year marks several regional economic shocks. In the Central/Kabul region, the number of high-wage jobs with foreign development and security companies has declined, while in the North East, large contracts to supply oil to NATO ended in 2014. Housing prices in urban centers, particularly in Kabul city, have dropped significantly since 2014 amid uncertainty and a weakening economy. Some provinces, such as Wardak, experienced strong farming harvests. Others, such as Helmand, were affected by a crop disease affecting poppy plants. Annual poppy production decreased 19% nationwide, according to the 2015 United Nations Opium Survey.

Ordinary Afghans feel the pressure of a weakening economy acutely. This year, 29.7% of respondents say that their household financial situation has grown worse over the past year, the highest percentage since the survey began. While substantial economic gains in average income have been made, more than a third of the Afghan population is estimated to live below the national poverty line of \$1 per day, and a similar proportion are food insecure.³ Amid conditions of rising insecurity, decreasing foreign aid, and a new unity government, Afghans express high rates of concern about economic conditions and employment. This chapter describes Afghan views on the economy in detail and also provides a portrait of asset ownership across the country.

3.1 OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMY

Key Questions

Q-4. *In your view what are the biggest problems in your local area?*

Q-5. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole?*

As reported in Chapter 1 (National Mood), this year the majority (57.5%) of Afghans say they believe their country is moving in the wrong direction. When asked about the reasons for their pessimism, the second most common response (after insecurity) is unemployment (25.4%). Other economic reasons for pessimism include a bad economy (12.4%) and high prices (3.4%). The survey has found that

economic issues are cross-cutting. Afghans often cite economic concerns when asked about a range of topics, including the problems in their local area, problems facing youth and women, problems facing Afghanistan as a whole, and even perceived causes of crime (Fig. 3.1).

ECONOMIC CONCERNS BY PROBLEM AREA

PROBLEMS IN YOUR LOCAL AREA	UNEMPLOYMENT (31.2%), POOR ECONOMY (6.7%), POVERTY, (5.9%), HIGH PRICES (5.5%)
PROBLEMS FACING AFGHANISTAN	UNEMPLOYMENT (22.4%), POOR ECONOMY (13.1%), POVERTY (5.9%)
PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH	UNEMPLOYMENT (71.4%), POOR ECONOMY (15.9%)
PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN	LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES (22.3%), POVERTY (8.7%)
BIGGEST CAUSE OF CRIME	UNEMPLOYMENT (21.7%), POVERTY / WEAK ECONOMY (8.4%)

FIG. 3.1: Q-5A/B. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole? Q-4A/B.* *In your view what are the biggest problems in your local area? Q-6A/B.* *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in Afghanistan? Q-7A/B.* *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? (A and B responses combined for each question); Q-28.* *In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (percentage of Afghans who cite economic challenges, by question)*

Among Afghans who say that the nation is moving in the right direction, 43.1% cite positive reasons related to the economy, particularly reconstruction and rebuilding (31.8%) and economic revival (7.9%). Construction of roads and public infrastructure has been driven by foreign aid. In urban areas, the housing market has grown rapidly from a rise in Afghan private sector investment. When asked about their reasons for optimism about the direction of the country, notably few Afghans cite reasons of more job opportunities (2.4%), low prices (0.9%), or more factories (0.2%).

3.2 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

Key Question

Q-9. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of products in the market.*

Between 2007-2012, and again in 2015, the survey asked Afghans whether they have experienced an improving, worsening, or static situation in various aspects of their household well-being. This year, when asked about employment opportunities, more than half of respondents (55.4%) say that employment opportunities for their household have worsened in the past year, while 36.5 say they are the same, and only 7.6% say they are better (Fig. 3.2). Respondents in Panjshir (78.5%), Balkh (74.8%), and Kabul (73.6%) provinces are most likely to report worsening job opportunities, while respondents most likely to report better job opportunities are from Laghman (26.2%) and Zabul (22.9%).⁴ Zabul and Laghman have agriculture-based economies and experienced strong harvests in 2015. Overall, residents of urban areas (67.5%) are more likely to say their job prospects have worsened compared to residents of rural areas (51.5%).

Perceptions of change in respondents' household financial situation since last year also suggest a deterioration. Only 21.0% of Afghans say their household financial situation has improved in 2015, compared to 49.8% who said the same in 2012. Meanwhile, the percentage of Afghans who say their household financial situation worsened over the past year is 29.7% in 2015, compared to 6.9% in 2012. The hardest hit areas appear to include the provinces along foreign military transportation lines, notably near Bagram Air Base, where dramatic reductions in spending have impacted various supply chains. More than half (58.8%) of Parwan residents say their financial situation has gotten worse, as do 55.3% of residents of Kabul. Similar to the trend in perceptions of job opportunities, residents of urban areas are nearly twice as likely (44.7%) to say their financial situation has worsened when compared to residents of rural areas (24.7%).

ECONOMIC INDICATORS: BETTER HOUSEHOLD SITUATION




FIG. 3.2: Q-9A/C. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of products in the market. (percentage who say each is "better" compared to one year ago)

Changes in economic conditions may interact with other changes in Afghan society, such as household size. Average household size in the survey, based on nine years of repeated national samples (2007-2014), is 9.4 people. Average household size in 2015 is higher, at 9.8 people. A larger household size is significantly correlated with a larger average household income and a better household financial situation, suggesting that some households may be responding to changes in the economy by pooling their resources.

Perceived access to products in the market also shows a decrease in 2015 compared to previous years, possibly reflecting decreases in purchasing power and increases in insecurity that may affect trade. Over one-third of Afghans (38.0%) say the availability of goods in their local market has declined since last year, while 50.3% say availability is about the same, and 10.9% say availability of goods has improved.

Residents of the Central/Kabul (45.8%) and South East (40.8%) regions are most likely to say that the availability of goods has decreased, while residents of the North East (29.2%), Central/Hazarajat (33.1%), and West (33.1%) regions are least likely to say the availability of goods has decreased.

3.3 EMPLOYMENT

Key Questions

D-3. *Are you now working, as a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or without a job and looking for work?*

D-4. *(Ask if answered "Housewife," "Unemployed," or "Student" in D-3) Are you currently looking for paid work outside the home?*

D-5. *(Ask if answered "Working" in D-3) What is your main occupation or work?*

Each year, the survey asks Afghans about their employment status, including whether they are currently jobless and looking for work. This question does not produce an official employment or unemployment rate, but it does reveal meaningful trends over time. In 2015 nearly three-fourths (72.8%) of Afghan men report that they are working, lower than last year's reported rate of 80.0%, while 87.0% of Afghan women say that they are housewives, and 5.5% say they are working (Fig. 3.3). A total of 10.7% of men and 4.4% of women, all age 18 or older, say that they are students.

SELF-REPORTED EMPLOYMENT

	WOMEN	MEN
	(%)	(%)
WORKING	5	73
HOUSEWIFE	87	-
RETIRED	<0.5	2
STUDENT	4	11
JOBLESS	3	14

FIG. 3.3: D-3. *Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or without a job and looking for work? (percentage who identify with each category)*

One notable change is a decrease in the percentage of women who say that they are jobless and looking for work. Whereas 11.0% of women in 2014 said they were without work, and seeking it, this number dropped to 3.1% in 2015 (Fig. 3.4). This decrease does not reflect any change in the wording or coding of the survey question. The reduction appears to be concentrated in the North West (-20.0%), North East (-18.1%), and East (-11.9%) regions, while women living in the Central/Hazarajat region are more likely this year than last year to say that they are unemployed (+6.1%). Some of these changes may be related to rising concerns over security (i.e., women may be less likely to actively seek work due to a deteriorating security situation in their local area).




Fig. 3.4: D-3. *Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or without a job and looking for work? (percentage who say they are without a job and looking for work)*

Because some Afghan women may self-identify as housewives but simultaneously be also seeking work outside the home, the survey asks students, retirees, and housewives a follow-up question about whether they are currently seeking work outside of the home. Among women who self-identify as housewives, 8.0% report that they are also seeking work outside the home.

Self-reported unemployment among men is highest around the Central/Kabul region (Fig. 3.5). This may be related to migratory patterns, where men leave rural areas to seek work in cities. Male unemployment is most severe in Wardak, Zabul, Kabul, and Logar provinces, all of which report male unemployment figures of above 20%. On average, these provinces also tend to report higher levels of insecurity relative to other provinces in 2015.

SELF-REPORTED UNEMPLOYMENT: MEN




Fig. 3.5: D-3. *Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or without a job and looking for work? (percentage of men who say they are without a job and looking for work)*

Female joblessness appears less concentrated than male joblessness, with Badghis standing out as the province with the highest level of reported female unemployment (13.7%) (Fig. 3.6). However, the subsample of women who say they are unemployed in each province is too small to draw inferences.⁵ Nationwide, a decrease in female unemployment may show a decrease in the number of women interested or willing to work outside the home.

SELF-REPORTED UNEMPLOYMENT: WOMEN




FIG. 3.6: D-3. Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or without a job and looking for work? (percentage of women who say they are without a job and looking for work)

Employment status appears to be closely linked with respondents' level of education. Afghans who say that they have at least some formal schooling are significantly more likely to report having a job than those who say they do not have any schooling. Among Afghans who report no formal education, just 29.1% say they are employed, while among those with at least some level of schooling, 47.8% say they are employed. For Afghan women, the relationship between education and employment is even stronger. Women with at least some level of schooling are significantly more likely to work outside the home (13.2%, compared to 2.6% of those who never went to school), or to seek work outside the home.

Among Afghans who are working, most men say that they are farmers (36.4%), informal salesmen or businessmen (13.3%), skilled workers (9.1%), or farm laborers (8.5%). Working Afghan women are most often teachers (44.1%), skilled workers or artisans (such as in the handicraft or carpet-weaving industries) (18.9%), domestic or unskilled workers (8.9%), or working in informal sales or business (7.3%) (Fig. 3.7).

OCCUPATION BY GENDER

	MEN	WOMEN
	(%)	(%)
FARMER (OWN LAND / TENANT FARMER)	36	7
INFORMAL SALES / BUSINESS	13	7
SKILLED WORKER / ARTISAN	9	19
FARM LABORER (OTHER'S LAND)	8	<0.5
LABORER, DOMESTIC, OR UNSKILLED WORKER	8	9
SMALL BUSINESS OWNER	6	2
SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL	6	4
SCHOOL TEACHER	4	44
GOVERNMENT OFFICE - CLERICAL WORKER	4	5
MILITARY / POLICE	2	0
PRIVATE OFFICE - CLERICAL WORKER	1	1
PRIVATE OFFICE - EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	1	<0.5
GOVERNMENT OFFICE – EXECUTIVE / MANAGER	1	1
MULLAH	<0.5	0
UNIVERSITY TEACHER	<0.5	1

FIG. 3.7: D-5. (Ask if answered “Working” in D-3) What is your main occupation or work? (percentage who cite each occupation)

3.4 WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY

Key Questions

D-19. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?

Q-66. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?

The percentage of Afghans who say that women contribute to their household’s income has increased over time. This year, 22.6% of Afghans say women contribute to their household’s income, up from 13.6% in 2009 when the question was first asked. Some evidence suggests that the share of household income contributed by women has increased over time as well.⁶ The percentage of Afghans with female income earners in their household ranges widely across provinces, from 4.8% in Panjshir and Zabul, to 56.7% in Nooristan and 64.7% in Daikundi. Women’s contribution to household income is most common in the Central/Hazarajat region (49.3%) and lowest in the South West (15.6%) and North East (16.9%) regions (Fig. 3.8). The number of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region who say that women contribute to household income has nearly doubled since 2014, significantly more than all other regions. Compared to other regions, average household income in Central/Hazarajat is lowest, while support for women working outside the home is highest.

HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WOMEN CONTRIBUTE TO INCOME

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
CENTRAL / KABUL	7	11	10	12	15	17	19
EAST	11	15	13	9	20	21	19
SOUTH EAST	13	21	33	23	24	24	24
SOUTH WEST	10	10	8	15	12	16	16
WESTERN	19	21	20	16	20	37	29
NORTH EAST	9	16	17	10	11	16	17
CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	25	13	37	24	18	29	49
NORTH WEST	26	19	20	22	27	28	29

FIG. 3.8: D-19. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not? (percentage who say “yes”)*

The average monthly income in households where women contribute to family earnings is 10,197 Afs (approximately USD \$158).⁷ By comparison, in households where women do not contribute, the average monthly income is 10,851 Afs (approximately USD \$168). While other explanatory factors may be involved, this trend suggests that poorer households are more likely to allow women to work due to financial need.

The survey also asks respondents whether women should be allowed to work outside the home. A large majority of respondents (64.0%) say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, including 72.9% of Afghan women and 53.8% of Afghan men. A majority of respondents support this idea in all but eight of Afghanistan’s provinces (Fig. 3.9). Residents of Zabul (16.0%), Paktika (18.8%), and Uruzghan (22.6%) provinces are least likely to support women working outside the home.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME




Fig. 3.9: Q-66. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not. What is your opinion? (percentage who agree with the statement that women should be allowed to work outside the home)

3.5 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS

Key Questions

D-7. How many of the following [assets] does your household have? a) Bicycle, b) Motorcycle, c) Motorcycle, d) TV, e) Refrigerator, f) Washing machine, g) Sewing machine, h) Mobile phones, i) Jeribs of land, j) Livestock (not poultry), k) Houses (owned)

D-18A. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

D-18B. (If responded "Don't Know" in D-18A) If you are unsure of the actual monthly amount, could you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly income?

Each year the survey asks Afghans about their household's assets and family income, including ownership of tools, appliances, land, and livestock, as well as cash earnings. Rural and urban households report very different asset holdings, illustrating one of the major divisions in Afghan society. While urban residents own disproportionately more modern products than people from villages, some items are equally likely to be owned by rural and urban Afghans. For example, 54.1% of rural households report

owning a bicycle, compared to 51.1% of urban households. Other assets are more common in rural households, such as motorcycles (owned by 50.9% of rural households compared to 29.4% of urban households). However, urban Afghans are much more likely to report owning consumer appliances such as a television, refrigerator, and washing machine, all of which require access to electricity (Fig. 3.10).

HOUSEHOLD ASSET INVENTORY

ITEM	RURAL	URBAN	OVERALL
	(%)	(%)	(%)
BICYCLE	54	51	53
MOTORCYCLE	51	29	45
CAR	19	29	22
TELEVISION	52	92	62
REFRIGERATOR	9	66	23
WASHING MACHINE	12	63	24
SEWING MACHINE	72	74	72

FIG. 3.10: D-7. *How many of the following does your household have? a) Bicycle, b) Motorcycle, c) Car, d) TV, e) Refrigerator, f) Washing machine, g) Sewing machine (percentage of respondents who say they have at least one of each item in their household)*

Mobile phones have become ubiquitous over the past decade. This year, just 17.4% of Afghans say that they do not have a mobile phone in their household, and most (82.3%) say that they have at least one phone or more (Fig. 3.11).

HOUSEHOLD MOBILE PHONES

NUMBER OF MOBILE PHONES	RURAL	URBAN	OVERALL
	(%)	(%)	(%)
0	21	7	17
1	27	17	25
2	27	29	27
3 OR MORE	24	47	30

Fig. 3.11: D-7. *How many of the following does your household have? h) mobile phones (percentage of respondents based on how many mobile phones they have in their household)*

Nearly all provinces have a mobile phone penetration rate of more than 75%. Just two provinces, Helmand (8.7%) and Nooristan (3.7%), report mobile phone ownership rates of below 25% (Fig. 3.12).

HOUSEHOLDS WITH MOBILE PHONES: BY PROVINCE




Fig. 3.12: D-7. How many of the following does your household have? h) mobile phones (percentage reporting at least one mobile phone in the household)

Land and livestock remain the backbone of the rural economy in Afghanistan. Half of respondents (53.7%) say that they have between 1 and 10 *jeribs* of land (with one *jerib* being equal to about 0.2 hectares), while 37.4% of Afghan families report owning no land (Fig. 3.13).⁸ Landlessness is particularly common among urban dwellers, with over 76.3% of urban Afghan families reporting no landholdings. Urban residents without land are often able to rent accommodations, but can be more sensitive to economic shocks because land is an asset that can be rented or sold to meet urgent economic needs.

HOUSEHOLD LAND OWNERSHIP

JERIBS OF LAND	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
0	25	76	37
1-10	65	20	54
11-20	6	2	5
21 OR MORE	4	1	3

FIG. 3.13: D-7. How many of the following does your household have? i) Jeribs of land. (percentage who report owning each number of jeribs of land)

Livestock holdings (excluding poultry) are largely a rural practice, with 86.0% of Afghans living in urban households reporting no livestock ownership, compared to 73.6% of respondents in rural households (Fig. 3.14). The highest rates of household livestock are reported in Nooristan (97.2%), Khost (96.6%), and Kunar (91.3%) provinces. The lowest rates are reported in Kabul (11.3%), Kandahar (44.9%), and Balkh (45.4%).




FIG. 3.14: D-7. How many of the following does your household have? j) Livestock (not poultry) (percentage of respondents who report owning any number of livestock)

3.6 HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Key Questions

D-18A. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

Afghans surveyed in 2015 report an average monthly income of 11,214 Af\$ (approximately \$174 USD). Afghans who live in urban areas report higher monthly incomes (15,890 Af\$, or USD \$246) than residents of rural areas (9,672 Af\$, or USD \$150). There are significant regional variations in household income as well, ranging from 5,870 Af\$ (USD \$91) in the Central/Hazarajat region to 16,195 Af\$ (USD \$251) in the Central/Kabul region (Fig. 3.15). Afghans who have more education are significantly more likely to report higher monthly household income than those with less education (Fig. 3.16).

AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME




FIG. 3.15: D-18A/B.⁹ For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? (average reported monthly income of respondents in each region, in USD)

AVERAGE INCOME BY EDUCATION LEVEL




FIG. 3.16: D-10. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed? **D-18A.** For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? (average reported monthly income of respondents who completed each grade level, in USD)

3.7 WEALTH AND HAPPINESS

Key Questions

D-18A. *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?*

D-24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

There is a significant positive correlation between Afghans' income and their reported level of general happiness in life (Fig. 3.17). While income and happiness are correlated, it is not possible to say that higher incomes cause higher levels of happiness. Importantly, other factors correlated with happiness include having more education, residing in an urban area (rather than a rural area), having a higher overall household standard of living, reporting a lower fear for personal safety, participating in sports, and reporting a high degree of confidence in the ability to influence local government decisions (see Chapter 1, National Mood, for additional information on the issue of happiness).¹⁰

INCOME AND HAPPINESS




Fig. 3.17: D-18a. *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? D-24.* *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy? (average income of respondents for each degree of happiness)*

End Notes

¹Faiez, R. & O'Donnell, L. "Afghan economic crisis looms as foreign aid dollars depart." 26 January 2015. *The Washington Times*. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/26/afghan-economic-crisis-looms-as-foreign-aid-dollar/?page=all>. See also: Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. SIGAR: 30 July 2014, p. 212. <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf>

²Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014. (UNODC: 2014), p. 8. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_Socio-economic_analysis_2014_web.pdf

³"Overview: Afghanistan." World Food Programme. <http://www.wfp.org/countries/afghanistan/overview>

⁴Wardak was most likely to say that their household financial situation is better in 2015 compared to last year. However, data from Wardak was flagged by Asia Foundation logic tests for high failure rate and the data quality there is still under investigation.

⁵For example, the frequency of unemployed women in Badghis is only 24, out of a weighted sample of 142 females in Badghis.

⁶Between 2009-2013, the survey asked what percent of the household income was contributed by female members. The percentage of respondents who said that women contribute more than 50% of household income increased from 5.3% in 2009 to 8.7% in 2013. While this question was temporarily dropped to make space for other questions in the survey, it suggests that women play a significant role in household income. Overall, among respondents who say women contribute, most (63.4%) say that this contribution amounts to less than a quarter of household income, while 27.3% say women's contribution amounts to between 26-50%, and 7.2% say that women contribute more than 50% of household income.

⁷Assumes a July, 2015, exchange rate of 64.6 Afghanis per U.S. dollar.

⁸Grace, Jo. "Glossary: jerib" Who Owns the Farm? Rural Women's Access to Land and Livestock. (The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: 2005). <http://www.areu.org.af/Default.aspx?Lang=en-US>

⁹Income is a continuous variable created from d18a and d18b. Each income category in d18b are replaced by mean values that corresponds with income ranges from d18a.

¹⁰OLS regression was used to regress self-reported level of happiness (d24) on a variety of factors including gender (d1), age (d2), income (a composite of d18a and d18b), education (d10), direction of the country (q1), standards of living scale (alpha=0.749), settlement (m6b), playing sport (d21), perception of influence over local government's decisions (q35), being a member of Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups (d14), and using television as a source of obtaining news and information (q8b). The model explains 9.2% of variance in self-reported happiness ($r^2=0.0919$; $F(14,7669)=45.64$; $p<0.0001$).



4 DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has experienced widespread, unprecedented improvement in the nationwide coverage and quality of roads, education, drinking water, and health services. In 2000, under the Taliban regime, life expectancy at birth was 45.3 years of age, while schooling expectancy was just 2.5 years. As of 2013, life expectancy at birth has risen to 60.9 years and expected schooling to 9.3 years.¹ Maternal and infant mortality rates have dropped significantly as access to health services has increased. While girls were essentially shut out of schools during the Taliban regime, schools for girls have now been opened in all provinces. However, Afghanistan still ranks low among nations in terms of most development indicators. The most recent ranking by the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), an index that measures health, education, and income, ranks Afghanistan 169th out of 187 countries.²

In addition to security concerns, weak capacity for revenue collection is a major challenge to the government's ability to deliver public services. In most cases, after service delivery infrastructure is built (e.g., school buildings, dams, clinics, power lines, roads), the Afghan government is responsible for staffing, operating, and maintaining it. However, government revenue collection systems are not yet able to support these costs, and the Afghan government remains dependent on foreign assistance for support. These challenges are complicated by demographic imbalances and low levels of education. Approximately half of Afghanistan's population is under age 18, while more than half of Afghanistan's adults lack any level of formal education. The Afghan government now faces disproportionate demand for youth nutrition, education, and maternal healthcare services, without an adequately sized or educated adult population needed to staff and manage these services. Afghanistan faces a shortage of qualified teachers and nurses, and one of the world's highest child malnutrition rates, with an estimated 55% of children under age five who suffer from chronic malnutrition and vitamin and mineral deficiencies.³

While Afghans' satisfaction with many public services, including healthcare, medicine, and children's education has fallen in 2015, their satisfaction with availability of electricity and drinking water has gradually increased since 2007. Increased satisfaction with drinking water may be due to an increase in household and community wells, followed by slow but steady growth in piped water supply, mostly in urban areas. In 2014, 56.8% of survey respondents said their main supply of drinking water came from a well, up from 52.9% one year earlier. Satisfaction with irrigation water has decreased over time, which is of major concern, given that agriculture is the largest source of Afghan livelihoods and nutrition.

Electrification has increased substantially since Afghanistan began importing electricity from Uzbekistan in 2008. Major efforts are underway to increase Afghanistan's power production, with several hydroelectric dams under construction, including the Manogi Power Dam and the Kunar Dam in Kunar province, the Naghlu Dam in Kabul province, and the Kajaki Power Station in Helmand. Notably, the two largest foreign investments in Afghanistan's electrification infrastructure are the Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project, which will build power lines along the Ring Road (Highway 1) that connects seven out of eight regions, and the Kandahar-Helmand Power Project (KHPP), which will provide power to residents in those two provinces and eventually to a broader region through integration with the PTEC. Along with hydropower, Afghanistan also depends on fossil

fuels and solar energy, but The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) has also identified alternative energy, such as wind and solar energy, as priorities for development.

This chapter examines Afghans' level of satisfaction with key public services, including education and healthcare, perceptions of the Afghan government's project implementation, and migration.

4.1 SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES

Key Questions

Q-10. *I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. a) Clean drinking water, b) Water for irrigation, c) Electricity, d) Clinics or hospitals, e) Medicine, f) Education for children, g) Roads.*

Q-9. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? d) Quality of food in your diet, f) Health/well-being of your family members, b) Electricity supply, h) Access to schools.*

Overall satisfaction with the quality of most services decreased in 2015 (Fig. 4.1). This includes significant decreases in satisfaction with the availability of medicine and education for children. However, although overall Afghans are least satisfied with electricity, reported satisfaction with electricity shows a slight increase (40.2% are very or somewhat satisfied, compared to 38% in 2014), consistent with a long-term rising trend since 2007, when satisfaction was just 30.7%.

Access to and satisfaction with public services vary widely by region, province, and often by district.⁴ The most visible difference exists between urban and rural residents. Rural Afghans are more than twice as likely to report dissatisfaction with their access to electricity compared to urban respondents (68.7% vs. 25.9%, respectively), and also more likely to say they are dissatisfied with their access to roads (58.8%) than urban Afghans (39.7%). However, urban and rural Afghan families are, on average, equally satisfied with their access to drinking water, with 71.8% of Afghans saying they are satisfied.




FIG. 4.1: Q-10. *I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. a) Clean drinking water, b) Water for irrigation, c) Electricity, d) Clinics or hospitals, e) Medicine, f) Education for children, g) Roads. (percentage who say “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”)*

Nationwide, 71.8% of Afghans are satisfied with the quality of their drinking water. Afghans living in the East region, along with those living near the drainage basins of the Herat and Helmand Rivers in the West and South West, report the highest satisfaction with their drinking water (Fig. 4.2). Recent population growth in metropolitan Kabul and slow improvements in water infrastructure make access to clean drinking water there a challenge. Water tables in urban areas also contain more pollutants than those in rural areas.

SATISFACTION WITH DRINKING WATER




FIG. 4.2: Q-10A. Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. a) Clean drinking water (percentage who say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”)

Overall, the nationwide rate of satisfaction with access to irrigation water (47.5%) is much lower than that of drinking water. In many parts of the country, conflict and lack of maintenance have left karez irrigation systems⁵ and in-river canalization damaged and underutilized. Figure 4.3 shows that Afghans in the North East report the highest level of satisfaction with quality of irrigation water in their area. Nationwide, the provinces of Parwan, Laghman, and Helmand report the highest satisfaction rates (all over 75%). Irrigation water in Helmand benefits from the Helmand River, while Laghman irrigation uses the Alingar, Alishang, and Kabul Rivers. Parwan has benefitted from multiple donor-funded irrigation improvement projects, including projects sponsored by China, Germany, and the United States.

Overall, residents of the North West report the highest rates of dissatisfaction with water for irrigation (57.1%). Compared to 2014, levels of satisfaction decreased in Central/Hazarajat (down twelve percentage points to 49.5%) and in the South East (down eleven percentage points to 48.2%), while satisfaction increased in the East, South West, and West regions more than six percentage points each.

SATISFACTION WITH WATER FOR IRRIGATION




FIG. 4.3: Q-10B. *Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. b) Water for irrigation (percentage who say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”)*

Electricity access remains a largely urban phenomenon, as Figure 4.4 illustrates. Overall, 40.2% of Afghans are satisfied with their electricity, up slightly from 2014. Since 2007 this number has steadily risen. However, Kabul is the only province where the level of reported satisfaction with electricity is greater than 75%. Rural areas often rely on generators or alternative methods of energy, such as solar power. When asked whether their access to electricity is better, worse, or the same as last year, Afghans in the South West, East, and South East regions bordering Pakistan are less likely to say that they are satisfied with electricity than Afghans in the regions bordering northern neighboring countries. Afghanistan imports electricity from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, but not from Pakistan, which is itself struggling with electricity shortages. Kabul and Kunduz are the only two provinces where over 60% of Afghans report satisfaction with electricity.

SATISFACTION WITH ELECTRICITY




FIG. 4.4: Q-10C. Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. c) Electricity (percentage who say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”)

Access to roads remains a key issue for economic growth and development, but also for access to public services, such as healthcare and education. Overall, 45.6% of Afghans say they are satisfied with the roads in their area. The Ring Road has not been completed in Faryab and Badghis provinces, and minor roads are more common in and around Kabul province. Overall, a majority of Afghans in 13 provinces say they are somewhat or very satisfied with the roads in their area, while a majority in the remaining 21 provinces say they are not satisfied (Fig. 4.5).

SATISFACTION WITH ROADS




FIG. 4.5: Q-10G. Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. g) Roads (percentage who say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”)

4.2 EDUCATION

Key Questions

D-10. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?

D-11. How many years, if any, have you studied at Islamic madrasa?

Q-10. I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. f) Education for children.

Q-9. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? h) Access to schools.

Since 2000, the average number of years that Afghan children attend school has risen from 2.5 years to 9.3 years. The level of formal education among adults remains low. Over half (54.5%) of the population

reports having had no formal schooling (Fig. 4.6). An additional 14.9% have only a home school or primary school education, while 23.3% of respondents say that they have completed high school or university.




FIG. 4.6: D-10. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?*

In addition to formal education, which includes government and some private schools, many Afghans receive informal education at religious education institutions called *madrastas*.⁶ Overall, 50.5% of Afghans report having studied at a *madrasta* for at least one year. Among those with *madrasta* education, most (85.1%) say they studied there for less than five years, and less than 1% (or 0.3% of all Afghans) studied in a *madrasta* for more than 10 years. In most cases, *madrastas* and formal government schools appear to be complementary. While some Afghans attend a *madrasta* in lieu of a formal education, in most cases, it appears that *madrastas* are attended in tandem with formal schools. Among women, 37.3% of those who say they attended *madrasta* classes also say they received formal schooling, compared to only 20.4% of those who did not study at a *madrasta*. For men, the comparison is 66.9% to 46.9%.

When asked about their level of satisfaction with education for children in their area, 67.8% say they are satisfied, with 23.4% very satisfied and 44.4% somewhat satisfied. This is down somewhat from last year when 32% were very satisfied and 42% were somewhat satisfied. As with electricity and roads, satisfaction with education for children varies significantly according to urban and rural status. Afghans in urban areas are more likely to say they are satisfied with their children's education (80.1%) than those in rural regions (63.7%). Afghans living in Kabul province or neighboring provinces are the most likely to report satisfaction with education for children. Outside Kabul, the highest levels of satisfaction are found in Parwan (90.1%), Jawzjan (89.3%), and Kapisa (87.0%) provinces, whereas the lowest levels of satisfaction are reported in Nooristan (41.4%), Ghor (47.8%), and Farah (48.5%) (Fig. 4.7).

SATISFACTION WITH EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN




FIG. 4.7: Q-10F. Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. f) Education for children (percentage who say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”)

When asked whether access to education in their area has improved, worsened, or remained the same since one year ago, 23.2% of Afghans say it has improved. Afghans in the Central/Kabul (29.5%) and North East (34.1%) regions are most likely, on average, to say that access to education is better in 2015 than one year ago. In the South West, however, and specifically in Uruzghan and Kandahar province, respondents are more likely to say that access to education is worse in 2015 compared to one year ago (42.2% and 38.7% respectively).

4.3 HEALTH AND NUTRITION

Key Questions

Q-10. I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. d) Clinics or hospitals, e) Medicine.

Q-9. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has

gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? d) Quality of food in your diet, f) Health/well-being of your family members.

Overall, 49.1% of Afghans say they are satisfied (either somewhat or very) with clinics and hospitals in their area, and 42.4% are satisfied with medicine. Again, there are prominent urban and rural differences. A minority (44.3%) of rural respondents say they are satisfied with the quality of clinics and hospitals in their area, and only 38.3% are satisfied with the quality of medicine. In contrast, a majority of urban Afghans are satisfied with the quality of clinics and hospitals (63.5%) and medicine (54.6%).

When asked if the health and well-being of their family is better, worse, or the same as one year ago, in only a handful of provinces do more than a quarter of Afghans say it is better (Fig. 4.8). Because the number of health clinics and healthcare facilities has not decreased dramatically, nor has there been any new health crisis that would have affected people nationwide, it is possible that this perception is tied to the changing economy. A decrease in household income can reduce funds available for food, medicine, and healthcare.

IMPROVED HEALTH/WELL-BEING OF FAMILY MEMBERS




FIG. 4.8: Q-9F. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? f) Health/well-being of your family members (percentage who say "better")

When asked to evaluate the quality of food in their household diet compared to one year ago, 14.1% say it is better, 55.4% say it is the same, and 30.0% say it is worse. Provinces where respondents are most likely to say the quality of food is worse include Farah (43.2%), Kandahar (43.1%), and Kabul (40.8%). Residents of Jawzjan (32.5%), Wardak (27.4%), and Badakhshan (25.0%) provinces are most likely to say the quality of food is better this year. (Fig. 4.9).




FIG. 4.9: Q-9D. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? d) Quality of food in your diet. (percentage who say “worse”)

4.4 LANDMINES

Key Questions

- Q-20.** How often, if at all, are there accidents caused by mines and unexploded devices in your community? Do they happen once a month or more often, several times a year, once a year or less, or do they never happen in your community?
- Q-21.** Has anyone in your household been physically injured as a result of violence, such as by a bullet, rocket, or unexploded ordinance?
- Q-22.** Do you think the care provided by the government or by NGOs to people in your community who are disabled or seriously injured as a result of conflict, violence, mines, or unexploded objects is adequate?

This year, the survey asked several new questions about injuries and disabilities resulting from the conflict and the level of government care for victims. Overall, 11.9% of respondents nationwide say that accidents from mines or unexploded devices occur at least once a month in their area. Among respondents in Helmand province, this figure is 42.8%, and in Paktia, it is 40.9% (including men reached through intercept interviews). Reported accidents are highest in areas with ongoing insecurity and fighting with AOGs, particularly in the South West and East regions, but also in Kunduz province in the North East region.

Nearly one in four Afghans (24.3%) say that someone in their household has been physically injured, at some point in time, by a bullet, rocket, landmine, or other violent device. Here again, provinces with current or recent political violence are most likely to have a victim in their family, including an alarming 77.6% in Helmand, 63.9% in Zabul, and 63.2% in Logar. Provinces least likely to report having a victim of conflict-related violence in the family include provinces in the North East region, such as Badakhshan (0.6%), Panjshir (1.0%), and Bamyan (2.9%), along with Kabul (5.8%).

When asked whether the care provided by the Afghan government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for victims of violent conflict is adequate, 54.3% of Afghans say it is inadequate and 30.6% say it is adequate, while 13.7% say they do not have an opinion because there are no such government services or issues with political violence in their area. Those in the South West and South East regions, where political violence is most frequent, are most likely to say the current level of care for victims is inadequate (Fig. 4.10). Perceptions also appear significantly tied to access to information. Afghans who use a television for news and information are significantly more likely to say that the level of care for victims is inadequate.⁷

PERCEPTION OF CARE FOR INJURED / DISABLED AS INADEQUATE




FIG. 4.10: Q-22. Do you think the care provided by the government or by NGOs to people in your community who are disabled or seriously injured as a result of conflict, violence, mines, or unexploded objects is adequate? (percentage who say “inadequate”)

4.5 DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND DONORS

Key Questions

Q-11. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. a) Reconstruction/building of roads, bridges, b) New government school opening, c) New private school opening, d) New private university, e) Drinking water project (e.g. new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir), f) Irrigation project, g) Government-supplied electricity, h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.), i) Reconciliation with anti-government groups, j) Programs in agriculture, k) New factories opened, l) Building new mosques.

Q-12. (Ask if answered code 1 'Yes' to any items in Q-11) Which country do you think has provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area? Is there another country that you believe has funded these projects?

The World Bank estimates that 85% of Afghanistan’s development budget relies on international donor support.⁸ These development investments have been spent primarily on infrastructure, education,

health, governance, and security projects. Each year the survey asks Afghans if they are aware of different types of development projects in their area within the past year. The survey then asks them if they know who funded these projects. Some donors use branding more than others, and survey responses may reflect general perceptions and guesses.

Overall, 58.4% of Afghans say that they are aware of at least one project in their local area in the past 12 months from the categories mentioned. Among the project types, Afghans are most likely to say they have heard of a road and bridge project (30.3%), and least likely to say they are aware of a new factory opening (4.6%). Here again, significant differences between urban and rural respondents emerge. Afghans in rural areas are more likely to report awareness of projects related to agriculture, irrigation, or drinking water, while urban Afghans are more likely to report awareness of government electricity projects or opening of private schools and universities (Fig. 4.11, on right). Provinces least likely to report awareness of any type of local development project include Jawzjan, Bamyan, Baghlan, Panjshir, Daikundi, and Sar-i-Pul. Those most likely include Kunduz, Samangan, Ghor, Laghman, and Logar.

AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN LOCAL AREA




FIG. 4.11: Q-11A/L. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area. a) Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges, b) New government school opening, c) New private school opening, d) New private university, e) Drinking water project (e.g. new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir), f) Irrigation project, g) Government-supplied electricity, h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.), i) Reconciliation with anti-government groups, j) Programs in agriculture, k) New factories opened, l) Building new mosques*

Since 2011, as foreign aid has decreased, Afghans show decreasing awareness of development projects in their area across sectors (Fig. 4.12).




FIG. 4.12: Q-11A/L. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area. a) Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges, e) Drinking water project (e.g. new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir), f) Irrigation project, g) Government-supplied electricity, h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.), i) Reconciliation with anti-government groups, j) Programs in agriculture, k) New factories opened, l) Building new mosques*

In most cases, respondents cannot say who is responsible for the projects in their area. When asked which country is responsible for implementing these development projects, 44.0% say they don't know compared with 41% in 2014. Among those who say they know, the most common answer is the Afghan government (including the Ministries of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; and the National Solidarity Program, NSP) (24.5%), the United States (22.6%), Japan (11.9%), and India (11.1%).⁹ An additional 10.9% say that the people of the local area themselves were responsible for implementing the project. Other commonly mentioned donors include Germany (6.7%), China (5.0%), and Turkey (4.6%).

Importantly, for a number of years, one of the goals of development projects funded by international donors is to build the legitimacy of the Afghan state. To reinforce this effort, President Ghani has lobbied for increased on-budget funding for the Afghan government, enabling Afghan government ministries to implement and brand projects as their own. Figure 4.13 illustrates the visibility of the

Afghan government through development projects, including the government-implemented NSP program. In Herat province, 52.4% of respondents who report a development project in their area attribute it to the Afghan government, ministries, or NSP, while in Kapisa province 47.6% say the same. In contrast, provinces in the South West and North West region are least likely to attribute projects to the Afghan government. In Helmand province, for example, less than 2% of those reporting knowledge of a development project attribute it to the Afghan government.

FUNDERS FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: AFGHAN GOVERNMENT




FIG. 4.13: Q-12A/B: (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” to any items in Q-11a-l) Which country do you think has provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area? Is there another country that you believe has funded these projects? (percentage of respondents who say “the Afghan government,” “Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development,” “Ministry of Agriculture,” or the “National Solidarity Program” is implementing these projects)

4.6 MIGRATION

Key Question

D-16. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

According to the United Nations, more than 120,000 Afghans applied for asylum in 44 countries between January and August 2015.¹⁰ The Afghan Passport Office has processed record numbers of new passports for Afghans seeking to leave the country.¹¹ A key question for the Afghan government and for other governments is to understand what factors lead to migration, particularly among Afghanistan's educated class, and what factors increase the likelihood that Afghans stay in the country.

Starting in 2011, the survey has asked respondents if they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This year, 39.9% of Afghans say yes, an increase from 33.8% in 2011, while 57.9% say no. Afghans most likely to say yes live in the Central/Kabul (47.4%) and West (44.2%) regions; those least likely live in the South West (26.2%). Notably, Afghans living in more insecure provinces in the South West are less likely to say yes compared to Afghans living in less insecure provinces in the North East. For example, Afghans living in Zabul (10.7%), Helmand (25.7%), and Uruzghan (25.0%) are among the least likely to say yes, while Afghans in urban centers of Kabul (49.7%), Balkh (48.5%), and Herat (48.4%) are among the most likely.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MIGRATION

AFGHANS WHO SAY THEY WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, ON AVERAGE, ARE:	AFGHANS WHO SAY THEY WOULD NOT LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, ON AVERAGE, ARE:
MORE LIKELY TO BE MEN	MORE LIKELY TO BE WOMEN
MORE LIKELY TO BE EDUCATED	LESS LIKELY TO BE EDUCATED
MORE LIKELY TO BE YOUNGER	MORE LIKELY TO BE OLDER
MORE LIKELY TO RESIDE IN AN URBAN AREA	MORE LIKELY TO RESIDE IN A RURAL AREA
MORE LIKELY TO BE SINGLE	MORE LIKELY TO BE MARRIED
MORE LIKELY TO HAVE HEARD OF ISIS	LESS LIKELY TO HAVE HEARD OF ISIS
MORE LIKELY TO THINK AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES NEED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	LESS LIKELY TO THINK AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES NEED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

FIG 4.14: D-16. *Tell me, if given opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*¹²

End Notes

¹United Nations Development Program (2013). Human Development Report 2013, Afghanistan Country Profile. The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World retrieved 13 September 2015 at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/AFG.pdf>

²United Nations Development Program. “Human Development Indicators: Afghanistan.” Accessed 12 October 2015. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG>

³The World Bank. “Government of Afghanistan Signs \$100 million Grant with World Bank to Improve Afghans’ Health Outcomes.” May 6, 2013. Kabul. Accessed October 20, 2015. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/05/06/government-of-afghanistan-signs--100-million-grant-with-world-bank-to-improve-afghans-health-outcomes>

⁴In most cases, the survey’s sample size is not large enough to sustain granular analysis at the district level. However, provincial and regional comparisons can often be made with reasonable margins of error (e.g. +/- 5%), assuming adequate sample sizes.

⁵A karez is an underground canal system that taps aquifers by gravity through a series of subsurface tunnels. It often extends for many kilometers before surfacing to provide water for drinking and irrigation.

⁶Though the word *madrassa* literally means school – and indeed in Arabic refers to both secular and religious educational institutions – in this context *madrassas* typically refer to places with religious-focused learning.

⁷Watching television (d8a) correlates negatively with the perception of adequacy of care provided to the victims of conflicts ($r = -0.0736$, $p < 0.0001$).

⁸Gomez Osorio, Camilo. “Managing the Fiscal Challenge.” *Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014*. The World Bank. 2013. p. 78. Accessed 9 September 2015: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13107/758480PUB0EPI0001300PUBDATE02028013.pdf?sequence=1>.

⁹Each respondent was asked to mention two contributors. If they mentioned more than one contributor, both were counted. Respondents who said “don’t know” for both were treated as a single “don’t know.”

¹⁰Hamid, Tamim. “120,000 Afghans Seek Asylum in 44 Countries: UNHCR.” 25 October 2015. <http://www.direct0.toloneews.com/en/afghanistan/22048-120000-afghans-seek-asylum-in-44-countries-unhcr>

¹¹Kugelman, Michael. “The Next Refugee Crisis: Afghanistan.” *The New York Times*. 21 October 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/opinion/the-next-refugee-crisis-afghanistan.html>

¹²Probit regression was used to regress the respondent’s willingness to leave Afghanistan given the opportunity (d16) on a variety of factors such as gender (d1), age (d2), education (d10), income (d18a-b), settlement (m6b), marital status (d13), perception of fear for personal safety (q19), measure of sympathy with AOGs (q51), awareness of ISIS (q14), whether someone in the household has injured as a result of conflicts (q21), confidence in government institutions scale ($\alpha = 0.8549$) and household standard of living scale (q9a-h, $\alpha = 0.749$). The model was weighted by urban/rural and provincial population distribution, and excluding intercept interviews using sampling weight. The full model explained 3.3% of variance in the dependent variable (d16) (pseudo $R^2 = 0.0331$, $p < 0.0001$).



5 GOVERNANCE

On September 29, 2014, in the wake of a protracted and intense electoral process followed by a period of uncertainty, President Karzai peacefully transferred power to the two candidates for president, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. A week earlier, both presidential contenders had agreed to combine efforts and work together under the National Unity Government (NUG) Agreement. In Afghanistan, the power-sharing agreement represents a new model of government, and one without a clear roadmap. When Ashraf Ghani assumed the presidency, he used an executive decree to install Abdullah Abdullah as chief executive officer, a newly created position akin to prime minister. The unity agreement requires that a *Loya Jirga* (the tribal leaders' assembly) meet within two years to decide whether the constitution should include an executive prime minister position.

The unity government has made security and service delivery early priorities. On its first day, it signed the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States and the Status of Forces Agreement with NATO, committing Afghanistan to long-term military partnerships. The BSA also obligates the United States to contribute on-budget funds through the Afghan government to support the ANSF in their capacity to secure the country.

Against the backdrop of security priorities and a drawn-out political process, the unity government continues to face challenges on several fronts, including the delivery of critical services, endemic corruption, and weak institutional leadership. While nominated ministers endured long delays awaiting approval from parliament, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah required each ministry to determine a “100-day plan” to address key issues from their presidential campaigns.

This year, public favorability for most governance indicators is low. The number of respondents in 2015 who say the national government is doing a good job has decreased from 75.3% in 2014 to 57.8% in 2015. Importantly, the 2014 survey was conducted immediately following the presidential elections, before election results were announced and expectations were high. The 2015 survey was conducted nine months after the NUG was formed. Respondents this year report significantly lower levels of confidence in elected leaders and public institutions, and especially low levels of confidence in the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and the Independent Election Complaints Commission (IECC).

Despite current and planned government efforts to curb corruption, 89.9% of Afghans say that corruption is a problem in their daily lives, the highest percentage reported in a decade. Exposure to local-level corruption in a variety of institutions appears to have increased, while national pessimism due to administrative corruption appears to have decreased.

This chapter explores the level of confidence Afghans have in government institutions, officials, and authorities, the issue of corruption, and perceptions of the justice and dispute resolution systems. Special attention is paid to how public opinion has changed over time, and to remaining challenges.

5.1 SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

Key Question

Q-38. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item], is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? a) National government/National Unity Government, b) Provincial government, c) Municipal authorities (asked to urban residents only), d) District government (asked to rural residents only).*

Overall, respondents report a sharp decline in positive perceptions of the performance of nearly all types of government institutions (Fig. 5.1). The proportion of Afghans who say that the national government is doing a good job (either somewhat or very good) has fallen sharply, from 75.3% in 2014 to 57.8% in 2015. Reported satisfaction with provincial, municipal, and district government also shows steep declines. Most notably, satisfaction with provincial government has decreased from a high of 80.4% in 2012 to 57.1% in 2015. Satisfaction with district government shows the most modest decrease, from 56.7% in 2014 to 53.4% in 2015.

More rural (60.5%) than urban (49.7%) respondents, and more women (61.5%) than men (53.7%) say the NUG is doing a good job. Afghans in the South West region (70.7%) are most likely, and Afghans in the Central/Kabul region (46.5%) are least likely, to say the same. One explanation may be related to political expectations and the outcome of the election. During the 2014 presidential election, Dr. Abdullah received considerably more support from the Central/Kabul region than President Ghani, while President Ghani received more support in the South West region.

The percentage of Afghans who say provincial government is doing a somewhat good job (43.7%) or very good job (13.4%) has decreased significantly since 2012 (54.5% and 26.0%, respectively). Provincial government, which includes provincial governors and provincial development committees, play an important role in coordinating government programs and services. However, international funding support for provincial government has decreased, and these positions are often political rather than administrative in nature. Both provincial and district governors have seen their formal powers reduced in recent years, especially in terms of delivery of justice services, in favor of other mechanisms such as reliance on local elders and *shuras*.




FIG. 5.1: Q-38. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) National government, (b) Provincial government, (c) Municipal authority (asked to urban residents only) (d) District government (asked to urban residents only) (percentage who say “somewhat good job” or “very good job”)

5.2 CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Key Questions

Q-37. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. a) Independent Election Commission, b) Community Development Councils, c) Community shuras/jirgas, d) Government ministers, e) International NGOs, f) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV, g) National NGOs, h) Parliament as a whole, i) Provincial Councils, j) Religious leaders, k) Your member of parliament.

Q-39. In the last two years, has the member of parliament (MP) for your province ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affected you?

Each year, respondents are asked about the degree of confidence they have in various public officials, institutions, and organizations to do their jobs. Some institutions at the local level, such as the community development councils, are involved in decisions that regularly affect respondents' daily lives, while others, such as the Independent Election Commission (IEC) or the Independent Election Complaints Commission (IECC), are national-level institutions that many Afghans were unfamiliar with until the 2014 presidential election.

This year, the percentage of Afghans reporting confidence (whether some or a lot) in each institution or authority decreased across all categories (Fig. 5.2). The level of confidence reported in community development councils and *shuras/jirgas* appears the most stable over time, showing decreases of 4.4% and 4.6%, respectively. The largest decrease in reported confidence is for the IEC (36.4%), down from 66.4% in 2014. Only 8.0% of Afghans say they have a lot of confidence in the IEC, down from 28.0% during the June 2014 election. Similarly, 34.7% of Afghans have confidence in the ECC, with just 7.8% saying they have a lot of confidence.

Afghans also report significantly less confidence in parliament, with 42.4% expressing some or a lot of confidence, down from 51.0% in 2014. There has also been a decline in confidence in respondents' individual members of parliament (MPs), from 51.5% in 2014 to 42.9% in 2015. The erosion of confidence in parliament and MPs has occurred alongside a reported decrease in citizen engagement with MPs. When asked whether their MP has helped them with a problem in the past two years, 19.8% of Afghans say yes, down from 25.0% in 2014. Men (21.8%) are more likely than women (18.0%) to say they have been helped by their MP, but respondents of both genders report a decline of more than five percent.

While the decrease in reported confidence has been most severe for the electoral institutions and elected officials, a slight drop in public confidence is also reported for community-based institutions. Around two-thirds (64.1%) of respondents say they have some or a lot of confidence in community *shuras/jirgas* in 2015, compared to 68.7% last year, while confidence in community development councils declined to 61.1% this year from 65.5% in 2014. On average, Afghans living in rural areas are more positive about each of these institutions and authorities compared to Afghans in urban areas (exceptions are for national and international NGOs, and for the media), with respondents in rural areas expressing levels of confidence that are four to eight percentage points higher than Afghans in urban areas.

CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION	-	57	67	54	59	60	-	66	36
ELECTION COMPLAINTS COMMISSION	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	64	65	64	61	68	66	63	65	61
COMMUNITY SHURAS/JIRGAS	72	69	67	66	70	68	65	69	64
GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	57	51	53	54	56	55	46	47	42
INTERNATIONAL NGOS	64	64	66	54	56	53	51	53	44
MEDIA	62	63	62	57	69	71	67	73	67
NATIONAL NGOS	60	62	61	55	54	54	52	57	50

PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE	-	-	-	59	62	62	50	51	42
PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	70	65	62	62	67	66	58	58	52
RELIGIOUS LEADERS	-	-	-	-	74	73	65	70	64
YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	52	43

FIG. 5.2: Q-37. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. (percentage who report "some" or "a lot" of confidence in each)*

5.3 CORRUPTION

Key Questions

Q-29. *Now we want to ask some questions about corruption. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life; b) In your neighborhood; c) In your local authorities; d) In your provincial government; e) In Afghanistan as a whole.*

Q-30. *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. a) Officials in the municipality/district office; b) Provincial governor's office; c) Customs office; d) Afghan National Police; e) Afghan National Army; f) Judiciary/courts; g) State electricity supply; h) Public healthcare service; i) When applying for a job; j) Admissions to schools/university.*

Every year, the survey asks Afghans about their perceptions of the extent to which corruption is a problem in daily life, government, and in Afghanistan as a whole. In 2015, 89.9% of Afghans report that corruption is a problem in their daily lives, with 61.1% saying it is a major problem and 28.8% saying it is a minor problem. When considering different levels of government, the proportion is even higher, with 91.2% of respondents reporting that corruption is a problem in relation to local authorities (60.4% report it is a major problem, 30.8% report it is a minor problem), and 94.0% reporting it is a problem among provincial authorities (69.0% say it is a major problem, 24.9% say it is a minor problem). When asked about corruption in Afghanistan as a whole, a staggering 94.6% report that corruption is a problem, including 76.5% saying it is a major problem (Fig. 5.3).




FIG. 5.3: Q-29. *Now we want to ask some questions about corruption. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life; b) In your neighborhood; c) In your local authorities; d) In your provincial government; e) In Afghanistan as a whole. (percentage who say “major problem”)*

Looking at geographic differences, Afghans are most likely to say that corruption a major problem in their daily life in Central/Kabul region (71.7%), followed by the East (66.7%), South East (63.5%), and South West (64.6%) regions. Figure 5.4 shows the geographic distribution of the perception of corruption as a major problem in daily life. Helmand (84.8%) and Kabul (81.7%) are the two provinces with the highest proportion of residents who say that corruption is a major problem, while the lowest province, by a wide margin, is Panjshir (11.0%).

PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION: MAJOR PROBLEM IN DAILY LIFE




FIG. 5.4: Q-29. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life. (percentage of respondents who say “major problem”)

The survey also asks Afghans about their direct experiences with corruption, beyond general perceptions. For this question, survey enumerators define corruption in more specific terms, asking respondents if they have been in situations where they have had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or perform a favor over the past year for various institutions or authorities. This year, respondents report sharp increases in the incidence of bribes and other forms of corruption.

About two-thirds (66.0%) of respondents who had contact with the municipality report paying bribes (some, most, or all of the time), up from 55.1% last year and above the previous high of 58.2% in 2011. Over half (53.3%) of Afghans say they paid a bribe to the police, up from 45.1% in 2014, almost matching the previous high of 53.7% in 2011. The overall trend since 2007 is a steady increase in reported corruption (Fig. 5.5).

EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
MUNICIPALITY/ DISTRICT GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	46	43	41	43	43	56	51	58	55	66
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	61
CUSTOMS OFFICE	40	34	36	37	42	52	49	57	47	61
ANP	53	43	40	46	49	54	48	52	45	53
ANA	-	24	21	25	30	34	30	39	33	43
JUDICIARY / COURTS	55	47	49	51	52	62	60	62	55	63
STATE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	44	46	37	41	41	48	46	53	47	55
PUBLIC HEALTHCARE SERVICE	51	44	41	48	48	55	50	55	49	53
WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	59	51	47	52	50	58	57	55	52	59
ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS / UNIVERSITY	-	33	32	37	39	45	42	46	39	43

FIG. 5.5: Q-30. *Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it all of the time, most of the time, some of the time, or none of the time? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. a) Officials in the municipality/district office, b) Provincial governor's office, c) Customs office, d) Afghan National Police, e) Afghan National Army, f) Judiciary/courts, g) State electricity supply, h) Public healthcare service, i) When applying for a job, j) Admissions to schools/university. (percentage of respondents who say they experienced corruption "some," "most," or "all of the time," among those who say they had contact with each institution or situation)*

Figure 5.6 illustrates the geographic distribution of reported police corruption, showing that the highest proportion of respondents paid bribes to the police in Wardak and Uruzgan provinces (91.0% and 84.5%, respectively), while the lowest rates of bribe-paying to the ANP are in Panjshir and Badakhshan (8.1% and 11.1%).

REPORTED CORRUPTION RATE: POLICE




FIG. 5.6: Q-30D. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for the Afghan National Police? Was it all of the time, most of the time, some of the time, or none of the time? If you had no contact with the ANP, please tell me so (percentage of respondents who say they experienced corruption “some,” “most,” or “all of the time,” among those who say they had contact with the ANP)

5.4 JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Key Questions

Q-52 (a-d). Now I would like to ask you some questions about the justice system in our country. If your household were to have (a dispute over land; a dispute over water; family problems; problems accessing healthcare), from whom would you ask for help to resolve it?

Q-54. In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?

Q-55. What kind of a case or dispute was it?

Q-57. Where have you taken this case or dispute?

Q-58. (Ask if 1 “Huquq Department” in Q-57) And now let’s turn to the local Huquq, Department. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department. a) Local Huquq are fair and trusted, b) Local Huquq follow the norms and values of our people, c) Local Huquq are effective at delivering justice.

Q-59. (Ask if 2 “state courts” in Q-57) Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? a) State courts are fair and trusted, b) State courts follow the norms and values of our people, c) State courts are effective at delivering justice.

Q-60. (Ask if 3 “jirga/shura” in Q-57) And now let’s turn to village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shura. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras? a) Local jirgas/shuras are fair and trusted, b) Local jirgas/shuras follow the norms and values of our people, c) Local jirgas/shuras are effective at delivering justice.

Afghans approach a range of formal and informal actors for assistance with resolving disputes, and the source of assistance varies depending on the type of dispute or problem. For example, to solve problems involving land or water, respondents most frequently say they would go to local elders of the *shura*, while for problems related to access to healthcare, they are more likely to say they seek help from a local government department (Fig. 5.7). Local *maliks/khans* (local notables and leaders) are not cited as the most common choice for problem-solving related to any of the four types of issues highlighted below, but are still perceived by some Afghans as an important source of assistance for dispute resolution, particularly for water-related disputes. In many if not most cases, local *maliks* or *khans* are members of *shuras* in their communities.

PREFERRED SOURCE OF HELP, BY PROBLEM AREA

	LAND	WATER	FAMILY	HEALTHCARE
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
LOCAL ELDERS OF THE SHURA	47	24	14	9
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT	12	17	8	30
MALIK / KHAN	9	16	9	5
FRIENDS AND FAMILY	3	4	30	8
DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	6	5	5	11

FIG. 5.7: Q-52A-D. Now I would like to ask you some questions about the justice system in our country. If your household were to have (a dispute over land; a dispute over water; family problems; problems accessing healthcare), from whom would you ask for help to resolve it? (percentage who say they would approach each actor or institution for assistance for each type of problem)

This year, 21.5% of respondents say they had a dispute or formal case that they could not resolve and had to take to the *Huquq* Department or *shural/jirga*, up slightly from 19.1% last year (Fig. 5.8). Among respondents who took their case forward for dispute resolution by an external body, 43.2% took it to their local *shural/jirga*, 36.1% to a state court, and 22.7% to the *Huquq* Department. The *Huquq* Department of the Ministry of Justice, and state courts are formal justice institutions, and the *Huquq* can refer cases to state courts. The *Huquq* Department is primarily responsible for civil matters, while criminal cases are taken up by the state courts system. *Shuras/jirgas* are informal forums. *Shuras* and *jirgas* are traditional mechanisms for addressing a variety of local disputes, made up of local leaders and elders.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USE OF *HUQUQS* OR *SHURAS/JIRGAS*




FIG. 5.8: Q-54. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not? (percentage of respondents who say "yes")*

The most common type of dispute for which respondents say they sought outside resolution is a land dispute (42.2%), followed by family problems/divorce (23.2%, when combined), and other property disputes (14.8%) (Fig. 5.9).

TYPES OF CASES TAKEN FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION




FIG. 5.9: Q-55. What kind of a case or dispute was it? (percentage citing each type of dispute, among those who say they took a dispute forward for external resolution)

As in all previous years, among those respondents who had direct experience with state courts, the *Huquq* Department, and local *shuras/jirgas*, among the three types of institutions local *shuras* and *jirgas* emerge as the most fair and trusted, the most effective at delivering justice, and better at adhering to the norms of the people (Fig. 5.10). For example, 80.0% of respondents who used *shuras* and *jirgas* say that they are fair and trusted mechanisms, compared to 68.0% who used the *Huquq* Department and 59.9% who used state courts. Nonetheless, all three institutions are trusted by a majority of Afghans who used them.

PERCEPTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTIONS

	FAIR AND TRUSTED	EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	FOLLOW NORMS OF THE PEOPLE
	(%)	(%)	(%)
HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	68	56	52
STATE COURTS	60	49	48
LOCAL JIRGAS / SHURAS	80	68	68

FIG. 5.10: Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the local *Huquq* Department (Q-58A/C), state courts (Q-59A/C), or local *shuras/jirgas* (Q-60A/C): a) This institution is fair and trusted, b) It follows the norms and values of our people, and c) It is effective at delivering justice (percentage of respondents who agree strongly or somewhat with each statement, among those who took their cases to each institution).

End Notes

¹Progress on these campaign promises can be tracked online at www.sadroz.af.



6 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The 2015 survey examines Afghan views of the democratic process in the year following the presidential election of 2014. On election day, April 5, 2014, the mood across the country was cautiously optimistic.¹ Despite fears that violence or fraud might dampen the historic elections, initial reports showed voter turnout surpassing most expectations. With high turnout numbers coming in throughout the day, Afghans and non-Afghans characterized the day as an overwhelming success. However, no decisive outcome resulted, and a runoff election was scheduled for June. In June, voters again defied Taliban threats and voted in record numbers. The 2014 *Survey of the Afghan People* was conducted immediately following these elections, but prior to the scheduled announcement of the results. In response to suspicions of fraud and ongoing political disagreements, the United Nations then supervised a recount of all the ballots. In September 2014 the two remaining candidates Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah agreed to form a National Unity Government, whereby the named winner of the run-off election, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, became president, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah assumed the newly created post of chief executive officer.² Currently, the position of president is constitutionally mandated, while the position of CEO was created by executive decree.

The National Unity Government (NUG) has faced multiple challenges, including the timely appointment of a cabinet, political resistance from the parliament, rising insecurity, and decreasing foreign military and development aid. The first nine months of the NUG correspond with a sharp drop in Afghan satisfaction with the democratic process. The percentage of Afghans in 2015 who say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Afghanistan (57.1%) reflects the greatest drop (from 73.1% in 2014) in the past decade. The percentage of Afghans who say they can impact local government decisions has also decreased, from 55.8% in 2014 to 44.5% this year. Increased violence throughout the country may have contributed to changing opinion as well. The number of Afghans who cite fear while participating in the democratic process, including voting and expressing opinions in public, has increased significantly.

In the midst of growing perceptions of insecurity and doubts about the legitimacy of the democratic process, the Afghan government is now preparing for the 2016 parliamentary elections. Changing public opinion may affect participation and confidence. Also, growing threats from ISIL/ISIS and the Taliban may suppress voter turnout. This chapter examines current demographic and geographic variations of opinion about democracy in Afghanistan, including basic political freedoms, perceived ability to impact local government decisions, women and voting, and the role of religion in the political process.

6.1 EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS

Key Question

Q-33. Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? a) Voting in a national/provincial election; b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; c) Running for public office.

In the 2014 survey, which was conducted immediately after the presidential runoff election, Afghans reported a comparatively low level of fear while voting (45.8%). The ANA and ANP were highly involved in providing security for the election, and Pakistan coordinated with Afghan forces to seal the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to reduce the chance of cross-border attacks.³ In 2015 (a non-election year), 55.6% of Afghans report fear (either some or a lot) while voting, a rate of fear that approaches the highest recorded between 2010 and 2013 (Fig. 6.1). This fear may be related to an overall increase in insecurity, including threats from the Taliban and other groups.




FIG. 6.1. Q-33. Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? a) Voting in a national/provincial election (percentage of respondents who say "some fear" or "a lot of fear")

In addition to asking about voting in an election, the survey also asks Afghans how much fear they would experience while partaking in two other political activities: participating in a peaceful demonstration, and running for office. Like fear while voting, the percentage of Afghans who say they would experience fear while participating in a peaceful demonstration (69.1%) decreased slightly compared to 2014 (69.4%). The percentage of Afghans who say they would experience fear while running for office is the highest in 2015 (72.8%) to levels of fear reported between 2006 and 2014.⁴

Among the three activities, fear while voting in an election shows the greatest variation across geographic regions, ranging from 32.2% in the Central/Hazarajat region and 42.1% in the North East region to between 68.1% and 68.7% in the South East, West, and South West regions. Residents of the South

West region report the highest level of fear while participating in a peaceful demonstration (80.7%), while residents of the South East and South West regions report the highest rates of fear while running for political office (79.1% and 78.5%, respectively) (Fig. 6.2).




FIG. 6.2. Q-33. Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? a) Voting in a national/provincial election; b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; c) Running for public office. (percentage of respondents who say “some fear” or “a lot of fear”)

For all three questions, women report experiencing fear at a greater rate than men. The greatest difference between genders is seen in responses about participating in a peaceful demonstration (with 62.4% of men and 75.0% of women reporting some level of fear). By comparison, 51.5% of men and 59.2% of women report fear while participating in an election and 69.3% of men and 76.0% of women report fear while running for office.

6.2 ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS

Key Question

Q-35. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?*

The percentage of Afghans who say they can impact local government decisions has fallen to the lowest level since 2006. This year, 44.5% of Afghans surveyed say they have influence over local government decisions, either a lot (7.9%) or a little (36.6%), compared to 55.9% in 2014 (Fig. 6.3). The greatest variation in responses is among geographic regions: the highest percentage of Afghans who say they can have impact live in the East (56.1%) and South West (55.6%) regions, while only 37.0% of residents in the South East and 38.6% of residents in the Central/Kabul region say so. However, there are significant variations within regions. In fact, the highest and lowest percentages were recorded in the Central/Kabul region's provinces of Wardak (72.5%) and Parwan (10.5%) (Fig. 6.4).




FIG. 6.3. Q-35. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all? (percentage of respondents who say “a lot” or “some”)*


INFLUENCE OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS: BY PROVINCE

FIG. 6.4 Q-35. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all? (percentage of respondents who say “a lot” or “some”)*

Experiences from the 2014 presidential election may have affected responses to this question. Multivariate analysis that controls for gender, age, income, and geographic differences reveals a variety of tendencies that correspond with perceptions of the ability to influence local government decisions (Fig. 6.5). While these are notable associations, they cannot be interpreted as having a causal relationship to views on influence over local government.

PERCEPTION OF ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS

AFGHANS WHO REPORT SOME OR A LOT OF ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS, ON AVERAGE, ARE:	AFGHANS WHO REPORT VERY LITTLE OR NO ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS, ON AVERAGE, ARE:
More likely to report improvements in their standard of living compared to last year ⁵	More likely to report a standard of living that grew worse compared to last year
More likely to report experiences of corruption in the past year	Less likely to report experiences of corruption in the past year
Have more confidence in government institutions	Have less confidence in government institutions
More likely to use mobile phones or internet for obtaining news and information	Less likely to use mobile phones or internet for obtaining news and information
More confident that if they were the victim of violence or a criminal act, the guilty party would be punished	Less confident that if they were the victim of violence or a criminal act, the guilty party would be punished
More likely to report satisfaction with the way democracy works in Afghanistan	More likely to report dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in Afghanistan
More likely to say they feel safe to express their opinion about the government in public	Less likely to say they feel safe to expressing his or her opinion about the government in public
More likely to report sympathy with AOGs	Less likely to report sympathy with AOGs
Less educated	Have higher level of educational attainment
More likely to say that a female member of the family contributes to household income	Less likely to have a female member of family contribute to household income
More likely to say they are happy in life	More likely to be unhappier in life
More likely to be a member of Pashtun or Uzbek ethnic groups	Less likely to be a member of Pashtun or Uzbek ethnic groups

FIG. 6.5. Q-35. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?*⁶

6.3 POLITICS AND RELIGION

Key Question

Q-31. *Some people say that that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion, and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*

Most Afghans (61.3%) say that religious scholars should be involved in politics. Pashtuns (65.0%) and Tajiks (61.7%) are more likely to agree that religious leaders should be involved in political decisions, compared to 56.0% of Uzbeks and 52.6% of Hazaras. Accordingly, the regions with the highest percentage of residents who believe religious leaders should take part in political decisions are the regions with the highest concentrations of Pashtun and Tajik residents: the South West (73.2%) and East (73.3%) regions. Meanwhile, the regions with the lowest percentage of residents who say the same are the Central/Hazarajat (48.8%), North West (56.1%), and West (56.8%) regions. In all regions, the percentage of residents who support mixing religion and politics declined in 2015 compared to how Afghans answered the same question in 2014 (64.9%). However, responses to this question have varied considerably over the past 10 years.

There are slight differences in opinion between residents of urban (58.1%) and rural (62.3%) regions who support religious leaders' involvement in politics, and also between men (63.6%) and women (59.3%). Afghans who studied at the university level are less likely (55.9%) to support the involvement of religious leaders in politics compared to Afghans who did not attend school (61.7%). Residents of insecure areas who were polled using intercept interviews are significantly more supportive of the involvement of religious leaders in politics (73.3%).

6.4 WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING

Key Question

Q-71. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?*

When asked if women should make electoral decisions themselves, just over half of Afghans (50.1%) say yes, while 27.4% say women should decide in consultation with men, and 21.9% say men should decide for women. This year, when compared to previous years, fewer Afghans say women should decide for themselves. In 2014, 56.0% said women should vote for themselves, and only 17.0% said that men should decide for women.

Female respondents are slightly more likely to say that women should vote for themselves (51.6%) when compared to male respondents (48.3%) (Fig.6.6). Among men from highly insecure areas reached through intercept interviews, a smaller percentage (39.8%) say they support women making electoral decisions by themselves. Notable variations in responses are seen across geographic areas. Residents of urban areas (60.9%) report greater support for women choosing whom they vote for, while only 46.5% of rural residents say the same. Regionally, the percentage of respondents who support women making their own electoral decisions range from a low of 29.8% in the South West region to a high of 68.4% in the Central/Hazarajat region. Greater variations emerge when responses are analyzed at the provincial level, ranging from a high of 80.9% of Panjshir residents to a low of 10.5% of Zabul residents who support the idea of women making their own voting decisions (Fig. 6.7).

WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING




FIG. 6.6. Q-71. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (percentage of respondents who choose each response)*

WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING: BY PROVINCE

		WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES	MEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR WOMEN	WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE, BUT IN CONSULTATION WITH MEN
		(%)	(%)	(%)
PROVINCES WITH THE MOST SUPPORT FOR WOMEN DECIDING ON THEIR OWN	PANJSHIR	81	12	6
	DAIKUNDI	69	11	20
	KABUL	68	10	22
	BAMYAN	68	12	20
	PAKTIA	61	7	31
PROVINCES WITH THE LEAST SUPPORT FOR WOMEN DECIDING ON THEIR OWN	HELMAND	29	25	45
	KANDAHAR	26	48	26
	PARWAN	24	15	60
	NOORISTAN	18	45	37
	ZABUL	10	78	4

FIG. 6.7. Q-71. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (percentage of respondents who choose each response)*

6.5 ELECTIONS

Key Questions

Q-32. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

Q-43. *Did you vote in the presidential runoff election of 2014 or not?*

Q-46. *In general, do you think the presidential runoff election in Afghanistan was free and fair, or not?*

This year's survey responses suggest that Afghanistan's contested presidential election of 2014 has had a significant impact on how Afghans view their country's democratic process. This year, 57.2% of Afghans say that they are somewhat or very satisfied with how democracy works in Afghanistan. This represents a significant decrease compared to 2014, when 73.1% of Afghans said they were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with how democratic process functioned in their country. (Fig. 6.8), and is by far the lowest level of satisfaction reported since 2006.




FIG. 6.8. Q-32. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. (percentage of respondents who say “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied”)*

Afghans who say they voted for President Ashraf Ghani are more likely to say they are satisfied with democracy in Afghanistan than supporters of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Nearly two-thirds of President Ghani's supporters (64.5%) say they are satisfied with democracy in Afghanistan, compared to 56.2% of Dr. Abdullah's supporters. While all geographic regions experienced decreasing satisfaction compared

to the 2014 survey, the greatest decreases in satisfaction were in the North West region (decrease of 22.6 percentage points), and the Central/Kabul region (decrease of 19.1 percentage points), where support for Dr. Abudullah was strongest. In 2015, residents of the Central/Hazarajat (70.1%) and the East (68.3%) regions report the highest rates of satisfaction with the democratic process, while residents of the West (49.3%) and Central/Kabul (52.9%) reported the lowest rates of satisfaction. There was no significant difference in satisfaction rates between residents of urban (56.2%) and rural (57.6%) areas. Just over half (50.9%) of Afghans who live in insecure areas say they are very or somewhat satisfied with how democracy works in Afghanistan.

This year's survey asked Afghans three questions about the 2014 presidential election that were also included in the 2014 survey. As mentioned above, the 2014 survey was administered after the election, but before allegations of fraud became widespread, resulting in a recount and, ultimately, the decision to form a power-sharing government. By asking these questions again, after the full election process has been completed, the 2015 survey reveals how the post-election controversy may have impacted public perceptions of the electoral process.

In particular, the percentage of Afghans who say they believe the presidential election was free and fair has changed. In 2014, just after the ballots were counted, 63.3% said the election was free and fair. This year, only 36.0% say the same. Decreases of between 20 and 30 percentage points are observed across all regions (Fig. 6.9), and among both those who say they voted for President Ghani and those who voted for Dr. Abdullah.




FIG. 6.9. Q-46. *In general, do you think the presidential runoff election in Afghanistan was free and fair, or not? (percentage of respondents who say “yes”)*

End Notes

¹Nordland, R., Ahmed, A. and M. Rosenberg. “Afghan Turnout is High as Voters Defy the Taliban.” *New York Times*, 5 April 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/asia/afghanistan-voting.html>

²Katzman, K. “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance.” Congressional Research Service, 12 January 2015. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf>

³“Pakistan seals borders for Afghan polls.” 5 April 2014. *The Express Tribune*. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/691629/pakistan-seals-borders-for-afghan-polls/>.

⁴See Chapter 2 (Security) for more information about level of fear when participating in specific activities.

⁵Standards of living are contained in a scale ($\alpha=0.749$) that consists of eight sub-questions in q9, including financial situation of household, employment opportunities, availability of products in the market, quality of food in diet, physical condition of house/dwelling, health/well-being of family members, electricity supply and access to schools.

⁶Using an OLS regression, perception of how much respondents think they have influence on local government decisions was regressed on a variety of demographic and attitudinal measures, including income, age, geographic location, fear of participating in political activities (scale), confidence in ANA (scale), confidence in ANP (scale), exposure to corruption (scale), confidence in government (scale), sources of obtaining information (q8a-q8f), confidence that guilty parties would be punished (q27), satisfaction with democracy (q32), safety expressing opinions in public (q34), sympathy with AOGs (q51), level of education (d10), education in an Islamic madrasa (d11), female contribution to household income (d19), and overall happiness (d24). The full model explains 18.2% of the variance in whether a respondent expressed ability to influence local government decisions. ($R^2=0.182$, $F(25,6210)=48.86$, $p<0.0001$).



7 ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Access to information for Afghans has expanded dramatically since 2001. For example, television ownership has more than doubled in the last eight years, and more than 80% of Afghans in 2015 report having one or more mobile phones in their home (90% in urban areas). Afghanistan continues to benefit from public and private sector investment in its communications infrastructure. According to the Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority (ATRA), more than \$2.5 billion has been invested in Afghanistan's communications infrastructure since 2001, and mobile phone coverage now extends to 24.5 million mobile subscribers, roughly 89% of the population.¹ ATRA reports that there are 94 television stations and 258 FM radio stations operating in the country.² Internet for mobile phones was introduced in 2013 and is now available in 27 provinces of Afghanistan through five private sector providers.³

Despite these dramatic improvements in access to telecommunications and other media, Afghanistan still struggles with freedom of the press. Afghanistan is ranked 122nd out of 180 nations in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index. However, Afghanistan ranks better than some of its neighboring countries: while it is ranked closely behind Tajikistan, it is ranked higher than Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, China, and Turkmenistan. Among the South Asian countries, Afghanistan is ranked 4th, behind Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives but ahead of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.⁴ While the survey reveals a decline in overall confidence in media (27.4% in 2015, down 7 percentage points since 2014), media still remains the most trusted institution alongside religious leaders, and ahead of government institutions and NGOs.⁵

One of the progressive steps toward institutionalization of freedom of information was taken at the end of 2014, when newly elected President Ghani signed the Access to Information Law, which for the first time in history allows Afghans to access public government information. The law was positively received in media coverage, but some are concerned that it will not be implemented or enforced.⁶ For example, the law calls for the establishment of the Monitoring Commission on Access to Information, but the commission and independent budget have not yet been established.⁷ Afghans are experiencing an expanding media sector with increased access to information since 2001, and this process will continue during this time of considerable transition.⁸ This chapter explores the ways in which Afghans obtain news and information and their overall media consumption habits.

7.1 SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION

Key Questions

Q-8. *Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information? a) Radio, b) TV set, c) Mobile phone, d) The internet, e) Mosque, f) Community shuras.*

Q-37. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. i) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV.*

D-7. How many of the following does your household have? d) TV set, h) Mobile phone.

D-8a. Do you watch television?

D-8b. What TV show would you say you watch the most?

D-9a. Do you have a mobile phone that is used mainly by you? That is, not jointly by the family, but by you personally?

D-9b. How many members of your household have mobile phones?

D-9c. And how many members of your household own mobile phones that have internet access, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?

Radio remains the most widely used means of obtaining news and information in Afghanistan (75.7%), followed by television (61.6%), mobile phones (50.3%), the mosque (48.3%), community *shuras* (37.4%), and the internet (9.6%) (Fig. 7.1). Compared to previous years, Afghans' reliance on television and the internet has increased. This appears to correspond with rapid urbanization and wider availability of television and internet across the country, including access to each through mobile "smart" phones.

**SOURCES OF OBTAINING NEWS AND INFORMATION:
2013-2015**




FIG 7.1: Q-8. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? a) Radio, b) TV set, c) Mobile phone, f) The internet, g) Mosque, h) Community shuras. (percentage of respondents who say they use each source)⁹

Television ownership has nearly doubled in the past eight years, from 36.9% of Afghans owning televisions in 2007 to 62.1% in 2015 (Fig. 7.2). When asked if they actively watch television (beyond owning a TV set), over half (55.9%) of Afghans say yes, up from 44.9% in 2006. When asked which television shows they watch the most, Afghans say the six o'clock news (33.8%), followed by serials (25.8%), religious programs (4.0%), and sports (3.1%).

TV OWNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN




FIG 7.2: D-7D: *How many of the following does your household have? (TV) (trendline uses X-1B in the merged variable list, 2007-2012, for comparison with D-7D) (percentage of respondents who own TVs)*

Residents of urban areas are more likely to use TV (91.2%) than radio (62.1%), though radio remains the most common source of news and information nationwide. Use of the internet as a way to obtain news and information has grown significantly in the past three years (from 3.2% in 2013 to 9.6% in 2015). However, internet use is more prevalent among residents of urban areas (22.4%, compared to 5.4% of people in rural areas) and men (13.4%, compared to 6.2% of women). Not surprisingly, it is also used more among 18-24 year olds than by older respondents.¹⁰ Women report using these various sources of news and information at lower rates than men, with the exception of television, which men and women use at equal rates (Fig 7.3).

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION: BY GENDER, SETTLEMENT, AND AGE

	RURAL	URBAN	MEN	WOMEN	18-24 Y/O	25-34 Y/O	35-44 Y/O	45-54 Y/O	54+ Y/O
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
RADIO	80	62	82	70	75	76	78	73	76
TV SET	52	91	62	62	66	59	57	64	63
MOBILE PHONE	48	57	56	45	53	48	49	51	50
THE INTERNET	5	22	13	6	14	9	7	7	8
MOSQUE	50	43	73	26	47	45	48	50	59
COMMUNITY SHURAS	41	27	55	22	34	35	38	42	49

FIG 7.3: Q-8. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? a) Radio, b) TV set, c) Mobile phone, f) The internet, g) Mosque, h) Community shuras. (percentage of respondents who say they use each source)

A large majority of Afghans (82.5%) report having at least one mobile phone in their household. This figure is higher among urban households (92.7%) compared to rural households (79.2%). When respondents were asked more specifically if they have a phone that is mainly for their personal use, about half (49.6%) say yes. However, many more men (70.7%) than women (31.1%) report owning a mobile phone for personal use. One-fifth (21.0%) of the respondents say that someone in their household has access to the internet. This figure is much higher for urban dwellers (40.2%) compared to rural respondents (14.7%).

7.2 ROLE OF TELEVISION IN PUBLIC OPINION AND BEHAVIOR

Key Questions

Q-8. Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information? b) TV set.

Q-43. Did you vote in the presidential runoff election of 1393 or not?

Q-69. In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.

D-7. How many of the following does your household have? d) TV set.

D-8a. Do you watch television?

D-8b. What TV show would you say you watch the most?

D-21. Do you yourself play any sport?

Afghans now use TV for news and information in most parts of the country thanks to a growing number of private TV stations, expanded coverage, and increased television ownership. Television's ability to deliver easily accessible audio-visual news and information from around the world makes it an important tool for shaping and directing public opinion and behavior. Televised debates and discussions among senior government officials and experts on various issues have become routine for popular TV stations, with a corresponding ability to shape viewers' perceptions about important events in the country. For example, President Ghani's televised speech following a wave of terrorist attacks in Kabul

in early August 2015 triggered a nationwide campaign against Pakistan¹¹ that may have contributed to a decrease in bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹²

While the survey cannot assess the impact of specific types of television content on Afghan public opinion and behavior, a comparison of respondents who rely on television as a source of obtaining news and information to those who do not, reveals different patterns in attitudes and opinions. For example, while urban Afghans were more likely to have voted in the 2014 presidential run-off election compared to Afghans from rural areas, using television as a source of obtaining news and information also associated with increased likelihood of voting in rural areas (Fig 7.4).¹³




FIG 7.4: Q-8. *Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? b) TV set. Q-43. Did you vote in the presidential runoff election of 1393 or not? (percentage who say that they voted in the runoff election, and do or do not use TV for information)*

Afghans who say they watch television are more likely to favor more liberal attire for women in public (Fig 7.5).¹⁴ This relationship was sustained after controlling for gender, age, household income, education, and settlement (i.e., rural/urban residency).¹⁵ Watching television is also found to have a positive relationship with support for women's education and employment, and a higher ideal age for women's marriage. Afghans who report watching television are significantly more supportive of the idea of women working outside the home¹⁶ and pursuing education.¹⁷ Those who report watching television are also significantly more likely to suggest an older age of marriage for both women and men.¹⁸ In spite of robust patterns observed here, it is worth noting that these patterns do not necessarily indicate causal relationships. For example, it might be the case that Afghans who already have more liberal views about women also prefer to watch television; it is not necessarily the case that watching television is shaping their views about women.

IEWS ON HOW WOMEN SHOULD DRESS IN PUBLIC BY TV VIEWERSHIP




FIG 7.5: D-8A. *Do you watch television? Q-69. In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (percentage of respondents who prefer each style of dress, based on television viewership)*

Afghans who say they watch television are likely to express less sympathy toward AOGs.¹⁹ The trend holds even after controlling for other demographic factors and perceptions.²⁰ Similarly, Afghans who report watching television are more likely to have higher confidence in the ANA and ANP.²¹ They are also more likely to say that the current government's negotiations with the Taliban are a bad idea.²²

Afghans who report watching television are more likely to be younger²³ and to play sports²⁴ than those who do not. While overall, fewer women than men say they play sports, women who report watching television are four times more likely to play sports than women who say they do not watch television; this effect exist for men as well, but to a lesser degree (Fig 7.6).




FIG 7.6: D-8A. *Do you watch television? D-21. Do you yourself play any sport? (percentage who play a sport, by TV viewership)*

End Notes

¹ Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority. Telecom Statistics. Accessed 6 October 2015. <http://atra.gov.af/en/page/telecom-statistics-2013>

² Ibid.

³ Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority. Coverage Footprint. Accessed 6 October 2015. <http://atra.gov.af/en/page/7000/7006>

⁴ “2015 World Press Freedom Index.” Reporters Without Borders. Accessed 6 October 2015. <https://index.rsrf.org/#!/index-details>

⁵ Percentage represents those who say they have “a lot of confidence” in the media.

⁶ Analysts have identified the following weakness in the current law: (1) Requesters of information may be required to disclose why they are requesting information, which is contrary to the principles of freedom of information; (2) There is no protection for civil servants who release information in good faith pursuant to the law or to expose wrongdoing; (3) Article 15 of the Access to Information Law, which addresses prohibitions on requested information, is vague and broad (e.g., concepts of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, and national interest are not clearly defined). Muqbel, Habibullah. “Right to Information: The Foundation for Transparent and Responsive Governance in Afghanistan.” Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 6 October 2015.

<http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/Policy%20Brief%20-%20Right%20to%20Information.pdf>

⁷ “Access to Information Law.” Ministry of Justice. 23 December 2014. Accessed 6 October 2015. http://moj.gov.af/content/files/OfficialGazette/01101/OG_01156.pdf

⁸ Press freedom is found to be negatively correlated with political instability, meaning if a country is experiencing political instability, freedom enjoyed by press in that country is more likely to suffer (Reporters Without Borders report a 0.59 correlation coefficient between its Press Freedom Index and the political instability indicator of The Institute for Economics and Peace). There are, however, exceptions to the case that include China, Malaysia, and Mexico. “How the Press Freedom Index Correlates with Other Indicators.” Reporters Without Borders. Accessed 6 October 2015. <https://index.rsrf.org/#!/insights/perspectives-other-indicators>

⁹ Data for mosques and community shuras are missing in the 2013 survey.

¹⁰ Age and using the internet as a source of news and information are negatively correlated ($r=0.06$, $p<0.0001$).

¹¹ “Afghans call to boycott trade with Pakistan for sheltering terror.” Khaama Press. 11 August 2015. Accessed 6 October 2015. <http://www.khaama.com/afghans-call-to-boycott-trade-with-pakistan-for-sheltering-terror-9582>

¹² Jhanmal, Zabihullah. “Afghan-Pak Trade Drops 40 Percent in Three Months: PAJCCI.” Tolo News. 15 September 2015. Accessed 6 October 2015. <https://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21398-afghan-pakistan-trade-drops-40-percent-in-past-three-months-pajcci>

¹³ Using probit regression, voting in the presidential runoff election of 1393 (q43) was regressed on television as source of obtaining news and information (q8b) and settlement (m6b), controlling for gender (d1), age (d2), education attainment (d10), perception of fear while voting in an election (q33a), and using radio (q8a), mobile phone (q8c), the internet (q8d), mosque, (q8e) and community *shura* (q8f) as source of obtaining news and information. The full model explained 5.6% of the variance in attitudes toward women’s public dress (Pseudo $R^2=0.0559$, $p<0.0001$).

¹⁴ $r=.22$, $p<0.0001$

¹⁵ Views toward women’s public dress (q69) was regressed on gender (d1), age (d2), income (a composite of d18a and d18b), education (d10), place of residence (i.e. urban/rural) (m6b), and television viewership (d8a). In a simple regression using only television viewership, watching television explained 4.6% of the variance in views on women’s public dress, more than any other variable. In the full model, television viewership predicts a 0.4 level increase toward more modest women’s public dress (1-6 levels) compared to those who reported not watching television ($\beta=.39$, $t=11.44$, $p<0.0001$). The full model explained 9.0% of the variance in attitudes toward women’s public dress ($R^2=0.0896$, $F(6, 8415)=106.59$, $p<0.0001$).

¹⁶ Working outside the home is a scale ($\alpha=0.85$) using questions q67a, q67b, q67c, q67d, q67e, q67f, q67g, and q67h, which measures agreement on with women working in various places including governmental offices, non-governmental organizations, hospitals or clinics, female-only schools, co-ed schools, army or police, private companies with female-only employees, and private companies with male and female employees.

¹⁷ Pursuing education is a scale ($\alpha=0.79$) using questions q65a, q65b, q65c, q65d, q65e, and q65f, which measures agreement with women’s education at various stages including Islamic *madrasa*, primary school, secondary school, university in the hometown province, university in another province, and studying abroad on a scholarship.

¹⁸ For relationship between television viewership and the best age for women to marry: $t(9534)=-13.7116$, $p<0.0001$, with those who reported watching television suggesting higher age of marriage for women. For relationship between television viewership and the best age for men to marry: $t(9534)=-16.5312$, $p<0.0001$, with those who reported watching television suggesting higher age of marriage for men.

¹⁹ $r=-.19$, $p<0.0001$

²⁰ Sympathy toward AOGs (q51) was regressed on gender (d1), age (d2), education (d10), income (a composite of d18a and d18b), urban / rural (m6b), general fear scale (alpha=.77), confidence in government scale (alpha=.85), exposure to corruption scale (alpha=.9), confidence in ANA scale (alpha=.84), confidence in ANP scale (alpha=.82), and television viewership (beta=0.1, t=-5.79). The model was weighted by urban/rural and excluding intercept interviews. The full model explains 18.3% of the variance in sympathy toward AOGs ($R^2=0.1833$, $F(11,6740)=107.19$, $p<.0001$).

²¹ For relationship between television viewership and confidence in ANA scale (alpha=.84): $r=.21$, $p<.0001$. For relationship between television viewership and confidence in ANP scale (alpha=.82): $r=.14$, $p<.0001$.

²² $r=-.07$, $p<.0001$

²³ $r=.05$, $p<.0001$

²⁴ $r=.15$, $p<.0001$



8 WOMEN IN SOCIETY

This past year included many milestones, opportunities, and disappointments for Afghan women. On the positive side, within the National Unity Government, women have increasingly been promoted to leadership positions. The cabinet now includes four female ministers,¹ up from three in the previous administration, and two new female provincial governors have been appointed in Daikundi and Ghor provinces.² A woman was also nominated to the Supreme Court for the first time,³ although her nomination was later rejected by the Afghan Parliament. As part of what donors and the Afghan government are calling Afghanistan’s “Transformation Decade” (2015-2024), several new programs for women were launched in 2015 to support women’s leadership, rights, and participation in the workforce. The largest of these is the Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs project (“PROMOTE”), an Afghan government initiative that seeks to benefit 75,000 Afghan women aged 18-30, supported by more than USD \$400 million in donor funds.

However, women’s rights and safety in Afghanistan remain under threat, as illustrated by several high profile cases in 2015. The most prominent occurred in March 2015, when Farkhunda Malikzada, a young Afghan woman studying Islamic law, was falsely accused of burning the Qur’an in front of a religious landmark in Kabul. An angry mob of men brutally attacked her and burned her to death. Outrage erupted among Afghans and members of the international community. In response, Afghans organized mass protests, and some of the perpetrators were sentenced to time in prison. An appeals court decision later reversed sentences for key defendants, and some of those previously sentenced were released from jail.⁴ Following outcries over the reversal, in July 2015 a spokesman for President Ashraf Ghani promised to reassess the case with the help of the Attorney General’s Office.⁵

Many Afghans are still grappling with questions about women’s rights and roles in various aspects of public life. On the one hand, most Afghans favor women having an expanded scope of rights and social and economic opportunities. For example, 64.0% of Afghans in the survey say women should be able to work outside the home. A majority of Afghans say they disagree with certain traditional practices that violate the rights of women and girls, such as *baad* and *baddal*,⁶ and are supportive of a woman’s right to her share of an inheritance (*miras*). A majority of Afghans say it is acceptable for women to work in a number of public settings, and an overwhelming 93.6% support women’s equal access to education in Islamic *madrastas*. A high proportion also support equal opportunities at the primary school (84.5%) and high school (82.8%) level, as well as at the university level if the university is located in a woman’s home province (73.8%). This year also shows a modest but encouraging increase in the percentage of women who are aware of institutions or organizations in their community where women can resolve their domestic and legal problems (23.4%, up from 19.3% in 2011).

However, the number of Afghans who say they strongly agree with women having equal access to educational opportunities has decreased over time, from 58.5% in 2006 to 37.8% in 2015, a drop strongest among Afghan men in rural areas. Support for the idea of women working outside the home has also gradually declined, from 70.9% in 2006 to 64.0%. In the wake of an historic presidential election, the number of Afghans who say women should make their own voting decisions has dropped to a record low of 50.1% in 2015.⁷ This chapter explores Afghans’ opinions on a variety of issues affecting

Afghan women, particularly access to justice, cultural practices, political participation, education, and economic opportunities.

8.1 JUSTICE

Key Questions

Q-52C. *If your household were to have family problems, from whom would you ask for help to resolve it?*

Q-61. *In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority, where can women go to have their problem(s) resolved?*

Q-62A. *What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

Q62B. *Have you ever contacted this or another organization, institution, or authority that helps solve women's problems in your area?*

Q-54. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department⁸ or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?*

Q-59E. *Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? e) State courts treat men and women equally.*

Q-60E. *Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras? e) There should be local women's jirgas and shuras.*

Respondents were asked where they would go for assistance with family problems. As described in more detail in Chapter 5 (Governance), people are most likely to turn to friends and family, followed by elders of the local *shura*, *maliks/khans*, government departments, and the district office. At the national level, there is no significant difference in how men and women respond to this question, but there are some differences in the way urban and rural women say they would seek assistance with family problems. For example, urban women (40.4%) are more likely than rural (26.5%) to ask for assistance from friends and family. Rural women, meanwhile, are more likely to ask for help from *maliks/khans* (10.4%) than women from urban areas (4.8%).

Looking at the specific types of disputes or cases that respondents say they have taken to an external party for resolution over the past year, women are more likely than men to go to the *Huquq* Department with matters related to family problems and divorce (Fig. 8.1).

Since 2011, respondents have been asked if there is an organization, institution, or authority in their area where women can go to have their problems resolved. In 2015, nearly one quarter (23.4%) of respondents say they are aware of one in their area, a modest but encouraging increase from 2014 (19.2%). Among those who are aware of such an organization, institution, or authority, half (45.7%) identify the Directorate of Women's Affairs, while 9.7% identify the District Governor's Office and 9.0% identify the Human Rights Council/Office.⁹ Urban respondents (28.1%) are more likely than

rural respondents (21.9%) to say they are aware of such a resource, and women (24.0%) are more likely than men (22.8%) to be aware. Among women, the lowest rate of awareness of a place where women can go for assistance with their problems is in the Central/Hazarajat region (5.5%), and the highest is in the South East region (31.0%).

A new question included this year asked respondents if they have ever contacted an organization or authority that helps women resolve their problems. Of the 23.4% who are aware of this type of organization, 34.3% have had contact with one. While responses show no significant differences between men and women at the national level, rural respondents (37.2%) are more likely than urban respondents (27.4%) to have contacted an organization that assists women.

**FAMILY PROBLEMS AND DIVORCE CASES
TAKEN TO HUQUQ**




FIG. 8.1: Q-54. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?* **Q-55.** *What kind of a case or dispute was it? (percentage who took a divorce or other family-related case to the Huquq Department)*

Each year, the survey tracks perceptions of state courts among people who say they had cases in these courts. This year, among the 8.7% of all respondents who had a case in the state courts, 47.0% somewhat or strongly agree that the state courts treat men and women equally (51.1% of women and 43.1% of men). Respondents from the North East (61.0%) and Central/Kabul (55.6%) regions are most likely to agree with the statement, while people from the South West (62.9%) and West (50.9%) regions are most likely to disagree.

Respondents who took their cases forward for resolution by a *jirga* or *shura* (9.3% of all respondents) were also asked if there should be local women's *jirgas* and *shuras*. A majority of respondents somewhat or strongly agree with the statement (68.0% of women and 66.3% of men).

8.2 CUSTOMS AND CULTURAL PRACTICES

Key Questions

Q-72. *What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married?*

Q-73. *What do you think is the best age for a man to get married?*

Q-69. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (show card pictured in Fig. 8.3).*

Q-63. *Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? a) The practice of baad is acceptable, b) The practice of baddal is acceptable, c) A daughter is entitled to part of her deceased father's inheritance (miras).*

When asked about the best age for women to marry, responses range from 12 to 31 years (the range in 2014 was 10 to 38 years). In 2015, the most frequent responses for a woman's ideal marital age are 18 and 20 years old (31.9% and 25.1% of respondents, respectively). Responses on the most appropriate age for men to marry range from 12 to 45 years, with the most frequent responses being 20 (21.9%) and 25 (18.6%) years (Fig. 8.2). There is little difference in male and female opinions regarding the best ages for men and women to get married.

BEST MARRIAGE AGE FOR MEN AND WOMEN




FIG. 8.2: Q-72. *What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married?* **Q-73.** *What do you think is the best age for a man to get married?* (percentage of respondents citing each age)

Attitudes toward appropriate public dress for women are comparable to last year's responses. This year, 35.1% of Afghans say that the *burqa* (Fig. 8.3, Image 1) is the most appropriate public dress for women, followed by 27.7% who say that the *niqab* (Image 2) is the most appropriate. Only 1.2% say that being

unveiled (Image 6) is most appropriate. More men (39.4%) than women (31.3%) say women should wear the *burqa* in public, whereas twice as many women (18.1%) than men (9.7 %) agree that a form of *hijab* (Image 4) is the most appropriate attire for women in public.

Some perceptions regarding appropriate attire for women are tied to education, region, urban/rural residence, and ethnicity. As education level rises, the preference for the *burqa* decreases: 40.2% of those with no schooling, 34.8% of those with some or complete primary education, 27.3% of those with some or complete secondary education, and 24.5% of those with higher education report a preference for the *burqa*.¹⁰ In contrast, there is little variance in education levels among respondents who prefer the *niqab*: 26.8% of those with no education, 27.9% of those with some or complete primary education, 29.5% of those with some or complete secondary education, and 28.3% of those with higher education education report a preference for the *niqab*.

Rural respondents are most likely to report a preference for the *burqa* (39.5%) and the *niqab* (27.6%), while urban residents are more likely to state a preference for the *niqab* (28.0%) and *hijab* (22.1%). Pashtuns (47.6%) are more likely than all other ethnic groups to say the *burqa* is the most appropriate public attire for women, and Hazaras (11.6%) are the least likely to say so.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC




FIG. 8.3: Q-69. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (percentage of respondents who selected each image)*

As Afghanistan develops, its citizens continue to negotiate traditional and modern cultural practices. The survey assesses men's and women's perceptions of three practices that relate to women: *baad*, *baddal*, and *miras*. *Baad* refers to the traditional practice of resolving a dispute by giving away a daughter to

another party as penalty or payment, such as to settle a debt, grievance, or conflict between families, while *baddal* refers to the exchange of daughters between families for marriage. This is often, but not always a form of forced marriage and may have economic implications.¹¹

Most Afghans (80.4%) disagree (either somewhat or strongly) with the practice of *baad* (81.2% of women and 79.4% of men). Fewer, though still a clear majority (64.7%), disagree with the practice of *baddal*, including 68.2% of women and 60.9% of men. Both practices are more common in rural than urban areas, and Afghans in urban areas are significantly more likely to disagree with *baad* (90.7%) than those in rural areas (76.9%). Importantly, because *baad* and *baddal* are traditional Afghan practices, some Afghans may not feel comfortable expressing disapproval that contradicts tradition, even if they harbor private reservations toward each. For topics such as these, where social desirability bias may be an issue, it is often useful to examine responses of strong agreement or strong disagreement, rather than some agreement or some disagreement. Residents of the Central/Kabul region are most likely to express strong disagreement (82.7%) with the practice of *baad*, while Afghans living in the East region are least likely to strongly disagree (49.3%). Among Afghanistan's major ethnic groups, Tajiks are most likely to strongly disagree (69.7%) with the practice of *baad*, followed by Uzbeks (62.4%), Hazaras (60.6%), and Pashtuns (56.6%). In addition, 60.9% of respondents belonging to other minority ethnic groups (e.g. Nooristanis, Turkmens, Balochs) strongly disagree with the practice of *baad*.

Miras, meanwhile, refers to a daughter's inheritance of a portion of her deceased father's estate. While a daughter has a right to inheritance in *Shari'ah* (Islamic) law, some Afghan families do not allow it based on local cultural practice.¹² Overall, 87.8% of Afghans strongly or somewhat agree that a daughter is entitled to *miras*. More urban residents (74.2%) than rural residents (59.5%) strongly agree that a daughter is entitled to a part of her deceased father's inheritance. Those with no education (59.5%) are much less likely to support this statement than respondents with higher education (75.6%).

8.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Key Questions

- Q-70.** Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?
- Q-68.** Do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? a) Member of a Community Development Council, b) Governor of a province, c) CEO of a large company, d) Minister or cabinet member, e) Running for president of Afghanistan.
- Q-71.** If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

Afghan women currently constitute 27.7% of the elected positions in parliament's Lower House, and 17.6% of those in the Upper House, notably more than the proportion found in many Western nations. However, stated support for equal representation of men and women in political leadership positions has declined in recent years, from a high of 51.1% in 2008 to 43.6% in 2015. Meanwhile, the number

of Afghans who say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men has increased over time, from 36.8% in 2006 to 42.3% in 2015 (Fig. 8.4).




FIG. 8.4: Q-70. Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership? (percentage who say “mostly for men,” mostly for women,” and “equal for both men and women”)

Attitudes toward women in political leadership positions vary according to several demographic factors, including gender, region, and ethnicity. Women (52.9%) are more likely than men (32.9%) to support women’s equal access to political leadership positions, a pattern consistent across all regions, age groups, and ethnic groups. Nationwide, most Afghan men (56.3%) say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, compared to only 30.0% of women.

Regionally, men are most likely to say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men in the South West (58.7%), and least likely to say so in the Central/Hazarajat region (18.8%). In all regions except for the East and South West, men are more than twice as likely as women to say that political leadership positions should be for men. However, support for women in political leadership positions has increased in some areas over time. For example, stated support for women’s equal representation in leadership positions increased in the Central/Hazarajat region from 59.3% in 2014 to 73.9% in 2015, while in the Central/Kabul region, this figure increased marginally from 49.0% to 52.2%, and in the South East from 41.4% to 43.9%.

In 2015, the survey included new questions to explore Afghans’ perceptions of the acceptability of women’s access to specific types of leadership positions. Like topics of *baad* and *baddal*, questions about women’s issues can be sensitive and subject to social desirability bias, where respondents may express agreement even if they hold opposite opinions privately. For these, it is again useful to examine responses

of strong agreement and strong disagreement, rather than some agreement or some disagreement. Among the various leadership positions, Afghans are most favorable toward the idea of women serving on community development councils (CDCs), with 35.1% in strong agreement and only 10.2% in strong disagreement. Respondents were least favorable toward the idea of women running for president, with 24.6% in strong agreement and 23.2% in strong disagreement. Afghans state similar levels of strong agreement with women's access to the positions of governor, CEO of a large company, and minister or cabinet member (27.2%, 25.9%, and 27.6%, respectively) (Fig. 8.5).

WOMEN'S ACCESS TO LEADERSHIP POSITIONS




FIG. 8.5: Q-68. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (percentage of respondents who “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”)*

Demographic considerations of gender, geographic location, and education level appear to significantly differentiate responses to these questions. For example, more women (39.1%) than men (30.5%) strongly agree that women should be able to serve on the CDCs. When asked whether women should be able to run for president, 28.1% of women and 20.5% of men strongly agree.

Geographic variables, including urban/rural residency, region, and province have an even greater impact. Urban respondents (47.9%) are far more likely than rural respondents (30.9%) to strongly agree that women can be members of CDCs, and although 37.5% of urban respondents say that it is acceptable for women to run for president, only 20.3% of rural respondents are in favor. Regionally, more people in the Central/Kabul (45.0%) and Central/Hazarajat (42.1%) regions strongly agree that women can be provincial governors, and people in the South West (34.5%) and East (24.4%) are most likely to strongly disagree (Fig. 8.6). A large majority of respondents in Parwan province (74.7%) strongly agree that a woman can be a governor of a province, followed by Kabul (49.4%), Panjshir (44.0%), and Bamyan (43.9%). In contrast, 62.2% of respondents in Zabul and 61.4% of respondents in Paktika province strongly disagree.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR




FIG. 8.6: Q-68. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? b) Governor of a province (percentage who "strongly agree")*

Looking at differences by education level, 41.4% of Afghans with higher education strongly agree that women can be governor of a province, compared to 23.5% of Afghans who never attended school. Over one-third (35.3%) of those with higher education strongly agree that women can run for the office of president, while only 21.3% of those who never attended school strongly agree.

Each year the survey tracks Afghans' views on women's independence in voting, a key measure of public opinion on women's capacity to make political decisions that impact not only themselves, but the country as a whole. Only half of respondents (50.1%) say that women should make their own voting decisions, a decrease from 2014 (56.0%) and the lowest percentage since 2008. The percentage of those who say men should make women's voting decisions for them increased from 17.0% in 2014 to 21.9% in 2015. More women (51.6%) than men (48.3%) say that women should make independent voting decisions. However, since 2008, the percentage of both men and women who say women should decide for themselves has declined (Fig. 8.7). This decline may reflect rising concerns around women's safety and security, such as when traveling to a voting station.




FIG. 8.7: Q-71. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (percentage of men and women who say that “women should decide for themselves”)*

Afghans in urban areas (60.9%) are more likely than those in rural areas (46.5%) to support women’s independence in voting. Respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region (68.4%) and the Central/Kabul region (61.0%) are most likely to say that women should decide for themselves, while respondents in the South West (38.9%) region are more likely than people in other regions to say that men should make voting decisions for women.

Opinions differ among ethnic communities as well. A majority of Hazaras (64.2%) and approximately half of Tajiks (53.2%), Uzbeks (52.3%), and other ethnic groups (49.6%) say that women should make their own voting decisions, while only 43.2% of Pashtuns say women should decide on their own. Respondents with higher education are much more likely to say that women should decide for themselves (63.0%) than those who never attended school (45.9%).

8.4 EDUCATION

Key Questions

- Q64.** *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat?*
- Q65.** *And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat? a) Islamic madrasa education, b) Primary school, c) High school, d) University in your province, e) Studying in another province, f) Studying abroad on scholarship.*

Consistent with previous surveys, respondents were asked if they agree or disagree with the idea that women should have the same educational opportunities as men. The vast majority (78.2%) somewhat or strongly agree with the statement (down from 91.5% in 2006), while only 20.3% disagree (strongly or somewhat). Concurrent with a steady decrease in the level of strong agreement with gender equality in education (from 58.5% in 2006 to 37.8% in 2015), there has been an increase of those saying that they “agree somewhat” and “disagree somewhat” (Fig. 8.8).

When asked if they agree with equal education opportunities, women (81.8%) are more likely than men (74.1%) to state support. Overall, as respondents’ level of education rises, so does their support for women having the same education opportunities as men and for women having equal access to various specific levels of education, such as primary school, high school, and higher education.¹³ Over a third (34.6%) of respondents with no education and over half (53.9%) of respondents with higher education strongly support the general idea of women having the same opportunities as men. Similarly, 40.6% of respondents with no education and 66.1% of respondents with higher education strongly support higher education opportunities for women.

SUPPORT FOR EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
AGREE STRONGLY	59	56	57	55	50	50	48	44	38
AGREE SOMEWHAT	33	33	32	32	37	35	39	40	40
DISAGREE SOMEWHAT	5	7	6	8	7	9	9	12	16
DISAGREE STRONGLY	3	3	3	4	4	5	3	4	5

FIG. 8.8: Q-64. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat? (percentage of level of agreement)*

Notably, support for specific education opportunities for women is much higher than support for women having the same educational opportunities as men in general. Nearly all Afghans (93.6%) support (either strongly or somewhat) women’s equal access to education in Islamic *madrasas*, and a high proportion support equal opportunities at the primary school (84.5%) and high school (82.8%) level, as well as at the university level in a woman’s home province (73.8%). Respondents are less supportive of equal education opportunities that involve a woman studying outside her home province (48.0%) or abroad (35.5%). Women (41.2%) are more likely than men (29.1%) to support the idea of women pursuing scholarships abroad, and opportunities for studying at higher levels of education in another province (53.3% of women compared to 42.1% of men).

More urban respondents (57.4%) than rural (44.9%) agree that women should be able to study outside their home province. There is considerable regional variation in opinion. A majority of people in the Central/Hazarajat (76.4%) region agree that women and men should have equal opportunities to study in another province, while only 28.9% of people from the South West region agree.

While there is overall low stated support for women studying abroad on scholarship, it varies according

to ethnicity. Consistent with 2014 findings, Hazaras are most likely to agree with the idea (57.6%), followed by Uzbeks (44.2%), and Tajiks (35.8%). Pashtuns are the most likely to disagree with equal opportunities for women to study abroad (70.7%).

8.5 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

Key Questions

Q-66. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?*

Q-67. *For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places: a) Government offices, b) Nongovernment organizations (NGOs), c) Hospitals or clinics, d) Female-only schools, e) Co-ed schools, f) Army/police, g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only, h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room.*

D-19. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?*

The percentage of Afghans who support women working outside the home has been gradually but steadily declining, from 70.9% in 2006 to 64.0% in 2015 (Fig. 8.9). Women (72.9%) are much more likely than men (53.8%) to agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home. Stated support for women working outside the home is highest in the Central/Hazarajat (78.9%) and Central/Kabul (74.7%) regions, and lowest is in the South West (47.5%) and East (54.9%) regions. Respondents who never attended school (61.2%) are less likely to agree with the idea of women working outside the home than those with higher education (74.5%).

ATTITUDE TOWARD WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
WOMEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	71	70	69	67	64	62	66	64	68	64
WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	27	28	27	29	33	35	33	34	30	34

FIG. 8.9: Q-66. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? (percentage who agree with the first or second statement)*

Afghans' views vary widely on the acceptability of various specific employment venues for women. Among the places of employment described in the survey, female-only schools are viewed as most acceptable (with 85.7% strongly or somewhat agreeing), followed by hospitals or clinics (83.7%), government offices (70.7%), and co-ed schools (66.5%). The level of support for women working in NGOs (44.2%) and the army or police (41.4%) is far lower (Fig. 8.10).

For the first time, this year's survey asked about the acceptability of women's employment in two types of private sector situations: a company with only female employees, and a company where men and women work together in the same room. A high percentage of respondents (64.4%) say they disagree with the idea of women working in a private company where men and women work together, and more than half (51.2%) say they disagree with the idea of women working in a private company that only employs women.

Women find all employment venues more acceptable than men, but there are only modest differences in male and female opinion about the acceptability of most venues. Similarly high percentages of men (83.8%) and women (87.4%) say it is acceptable for women to work in girls' schools and hospitals/clinics (85.4% of women and 81.7% of men). Similarly low percentages of men (45.2%) and women (51.1%) say that it is acceptable for a woman to work in women-only companies, in companies alongside men (38.7% of women and 30.3% of men), and in the army or police force (43.6% of women and 38.9% of men). Interestingly, there is a wider gender gap in opinions about the acceptability of women working in government offices (77.1% of women and 63.6% of men), co-ed schools (71.1% of women and 61.4% of men), and NGOs (51.1% of women and 36.3% of men).

Different factors affect opinions about the acceptability of employment venues. There are variations by province about whether women should be able to work in NGOs. The majority of people in Daikundi (81.4%), Bamyan (74.5%), and Ghazni (59.5%) say it would be acceptable, while only a small minority of respondents in Zabul (1.1%), Paktika (10.1%), and Parwan (11.8%) say this. Ethnicity affects opinions about employment in the army or police force. While the majority of Pashtuns (61.4%) say that the army or police force is not an acceptable working venue for women, the majority of Hazaras (53.6%) say it is acceptable.




FIG. 8.10: Q-67. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? a) Government offices, b) Nongovernment organizations (NGOs), c) Hospitals or clinics, d) Female-only schools, e) Co-ed schools, f) Army/police, g)

*A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only, h)
A private company outside the homes (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room (percentage of respondents who “strongly” and “somewhat agree,” and “strongly” and “somewhat disagree”)*

The percentage of Afghans who say that female family members have a role in household income has steadily increased over time, from 13.6% in 2009 to 22.6% in 2015 (Fig. 8.11). Both urban (17.3%) and rural (24.3%) respondents are increasingly likely to say their female family members are contributing to household income. Some of this increase may reflect a strategic response to household financial difficulties.




FIG. 8.11: D-19. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not? (percentage of respondents who say “yes”)*

8.6 FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Several social and demographic factors may help explain why some Afghans are more supportive of women’s rights than others. These factors are not presented here as causes for why a person would or would not support women’s rights, but rather as tendencies to highlight within the Afghan context. Among these factors, noted briefly in Figure in 8.12, gender and level of education have a significant relationship with level of support for women’s rights. Women are more likely than men to support rights for women, while more educated men and women are both more likely to support women’s rights. Interestingly, age and income have no significant relationship with support for women’s rights.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

AFGHANS WHO ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS:	AFGHANS WHO ARE LESS SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS:
ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE WOMEN	ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE MEN
ARE MORE LIKELY TO LIVE IN URBAN AREAS	ARE MORE LIKELY TO LIVE IN RURAL AREAS
HAVE LESS FEAR OF PARTICIPATING IN SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES	HAVE MORE FEAR OF PARTICIPATING IN SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
ARE MORE LIKELY TO THINK THAT ISIS POSES A SECURITY THREAT	ARE LESS LIKELY TO THINK THAT ISIS POSES A SECURITY THREAT
USE TELEVISION OR INTERNET MORE THAN RADIO AS A SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION	USE RADIO MORE THAN TELEVISION OR INTERNET AS A SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION

FIG. 8.12: Results are based on analysis of a 6-item "Support for Women's Rights" scale, which includes **Q-64** (support for women having equal opportunities in education as men), **Q-65D** (support for women having access to a university education in their province), **Q-66** (support for women working outside the home), **Q-67A** (support for women working in government offices), **Q-68A/E** (support for women holding different leadership positions), and **Q-70** (support for women holding political leadership positions).¹⁴

End Notes

¹These include heads of the Ministry of Women's Affairs; the Ministry of Higher Education; the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and the Disabled; and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics.

²The female governor of Bamiyan province, Habiba Sarabi, resigned in 2014 in order to run for second vice-president to presidential nominee Zalmi Rasool.

³Joyenda, M.A. (9 July 2015) "MPs accused of discrimination after rejecting female Supreme Court nominee," Tolo News, accessed 31 October 2015: <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20382-mps-accused-of-discrimination-after-rejecting-female-supreme-court-nominee>

⁴Kargar, Z. (August 11, 2015) "Farkhunda, the making of a martyr." BBC News. Accessed 31 October 2015: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33810338>

⁵Aryan, A.W. (5 July 2015) "Ghani to have Farkhunda case reassessed following outrage over appeal decision." Tolo News. Accessed 31 October 2015: www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20326-ghani-to-have-farkhunda-case-reassessed-following-outrage-over-appeal-decision.

⁶*Baad* refers to the traditional practice of giving away a daughter to another party as penalty or payment for an offense to resolve a dispute, such as to settle a debt, grievance, or conflicts between families. *Baddal* refers to the exchange of daughters between families in marriage. This is often, but not always a form of forced marriage and may have economic implications (e.g. there is generally no bride price involved).

⁷The question (Q-71) was first introduced in the 2008 survey. The question asks, "If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?"

⁸The *Huquq* Department of the Ministry of Justice is responsible for handling civil cases, such as divorce or property. The *Huquq* have a presence in every provincial center, and in some but not all districts.

⁹The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, an independent national organization mandated to promote, protect, and monitor human rights in Afghanistan, has provincial offices throughout the country and has been involved in the investigation of human rights abuses. It also sometimes serves as a mechanism of local dispute resolution.

¹⁰Secondary education in Afghanistan includes middle school and high school. Those with a 13th or 14th grade education (i.e. post-high school) were grouped together with those who had some university education or a university degree.

¹¹Supra note 6.

¹²These three practices are all addressed directly or indirectly as acts of violence against women in the 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women.

¹³Correlation for education level and specific education opportunities: $r=0.1322$, $p<0.0001$.

¹⁴Using OLS regression, support for women's rights scale ($\alpha=0.9001$) was regressed onto gender (d1), age (d2), income (d18), education (d10), urban/rural (m6b), perception of fear participating in socio-political activities scale ($\alpha=0.7713$), perception about ISIS being a threat to security (q15), marital status (d13), using radio, television, mobile phone, the internet, mosque and community *shuras* as source of obtaining information (q8), confidence in ANA scale ($\alpha=0.843$), confidence in ANP scale ($\alpha=0.8202$), perception of religious leaders be involved in politics (q31), satisfaction with the way democracy works in Afghanistan (q32), sympathy with armed opposition groups (q51), years studying at Islamic madrasa (d11), willingness to leave Afghanistan if given opportunity (d16), having a female household member contributing to income (d19), playing sport (d21). The model was weighted by urban/rural and excluding intercept interviews. The full model explained 28.05% of variance in how much respondents support women's rights ($R^2=0.2805$, $F(23,5506)=93.35$, $p<0.0001$).



APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

1. SUMMARY

The Asia Foundation's annual *Survey of the Afghan People* is Afghanistan's longest-running nationwide survey of adult Afghan attitudes and opinions. Since 2004, over 75,000 Afghan men and women have been surveyed from more than 400 districts representing all 34 provinces. The 2015 survey includes a sample of 9,586 men (50.6%) and women (49.4%) above 18 years of age residing in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The sample was stratified by province and by geography (urban/rural status) using the most recent population data (2015-2016 estimates) released by the Central Statistics Organization (CSO). The total sample consisted of 18% urban households and 82% rural households.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted by 939 trained Afghan enumerators matched with respondents by gender (i.e., men interviewed men, and women interviewed women). All enumerators were resident of the provinces where they conducted interviews. Interviews were conducted between June 11 and June 28, 2015. Approximately 92% of interviews were conducted before the start of Ramadan on June 18, with a remaining 8% of interviews, along with ongoing back checks and quality control efforts, continuing during Ramadan at a slower pace. Fieldwork quality control backchecks continued until July 13. Interviews ranged from 20 to 65 minutes in length, with the average interview lasting 37 minutes (down from 41 minutes in 2014).

As in previous years, fieldwork was conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), and technical and statistical support was provided by D3 Systems, Inc. Third-party monitoring was conducted by Sayara Research for both fieldwork and enumerator training.¹ All data is public and free for immediate download here: <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey>.

Sampling points were determined using random selection techniques. In cases where a selected district was not accessible to enumerators (due to insecurity, weather, village could not be found, etc.), an alternative method called an "intercept interview" was used for comparison. Responses from these interviews are used to estimate the direction of potential bias on survey questions caused by sampling replacements. In this method, male enumerators "intercept" a sample of male respondents at public locations (e.g. bus stops) as they are traveling to or from a highly insecure sampling point not otherwise accessible to enumerators. These responses are then compared to the responses of men in the main sample to estimate possible bias. Sampling points that were designated for female respondents but which could not be accessed safely by female enumerators were replaced with different female interviews within the same strata (same province and urban/rural designation). Due to cultural and security concerns, intercept interviews did not include women. All statistics reported in this book are therefore based on a co-ed national random sample of 8,912 Afghans and a supplementary sample of 674 Afghan men living in highly inaccessible areas reached through intercept interviews.

ACSOR staff tracked disposition outcomes for all interviews by using the American Association for Public Opinion Research's (AAPOR) standard codes, which have been adapted to the Afghan context. For this sample, the response rate is 83.8%, the cooperation rate is 95.0%, the refusal rate is 3.4%, and

the contact rate is 89.0%.

Each year, the overall Margin of Error (MoE) for the survey is estimated on the basis of the binomial question, “Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” (x4 in the merged dataset). The estimated design effect is 2.53,² and the complex MoE at the 95% confidence level is +/-1.6% for the probability sample.³ This MoE takes into account both the complex survey design, which contains disproportionate stratification and two levels of clustering (the district and sampling point), as well as the weighting for provincial representativeness.

2. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The 2015 survey questionnaire included 31 administrative questions (used to track and manage each interview, such as the date and time), 32 demographic questions (such as age and gender), and 94 substantive questions. This year, 11 new substantive questions were introduced, and 12 were modified from previous surveys. The questionnaire addresses a wide range of topics, including infrastructure and development, rule of law, governance, security, corruption, elections, reconciliation, women’s issues, and social issues. Questions are determined on the basis of inputs from the Afghan government and other stakeholders, as well as on the basis of statistical and cognitive testing. Each year, proposed new questions are vetted to ensure that they are easy for an ordinary Afghan to understand, are not threatening or leading, and do not contain double negatives or other complications that threaten response validity. In total, the 2015 questionnaire went through 14 iterations before translation and back-translation into Dari and Pashto.

3. ENUMERATOR COMPOSITION AND TRAINING

A description of the field team composition by gender and experience is provided in Figure 9.1. The number of supervisors and male and female enumerators by province appears in Figure 9.2.

	FEMALE	MALE	TOTAL
NUMBER OF FEMALE / MALE ENUMERATORS	487	452	939
NUMBER OF ENUMERATORS PREVIOUSLY USED IN ACSOR PROJECT	476	445	921
NUMBER OF ENUMERATORS NEW TO A ACSOR PROJECT	11	7	18

FIG. 9.1: *Description of field team by gender and experience level*

	NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS	NUMBER OF FEMALE ENUMERATORS	NUMBER OF MALE ENUMERATORS	TOTAL NUMBER OF ENUMERATORS
KABUL	1	40	40	80
KAPISA	1	15	15	30
PARWAN	1	17	18	35
WARDAK	1	15	18	33
LOGAR	1	7	6	13
GHAZNI	1	14	13	27
PAKTIA	1	9	14	23
PAKTIKA	1	4	13	17
KHOST	1	9	9	18
NANGARHAR	1	18	18	36
LAGHMAN	1	18	17	35
KUNAR	1	10	10	20
NOORISTAN	2	7	9	16
BADAKHSHAN	1	10	11	21
TAKHAR	1	14	14	28
BAGHLAN	1	25	24	49
KUNDUZ	1	18	19	37
BALKH	1	16	15	31
SAMANGAN	1	16	21	37
JAWZJAN	1	10	9	19
SAR-I-PUL	1	10	9	19
FARYAB	1	10	13	23
BADGHIS	1	11	13	24
HERAT	1	14	14	28
FARAH	1	11	13	24
NIMROZ	1	7	11	18
HELMAND	1	11	11	22
KANDAHAR	1	18	18	36
ZABUL	1	16	11	27
URUZGHAN	1	16	19	35
GHOR	1	8	9	17
BAMYAN	1	10	10	20
PANJSHIR	1	11	12	23
DAIKUNDI	1	7	11	18
TOTAL	35	487	453	939

FIG. 9.2: Description of field team and gender of enumerators by province

The central training for provincial supervisors was held in Kabul on June 8 and 9, 2015, and was led by ACSOR project managers and a field manager. Thirty-five ACSOR supervisors were in attendance, as were a research analyst from D3 Systems, Inc. and staff from The Asia Foundation. Topics covered

during the training include:

- Proper household and respondent selection, including random walk procedure to select households, and correct use of the Kish grid to select respondents.
- Correct use of the contact sheet to record the result of all contact attempts.
- Full review of the questionnaire content.
- Proper recording of questions.
- Appropriate interviewing techniques and validation protocols.
- Back-check and quality control procedures.
- GPS coordinates and devices.

Mock interviews were conducted to provide enumerators with a better understanding of the logic and concept of the questions. Following the Kabul training, provincial trainings were led by the supervisors in their respective provinces between June 10 and June 13, 2015. Third-party monitors attended the trainings in order to ensure that trainings met the standards of The Asia Foundation and ACSOR.

4. SAMPLE DESIGN

- Target Population: Afghan adults (age 18+) in 34 provinces.
- Target Sample: 9,500 Afghan adults in 34 provinces.
- Achieved Sample: 9,586 Afghan adults in 34 provinces.

Step 1: A base sample was first stratified disproportionately by province, desired margin of error, and power estimates. A minimum of 200 interviews was carried out in each province. Within each province, the sample was then stratified by urban and rural population figures from the 2015-2016 CSO estimates. Each of the 65 strata was allocated at least one primary sampling unit (PSU) to ensure that the entire target population had an equal probability of selection.

Step 2: Districts were selected via probability proportional to size (PPS) systematic sampling. Districts served as the PSU. Each PSU contained two sampling points, one of male respondents and one of female respondents. This was done to allow for gender-matched interviewing, which is a cultural requirement of working in Afghanistan. Each PSU was chosen via PPS sampling within its stratum. In order to obtain information on the perceptions of Afghans living in insecure areas that were not accessible to the enumerators, “intercept” interviews were held with people coming out of these areas to towns and markets in more secure areas. For the 2015 survey, approximately 7% of the interviews (n=674) were intercept interviews. Intercept interviews were conducted in 64 districts across 25 provinces. These intercept interviews are identified by the variables “Method” and “Method2” in the data set.

Step 3: The settlements within districts were selected by simple random sampling. These served as the secondary sampling unit (SSU). Within urban strata, neighborhoods (called *nabias* in cities and towns) were used, while in rural strata villages were used. Because population data for settlement sizes does not exist, a simple random selection among all known settlements was used to select locations. In this survey, six interviews were done per sampling point.

In compliance with Afghan culture, interviews conducted by ACSOR enumerators were gender-specific, with female enumerators interviewing women and male enumerators interviewing men. Some districts with significant insurgent activity, military operations, or lack of transportation had male-only samples depending on conditions. In the case that a sampling point designated for female interviews was only accessible to male enumerators, it was replaced with a female sampling point from within the same strata (same province and same urban/rural status).

Step 4: Field managers used maps generated from several sources to select starting points within each SSU. In rural areas, the system required enumerators to start in one of five randomly selected locations (northern, southern, eastern, or western edges of the rural settlement, or in the center). In urban areas, because it is more difficult to differentiate neighborhood borders, a random location (north, south, east, west, or center) was provided to the enumerator and they started from an identifiable landmark in the vicinity (e.g., a school or mosque).

Step 5: To bolster the randomization process, each sampling point was also randomly assigned a different first contacted house: either the first, second, or third house the enumerator arrived at following the start of the random walk. After approaching the first contacted house, the enumerator then followed a set interval to select all other households for inclusion in the sample. For example, selecting every third house on the right in rural areas and every fifth house on the right in urban areas.

Step 6: After selecting a household, enumerators were instructed to use a Kish grid for randomizing selection of the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and their age in descending order, and the respondent was selected according to the rules of the Kish grid. The Kish grid provides a random selection criteria based on which visit the household represents in his or her random walk and the number of inhabitants living in the household. Column numbers in the Kish grid that accompanied the questionnaire were pre-coded in order to help prevent fraud or convenience selection based on available people. Enumerators were not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the respondent selected by the Kish grid. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, enumerators moved on to the next household according to the random route.

Typically enumerators were required to make two call-backs before replacing the household. Call-backs were made at different times on the same day or on a different day to increase the likelihood of engaging the designated respondent. While enumerators were able to complete some call-backs, the vast majority (97.7%) of the interviews were completed on the first attempt.

Due to the high rate of unemployment in Afghanistan and efforts by the survey team to select the best time of day for interviews, completion of the interview on the first attempt is common.

Figure 9.3 provides population percentages for each province as supplied by the Central Statistics Office, the unweighted sample, and the weighted sample.

	PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION	PERCENTAGE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (INCLUDES INTERCEPT INTERVIEWS)	PERCENTAGE IN WEIGHTED SAMPLE (WGT3) ⁴
KABUL	16.1%	9.3%	16.1%
KAPISA	1.6%	2.2%	1.6%
PARWAN	2.5%	4%	2.5%
WARDAK	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%
LOGAR	1.4%	2.2%	1.4%
GHAZNI	4.5%	2.2%	4.5%
PAKTIA	2.0%	2.2%	2%
PAKTIKA	1.6%	2.3%	1.6%
KHOST	2.1%	2.1%	2.1%
NANGARHAR	5.6%	2.2%	5.6%
LAGHMAN	1.6%	2.2%	1.6%
KUNAR	1.7%	2%	1.7%
NOORISTAN	0.5%	2.2%	0.5%
BADAKHSHAN	3.5%	2.3%	3.5%
TAKHAR	3.6%	2%	3.6%
BAGHLAN	3.4%	3.9%	3.4%
KUNDUZ	3.7%	4.1%	3.7%
BALKH	4.9%	4.3%	4.9%
SAMANGAN	1.4%	4.1%	1.4%
JAWZJAN	2.0%	2.1%	2%
SAR-I-PUL	2.1%	2.2%	2.1%
FARYAB	3.7%	2%	3.7%
BADGHIS	1.8%	2%	1.8%
HERAT	7.0%	4.3%	7%
FARAH	1.9%	2.1%	1.9%
NIMROZ	0.6%	2.2%	0.6%
HELMAND	3.4%	4%	3.4%
KANDAHAR	4.5%	4.1%	4.5%
ZABUL	1.1%	2.3%	1.1%
URUZGHAN	1.3%	3.9%	1.4%
GHOR	2.5%	2.1%	2.5%
BAMYAN	1.7%	4.4%	1.7%
PANJSHIR	0.6%	2.2%	0.6%
DAIKUNDI	1.6%	2.2%	1.6%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

FIG. 9.3: *Provincial distribution of population*

5. WEIGHTING

Weighting is a method of making the survey sample representative of a population. It usually assumes a random selection of respondents, and that the true population is known. The weight used for the 2015 survey (labeled “w” in the data), was constructed as a proportional weight. Eight weights were created, each weighted by strata (population and urban/rural status). The base weight, also referred to as the probability of selection weight or design weight, is computed simply as the inverse of the probability of selection for each respondent. However, two assumptions were made in the sampling design that resulted in treating the sample as approximately EPSEM (equal probability of selection method):

1. *All settlements are of equal size.* Since population estimates at the settlement level are unavailable and/or unreliable, the sample design drew settlements using a simple random sample (SRS). By assuming the settlements are of equal size the SRS condition of equal probabilities of selection holds true.
2. *The random route procedure is equivalent to a simple random sample of households and respondents.* Random route and Kish grid procedures were used for respondent selection. The assumption is that these procedures are equivalent to performing a simple random selection of households and respondents at the settlement level.

A fully EPSEM method results in a self-weighting design, or rescaled base weights of 1. However, base weights are still needed to correct for any disproportionate stratification that may be the result of oversampling, rounding for the cluster design, or removal of interviews due to quality control. The base weights are thus computed as follows:

$$B_i = (n_i / N_i)^{-1} \qquad w_i = B_i^{-1}$$

B_i = probability of selection for a respondent

w_i = base weight for respondents

n_i = sample size in strata i

N_i = total population in strata i

A post-stratification adjustment was performed on the resulting adjusted base weight to match the target population’s geographic distribution in Afghanistan. The only targets used for the raking was province by urban/rural status⁵ and gender. The weights included in the final data set are as follows:

1. The “wgt1” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status to account for the disproportionate stratification and quality control by simple inverse cell weighting. It includes intercept interviews.
2. The “wgt2” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status and gender by post stratification. It includes intercept interviews.

3. The “wgt3” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status to account for the disproportionate stratification and quality control by simple inverse cell weighting. It does not include intercept interviews.
4. The “wgt4” variable is a weight by province, urban/rural status, and gender by post stratification. It does not include intercept interviews.

6. SAMPLE DISPOSITION

The AAPOR publishes four different types of rate calculations used in AAPOR reporting (response rates, contact rates, cooperation rates, and refusal rates). ACSOR surveys use AAPOR’s Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2 as their standards. The formulas for these rates are provided below (Fig. 9.4)

Acronyms used in the formulas;

I	=	Complete interview
P	=	Partial interview
R	=	Refusal and break-off
NC	=	Non-contact
O	=	Other
UH	=	Unknown if household/occupied household unit
UO	=	Unknown, other
e	=	Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

$$\text{Response Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Cooperation Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + R}$$

$$\text{Refusal Rate 2} = \frac{R}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Contact Rate 2} = \frac{(I + P) + R + O}{(I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)}$$

	PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION	PERCENTAGE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (INCLUDES INTERCEPT INTERVIEWS)	PERCENTAGE IN WEIGHTED SAMPLE (WGT3)
	16.1%	9.3%	16.1%
ACSOR CODE	AAPOR CODE	DESCRIPTION	
COMPLETED INTERVIEWS		4%	2.5%
1	1.0/1.10	INTERVIEW WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED	10104
PARTIAL INTERVIEWS		2.2%	1.4%
10	1.200	DURING INTERVIEW, SELECTED RESPONDENT REFUSED (GENERAL)	29
11	1.200	DURING INTERVIEW, SELECTED RESPONDENT WAS NOT FEELING INFORMED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS	39
12	1.200	DURING INTERVIEW, SELECTED RESPONDENT GOT ANGRY BECAUSE OF A QUESTION	13
13	1.200	DURING INTERVIEW, SELECTED RESPONDENT PREFERRED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BE INTERVIEWED	23
14	1.2	DURING INTERVIEW, SELECTED RESPONDENT WAS IN A HURRY/NO TIME	21
		TOTAL PARTIALS	125
UNKNOWN ELIGIBILITY		2%	1.7%
20	3.130	NO ANSWER AT DOOR	249
21	3.200	NO ADULTS (18+) AFTER THREE VISITS	317
22	3.170	UNABLE TO ACCESS BUILDING OR HOUSE	87
23	3.210	OUTRIGHT REFUSAL AT THE DOOR	304
		TOTAL UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD	957
NON-CONTACTS			
24	2.210	SELECTED RESPONDENT NEVER AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW	96
25	2.250	SELECTED RESPONDENT LONG-TERM ABSENCE FOR THE FIELDWORK PERIOD	292
		TOTAL NON-CONTACTS	388
OTHERS			
26	2.300	SELECTED RESPONDENT NOT ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SURVEY	64
35	2.310	SELECTED RESPONDENT DECEASED	8
36	2.320	SELECTED RESPONDENT PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE INTERVIEW	14
37	2.332	SELECTED RESPONDENT UNABLE TO COMPLETE INTERVIEW IN LANGUAGES AVAILABLE	5
90	2.360	OTHER	0
		TOTAL OTHERS	91
REFUSALS			
30	2.11	SELECTED RESPONDENT REFUSES (GENERAL)	139

31	2.11	SELECTED RESPONDENT NOT FEELING INFORMED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS	65
32	2.11	SELECTED RESPONDENT GOT ANGRY BECAUSE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER	13
33	2.11	SELECTED RESPONDENT PREFERS HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD TO BE INTERVIEWED	95
34	2.11	SELECTED RESPONDENT IN A HURRY/NO TIME	94
		TOTAL REFUSALS	406
NOT ELIGIBLE			
40	4.7	DOES NOT MEET SCREENING CRITERIA/NOT ELIGIBLE FOR INTERVIEW	
41	4.500	NON-RESIDENTIAL (BUSINESS)/ABANDONED HOME	142
		TOTAL NOT ELIGIBLE	167

DISPOSITION RATES		
RATE	FORMULA/CALCULATION	PERCENT
VALUE FOR E	ESTIMATED PROPORTION OF CASES OF UNKNOWN ELIGIBILITY THAT ARE ELIGIBLE	0.985
RESPONSE RATE 3	$I / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+E(UH+UO)$	83.80%
COOPERATION RATE 3	$I / (I+P+R)$	95.01%
REFUSAL RATE 2	$R / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+E(UH+UO)$	3.37%
CONTACT RATE 2	$(I+P+R+O) / (I)+(R+NC+O)+E(UH+UO)$	88.96%

FIG. 9.4: Survey management detail

The 2015 response, refusal, and contact rates were similar to those in the 2014 survey. Proportionally, refusals and non-contacts were most common in the Kabul/Central region and least frequently encountered in the Central/Hazarajat and South West regions. A detailed regional comparison can be found in Fig. 9.5.

REGION	PROVINCES	REFUSALS	NON-CONTACTS	SUCCESSFUL INTERVIEWS	NON-CONTACTS AND REFUSALS PER SUCCESSFUL INTERVIEW
1. CENTRAL/ KABUL	KABUL, KAPISA, LOGAR, PANJSHIR, PARWAN, WARDAK	171	180	2436	0.1441
2. EAST	KUNAR, LAGHMAN, NANGARHAR, NOORISTAN	18	26	864	0.0509
3. SOUTH EAST	GHAZNI, KHOST, PAKTIA, PAKTIKA	28	19	864	0.0544
4. SOUTH WEST	HELMAND, KANDAHAR, NIMROZ, URUZGHAN, ZABUL	47	16	1692	0.0372
5. WEST	BADGHIS, GHOR, FARAH, HERAT	48	30	1068	0.0730

6. NORTH EAST	BADAKHSHAN, BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, TAKHAR	54	22	1272	0.0597
7. CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT	BAMYAN, DAIKUNDI	1	9	420	0.0238
8. NORTH WEST	BALKH, FARYAB, JAWZJAN, SAMANGAN, SARI-PUL	39	86	1488	0.0840

FIG. 9.5: Breakdown of non-response rate by region

7. SAMPLING REPLACEMENTS

Afghanistan remains a challenging research environment. Each year, randomly identified sampling points have to be replaced due to lack of access, usually due to insecurity. They are replaced with another randomized list. If the second randomly assigned sampling point is not accessible, then a third randomized list is used. Because insecurity has increased in Afghanistan, sampling replacements have also had to increase (Fig. 9.6).

YEAR	NUMBER OF SAMPLING POINTS (TOTAL)	NUMBER OF REPLACED SAMPLING POINTS	REPLACEMENT RATE
2008	762	52	6.8%
2009	961	208	21.6%
2010	825	214	25.9%
2011	825	166	20.1%
2012	1,436	341	23.7%
2013	1,568	267	17.0%
2014	1,628	460	28.3%
2015	1,684	482	28.6%

FIG. 9.6: Replacement rate by year

Of the 482 villages replaced in the main draw, 176 (36.5%) were replaced in the second draw, 128 (26.6%) were replaced in the third draw, and 178 (42.6%) were replaced by the supervisor.⁶ The primary reason for replacement was due to Taliban presence in the village or other security issues. Included in this final figure of 482 are four villages that had to be replaced with intercept interviews because the district became inaccessible due to heavy fighting between the Taliban and ANSF.

Reasons for all replacements are summarized in Fig 9.7, and a full list of replacements, as well as the fieldwork logs by province and sampling point, can be found on The Asia Foundation's website with the full dataset.⁷

The reasons for replacements have been consistent across annual fieldwork, with security being the primary reason for replacements since 2009. Fig. 9.7 outlines the reasons for replacements since 2008, the first year that reasons for replacement were recorded.

REASON	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
SECURITY ISSUES/TALIBAN	17	104	140	99	191	144	298	332
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	10	45	40	29	96	61	113	110
VILLAGE ABANDONED/COULD NOT BE FOUND	23	53	34	31	39	45	46	35
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	0	5	0	7	9	13	3	2
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	2	0	0	0	6	4	0	3
NOT SPECIFIED/OTHER	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	52	208	214	166	341	267	460	482

FIG. 9.7: *Reasons for village replacements by year*

8. QUALITY CONTROL

Quality control was integrated into every step of the survey process.

FIELD LEVEL

During fieldwork, enumerators were observed by supervisors or by a third-party validator. Field supervisors and third-party validators also conducted back-checks of interviews. In total, 39% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control.

The back-checks consisted of:

- Direct observation during the interview (448 interviews, or 5%),
- A return visit by the supervisor to the residence where an interview took place (2,069 interviews, or 22%),
- Back-check from the central office (224 interviews, or 2%), or
- Quality control by an external validator (991 interviews, or 10%).

As with the 2014 study, the 2015 *Survey of the Afghan People* included third-party validation by Sayara Research. ACSOR supervisors provided the fieldwork schedule to the validation team following the training briefings. Asia Foundation staff also participated in validation for some sampling points. Validators and/or Asia Foundation staff met with ACSOR enumerators during the field period and observed fieldwork to verify the correct administration of the survey, including of the starting point, the random walk, and the use of the Kish grid to select respondents in 168 sampling points. They also conducted back-checks of selected interviews.

GPS COORDINATES

In order to improve accuracy and verify fieldwork, ACSOR enumerators collected Global Positioning System (GPS) data using watches and phones in 1,455 out of the 1,684 sampling points (86%) (Fig.

9.8). While ACSOR was able to collect GPS coordinates in all 34 provinces, due to security concerns ACSOR was not able to collect GPS coordinates in all surveyed districts. The risk for interviewers carrying GPS units is that they may be mistaken as agents for government or military intelligence. This year, ACSOR collected GPS coordinates from 252 of the 366 selected districts (69%). As an extra level of verification, GPS coordinates were then compared against the GPS coordinates of villages provided by the CSO. For this study, the median distance from the selected villages was 1.25 km.



FIG. 9.8: 2015 survey coverage using GPS coordinates

CODING, DATA ENTRY, AND DATA CLEANING

After the completed questionnaires were returned to the ACSOR central office in Kabul, the answers to open-ended questions were sorted and coded by a team of coders familiar with international standards for creating code typologies for open-ended data. The questionnaires were then sent for data entry, using a team of more than 20 keypunchers. ACSOR keypunched all responses on-site to protect the data and closely monitor the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the keypunching team verified any errors inadvertently committed by enumerators.

During the data entry process, 20% of questionnaire data (2,022 out of 10,104 completed questionnaires) were randomly pulled by ACSOR's data entry managers. These questionnaires were then given to a different team for re-entry, and results from this independent entry were compared to the primary data

set. Discrepancies and errors were identified by data coders. Key-punchers with high error rates were provided with additional training and given an opportunity to improve. For all errors, questionnaire data were reviewed and the correct data was included in the final data set. The error rate for data entry for the 2015 survey was 0.18%, which is acceptable for international quality control standards. This error rate is slightly higher than the 0.11% error rate for the 2014 survey, but within the range of what ACSOR normally sees. Error rates vary over time due to staff turnover in the ACSOR data entry team.

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, D3 Systems, Inc. used a program called Hunter that searches for additional patterns and duplicate that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an enumerator.

The Hunter program includes three tests:

- Equality test: Compares interviews for similarities, grouped by enumerator, within sampling point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an enumerator average of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
- “Don’t Know” (i.e., non-response) test: Determines the percentage of “Don’t Know” responses for each enumerator’s cases. Typically, interviews with 40% or higher “Don’t Know” responses are flagged for further investigation.
- Duplicates test: Compares cases across all enumerators and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any cases that have a similarity of 95% or higher are flagged for further investigation.

Any interview that did not pass Hunter was pulled out for additional screening. If the interview did not pass screening, it was removed from the final database before delivery.

In the 2015 survey, 12 cases were deleted for having an enumerator average of over 90% similar responses (i.e., failing the equality test), 240 cases were deleted for being over 95% similar in substantive responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test), and five cases were deleted for consisting of over 40% “Don’t Know” responses (i.e., failing the “Don’t Know” test).

The Asia Foundation used Stata statistical software for logic test analysis. An additional 237 cases were deleted through Asia Foundation logic checks, and another 24 were deleted on the basis of third-party back-check and direct observation reports from Sayara Research. In total, 518 cases were deleted across all stages of quality control.

ACSOR REVIEW AND CLEANING

ACSOR and D3 Systems, Inc. conducted a full review of the data set. This included analyzing the data for irregularities and data processing errors. To achieve this, ACSOR wrote SPSS syntax code to:

- Identify incorrect coding;

- Verify filtering instructions were followed correctly;
- Identify outliers in the data; and
- List questionnaires and enumerators for further review.

In total, ACSOR and D3 Systems, Inc. wrote nearly 1,600 lines of code to create a total of 98 tests for the questionnaire. Questionnaires identified by these tests were then reviewed by ACSOR staff and the data was updated as necessary.

LOGIC TESTS

ACSOR and D3 Systems, Inc. analysts conducted checks for logic and patterning. These tests search for possible data entry errors and data anomalies including duplicate cases, patterning or matching responses, substantive response bias, systematic non-response, and field work productivity among enumerators. Along with ACSOR's review, The Asia Foundation's analysts developed and ran a series of logic checks to test for enumerator error, logical consistency, and to detect any possible patterns of falsification or poor performance.

The Asia Foundation used a total of 47 logic tests for its analysis. Based on the results of these tests, a total of 131 cases were removed from the data set for failing more than two logic tests, particularly in areas where field validation noted suspected problems with fieldwork. If an enumerator had at least two interviews deleted, all interviews conducted by this enumerator were removed from the data. Based on these findings, 27 enumerators' work was deleted from the final data set. Finally, an additional 24 cases were removed based on the results of the validation reports. This resulted in a total of 261 interviews being removed from the data as a result of client quality control measures and validation reports (Fig. 9.9).

In total, 5.1% of all interviews were removed at some stage of the quality control process.

	N-SIZE AT EACH STAGE OF QUALITY CONTROL	TOTAL REMOVED	PERCENTAGE REMOVED AT EACH STAGE
TOTAL INTERVIEWS	10,104	--	NA
N-SIZE POST-ACSOR QUALITY CONTROL	9,847	257	2.5%
N-SIZE POST-ASIA FOUNDATION QUALITY CONTROL	9,610	237	2.3%
FINAL DATA SET (POST-VALIDATION REPORTS)	9,586	24	0.2%

FIG. 9.9: Summary of removed cases

9. MARGIN OF ERROR

Focusing on the portion of the sample that is probability based (i.e., excluding intercept interviews), the added variance from a multi-stage stratified cluster design can be estimated via a design effect estimate for the survey's variables, and in turn, used to estimate the complex margin of sampling error. Design effect estimates provided in this section account for both the complex sample design, as well as the weights. The sample was stratified by urban/rural status and province with two stages of clustering: district and settlement. The design effect, for reporting purposes, is estimated for a key question of interest: "Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?" The following table provides design effect estimates for each response category of this key variable using the statistical software called R (survey package). In an effort to provide the reader with a survey-wide design effect, a "weighted mean" design effect was calculated as the average across each response category of the variable when weighted by frequency of response (Fig. 9.10).

	PROPORTION	COMPLEX SE	DESIGN EFFECT	SRS BOOTSTRAPPED SE
RIGHT DIRECTION	36.71%	0.7931%	2.4100	0.5220%
WRONG DIRECTION	57.45%	0.8536%	2.6561	0.5312%
REFUSED	0.57%	0.1112%	1.9663	0.0791%
DON'T KNOW	5.27%	0.3416%	2.1110	0.2342%
WEIGHTED MEAN			2.5346	

FIG. 9.10: *Design effect estimation using Q1*

Assuming a simple random sample with $n=9,586$, $p=.5$, at the 95% confidence interval level, the margin of error for the survey is 1%. However, when accounting for the complex design through the design effect estimate of 2.5346, $p=.5$ at the 95% confidence interval level, the complex margin of error (MOE) is 1.59%.

In addition to this conservative⁸ estimation of MOE, statistic specific standard errors are provided using bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a resampling method that does not rely on assumptions of the distribution of the variable of interest. These estimates are calculated with the weighted data, and can be multiplied by the square root of the design effect in order to achieve a standard error that takes the design into consideration. These estimates use the actual responses into consideration during calculation (as opposed to the conservative setting at $p=.5$).

End Notes

¹ACSOR and Sayara both provided quality control in the form of back-checks and direct observation of interviews. The method of monitoring is indicated in the data using the variable named “Method.”

²The design effect estimate is a weighted average across individual response option design effects for this key question of interest.

³The probability sample excludes intercept interviews from variance estimation.

⁴‘Wgt3’ variable in the data set. Post Stratified Weight by Strata without Intercepts. Distribution of the weighted sample by province is approximately the same for all four weights.

⁵The urban centers of some of the more rural provinces were included as their own strata and represent very small segments of the target population. As a result, cases from these strata have very small weights. The sampling points within these strata were allocated to ensure everyone that is part of the target population had an equal probability of being selected. Trimming was not done with these small weights in order to maintain a proportion to population estimates by strata weighted sample.

⁶Four sampling points in Nooristan were not assigned villages in the third draw and were replaced by the supervisor, and are therefore listed as having been replaced at the second draw.

⁷Refer to <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey/>

⁸The margin of error for a binary response is maximized when the proportions are set equal to each other (p=.5).



APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

REGION

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
CENTRAL / KABUL	24%
EAST	9%
SOUTH EAST	10%
SOUTH WEST	11%
WEST	13%
NORTH EAST	14%
CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	3%
NORTH WEST	14%

GEOGRAPHIC CODE

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VILLAGES	75%
TOWNS	5%
CITY	6%
METRO (KABUL)	14%

PROVINCE

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
KABUL	16%
KAPISA	2%
PARWAN	2%
WARDAK	2%
LOGAR	1%
GHAZNI	5%
PAKTIYA	2%
PAKTIKA	2%
KHOST	2%
NINGARHAR	6%
LAGHMAN	2%
KUNAR	2%
NOORISTAN	1%
BADAKHSHAN	4%
TAKHAR	4%
BAGHLAN	3%
KUNDUZ	4%
BALKH	5%
SAMANGAN	1%
JAWZJAN	2%

SAR-I-PUL	2%
FARYAB	4%
BADGHIS	2%
HERAT	7%
FARAH	2%
NIMROZ	1%
HELMAND	3%
KANDAHAR	5%
ZABUL	1%
URUZGAN	1%
GHOR	3%
BAMYAN	2%
PANJSHIR	1%
DAIKUNDI	2%

D1. Gender

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
MALE	47%
FEMALE	53%

D2. How old are you?

	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	6,709	2,203	8,912
18 TO 24 YEARS OLD	26%	31%	27%
25 TO 34 YEARS OLD	29%	26%	28%
35 TO 44 YEARS OLD	24%	18%	23%
45 TO 54 YEARS OLD	13%	13%	13%
55 AND OLDER	8%	11%	8%
AVERAGE AGE	34.4	34.4	34.4

D14. Which ethnic group do you belong to?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
PASHTUN	40%
TAJIK	34%
HAZARA	11%
UZBEK	8%
TURKMEN	2%
ARAB	1%

BALUCH	1%
AIMAK	1%
SADAT	1%
NURISTANI	1%
PASHAYEE	< 0.5%
QEZELBASH	< 0.5%
BAYAT	< 0.5%
SAFI	< 0.5%
SAHAK	< 0.5%
SAYED	< 0.5%
ALOKOZAY	< 0.5%
POPALZAY	< 0.5%
KHAROTI	< 0.5%
GUJAR	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Handwritten notes and diagrams on a whiteboard or paper. The text is partially legible and includes:

- 2. 3. 1. 10/15
- OFF - 100



APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

MAIN SURVEY QUESTIONS:

- Q1.** Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
RIGHT DIRECTION	37%
WRONG DIRECTION	57%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	5%

- Q2.** What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q2A. First mention _____

Q2B. Second mention _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: RIGHT DIRECTION	3,272	3,272
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	22%	32%
GOOD SECURITY	15%	29%
PEACE / END OF THE WAR	6%	11%
GOOD GOVERNMENT	6%	10%
HAVING ACTIVE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)	6%	10%
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEM	5%	10%
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	5%	9%
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	3%	8%
DEMOCRACY / ELECTIONS	4%	7%
REDUCTION IN LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	2%	5%
ROAD RECONSTRUCTION	1%	4%
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE	2%	3%
REMOVING TALIBAN	1%	3%
NATIONAL UNITY	1%	3%
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE	1%	2%
FREEDOM / FREE SPEECH	1%	2%
MORE JOB OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE	1%	2%
HAVING PARLIAMENT	1%	2%
MORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY THAN BEFORE	1%	2%
REDUCTION IN POPPY CULTIVATION	1%	2%
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS	1%	2%

WOMEN HAVE MORE FREEDOM	1%	2%
HAVING LEGAL CONSTITUTION	1%	2%
WOMEN CAN NOW WORK	1%	2%
CLINICS HAVE BEEN BUILT	< 0.5%	1%
GOOD COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	1%
IMPROVED JUSTICE	< 0.5%	1%
CLEAN DRINKING WATER	< 0.5%	1%
REMOVING TERRORISM	< 0.5%	1%
FOREIGN FORCES LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	1%
NEW PRESIDENT	1%	1%
DISARMAMENT	< 0.5%	1%
BETTER RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	1%
LOW PRICES	< 0.5%	1%
REFUGEES RETURN	< 0.5%	1%
HAVING A LEGITIMATE PRESIDENT	1%	1%
DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IN GENERAL	< 0.5%	1%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	1%
MORE ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS	< 0.5%	1%
PREVENTION / ELIMINATION OF CRIMES	< 0.5%	1%
FREE MOVEMENT / TRAVEL POSSIBLE	< 0.5%	1%
DECREASE IN CRIMES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BETTER TREATMENT OF ADDICTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ESTABLISHING HIGH PEACE JIRGA / SHURA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RESPECTING WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RESPECTING ISLAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PREVENTION / ELIMINATION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN NUMBER OF MADRASAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOREIGN FORCES LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PREVENTING INTERFERENCES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DECREASE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN EXPORTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORE FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEOPLE COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MINING OF NATURAL RESOURCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEOPLE ARE SATISFIED WITH GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BETTER TRANSPORTATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BETTER AND MORE MEDIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORE WATER FOR IRRIGATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HAVING ACTIVE GOVERNORS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WOMEN PARTICIPATE IN POLITICS	-	< 0.5%
DECREASE IN KIDNAPPING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

SIGNING STRATEGIC AGREEMENT	-	< 0.5%
DECREASE IN ARBITRARY ATTACKS BY THE U.S.	-	< 0.5%
DETECTING AND DEFUSING MINES	-	< 0.5%
HAVING ACTIVE AIRPORTS	-	< 0.5%
NEW TECHNOLOGY IS AVAILABLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ACCESS TO PRODUCTS	-	< 0.5%
CREATION OF ARBAKIES (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACTIVE	-	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%	13%

Q3. *What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?*

Q3A. *First mention* _____

Q3B. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: WRONG DIRECTION	5,120	5,120
INSECURITY	29%	45%
THERE IS UNEMPLOYMENT	12%	25%
CORRUPTION	7%	13%
BAD ECONOMY	5%	12%
BAD GOVERNMENT	7%	11%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	4%	7%
NO RECONSTRUCTION HAS HAPPENED	4%	7%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	3%	6%
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	2%	5%
INJUSTICE IN THE COUNTRY	2%	4%
POOR LEADERSHIP	2%	4%
POOR EDUCATION SYSTEM	1%	4%
HIGH PRICES	1%	3%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	1%	3%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CAUSE PROBLEMS	1%	3%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%	3%
TOO MANY FOREIGNERS ARE GETTING INVOLVED	2%	3%
COSTLY MARRIAGES	1%	3%
LACK OF AID / NO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	1%	2%
INCREASE IN DRUG TRADE	1%	2%
LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW	1%	2%

PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	< 0.5%	1%
INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY'S MILITARY MATTERS	1%	1%
UNFAIR ELECTIONS	1%	1%
WATER & POWER SUPPLY PROBLEMS	1%	1%
PRESENCE / INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%	1%
INCREASE IN CRIMES	< 0.5%	1%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	< 0.5%	1%
THERE IS DANGER TO ISLAM	1%	1%
PAKISTAN'S ROCKET ATTACKS ON AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	1%
POLITICAL RESISTANCE	< 0.5%	1%
FOREIGN AID CAUSES PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF UNITY	< 0.5%	1%
FRAUD IN ELECTION	< 0.5%	1%
HEALTHCARE PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN ISAF / COALITION FORCES AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP) / AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	1%
WESTERN INFLUENCE IS TOO GREAT	< 0.5%	1%
THERE IS NO PROGRESS	< 0.5%	1%
PLACING BOMBS ON THE ROADS	< 0.5%	1%
WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	1%
THEFT	< 0.5%	1%
PEOPLE DISILLUSIONED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	1%
WEAK PARLIAMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THE GOVERNMENT IS SUPPORTING TALIBAN AND AL-QAEDA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISARMAMENT DIDN'T TAKE PLACE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOOD FOR PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DRUG ADDICTS ARE INCREASING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TWO-FACED POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEAK AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SIGNING STRATEGIC AGREEMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO CANDIDATES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MISUSING THE POWER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INEXPERIENCED PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ELECTED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TERRORISM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WORK IS NOT GIVEN TO APPROPRIATE PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
U.S. ARBITRARY ATTACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISRESPECTING ISLAMIC VALUES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MANUFACTURING FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RAPE / SEXUAL HARASSMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T HAVE TRUST IN PEACE PROCESS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POISONING SCHOOL CHILDREN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BONN AGREEMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXITING OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CUTTING PEOPLE'S FINGERS AFTER EACH ELECTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN POPPY CULTIVATION	-	< 0.5%
LACK OF FIRE WOOD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH LUXURY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SPECIALISTS / PROFESSIONALS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF RESPECT FOR ISLAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PROBABILITY OF WAR	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AMERICANS BLOCKING ROADS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IEC INTERFERING IN ELECTION AND SUPPORTING ONE CANDIDATE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IMMORAL PROGRAMS IN TV	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF NORTHERN ALLIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RELEASING TALIBAN FROM PRISON	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNCERTAINTY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INVESTMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORAL CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AFGHANISTAN IS NOT INDEPENDENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CANDIDATES PROTESTING	-	< 0.5%
KARZAI INTERFERING IN ELECTIONS	-	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH FREEDOM	-	< 0.5%
CREATION OF ARBAKIES (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KILLING AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) / AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DOCTORS	-	< 0.5%
HIGH POLLUTION LEVELS	-	< 0.5%
RELEASING PRISONERS	-	< 0.5%
KARZAI SUPPORTING TALIBAN	-	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF HEZB-E-ISLAMI	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%	8%

Q4. *In your view what are the biggest problems in your local area?*

Q4A. *First mention* _____

Q4B. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912
UNEMPLOYMENT	17%	31%
INSECURITY / ATTACKS / VIOLENCE	14%	22%
ELECTRICITY	12%	20%
ROADS	9%	18%
DRINKING WATER	9%	17%
EDUCATION / SCHOOLS / LITERACY	4%	11%
HEALTHCARE / CLINICS / HOSPITALS	4%	10%
POOR ECONOMY	3%	7%
POVERTY	3%	6%
HIGH PRICES	2%	6%
CORRUPTION	2%	4%
CRIME	2%	3%
WATER FOR IRRIGATION	1%	3%
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	1%	2%
TALIBAN	1%	2%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%	2%
POLLUTION	1%	2%
LACK OF AGRICULTURAL TOOLS / EQUIPMENT	1%	2%
DRUGS SMUGGLING	1%	2%
LACK OF (PROPER) SHELTER	1%	2%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%	2%
GOVERNMENT / WEAK GOVERNMENT / CENTRAL AUTHORITY	1%	1%
INJUSTICE	1%	1%
NO PROBLEMS	1%	1%
ADDICTION TO DRUGS	< 0.5%	1%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	< 0.5%	1%
THEFT	< 0.5%	1%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	< 0.5%	1%
ROADSIDE BOMBS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF FOOD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DOCTORS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

LACK OF UNITY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DIKES AND DRAINS TO PREVENT FLOODING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF CLINICS FOR ANIMALS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEOPLE NOT FEELING RESPONSIBLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NATURAL DISASTERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF ISIS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF LAW IMPLEMENTATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAININGS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MOSQUES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MUNICIPALITIES NOT DOING THEIR JOB WELL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARMED PEOPLE / WARLORDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE OF PAKISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF TERRORISM AND AL-QAEDA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HIGH DOWRY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FUEL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ENTERTAINMENT OPPORTUNITIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN POPPY CULTIVATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORAL CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GOVERNOR MISAPPROPRIATING LANDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARBAKIS (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES / SEARCHING HOUSES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF WESTERN TRADITION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MARKETS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE CAN NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISRESPECT FOR ISLAMIC VALUES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MEN HARASSING WOMEN ON STREETS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF HEZB-E-ISLAMI	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NIGHT RAIDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE OF IRAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FUELS	-	< 0.5%
RETURNEES' PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POLLUTION IN SOCIETY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COLD HOUSES (FOR FRUITS)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

SETTING SCHOOLS ON FIRE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PUBLIC WELFARE	-	< 0.5%
LACK OF BANKING SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BAAD	-	< 0.5%
LACK OF HELP FOR WIDOWS	-	< 0.5%
AERIAL BOMBING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BAD / CORRUPT GOVERNOR	-	< 0.5%
NO ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN BOYS AND GIRLS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF EXTREMISTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF BAKERIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS (AGE) TAKE MONEY FROM PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH FREEDOM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHURAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ABDULLAH ABDULLAH NOT ACCEPTING THE RESULTS OF ELECTION	-	< 0.5%
LACK OF KINDERGARTEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FORCED MARRIAGES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RESTRICTIONS ON RIDING MOTORBIKES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ELECTIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DROUGHT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MADRASAS FOR WOMEN	-	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%	10%

Q5. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole?*

Q5A. *First mention* _____

Q5B. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912
INSECURITY / ATTACKS / VIOLENCE / TERRORISM	29%	43%
CORRUPTION	14%	24%
UNEMPLOYMENT	9%	22%
POOR ECONOMY	6%	13%
GOVERNMENT / WEAK GOVERNMENT / CENTRAL AUTHORITY	4%	8%
POVERTY	3%	6%
EDUCATION / SCHOOLS / LITERACY	2%	6%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	3%	6%
INTERFERENCE OF PAKISTAN	3%	6%

SUICIDE ATTACKS	3%	5%
INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES	3%	5%
INJUSTICE	2%	4%
HIGH PRICES	1%	4%
PRESENCE / EXISTENCE OF ISIS	1%	3%
DRUGS SMUGGLING	1%	3%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%	3%
TRIBAL ISSUES / PARTISANSHIP	1%	2%
SCARCITY OF ELECTRICITY	1%	2%
CRIME	1%	2%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	1%	1%
DISCRIMINATIONS	1%	1%
ROADS	1%	1%
LACK OF EFFICIENT AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)	1%	1%
HEALTHCARE / CLINICS / HOSPITALS	< 0.5%	1%
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	1%	1%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF NATIONAL UNITY	< 0.5%	1%
DRINKING WATER	< 0.5%	1%
BAD POLITICS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF (PROPER) SHELTER	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	< 0.5%	1%
IRRESPONSIBLE ARMED PEOPLE	< 0.5%	1%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS	< 0.5%	1%
ROADSIDE BOMBINGS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE OF IRAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEAK PARLIAMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WATER FOR IRRIGATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FRAUD IN ELECTIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POPPY CULTIVATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISRESPECT FOR ISLAMIC LAWS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNFAIR ELECTIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PRODUCTION COMPANIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MINES / LACK OF MINING FOR NATURAL RESOURCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEFT / CAR THEFT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISRESPECT TO OUR CULTURE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

EXISTENCE OF AL-QAEDA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WORK IS NOT GIVEN TO APPROPRIATE PERSON	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH LUXURY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RETURNEES' PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEAK JUDICIARY SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LOW SALARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOOD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RAPE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DRUG ADDICTS ARE INCREASING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MISSING THE POWER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FREEDOM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOREIGN FORCES' AIR-STRIKES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXITING OF FOREIGN FORCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PAKISTAN'S ROCKET ATTACKS ON AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DOCTORS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORAL CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MAINTAINING PEACE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF RESPECT FOR ELDERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOREIGNERS ARBITRARY (MILITARY) OPERATIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MUNICIPALITIES NOT DOING THEIR JOB WELL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GOVERNMENT OF INFIDELS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS	-	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE PRISONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF HEZB-E-ISLAMI	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUSINESS PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WE DON'T HAVE AN AIR FORCE	-	< 0.5%
LACK OF NATURAL GAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CRIMINALS DON'T GET PUNISHED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF EXPORTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF BARRICADES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FORCED MARRIAGES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE COUNCIL	-	< 0.5%
POLLUTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS (AGE) ARE GETTING STRONGER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF ARMED GROUPS / MILITIAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KARZAI SUPPORTING TALIBAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POISONING SCHOOL CHILDREN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SIGNING OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S.	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOT PROTECTING ISLAMIC HISTORY	-	< 0.5%

EXISTENCE OF EXTREMIST	-	< 0.5%
AFGHANS ARE NOT PATRIOTS	-	< 0.5%
SIGNING THE AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
COPYING WESTERN CULTURE	-	< 0.5%
NATURAL DISASTERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HAQQANI NETWORK INTERFERING IN OUR COUNTRY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOT SIGNING THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NO PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOREIGN COUNTRIES SUPPORT ABDULLAH ABDULLAH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE BANKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	-	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%	10%

Q6. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in Afghanistan? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

Q6A. *First mention* _____

Q6B. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912
UNEMPLOYMENT	51%	71%
ILLITERACY	12%	26%
POOR ECONOMY	6%	16%
NO HIGHER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH	8%	15%
BECOMING DRUG ADDICTS	7%	14%
INSECURITY	4%	10%
LACK OF YOUTH'S RIGHTS	3%	6%
LACK OF SCHOOLS	2%	5%
COSTLY MARRIAGES	1%	3%
CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	2%
TAKING REFUGE IN IRAN	1%	2%
INJUSTICE	1%	1%
HIGH COST OF LIVING	< 0.5%	1%
INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES	< 0.5%	1%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
CHANGING THEIR IDEOLOGY FOR WAR	1%	1%
MORAL CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	1%
TRIBAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF SPORT FIELDS	< 0.5%	1%

JOINING ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS (AGE) DUE TO UNEMPLOYMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISTURBANCE FROM POLICE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CAMPAIGN AMONG YOUTH FOR TALIBAN ENROLLMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEY DON'T HAVE A CLEAR FUTURE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INFORMATION / INTEREST TO ISLAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF HEALTHCARE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MISUSE OF YOUTH IN POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SEXUAL ASSAULTS ON YOUTH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NO PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%	17%

Q7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next biggest problem?*

Q7A. *First mention* _____

Q7B. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912
EDUCATION / ILLITERACY	20%	34%
LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN	11%	22%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	11%	18%
LACK OF RIGHTS / WOMEN'S RIGHTS	9%	16%
FORCED MARRIAGES / DOWRY	8%	14%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL COURSES	5%	9%
POVERTY	4%	9%
NO HOSPITALS / CLINICS	4%	7%
SECURITY	3%	5%
CAN'T LEAVE HOMES	2%	3%
UNDER CONTROL OF MEN / MEN HAVE POWER	2%	3%
NOTHING	3%	3%
LACK OF RESPECT TOWARDS WOMEN	1%	2%
LACK OF SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS	1%	2%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DOCTORS	1%	2%
DISTURBANCE OF WOMEN	1%	2%
PREGNANCY-RELATED HEALTHCARE	1%	2%
BAAD	1%	1%

GENERAL HEALTHCARE	1%	1%
LACK OF MARKETS FOR CRAFTS	1%	1%
NOT LETTING WOMEN GET HIGHER EDUCATION	1%	1%
NOT RECEIVING INHERITANCE	< 0.5%	1%
INJUSTICE	< 0.5%	1%
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	1%	1%
GOVERNMENT NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO WOMEN	< 0.5%	1%
CULTURAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	1%
FORCING WOMEN TO WORK	< 0.5%	1%
CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	1%
RAPES	< 0.5%	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER	< 0.5%	1%
MURDER OF LITERATE WOMEN	< 0.5%	1%
HIGH PRICES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN BOYS AND GIRLS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOOD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SELLING WOMEN / GIRLS FOR MONEY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KIDNAPPING OF WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF BAKERY FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BIAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF CONSTRUCTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOT ALLOWING WOMEN TO VOTE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOT AVAILABLE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PARKS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DRUG ADDICTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SUICIDE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PROBLEMS IN GENERAL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PUBLIC BATHS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOT HAVING HIJAB	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REPRESENTATION IN SHURA / JIRGA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISTURBANCE CREATED BY ISIS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ROADSIDE BOMBS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DIVORCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COURTS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SHARIA LAWS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MEDICAL CHECK-UPS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

LACK OF ATTENTION TOWARDS WIDOWS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NO ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE LOANS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	5%	20%

Q8. *Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	YES	NO	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) RADIO	76%	24%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) TV SET	62%	38%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) MOBILE PHONE	50%	49%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
D) THE INTERNET	10%	90%	< 0.5%	1%
E) MOSQUE	48%	51%	< 0.5%	1%
F) COMMUNITY SHURAS	37%	62%	< 0.5%	1%

Q9. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	BETTER	SAME	WORSE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD	21%	49%	30%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	8%	36%	55%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET	11%	50%	38%	< 0.5%	1%
D) QUALITY OF FOOD IN YOUR DIET	14%	55%	30%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF YOUR HOUSE / DWELLING	16%	57%	27%	< 0.5%	1%
F) HEALTH / WELL-BEING OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS	18%	54%	27%	< 0.5%	1%
G) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	15%	43%	40%	1%	1%
H) ACCESS TO SCHOOLS	23%	58%	19%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

Q10. *Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	VERY SATISFIED	SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) CLEAN DRINKING WATER	31%	41%	16%	12%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

B) WATER FOR IRRIGATION	15%	33%	27%	16%	1%	9%
C) ELECTRICITY	16%	24%	23%	35%	< 0.5%	1%
D) CLINICS OR HOSPITALS	13%	36%	32%	19%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) MEDICINE	10%	32%	36%	21%	< 0.5%	1%
F) EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN	23%	44%	22%	9%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
G) ROADS	13%	32%	30%	24%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

Q11. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	YES	NO	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) RECONSTRUCTION / BUILDING OF ROADS OR BRIDGES	30%	69%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) NEW GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OPENING	15%	85%	< 0.5%	1%
C) NEW PRIVATE SCHOOL OPENING	12%	87%	< 0.5%	1%
D) NEW PRIVATE UNIVERSITY	8%	91%	< 0.5%	1%
E) DRINKING WATER PROJECT (E.G. NEW WELLS, HAND PUMPS, TANK SYSTEM, RESERVOIR)	23%	76%	< 0.5%	1%
F) IRRIGATION PROJECT	13%	84%	< 0.5%	2%
G) GOVERNMENT SUPPLIED ELECTRICITY	13%	84%	< 0.5%	3%
H) HEALTHCARE (PRIMARY HEALTH CENTER, REGULAR VISITS OF DOCTORS, ETC.)	15%	84%	< 0.5%	1%
I) RECONCILIATION WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS	9%	89%	< 0.5%	2%
J) PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE	17%	82%	< 0.5%	2%
K) NEW FACTORIES OPENED	5%	94%	< 0.5%	1%
L) BUILDING NEW MOSQUES	22%	77%	< 0.5%	1%

Q12. *Which country do you think has provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area? Is there another country that you believe has funded these projects?*

Q12a. *First Mention (country)* _____

Q12b. *Second Mention (country):* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: AWARE OF PROJECTS	5,205	5,205
USA	16%	23%
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT / MINISTRIES	15%	19%
JAPAN	6%	12%
INDIA	5%	11%

PEOPLE THEMSELVES	7%	11%
GERMANY	4%	7%
CHINA	2%	5%
TURKEY	3%	5%
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM	3%	4%
SWEDEN	2%	3%
IRAN	2%	3%
SAUDI ARABIA	2%	3%
CANADA	1%	3%
UNITED KINGDOM (BRITAIN)	1%	2%
FRANCE	1%	2%
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	1%	2%
PAKISTAN	1%	2%
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN GENERAL	1%	1%
MINISTRY OF RURAL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT (MRRD)	1%	1%
RUSSIA	< 0.5%	1%
TAJIKISTAN	1%	1%
FOREIGN NGOS	1%	1%
UN-HABITAT	1%	1%
WORLD BANK	< 0.5%	1%
ITALY	< 0.5%	1%
DAKAR AGENCY	< 0.5%	1%
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE	< 0.5%	1%
NO COUNTRY	1%	1%
PRT TEAM	< 0.5%	1%
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)	< 0.5%	1%
ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM (ACF)	< 0.5%	1%
AUSTRALIA	< 0.5%	1%
PRIVATE BUSINESSMAN	< 0.5%	1%
CARE ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UZBEKISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UN AGENCIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOREIGN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRUST ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES (UNOPS)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SPAIN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNICEF	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NEPAL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DENMARK	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HOLLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

KOREA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
STABILITY IN KEY AREAS (SIKA)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
USAID	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DUBAI (UAE)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BAYAT FOUNDATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RED CROSS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MADERA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NORWAY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AGHA KHAN FOUNDATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TURKMENISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SWITZERLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HUNGARY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
QATAR	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CZECH REPUBLIC	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ISLAMIC RELIEF (IR)	-	< 0.5%
JORDAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MALAYSIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RED CRESCENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNDP	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SOUTH AFRICA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (CHA)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IBN-E-SENA FOUNDATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ICELAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
JACK	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GLOBAL ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KAZAKHSTAN	-	< 0.5%
ACTD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ACTT	-	< 0.5%
KUWAIT	-	< 0.5%
EGYPT	-	< 0.5%
UNHCR	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)	-	< 0.5%
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT (IRD)	-	< 0.5%
NIGERIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INDONESIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BANGLADESH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AGIF	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HZ	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SYRIA	-	< 0.5%
IRAQ	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

MEXICO	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MUNICIPALITY	-	< 0.5%
BELGIUM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
COMMUNITY COHESION INITIATIVE (CCI)	-	< 0.5%
WORLD VISION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FINLAND	-	< 0.5%
ARGENTINA	-	< 0.5%
SUDAN	-	< 0.5%
LITHUANIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MRC	-	< 0.5%
GRSP	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
COWAR	-	< 0.5%
CRDF	-	< 0.5%
GREECE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AUSTRIA	-	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL).	1%	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL).	-	44%

Q13. *There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
FOREIGN ARMIES	2%
NATIONAL ARMY	26%
LOCAL POLICE	21%
NATIONAL POLICE	47%
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS	2%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q14. *Have you heard of the group called ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	74%
NO	25%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q15. *In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	54%
NO	44%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q16. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA soldier are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) THE ANA IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	60%	32%	5%	2%	< 0.5%	1%
B) THE ANA HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	56%	32%	8%	3%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) THE ANA PROTECTS CIVILIANS	57%	31%	9%	3%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

Q17. *I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) ANP IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	44%	43%	10%	3%	-	< 0.5%
B) ANP HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	44%	41%	12%	3%	-	< 0.5%
C) ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES	38%	40%	16%	5%	< 0.5%	1%

Q18. *Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
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A) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	45%	38%	11%	6%	< 0.5%	1%
B) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	41%	39%	13%	6%	< 0.5%	1%
C) AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE	36%	35%	16%	8%	< 0.5%	5%

Q19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
ALWAYS	12%
OFTEN	22%
SOMETIMES	33%
RARELY	17%
NEVER	15%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Q20. *How often, if at all, are there accidents caused by mines and unexploded devices in your community? Do they happen once a month or more often, several times a year, once a year or less, or do they never happen in your community?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
ONCE A MONTH OR MORE	12%
SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR	22%
ONCE A YEAR OR LESS	18%
NEVER HAPPEN	47%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q21. *Has anyone in your household been physically injured as a result of violence, such as by a bullet, rocket, or unexploded ordinance?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	24%
NO	75%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q22. *Do you think the care provided by the government or by NGOs to people in your community who are disabled or seriously injured as a result of conflict, violence, mines or unexploded objects is very adequate, somewhat adequate, somewhat inadequate, or very inadequate?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VERY ADEQUATE	5%
SOMEWHAT ADEQUATE	25%
SOMEWHAT INADEQUATE	30%
VERY INADEQUATE	24%
THERE ARE NO SUCH ISSUES IN THIS AREA	14%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q23. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	18%
NO	81%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Q24. *What kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

Q24a. *First mention* _____

Q24b. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: VICTIMS	1,619	1,619
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	26%	31%
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	9%	19%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	9%	19%
RACKETEERING / EXTORTION	10%	18%
MURDER	8%	17%
PICK-POCKETING	7%	14%
BURGLARY / LOOTING	8%	13%
KIDNAPPING	7%	13%
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT / PROPERTY TAKEN FROM YOUR VEHICLE	5%	9%
MILITANTS/INSURGENT ACTIONS	3%	7%

FOREIGN FORCES ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	2%	6%
POLICE ACTIONS	3%	6%
SMUGGLING	1%	4%
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	1%	2%
ARMY ACTIONS	1%	1%
FIGHTING BETWEEN TALIBAN AND GOVERNMENT FORCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%	20%

Q25. *Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?*

BASE: VICTIMS	1,619
YES	62%
NO	37%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q26. *Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?*

Q26a. *First mention* _____

Q26b. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: VICTIMS	1,004	1,004
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	33%	45%
SHURA / ELDERS	19%	37%
TRIBAL LEADER / MALIK	9%	20%
DISTRICT GOVERNOR/ WOLESWAL	7%	19%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	15%	18%
MULLAH SAHEB	4%	13%
PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY	3%	8%
(JUST) MY FAMILY	2%	5%
LOCAL COMMANDER OR WARLORD	2%	4%
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	2%	4%
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR	1%	4%
COURTS	1%	4%
ARBAKAI (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	2%	3%
TALIBAN	< 0.5%	1%
PRESS OR OTHER MEDIA	-	1%

LOCAL PRT	< 0.5%	1%
AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION	< 0.5%	1%
OFFICE OF UN ORGANIZATION(S)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%	11%

Q27. *In the future, if you were a victim of violence or any criminal act in the future, how much confidence would you have that the guilty party would be punished? Would you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence at all?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE	9%
A FAIR AMOUNT	35%
NOT VERY MUCH	33%
NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	22%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q28. *In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
UNEMPLOYMENT	22%
CORRUPTION	15%
INSECURITY	9%
POVERTY / WEAK ECONOMY	8%
ILLITERACY	7%
LACK OF GOV'T ATTENTION / WEAK GOV'T	5%
LACK OF LAW IMPLEMENTATION	3%
DRUGS	2%
DISCRIMINATION	2%
TALIBAN	2%
PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES	2%
INJUSTICE	2%
PAKISTAN'S INTERFERENCE	2%
FOREIGNERS INTERFERING IN OUR COUNTRY	2%
EXISTENCE OF IRRESPONSIBLE ARMED GROUPS	2%
CRIMINALS RELEASED WITHOUT PUNISHMENT	1%
TERRORISM	1%
ROBBERIES	1%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%
CRIME IN GENERAL	1%
HIGH RATES	1%
HAVING WEAK / LOW-PAID POLICE	< 0.5%

CULTIVATING / SMUGGLING OF POPPY	< 0.5%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	< 0.5%
NIGHT RAIDS	< 0.5%
DRUG ADDICTS	< 0.5%
MURDERS	< 0.5%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	< 0.5%
LACK OF RESPECT TO ISLAM	< 0.5%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	< 0.5%
POWERFUL PEOPLE MISUSING THEIR POWER	< 0.5%
POLITICAL INSTABILITY	< 0.5%
VIOLENCE	< 0.5%
RAPING	< 0.5%
FIGHT OVER POWER	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE OF IRAN	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF INSURGENTS	< 0.5%
JIHADIST LEADERS	< 0.5%
LACK OF RECONSTRUCTION	< 0.5%
NOT COLLECTING THE WEAPONS FROM PEOPLE	< 0.5%
PERSONAL ENMITIES	< 0.5%
FRAUD IN CORRUPTION	< 0.5%
HUMAN TRAFFICKING	< 0.5%
WESTERN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%
RELIGIOUS MISGUIDANCE	< 0.5%
ROAD SIDE BOMBS	< 0.5%
CHILD ABUSE / HARASSMENT	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH FREEDOM FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%
HIGH PROFILE PEOPLE'S INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF ISIS	< 0.5%
LACK / LOW LEVEL OF CULTURE	< 0.5%
MAFIA CONTROLLING GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%
POORLY PROTECTED BORDERS	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHURAS	< 0.5%
RETURNEES	< 0.5%
ARBAKIS (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	< 0.5%
ARRESTING INNOCENT PEOPLE	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	4%

Q29. *Now we want to ask some questions about corruption. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	MAJOR PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	NOT A PROBLEM	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) IN YOUR DAILY LIFE	61%	29%	10%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD	53%	36%	11%	< 0.5%	1%
C) IN YOUR LOCAL AUTHORITIES	60%	31%	7%	< 0.5%	2%
D) IN YOUR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	69%	25%	5%	< 0.5%	1%
E) IN AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE	77%	18%	5%	< 0.5%	1%

Q30. *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	IN ALL CASES	IN MOST CASES	IN SOME CASES	IN NO CASES	HAD NO CONTACT	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY / DISTRICT OFFICE	6%	12%	14%	16%	51%	< 0.5%	1%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	3%	11%	15%	18%	52%	< 0.5%	1%
C) CUSTOMS OFFICE	5%	8%	10%	14%	61%	< 0.5%	1%
D) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	3%	11%	16%	26%	42%	< 0.5%	1%
E) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	3%	7%	12%	28%	49%	< 0.5%	1%
F) JUDICIARY / COURTS	6%	12%	15%	18%	48%	< 0.5%	1%
G) STATE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	3%	9%	16%	22%	48%	< 0.5%	1%
H) PUBLIC HEALTHCARE SERVICE	3%	12%	21%	32%	31%	< 0.5%	1%
I) WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	5%	11%	16%	22%	46%	< 0.5%	1%
J) ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS / UNIVERSITY	2%	8%	14%	32%	43%	< 0.5%	1%

Q31. *Some people say that that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion, and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	36%
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	61%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

- Q32.** *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VERY SATISFIED	14%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	43%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	27%
VERY DISSATISFIED	14%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

- Q33.** *Please, tell me, how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	NO FEAR	SOME FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) VOTING IN A NATIONAL / PROVINCIAL ELECTION	44%	41%	15%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	29%	41%	28%	1%	1%
C) RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	23%	43%	30%	1%	3%
D) ENCOUNTERING ANP	54%	32%	13%	< 0.5%	1%
E) ENCOUNTERING ANA	57%	28%	14%	< 0.5%	1%
F) TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	20%	46%	33%	< 0.5%	1%
G) ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY FORCES ONLY)	19%	44%	35%	< 0.5%	1%
H) ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	7%	20%	72%	< 0.5%	1%

- Q34.** *In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. Thinking back to a year ago, how safe did you feel expressing your opinions about the government in public?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VERY SAFE	15%
SOMEWHAT SAFE	46%
SOMEWHAT UNSAFE	30%
VERY UNSAFE	8%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q35. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (District/Provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
A LOT	8%
SOME	37%
VERY LITTLE	29%
NONE AT ALL	24%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q36. *Members of the parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	VERY GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT BAD JOB	VERY BAD JOB	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) LISTENING TO CONSTITUENTS AND REPRESENTING THEIR NEEDS	16%	45%	23%	15%	< 0.5%	1%
B) MAKING LAWS FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY	17%	39%	29%	15%	< 0.5%	1%
C) MONITORING THE PRESIDENT AND HIS STAFF	16%	37%	27%	18%	< 0.5%	2%

Q37. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	A LOT OF CONFIDENCE	SOME CONFIDENCE	NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE	NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) THE PRESIDENT (ASHRAF GHANI)	22%	35%	23%	20%	-	1%
B) INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION	8%	28%	32%	30%	< 0.5%	1%
C) INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMPLAINTS COMMISSION	8%	27%	33%	31%	< 0.5%	1%
D) THE AFGHAN CIVIL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (ACDO)	11%	38%	31%	16%	< 0.5%	3%

E) COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	21%	40%	25%	11%	< 0.5%	2%
F) COMMUNITY SHURAS / JIRGAS	25%	39%	23%	11%	< 0.5%	2%
G) GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	10%	32%	35%	21%	< 0.5%	2%
H) INTERNATIONAL NGOS	11%	34%	32%	20%	< 0.5%	3%
I) MEDIA SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	27%	39%	22%	10%	< 0.5%	1%
J) NATIONAL NGOS	12%	39%	33%	14%	< 0.5%	2%
K) PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE	10%	32%	35%	21%	< 0.5%	2%
L) PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	13%	39%	31%	15%	< 0.5%	2%
M) RELIGIOUS LEADERS	28%	37%	22%	12%	< 0.5%	2%
N) YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT	9%	34%	34%	20%	< 0.5%	2%
O) SALAAM AFGHANISTAN BANK	5%	21%	23%	16%	2%	33%

Q38. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item], is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	A VERY GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT BAD JOB	A VERY BAD JOB	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT	16%	41%	23%	19%	< 0.5%	1%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	13%	44%	28%	14%	< 0.5%	1%
C) MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES	9%	38%	30%	19%	-	4%
D) DISTRICT GOVERNMENT	12%	41%	30%	9%	< 0.5%	7%

Q39. *In the last two years, has the member of parliament (MP) for your province ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affected you?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	20%
NO	78%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q40. *In the last two years, has the provincial governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affected you?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	20%
NO	78%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q41. *Have you personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	23%
NO	76%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q42. *How satisfied were you with the result of this contact?*

BASE: CONTACTED A REPRESENTATIVE OF PROVINCIAL COUNCIL	2,045
VERY SATISFIED	19%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	43%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	23%
VERY DISSATISFIED	14%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q43. *Did you vote in the presidential runoff election of 1393 or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	69%
NO	30%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Q44. *If it's not a problem to say, for whom did you vote in the presidential runoff election of 1393?*

BASE: VOTED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF ELECTION OF 1393	6,191
ASHRAF GHANI	49%
DR. ABDULLAH ABDULLAH	36%
PREFER NOT TO SAY	14%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Q45. *How concerned were you, if at all, with security threats during the presidential runoff election? Were you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VERY CONCERNED	25%
SOMEWHAT CONCERNED	41%
NOT TOO CONCERNED	21%
NOT AT ALL CONCERNED	12%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q46. *In general, do you think the presidential runoff election in Afghanistan was free and fair, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES, FREE AND FAIR	36%
NO, NOT FREE AND FAIR	58%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	5%

Q47. *Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	63%
NO	34%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	4%

Q48. *Do you think that a peace agreement between the government and armed opposition groups will help stabilize the country, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	62%
NO	35%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	3%

Q49. *Do you think the current government negotiation with Taliban is a good idea, a bad idea, or do you not have an opinion?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
GOOD IDEA	52%
BAD IDEA	24%
NO OPINION	21%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q50. *In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
TO GAIN POWER	19%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS / INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	15%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY PAKISTAN	9%
TOO MUCH CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT	7%
UNEMPLOYMENT / POVERTY	4%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED / MOTIVATED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	4%
TO CREATE INSECURITY	3%
TO SUPPORT ISLAM	3%
THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	3%
FOR MONEY	2%
ILLITERACY	2%
UNEMPLOYMENT / POVERTY	2%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	2%
THEY ARE AGAINST ISLAM	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEMOCRACY	1%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO THEIR DESIRES	1%
INJUSTICE	1%
TO ESTABLISH SECURITY	1%
TO FORCE FOREIGN FORCES TO WITHDRAW	1%

THEY ARE AGAINST POLICE FORCES	1%
GOVERNMENT / ANSF IS TOO WEAK TO FIGHT	1%
THEY ARE NOT AFGHAN	1%
KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE	1%
TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY	1%
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	< 0.5%
THEY ARE BRUTAL / CRUEL	< 0.5%
TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY	< 0.5%
THEY ARE TRAITORS	< 0.5%
THEY IMPLEMENT THE LAW	< 0.5%
MORAL CORRUPTION	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION	< 0.5%
FIGHTING IS THEIR WAY OF LIFE	< 0.5%
THEY ARE CORRUPT	< 0.5%
TO SUPPORT DRUG TRAFFIC	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AFGHANS	< 0.5%
TO DESTROY SCHOOLS	< 0.5%
ILLITERACY	< 0.5%
THERE IS NO REASON	< 0.5%
FREEDOM	< 0.5%
THEY HAVE BEEN DECEIVED	< 0.5%
ROBBERY	< 0.5%
PROTECT PEOPLE FROM CRUEL GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEVELOPMENT	< 0.5%
TO CREATE FEAR / TERROR	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN WORKING	< 0.5%
THEIR LEADERS FORCE THEM TO FIGHT	< 0.5%
THEY ARE STUPID / BARBARIAN	< 0.5%
FOR REVENGE	< 0.5%
FOR MONEY	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST ELECTIONS	< 0.5%
SUFFER LOSSES BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES	< 0.5%
HAVE AVAILABLE WEAPONS	< 0.5%
THEY GET RELEASED AFTER BEING ARRESTED	< 0.5%
ISIS	< 0.5%
KARZAI IS SUPPORTING THEM	< 0.5%
THEY ARE NOT AWARE OF ISLAMIC LAWS	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	9%

Q51. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
A LOT OF SYMPATHY	6%
A LITTLE SYMPATHY	22%
NO SYMPATHY AT ALL	70%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q52. *If your household were to have _____, from whom would you ask for help to resolve it?*

Q52a. *A dispute over land _____*

Q52b. *A dispute over water _____*

Q52c. *Family problems _____*

Q52d. *Problems accessing healthcare _____*

	Q52A	Q52B	Q52C	Q52D
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912	8,912	8,912
ELDERS OF THE LOCAL SHURA / JIRGA	47%	24%	14%	9%
LINE DEPARTMENTS	12%	17%	8%	30%
FRIENDS AND FAMILY	3%	4%	30%	8%
MALIK / KHAN	9%	16%	9%	5%
DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	6%	5%	5%	11%
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	4%	7%	5%	6%
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	4%	5%	4%	2%
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR / AUTHORITIES	3%	3%	3%	5%
MULLAH	2%	2%	7%	3%
A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT	4%	5%	1%	2%
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL	1%	2%	3%	4%
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	6%	2%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	2%	3%	2%	2%
MUNICIPALITY	1%	1%	< 0.5%	1%
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM	< 0.5%	1%	< 0.5%	2%
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	2%
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	1%
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES	-	-	< 0.5%	1%
FOREIGN FORCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TALIBAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WATER SUPPLIER	-	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	<0.5%
COURTS	< 0.5%	-	-	-

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE	-	< 0.5%	-	-
DOCTORS	-	-	-	< 0.5%
DIRECTORATE OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS	-	< 0.5%	-	-
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE	< 0.5%	-	-	-
NO ONE	-	-	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%	1%	1%	2%

Q53. *How satisfied are you with the available dispute resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VERY SATISFIED	15%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	48%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	25%
VERY DISSATISFIED	10%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q54. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the huquq department or village / neighborhood-based shura / jirga to resolve it, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	21%
NO	78%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Q55. *What kind of a case or dispute was it?*

BASE: HAD A DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	1,912
DISPUTE OVER LAND	42%
OTHER PROPERTY DISPUTE, NOT LAND	15%
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE	10%
DIVORCE	7%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	17%
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT	8%
DISPUTE OVER WATER	< 0.5%
ROBBERY	< 0.5%
DISPUTE OVER INHERITANCE	< 0.5%

MURDER	< 0.5%
PHYSICAL ABUSE / BEATING	< 0.5%
FIGHT BETWEEN DIFFERENT GROUPS	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q56. *Were you fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?*

BASE: HAD A DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	1,912
FULLY	20%
SOMEWHAT	46%
NOT SATISFIED	24%
NOT FINISHED YET / STILL IN PROCEEDINGS (VOL.)	8%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q57. *Where have you taken this case or dispute?*

BASE: HAD A DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	1,912
HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	23%
STATE COURT	36%
VILLAGE, NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SHURA / JIRGA	43%
FRIENDS	< 0.5%
TRAFFIC POLICE	< 0.5%
DISTRICT OFFICE	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	3%

Q58. *And now let's turn to the local huquq department. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department:*

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO LOCAL HUQUQ DEPARTMENT (434)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) LOCAL HUQUQ ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	26%	42%	19%	12%	1%
B) LOCAL HUQUQ FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	17%	35%	34%	13%	1%
C) LOCAL HUQUQ ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	18%	38%	27%	15%	2%
D) LOCAL HUQUQ RESOLVE CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY	15%	32%	33%	19%	2%

Q59. *Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts?*

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO STATE COURT (691)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) STATE COURTS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	18%	42%	21%	13%	6%
B) STATE COURTS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	14%	34%	29%	16%	6%
C) STATE COURTS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	16%	33%	28%	16%	6%
D) STATE COURTS RESOLVE CASES TIMELY AND PROMPTLY	10%	32%	27%	24%	6%
E) STATE COURTS TREAT MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY	15%	32%	28%	18%	7%

Q60. *And now let's turn to village / neighborhood-based jirgas / shura. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village / neighborhood-based jirgas / shuras?*

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO A JIRGA / SHURA (826)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) LOCAL JIRGAS / SHURAS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	30%	50%	11%	1%	7%
B) LOCAL JIRGAS / SHURAS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	27%	40%	21%	5%	7%
C) LOCAL JIRGAS / SHURAS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	29%	39%	18%	7%	7%
D) LOCAL JIRGAS / SHURAS RESOLVE CASES TIMELY AND PROMPTLY	25%	40%	22%	7%	7%
E) THERE SHOULD BE LOCAL WOMEN'S JIRGAS AND SHURAS	31%	36%	18%	8%	8%

Q61. *In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority, where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8912
YES	23%
NO	73%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%

Q62a. *What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

BASE: KNOWS AN ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION OR AUTHORITY	2,087
DIRECTORATE OF WOMEN AFFAIRS	46%
DISTRICT OFFICE	10%
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL	9%
QAWM ELDERS	5%
LOCAL COUNCIL	4%
POLICE	3%
THE COURT	3%
DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL WORKS	2%
PROVINCIAL OFFICE	2%
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN GENERAL	2%
VILLAGE SHURA / ELDERS SHURA	2%
WOMEN'S SHURA	1%
WHO	1%
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM	1%
CHIEF OF POLICE	1%
SAFE HOUSE	1%
ATTORNEY GENERAL	1%
LACK OF MASJID/MADRASSA	< 0.5%
WOMEN CAPACITY BUILDING LITERACY ORGANI	< 0.5%
NEDA-E-ZAN ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%
MINISTRY OF RURAL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT (MRRD)	< 0.5%
LOCAL JIRGAS	< 0.5%
TRUST ORGANIZATIONS	< 0.5%
RELIGIOUS ULEMA	< 0.5%
LOCAL AUTHORITIES	< 0.5%
BALKH GIRLS UNION	< 0.5%
JAMYAT ESLAH	< 0.5%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)	< 0.5%
ARPD	< 0.5%
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)	< 0.5%
USAID	< 0.5%
AGHA KHAN FOUNDATION	< 0.5%
AWP	< 0.5%
UNESCO	< 0.5%
TALIBAN	< 0.5%
UNICEF	< 0.5%
RED CRESCENT SOCIETY	< 0.5%
UN-HABITAT	< 0.5%
MUNICIPALITY	< 0.5%

REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	5%

Q62b. *Have you ever contacted this or another organization, institution, or authority that helps solve women's problems in your area?*

BASE: KNOWS AN ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION OR AUTHORITY	2,087
YES	34%
NO	59%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	6%

Q63. *Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) THE PRACTICE OF BAAD IS ACCEPTABLE	6%	13%	18%	62%	< 0.5%	1%
B) THE PRACTICE OF BADDAL IS ACCEPTABLE	11%	23%	24%	41%	< 0.5%	1%
C) A DAUGHTER IS ENTITLED TO PART OF HER DECEASED FATHER'S INHERITANCE (MIRAS)	63%	25%	7%	5%	-	< 0.5%

Q64. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
STRONGLY AGREE	38%
SOMEWHAT AGREE	40%
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	16%
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q65. *And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION	71%	23%	4%	2%	-	< 0.5%
B) PRIMARY SCHOOL	59%	25%	10%	5%	-	< 0.5%
C) HIGH SCHOOL	57%	26%	11%	6%	-	1%
D) UNIVERSITY IN YOUR PROVINCE	47%	27%	15%	10%	< 0.5%	1%
E) STUDYING IN ANOTHER PROVINCE	23%	25%	26%	25%	< 0.5%	1%
F) STUDYING ABROAD ON SCHOLARSHIP	17%	18%	26%	38%	< 0.5%	1%

Q66. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
WOMEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	64%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	34%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

Q67. *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? Strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) GOVERNMENT OFFICES	39%	32%	15%	14%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)	19%	25%	28%	27%	< 0.5%	1%
C) HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	58%	26%	9%	7%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
D) FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	64%	22%	8%	6%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) CO-ED SCHOOLS	37%	29%	19%	14%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
F) ARMY / POLICE	15%	26%	29%	29%	< 0.5%	1%
G) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) -- WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY	21%	27%	24%	27%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

H) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) -- WHERE MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES WORK IN THE SAME ROOM	12%	22%	29%	36%	< 0.5%	1%
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Q68. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? Strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	35%	39%	15%	10%	< 0.5%	1%
B) GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	27%	30%	25%	17%	< 0.5%	1%
C) CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	26%	30%	24%	18%	< 0.5%	1%
D) MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	28%	31%	22%	18%	< 0.5%	1%
E) RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	25%	28%	23%	23%	< 0.5%	1%

Q69. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
IMAGE 1	35%
IMAGE 2	28%
IMAGE 3	15%
IMAGE 4	14%
IMAGE 5	7%
IMAGE 6	1%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

Q70. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
MOSTLY FOR MEN	42%
MOSTLY FOR WOMEN	13%
EQUAL FOR BOTH MEN AND WOMEN	44%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q71. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES	50%
MEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR WOMEN	22%
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES BUT IN CONSULTATION WITH MEN	27%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q72. *What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married?*

	BEST AGE FOR WOMEN	BEST AGE FOR MEN
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912
12 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
13 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
14 YEARS OLD	2%	< 0.5%
15 YEARS OLD	3%	< 0.5%
16 YEARS OLD	8%	1%
17 YEARS OLD	4%	1%
18 YEARS OLD	32%	11%
19 YEARS OLD	8%	4%
20 YEARS OLD	25%	22%
21 YEARS OLD	3%	3%
22 YEARS OLD	6%	11%
23 YEARS OLD	2%	5%
24 YEARS OLD	2%	6%
25 YEARS OLD	4%	19%
26 YEARS OLD	1%	4%
27 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	2%
28 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	3%
29 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	1%

30 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	5%
31 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
32 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
33 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
34 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
35 YEARS OLD	-	1%
36 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
37 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
38 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
39 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
40 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
42 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
45 YEARS OLD	-	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS:

- D3.** *Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or without a job and looking for work?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
WORKING	37%
RETIRED	1%
HOUSEWIFE	46%
STUDENT	7%
UNEMPLOYED	8%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

- D4.** *Are you currently looking for paid work outside the home?*

BASE: HOUSEWIFE, STUDENT OR UNEMPLOYED	5,523
YES	17%
NO	74%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	9%

- D5.** *What is your main occupation or work?*

BASE: WORKING OR RETIRED	3,384
FARMER (OWN LAND / TENANT FARMER)	34%

FARM LABORER (OTHER'S LAND)	8%
LABORER, DOMESTIC, OR UNSKILLED WORKER	8%
INFORMAL SALES / BUSINESS	13%
SKILLED WORKER / ARTISAN	10%
GOVERNMENT OFFICE - CLERICAL WORKER	4%
PRIVATE OFFICE - CLERICAL WORKER	1%
GOVERNMENT OFFICE – EXECUTIVE / MANAGER	1%
PRIVATE OFFICE – EXECUTIVE / MANAGER	1%
SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL	6%
SMALL BUSINESS OWNER	6%
SCHOOL TEACHER	7%
UNIVERSITY TEACHER	< 0.5%
MILITARY / POLICE	2%
MULLAH	< 0.5%

D6. Overall, for you and your family, which period was better for you economically, this year, last year, or was there no difference?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
THIS YEAR	16%
LAST YEAR	45%
NO DIFFERENCE	37%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

D7. How many of the following does your household have?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (8,912)	MEAN VALUE	STANDARD DEVIATION
A) BICYCLE	1.02	6.20
B) MOTORCYCLE	0.99	6.83
C) CAR	0.67	6.54
D) TV	1.21	6.55
E) REFRIGERATOR	0.74	6.95
F) WASHING MACHINE	0.74	6.80
G) SEWING MACHINE	1.27	5.96
H) MOBILE PHONE	2.21	4.98
I) JERIBS OF LAND	4.86	16.88
J) LIVESTOCK (NOT POULTRY)	4.82	14.38
K) HOUSES (OWNED)	1.37	6.26

D8a. *Do you watch television?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	56%
NO	44%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KN (VOL.)	< 0.5%

D8b. *What TV show would you say you watch the most?*

BASE: THOSE WHO WATCH TELEVISION	4,985
NEWS AT 6	34%
SERIALS	26%
RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS	4%
SPORTS	3%
SHABKHAND	3%
COMEDY SHOWS	2%
POLITICAL SHOWS	2%
BAMDAD KHOSH	2%
100 SANIA	2%
TAWDE KHABARE	2%
LAHZA BA LAHZA	1%
SHAB MOSIQI	1%
QAB GOFTOGO	1%
TV PROGRAMS IN GENERAL	1%
OTHERS	17%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

D9a. *Do you have a mobile phone that is used mainly by you? That is, not jointly by the family, but by you personally?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	50%
NO	50%

D9b. *How many members of your household have mobile phones?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
0 MOBILE PHONES	17%
1 MOBILE PHONES	28%
2 MOBILE PHONES	28%
3 OR MORE MOBILE PHONES	27%

D9c. *And how many members of your household own mobile phones that have internet access, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?*

BASE: HAVE MOBILE PHONE	7,353
0 MOBILE PHONES	61%
1 MOBILE PHONES	16%
2 MOBILE PHONES	7%
3 MOBILE PHONES	2%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	13%

D10. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
NEVER WENT TO A SCHOOL	55%
INFORMAL SCHOOLING AT HOME OR AT A LITERACY CLASS	3%
PRIMARY SCHOOL, INCOMPLETE (CLASSES 1 TO 5)	7%
PRIMARY SCHOOL, COMPLETE (FINISHED CLASS 6)	5%
SECONDARY EDUCATION, INCOMPLETE (CLASSES 7 TO 8)	4%
SECONDARY EDUCATION, COMPLETE (FINISHED CLASS 9)	3%
HIGH SCHOOL INCOMPLETE (CLASSES 10-11)	5%
HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETE (FINISHED CLASS 12)	11%
14TH GRADE INCOMPLETE (CLASS 13)	1%
14TH GRADE COMPLETE (FINISHED CLASS 14)	3%
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION INCOMPLETE (HAVE NO DEGREE DIPLOMA)	2%
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION COMPLETE (HAVE DEGREE DIPLOMA)	2%

D11. *How many years, if any, have you studied at Islamic madrasa?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
0 YEARS	50%
1 YEARS	10%
2 YEARS	17%
3 YEARS	11%
4 YEARS	5%
5 YEARS	3%
6 YEARS	2%
7 YEARS	1%
8 YEARS	1%
9 YEARS	< 0.5%
10 YEARS	< 0.5%
11 YEARS	< 0.5%

12 YEARS	< 0.5%
13 YEARS	< 0.5%

D12. Which languages do you speak?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
DARI	78%
PASHTO	49%
UZBEKI	11%
ENGLISH	5%
TURKMENI	3%
URDU	2%
ARABIC	1%
PASHAYEE	1%
BALOCHI	1%
NURISTANI	1%
HINDI	< 0.5%
RUSSIAN	< 0.5%
GERMAN	< 0.5%
PAMIRI	< 0.5%
SHIGNEE	< 0.5%
FRENCH	< 0.5%

D13. Are you married or single?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
SINGLE	19%
MARRIED	79%
WIDOWER / WIDOW	2%

D15. Which of the following three options do you identify with most at the moment – choose one? And which do you identify with next most?

	1ST MENTION	2ND MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912	8,912	8,912
BEING AFGHAN	57%	18%	75%
BEING _____ [STATE ETHNICITY FROM D14]	21%	33%	54%
BEING MUSLIM	22%	43%	65%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%	5%	< 0.5%

D16. *Tell me, if given opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	40%
NO	58%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

D17. *How many people live here in this household?*

	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	6,709	2,203	8,912
1 TO 5 PEOPLE	10%	16%	11%
6 TO 10 PEOPLE	52%	60%	54%
11 TO 15 PEOPLE	31%	16%	27%
16 TO 20 PEOPLE	6%	5%	6%
21 TO 30 PEOPLE	1%	2%	1%
MORE THAN 30 PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	-	< 0.5%
AVERAGE (PEOPLE)	10.0	9.1	9.8

D18. *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?*

	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	6,709	2,203	8,912
LESS THAN 2,000 AFS	9%	5%	8%
2,001 - 3,000 AFS	8%	4%	7%
3,001 - 5,000 AFS	22%	14%	20%
5,001 - 10,000 AFS	34%	33%	34%
10,001 - 15,000 AFS	15%	16%	15%
15,001 - 20,000 AFS	7%	13%	8%
20,001 - 25,000 AFS	2%	4%	2%
25,001 - 40,000 AFS	1%	6%	2%
MORE THAN 40,000 AFS	1%	2%	1%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%	1%	2%

D19. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	23%

NO	77%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KN (VOL.)	< 0.5%

D20. *What is your favorite sport, in general?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
FOOTBALL	22%
NOTHING	15%
VOLLEYBALL	11%
CRICKET	11%
RUNNING	5%
REFUSED	3%
WRESTLING	2%
BUZKASHI	2%
BODYBUILDING / FITNESS	1%
JUMPING ROPE	1%
SPORTS (IN GENERAL)	1%
BASKETBALL	1%
BOXING	1%
TAEKWONDO	1%
JOGGING	< 0.5%
KARATE	< 0.5%
GYMNASTICS	< 0.5%
SWIMMING	< 0.5%
CYCLING	< 0.5%
KICK-BOXING	< 0.5%
STONE-THROWING	< 0.5%
FREE FIGHT	< 0.5%
TENNIS	< 0.5%
SNOOKER	< 0.5%
KUNG FU	< 0.5%
HORSE-RIDING	< 0.5%
WEIGHT LIFTING	< 0.5%
CHESS	< 0.5%
HANDBALL	< 0.5%
DRIVING / RACING	< 0.5%
HOCKEY	< 0.5%
KABADDI	< 0.5%
MARTIAL ARTS (WUSHU)	< 0.5%
SPEAR FIGHTING	< 0.5%

SKIING	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	21%

D21. *Do you yourself play any sports or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	20%
NO	80%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	< 0.5%

D22. *What sports do you play?*

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: PLAY SPORT	1,750	1,750
FOOTBALL	30%	43%
VOLLEYBALL	16%	32%
RUNNING	16%	24%
CRICKET	14%	19%
JUMPING ROPE	5%	7%
BODYBUILDING/FITNESS	4%	6%
SPORTS (IN GENERAL)	2%	3%
WRESTLING	2%	3%
JOGGING	1%	2%
BOXING	1%	2%
TAEKWONDO	1%	2%
BUZKASHI	1%	1%
GYMNASTICS	1%	1%
NOTHING	1%	1%
SWIMMING	1%	1%
KARATE	1%	1%
STONE-THROWING	< 0.5%	1%
BASKETBALL	< 0.5%	1%
FREE FIGHT	1%	1%
KUNG FU	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KICK-BOXING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SNOOKER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CHESS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEIGHT LIFTING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TENNIS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CYCLING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

HORSE-RIDING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MARTIAL ARTS (WUSHU)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MUAY THAI	-	< 0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%	48%

D23. *In the past month, how often did you play a sport of any kind?*

BASE: PLAY SPORT	1,750
EVERY DAY	31%
SEVERAL DAYS A WEEK	51%
ONCE, OR JUST A FEW TIMES	15%
NEVER	2%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%

D24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy or not at all happy?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
VERY HAPPY	29%
SOMEWHAT HAPPY	46%
NOT VERY HAPPY	20%
NOT AT ALL HAPPY	4%
REFUSED (VOL.)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

D-25 *(Interviewer code): Record number of people present for the interview (excluding the interviewer). Please record the number of people present from each of the three generational categories listed below. If nobody was present from a particular category, enter "0."*

	NONE PRESENT	AT LEAST ONE PRESENT
JUNIOR (CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE)	27	73
ADULTS (PEERS, FRIENDS)	30	70
ELDERS	37	63

D-26 Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

	%
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE (AT EASE) WITH THE ENTIRE QUESTIONNAIRE	63
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MOST OF THE QUESTIONS	32
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH ONLY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS	5
THE RESPONDENT WAS GENERALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE	1
TOTAL	100

D-27 (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?


	%
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE (AT EASE) WITH THE ENTIRE QUESTIONNAIRE	64.59
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MOST OF THE QUESTIONS	29.65
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH ONLY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS	5.01
THE RESPONDENT WAS GENERALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE	0.75
TOTAL	100

D28. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
YES	44%
NO	56%

D29. Method of quality control/back-check

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,912
DIRECT SUPERVISION DURING INTERVIEW	5%
BACK-CHECK IN PERSON BY SUPERVISOR	24%
BACK-CHECK FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE	3%
QUALITY CONTROLLED BY NON-ACSOR MONITORING TEAM	12%
NOT APPLICABLE	56%



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