Emergency Livelihoods in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan

A review of programme strategy in Kunduz and Nangarhar integrating markets, gender and conflict sensitivity

OXFAM

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Acknowledgements

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For more information on this study, please contact Oxfam in Afghanistan.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Afghan Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFJR 1/2/3</td>
<td>Afghanistan Relief Joint Response Project - Phases 1/2/3</td>
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<td>AHEAD</td>
<td>Assistance for Health, Education, and Development (NGO)</td>
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<td>AOG</td>
<td>Armed Opposition Group</td>
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<td>AREDP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARD-F</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural and Rural Development – Facility</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
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<td>CfW</td>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
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<td>CLARA</td>
<td>Cohort Livelihoods and Risk Analysis</td>
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<td>CVWG</td>
<td>Cash and Voucher Working Group (Afghanistan)</td>
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<td>DRA</td>
<td>Dutch Relief Alliance</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict Affected States</td>
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<td>FCS</td>
<td>Food Consumption Score</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FSAC</td>
<td>Food Security &amp; Agriculture Cluster (Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>GoIRA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income Generating Activity</td>
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<td>LLH</td>
<td>(Emergency) Livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAIL</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (Afghanistan)</td>
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<td>MPCG</td>
<td>Multipurpose Cash Grant</td>
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<td>NCRO</td>
<td>New Consultancy and Relief Organisation (NGO)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTR</td>
<td>Real Time Review (Oxfam Humanitarian Response Evaluation Method)</td>
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<td>rCSI</td>
<td>Reduced Coping Strategies Index</td>
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<td>RAMP</td>
<td>Rebuild Agriculture Markets Programme</td>
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<td>SLRC</td>
<td>Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium</td>
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<td>SMEB</td>
<td>Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket</td>
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<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>Unconditional Cash Transfer</td>
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Summary Report for Policy and Decision Makers

Areas of Northern and Eastern Afghanistan affected by protracted conflict and displacement require a triple track approach to emergency livelihoods and economic recovery. It is necessary to continue with short term ground level emergency cash and livelihoods input support, and yet also to recognise the limits of these. It is necessary to protect space for humanitarian action for the sake of relief, livelihoods protection and to cushion against ongoing shocks and deepening insecurity. However, it is also necessary to link together humanitarian and development livelihoods approaches through evidence building, advocacy, and livelihoods and market governance interventions at the household, community and market governance levels. Ultimately, emergency livelihoods programming can create a ‘hold’ onto which development actors may latch, and it can help to alleviate negative coping and build resilience to further shocks – and these are vital objectives. However, emergency programming with households and local communities cannot result in sustainable or resilient economic recovery for the most vulnerable populations without significant structural reform, and changes in the current conflict dynamics. This report shares the results of a mixed-method review of emergency livelihoods programme strategy in Eastern and Northern Afghanistan, integrating market, gender and conflict sensitivity concerns. It combines existing programme databases, evidence sources and literature with stakeholder discussions, household interviews, and focus group discussions conducted in Kabul, Kunduz and Nangarhar during August and September 2018.

Emergency Livelihoods Key Findings

The design and evaluation of effective evidence-based approaches to emergency livelihoods programming in Afghanistan is severely hampered by the lack of a suitable technical forum and coordination mechanism. Mandate and technical capacity gaps between the existing FSAC, CVWG and high-level policy forums on ‘durable solutions’ require policy makers and donors, especially those interested in linking humanitarian and development spheres, to push for a specialised emergency livelihoods space.

Cash transfer programming has the potential for positive livelihoods impacts, especially the protection of assets and prevention of degradation, regardless of an agency’s, or clusters’, intentions in terms of sectoral assistance. Interestingly, in the Afghanistan context, the potential livelihoods impact of various cash transfer interventions is yet to be fully explored. Households use cash to restore assets, invest in income generation, solve and incur economic obligations as well as to maintain essential livelihoods outcomes. Cash transfers should be better monitored, from a livelihood perspective, to identify and build on successful cases.

Programme approaches that move into skills development, employment facilitation and micro-business support can be effective for small groups of select beneficiaries in certain settings. However, the large programme resource levels required to overcome the structural, rule of law and economic barriers limit the efficiency and potential scale of these programmes. The most vulnerable are also rarely in a position to engage and benefit. More pared down versions of these programmes that seek to achieve training without any employment or start-up support risk doing harm by encouraging unsupported economic risk taking and

There is a need for emergency livelihoods interventions in conflict and displacement affected areas of Northern and Eastern Afghanistan to more rigorously define the scale of livelihoods issues (whether at the household, community or macro-level) and to ensure that issues are addressed at the correct scale rather than assuming a ‘trickle up’ of household level interventions into larger change. There is a need to think about governance of the market in a similar way to how colleagues might think about governance of a community, or a region.

A dose of reality is required as to the extent to which emergency livelihoods interventions have the capacity to generate resiliency in such a complex environment. Given the severe structural and conflict related constraints in both Kunduz and Nangarhar, the linking together of emergency and development interventions must often be through evidence building and policy related advocacy. There are diminishing returns to altering physical livelihoods interventions (and particularly to substituting resource intensive livelihoods development interventions for straightforward cash assistance) on the ground if the context is not supportive.

A more ‘enabling’ approach to programming is needed. Emergency livelihoods must focus on supporting people to access relatively immediate ways of applying their own livelihoods capabilities, assets and strategies to generate income, cope with shocks and maintain a minimum level of consumption. Certain physical and financial assets can be distributed, but a livelihood cannot. Debate needs to advance from ‘what livelihood input or training is best, and what kit or curriculum is therefore required’ to what, on a humanitarian time-frame and with the degree of ground access available,
raising unrealistic expectations. As such, these programmes must be seen as pilots and as an opportunity to generate evidence to inform policy to reduce the barriers to wider success.

Key Findings Related to Markets, Gender and Conflict Sensitivity

Markets in Kunduz and Nangarhar are highly saturated and typical market linkage approaches offer diminishing returns

Key labour and production sectors that are accessible to the poor and vulnerable are highly saturated. Markets related work therefore requires a different approach than the typical market linkage activities that rely on bringing supply to pockets of demand. There is a need to shift focus onto the barriers on the demand side and to recognise that agency projects cannot, in isolation, create demand nor secure jobs – policy level work is required.

- When questioned about livelihoods expansion and recovery, the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance consistently express the desire, and need for, steady and secure employment, essential infrastructure such as irrigation, electrification and basic education, and most of all security. These fundamental needs are seen to constitute a requirement for individuals to accumulate capital, access markets and invest in livelihoods.
- While men rely on extensive personal contacts to collect (either in person or over the phone) market information, women possess extremely limited capacity to interact with the market. In Kunduz, some access by women (as pairs and in exceptional cases) appears possible, however in Nangarhar women have almost no access to market information due to physical confinement.
- Physical insecurity is the most commonly cited impediment to market access, development and investment of capital (notwithstanding the gendered access constraints).
- Households consistently report a desire for labour markets to provide stable and secure employment typically associated with urbanised and formal industry, above and beyond ad hoc production activities such as small-scale weaving, tailoring, handicrafts etc (i.e. ‘subsistence entrepreneurship’).

Improving gender integration requires highlighting both the value of women and men’s work, and the risks faced in accomplishing it

There are severe, and well known, gender inequalities in Afghanistan and the Provinces of Kunduz and Nangarhar are both relatively conservative areas (the latter more so than the former). Oxfam assessments in Kunduz and Nangarhar consistently demonstrate the lack of women’s involvement in economic decision-making processes, and isolation in the local context related social and cultural norms, despite significant domestic, household and productive expectations. One striking finding is that, when asked to describe, in the context of livelihoods activities, the risks and threats that are faced, and the mitigation strategies that are employed, by the opposite gender (i.e. husbands speaking of wives, and wives speaking of husbands) each gender appears to have quite limited knowledge of the other.

- Women frequently describe men as facing no challenge because they are men, while men describe women as facing no challenge because they either ‘do no activities’ or ‘stay just in the home’.
- Qualitative data show that men face significant insecurity, access and relationship challenges that require strategies such as altering travel routes, reducing the time of activities, and investing heavily into consensus building before undertaking certain livelihoods activities.
- Women also, far from being inactive, struggle daily to undertake a diverse set of agricultural, livestock and other production activities and, in addition to insecurity, face cultural and social barriers to basic movement and information access. Burdensome strategies such as relying on male proxies, moving in groups, and constant negotiation with male family members and community leaders are required.
- Data suggests a gendered division of access to supplementary and emergency income sources that is worth further investigation; with men appearing to have greater access and ability to take on debt when required, while women are more reliant on remittances from male family members (uncles, brothers and sons).
- The well-known limitations on women’s mobility, access and capacity to undertake livelihoods activities are explained by respondents primarily through two rationales: fear of physical insecurity related to conflict and fighting, and social and cultural norms and the fear of ‘rumours’ and judgement on families and communities.
Conflicts in emergency livelihoods require greater staff training, competency, and highly contextual local knowledge during programme implementation.

Social, environmental, economic and political conflicts, with the potential to rapidly escalate into threats and acts of violence, are pervasive in areas of humanitarian operation in Afghanistan. Despite such conflicts often being informally perceived by teams in the field, formally recognising and engaging with these is rare. The most common form of conflict management is avoidance, either through programme delay or withdrawal, or by aligning community entry with the existing power brokers. Field teams from many agencies (including, for example, those implementing the citizens charter) face significant technical, capacity and operational challenges in deploying other forms of conflict management practice. In some cases, the short timeframes of humanitarian funding and access limitation also limit the extent to which it is advisable to open these issues.

- Typical customary conflict resolution actors and forums, including local elders, leadership and religious figures, remain dominant for the resolution of economic, resource use and livelihoods programming related conflicts. Government is repeatedly described as a secondary, referral type, option only applied when an issue cannot be resolved locally or when certain local parties refuse to ‘buy in’ to a customary decision.
- These conflict resolution mechanisms can also be activated pro-actively as forums for mitigating risk through discussions and forming of consensus. Both local people and agencies providing assistance can engage.
- Women have extremely limited, or no, direct access or participation rights within these mechanisms. And so, the downside to managing conflict sensitivity through these customary structures is the high likelihood of contributing to furthering existing power structures, and especially the exclusion of women.
- Though respondents are hesitant to discuss conflicts related to assistance, the primary potential cause of conflicts relates not so much to programme design and/or objectives, but to decisions on beneficiary inclusion/exclusion.

Conclusions

Due to the significant structure constraints, and saturated market context, the most effective links between emergency livelihoods action and longer-term economic recovery objectives are likely to be found at the market governance and policy levels. Altering, or replacing, household level humanitarian interventions with longer term programme designs, or forcing recovery approaches onto an inappropriate context, is unlikely to improve livelihoods outcomes in a sustainable or resilient way. Emergency cash programming to protect livelihoods, and the provision of financial and physical assets (such as agricultural kits) is required alongside longer horizon programming that seeks to reduce the market governance and policy barriers that prevent vulnerable households from being able to successfully pursue their own diverse and complex livelihoods strategy; especially in terms of labour market access and urban livelihoods.

Linear regression modelling demonstrates that monthly income and days of labour per week are significantly related to basic livelihoods outcomes. However, demographic and socio-economic characteristics; including livestock and land access, gender disparities, disability status (such as the presence of disability and pregnancy in the HH) and whether more than one breadwinner is present, appear to play a greater role in determining outcomes. Despite the data limitations, this calls for realism as to extent of resilience or recovery that can be achieved by ground level interventions that are not simultaneously part of a strategy to influence the larger structural drivers of risk and vulnerability; including those at the macro-economic, governance and political levels.

Further analysis of typical humanitarian caseloads from Kunduz and Nangarhar show exceptionally high levels of vulnerable, as well as low levels (especially for IDPs and Returnees) of access to agricultural lands or to significant productive assets. One hard reality is that a significant number of the most vulnerable households currently being reached with emergency cash and livelihoods assistance are unlikely to ever become economically resilient due to socio-economic factors, and to being amongst the poorest of the poor. A discussion, including social protection and government colleagues, on the most efficient to carry such a caseload is needed.

Core Recommendations for Policy Makers and the Donor Community
• Emergency livelihoods interventions should aim to smooth consumption and to enable households to develop a cushion against the next shock. Resilience building, but without the expectation of a ‘resilient’ endpoint until the drivers of conflict and insecurity are resolved.

• Cash transfer programming is a potentially effective and appropriate primary response to both acute and chronic need which should be monitored for livelihoods protection outcomes, including an analysis of cash amounts versus utility (i.e. are assistance levels enough to meet the expected outcomes).

• Agencies have a technical and humanitarian responsibility to undertake a clear problem specification and to identify where it is possible and where it is not possible to pursue recovery and transitional approaches. Where it is not possible to move beyond short term assistance and livelihoods protection measures, these should be pursued together with policy level efforts to leverage this action to reduce the higher-level barriers to doing more. There are clear opportunities to engage with and influence urban economic growth planning, labour market structure and large-scale economic reform and rule of law programming in ways that would relieve livelihoods pressures on humanitarian caseloads. For example, integrating local populations into urban development planning, understanding and resolving legal, regulatory and security barriers in the informal sector, and engaging with local civil society and private sector groups to monitor the implementation of agricultural, business and economic development ambitions.

• Avoid being caught up in arbitrary definitional boundaries between humanitarian action and development. If there are barriers to successful pursuit of a livelihoods strategy that can be, at least lessened, on a 12-month humanitarian timeframe (such as access to extension services, or community mobilisation methods to increase the safety of physical market access), then pursue these in tandem – do not expect a linear transition from relief to recovery.

• Support the development of coherent urban growth and development plans (for example Kunduz and Jalalabad city master plans) and support local government to reduce regulation barriers and street-level harassment of ‘subsistence’ entrepreneurs. For example, by linking planning processes to social mobilisation for street-sellers, transport workers and other marginal urban livelihoods groups.

• A significant proportion of the humanitarian livelihoods caseload sits within the bottom 10-15% of the vulnerable population that will always struggle to achieve economic resilience and sustainability. Social protection discussions have largely stalled in country and must be re-invigorated if more operational efficient means of carrying this caseload are to be found.

**Core Recommendations for Emergency Livelihoods Programme Strategy**

• The current focus of emergency livelihoods programming is on financial and physical asset replacement. Greater focus is needed, when designing an emergency livelihoods programme (regardless of whether household level support is through cash programming, agricultural or livestock support, labour support or otherwise) to ask what barriers exist in the community context, and in the policies, institutions and processes at play, to households being able to apply the (supported) livelihoods strategy to achieve the desired livelihood outcomes. Layer interventions to work on multiple aspect of the livelihood’s framework simultaneously.

• ‘Enabling’ emergency livelihoods interventions include work to decrease household time burdens and enable the re-allocation of productivity gains. Like cash, any increase in the availability of time allows beneficiaries the empowerment to make decisions about how to allocate the gains.

• Ensure alignment between the goals and objectives of emergency livelihoods work, and especially of any linked market facilitation, gender empowerment and conflict sensitivity outcomes and agency access at the community level. Avoid producing and acting on an implied theory of change that is not deliverable as a result of security, access or operational constraints that limit agency credibility and footprint.

• Work, potentially with local business and chamber of commerce type associations, to highlight informal market barriers and generate evidence to contribute to decreasing market dysfunction, look for ways to apply community and political governance and advocacy approaches to governance of the market at the same time as delivering humanitarian assistance through standard channels.

• There is potential to do harm through rushed TVET, and other urban emergency livelihoods programmes that do not provide support to beneficiaries in developing the social linkages and assets necessarily to actually deploy new skills or products in the Afghanistan context. If it is not possible to deliver TVET curriculums that earn official certification, that are based on evidence of labour demand and that are able to be realistically resourced, then it is preferable to run cash transfer programming that provides beneficiaries with resources to pursue their own livelihoods strategies and investments. If there is too much uncertainty for agencies to make well evidenced programme design decisions then, in principle, these decisions should likely be left to beneficiaries to make as they see best fit.
• Design and run intensive skills development and micro-business programming that explicitly acknowledge and account for trade-offs in scale, and in inability to target the most vulnerable. Compensate by using programme interventions to leverage the evidence generation possible through such programmes into policy and advocacy engagement with larger multi-lateral, bi-lateral and state actors active in economic reform in the North and East of the country.

• Design and implement emergency livelihoods programmes for the populations in need. If access is too limited for more ambitious objectives, introduce cash support to protect livelihoods and enable individual HH livelihoods strategy and simultaneously work to address barriers at a policy level. Avoid designing a programme and then shopping around for a population that is accessible enough to benefit.

• Consider ways of increasing operational timeliness communication with beneficiaries as a means of improving programme quality. The timeliness of assistance can have a large livelihoods impact - what might a HH do in six weeks, which they might not have, if they had known that a large cash grant was coming.

• Consider increasing levels and scope of support to micro-business and production models in comparison to skills training, pair this with longer term (at least 6 month) low level cash support (30-40% of SMEB) for basic needs and coaching from business plan development, set up and operation. Any new income generation activities mean beneficiary risk taking, and risk taking requires support.

Core Recommendations for Markets, Gender and Conflict Sensitivity

• Carefully consider, prior to implementation, whether it is possible for the agency to sustain the consistent field and community presence required for more complex market facilitation and development approaches.

• Look for ways of consistently linking livelihoods evidence, learning and work on the ground with policy and advocacy strategies to influence the state and economic institutions that govern markets, and the large mid-range programmes that seek to reform these in turn.

• Livelihoods programming that seeks to contribute to women’s economic empowerment should consider how the programme can address both the social and cultural norms, and the threats and risks around physical insecurity related to the conflict. Current women’s economic empowerment models appear to work more comfortably on the first aspect than the second.

• Consider integrating basic household financial and debt management training, adapted for low literacy and numeracy populations, as a wedge to increase the visibility, and potentially the value, of ‘women’s work’.

• Adopt specific gender related proxy indicators should be used to track changes in control over productive resources and the allocation of spending, rather than general indicators that track awareness and knowledge of terms. For example, “Out of 100 AFN that comes into the HH, how many AFN do you physically spend? And out of 100 AFN, how many AFN do you decide how to spend?” is a question formulation that lends itself to more specific impact tracking.

• Consider conducting a rapid care analysis of both men and women’s labour to understand where it might be possible to either improve the productivity of time-consuming household labour tasks, or to work towards an improved intra-household capacity to negotiate a rational division of burdens.

• Continue moving from status (Host, IDP, Returned IDP, Documented or Undocumented Returnee) to vulnerability-based targeting (or at least the application of vulnerability criteria across diverse status groups), as both a programme quality and conflict sensitivity improvement. The assumptions made to link vulnerability and status are not upheld by a review of beneficiary data.

• Mainstream the use of conflict analysis tools such as mapping stakeholder relationships, conflict trees, and analysis of connectors and dividers. These tools can be used informally with internal field staff and partner teams just after community entry, and prior to the start of programming to better understand sensitivities and potential risks.

• Ensure that operational models enable conflict management rather than conflict avoidance. Partner lead implementation has benefits in local accessibility but increases the distance between the context analysis and sensitivity, programme design and adaptation that is vital to apply a livelihoods system approach as well as to navigate certain complex environments.
Introduction

Oxfam Afghanistan seeks to develop increasingly effective emergency livelihoods programming and approaches to bridge short and long-term objectives, and to achieve a sustained impact in what is a highly fluid and constrained environment. Livelihoods are the capabilities, assets and strategies\(^1\) that people use to meet basic needs and secure a means of living\(^2\). Emergency livelihoods programming is therefore the act of supporting people to access relatively immediate and short-term ways of applying their livelihoods capabilities, assets and strategies to generate income, cope with shocks and maintain a minimum level of household consumption in emergencies\(^3\).

This study maps the emergency livelihoods programming landscape in relation to the challenges of programming in settings of conflict and displacement in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan. It assesses the effectiveness of past and ongoing livelihoods interventions and offers new perspectives on programme opportunities and limitations. The review integrates market, gender and conflict sensitivity concerns and provides a set of recommendations for potential new emergency livelihoods programme strategies and intervention approaches. This document is therefore not a project specific evaluation but rather an overview of emergency livelihoods approaches in settings of conflict, displacement and return in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan over the last two years.

Final recommendations target emergency livelihoods programme design, implementation and contributions to policy. These are hopefully of interest to policy makers and donors, as well as senior humanitarian managers and livelihoods and economic recovery technical staff. This work was conducted in August and September 2018 as part of the Afghanistan Joint Response Project - Phase III (AFJR3), with support from the Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA). There were three overarching objectives:

1) To assess past and current emergency livelihoods and early recovery strategies and interventions.
2) To identify where it is possible to better integrate market, gender and conflict sensitivity perspectives and approaches into emergency livelihoods programming.
3) To assess what livelihoods programming opportunities exist for displaced and conflict affected populations in Kunduz and Nangarhar, and what kinds of strategies and intervention approaches are best placed to support them.

At a very top-line level, the protracted crisis in Afghanistan blurs distinctions between forms of need, vulnerability and risk, such that - as ALNAP notes - “chronic vulnerabilities in crisis-prone areas leads to millions of people falling between the cracks of humanitarian and development assistance”\(^4\). To a large degree this livelihood focused report echoes and complements where agencies, including Oxfam, are already speaking strongly on the negative impacts of failing to simultaneously tackle humanitarian needs and more structural, longer-term development challenges. From the perspective of emergency livelihoods programming there are institutional and financial pressures to press livelihoods recovery approaches onto the context.

In certain contexts this might be feasible, however, in areas such as Nangarhar and Kunduz, more work is needed to influence the structural limitations to progress, to encourage development actors to engage in conflict affected areas, and to reform the governance of both communities and markets, before emergency livelihoods interventions on the ground can be expected to generate resilient or sustained outcomes beyond the primary humanitarian aim of reducing suffering and mitigating the next shock. Agencies that engage with the nexus between humanitarian action, development, and peace with an emergency livelihoods approach must continue to look for ways to leverage evidence from work on the ground into policy engagement on a set of core issues that includes economic and urban governance, forced mobility, labour markets and other challenges at the district, provincial, national and...

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\(^1\) This includes human, natural, financial, physical and social assets, and capabilities and strategies that can be both material and social (or combinations thereof).


\(^3\) See Implementing a Comprehensive Response to Drought in Afghanistan.pdf

\(^4\) Implementing a Comprehensive Response to Drought in Afghanistan.pdf

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international levels. New technical approaches, and a willingness to accept the institutional risks of innovative programme designs are needed to move to the sector forward.

Agencies also need to realistically assess their organisational capacities to sustain the high level of community access, credibility and footprint required for quality implementation of more complex emergency livelihoods approaches that rely on economic and social mobilisation to strengthen market linkages, reach disadvantaged groups and genders, and to understand and navigate social and community level conflicts. Linking ground level work to policy engagement, and evaluating operational models to enable quality, is a greater challenge than simply altering emergency livelihoods interventions to include different components, different distribution items, different training curriculum, and so on - but it is a more realistic path to change given the severe structural limitations in the Afghanistan context.

Methodology

This is a mixed-methods review and several different sources of data and information are brought in to support analysis against the three key questions. Household and FGD Questionnaire design was drawn from standard livelihoods evaluation practice with additional questions on gender, risk and conflict sensitive programming (in part adapted from the CLARA\(^5\)). Data and information sources include:

- A review and synthesis of previous programme evaluations, needs assessments, and post-distribution monitoring reports\(^3\).
- Analysis of existing HH level databases containing humanitarian needs, vulnerability and livelihoods data.
- Interviews with numerous agency and programme stakeholders.
- 16 focus group discussions with programme participants and community leaders (divided evenly between male and female groups).
- Livelihoods profile interviews with representatives of 63 affected host, displaced and returnee households (divided evenly between male and female groups)
- A desk review of policy and other relevant documents, including external assessment, targeting and monitoring reports, Afghanistan cluster and partner strategies, and academic and policy studies\(^4\).

\(^3\) A list of internal programme documents reviewed is available in the annexes.
\(^4\) This includes work on emergency livelihoods in settings of conflict and displacement; market and urban programming; and the inclusion of gender, protection and conflict sensitivity. See bibliography for details.
To understand humanitarian beneficiary profiles in a quantitative sense, a series of HH level datasets from AFJR DRA phases 1, 2 and 3 and other Oxfam livelihoods projects were analysed alongside fresh field data from FGDs, stakeholder discussions and livelihoods profile interviews. An additional modelling exercise using linear regression has also been used to estimate what is reasonable to expect from changes in income levels and access to labour in terms of basic livelihoods outcomes (FCS, rCSI) measures at the HH level. Programme efficiency is gauged both financially through a review of budgets and in terms of timeliness. To identify where market, gender, and conflict sensitivity perspectives can be incorporated more qualitative data is brought into this picture, along with secondary sources on the situation in Afghanistan. Finally, all this information is called on, together with feedback from key stakeholders and partners on the ground, to come to some conclusions on livelihoods opportunities and potential programme strategies and interventions.

Limitations

The existing data available from various assessment, verification, and monitoring processes is large in quantity but was not collected with a specific overarching methodology in mind at the time. This means that programme data from the last 24 months, while extremely useful when synthesised together, cannot be quantitatively analysed as a single dataset, or as a coherent measure of impact (there is also a lack of control data). Also, the security situation in both Kunduz and Nangarhar during August and September 2018 prevented the primary study consultant from accompanying fieldwork. As a result, fresh data around the integration of market, gender and conflict sensitivity in emergency livelihoods work produced during FGD discussions and HH interviews have required second hand analysis and interpretation. Finally, the regression modelling used to illustrate the structural drivers of poverty in relation to the influence of incomes and labour days on livelihoods outcomes has a set of technical (statistical) limitations that are described the relevant annex.

Mapping Emergency Livelihoods Programming

The Afghanistan Context

Afghanistan faces an increasingly active conflict and related political and economic uncertainties including labour and agricultural market strains and ongoing population displacement and return. Many areas of the country are also
affected by high levels of disaster vulnerability and climate sensitivity. UNAMA recorded, in the first half of 2018, the highest level of civilian casualties since records began and progressively more key districts are being actively disputed between GoIRA and AOGs. OCHA reports 524,800 verified IDPs in 2018 so far, (as of the 8th of October), whilst the FSAC reports assisting approximately 330,000 in the same period (accounting for ongoing prior year displacement). So far in 2018, 537,710 undocumented Afghans have returned from Iran and 24,631 from Pakistan. This is a reversal of the 2016/2017 trend when most returnees arrived from Pakistan. Afghanistan is also experiencing a drought year where, as we move currently towards the primary crop planting season, the MAIL estimates a national wheat production deficit of more than two million metric tonnes (the lowest harvest since 2011). According to FEWSNET projections large portions of Northern Afghanistan may move into IPC 3 (Crisis) levels of food insecurity, with pockets of IPC 4 (Emergency) during October to January 2019; coinciding with the winter months.

Map 1: Afghanistan Displacement Tracking Matrix Overview

The macro-economic, governance and structural climate in Afghanistan is exceptionally challenging. Fifteen years of mid-range structural programmes have failed to sufficiently alter and reform either the rural or urban economy. Corruption, legal and regulatory barriers and ambiguity, and harmful political economies remain. Average annual GDP growth from 2014-17 was only 2.3% which, given the demographic growth rate, represents a drop in per capita terms. Much of Afghanistan’s recent growth has also been concentrated in specific service sectors, such as transportation, construction and telecommunication, that are highly dependent on the now dwindling external financial flows from international intervention and assistance.
Reporting from the Afghanistan Central Statistics Organization\textsuperscript{11}, the Asia Foundation\textsuperscript{12} and the World Bank\textsuperscript{13} show that national labour markets have stagnated\textsuperscript{5} since 2014, and even slightly deteriorated for specific groups including women, youth and rural populations. Overall unemployment stands at 24% (31% for youth). This represents 2 million Afghans actively searching for but unable to find work. At current estimated growth rates an additional 400,000 people enter this strained labour market annually. Of those employed 20% are underemployed and 80% of all jobs are classified as vulnerable and insecure (in terms of the certainty of work and payment, safety and welfare conditions, and ability to obtain basic employment rights). Just 27% of working-aged women are economically active and, accounting for unemployment, only 16% are estimated to be currently engaged in the economy; more than half of whom secure less than 24 hours work per week. This gender imbalance in access to the economy intensifies the low national labour force participation rate of 54%. For example, only 11% of women in rural areas report being engaged in any form of income generation (compared to 79% for men).

According to Asia Foundation research, the national average monthly income is 11,859 AFN (\$160 USD) with 29% of households reporting less than 5,000 AFN (\$68 USD)/month. The national poverty rate has reached 54.5% - up from 38.3% in 2011/2012 - and the number of urban poor has doubled since 2007. Average monthly incomes of humanitarian programme beneficiaries are much lower still, as shown in graph 1 (series 1 is before the most recent shock, and series 2 is after).

\textsuperscript{5}As measured by the unemployment rate and the employment-to-population ratio.
Case Study 1 – The Challenges of Assistance in the Current Environment

Mrs. Sharifa, 40 years old, lives with her four young daughters, four young sons and husband, 45 years old, in a small village in the Behsud District of Nangarhar Province, Eastern Afghanistan. After returning from Pakistan one and a half years ago they suffered financially as her husband, a day labourer, lacked the contextual knowledge and contacts to find work. Eventually he had no choice but to leave the family and travel to a neighbouring province in search of an income. The family was then identified as vulnerable, with little access to work and many of the children not attending school.

“just 15 days ago Oxfam-NCRO provided us with tailoring package value EURO 90 [tailoring machine, table, gas iron and essential tools] as livelihood source to support our family. I am really thankful from my heart to Oxfam-NCRO for reaching to us, but how could a small tailoring machine solve the problems and fulfil the household expenses of a family of 10 members without having any primary income source?”

While acknowledging the support and her ability to earn around 1000 AFN from the activity, Mrs. Sharifa challenged expectations that this would result in a sustained change without further changes in the context facing the family.

The main difficult of tailoring is to consider the current demands, design models and style making women’s clothes. As well, women prefer to sew their clothes in a modern and advanced shop that can offer new styles, not by us sewing through traditional ways. Secondly, we don’t have enough tools and sources to cope with current styles. Thirdly, it’s difficult for women to link with the market or travel themselves on a daily basis due to cultural constraints, as well as limitation from family said by Mrs. Sharifa.

“Next time it would be good to see my children at work to be busy with...livelihood activities such as Zarang motorcycle [used for transportation of goods on rent], and a small shop in the village...which will help us to have AFN 100-150 per day – 3000 to 4000 monthly to solve our entire family problems in term of household expenses”

In short, Mrs. Sharifa’s family, to see changes on a resilient or sustained scale, were expecting a set of assistance and capital value many times higher than what was able to be provided. She recommended that it will be more effective to provide a family with substantial financial livelihoods assistance (full capital for a motorcycle and a shop) and support them for 6 months minimum to change their lives and exit the vulnerable situation. The challenge for agencies, and especially donors, is to consider whether they are able to meet Mrs. Sharifa’s expectations with the resources that are made available. There is a danger in designing programmes that, with the resources available, are clearly unachievable. For example, there is evidence that the capacity of humanitarian interventions to ‘create’ and ‘give’ jobs (rather than to re-shuffle the existing labour market) is extremely limited (see Fiori & Rigon 2017). However, this is one of the most common beneficiary needs and demands. Agencies and donors have a responsibility to consider the risk of harm that comes with naivety and to identify situations where meeting beneficiary needs requires greater engagement with context, governments and other stakeholders.
Much of Afghanistan’s recent economic growth has been concentrated in sectors linked to intervention spending and aid flows which are now contracting, rather than more sustainable growth in primary industry, extractives or manufacturing. Key structural challenges in terms of rule of law, deficits in infrastructure and a hostile business climate remain largely unchanged. For example, in 2014, it was estimated that in order to increase rural incomes the agricultural sector would need to grow by at least 6% per year, at the time this represented double the growth rate of the prior decade. Due to droughts, contractions, and conflict the actual growth rates since are estimated to as, 2015: -5.7%, 2016: 6%, 2017: 1.4%, 2018: -3.6% (forecasted). Far short of the requirement for any increase in rural incomes.

Regardless, a significant proportion of available livelihoods support, and recovery related resources are dedicated to large-scale ‘mid-range’ agricultural market and value chain development programmes. Agriculture, including livestock, provides a source of income to 44% of households, and is the primary source for 28%, however, demographic pressures mean that average HH holdings of irrigated land have steadily decreased from 1.3ha in 2007-8 to 1.0ha in 2016-17. Programme examples include USAID’s $132.5 million USD RAMP (2004-2006) and, since 2009, the Comprehensive Agricultural and Rural Development – Facility (CARD-F), as well as the AREDP with a value of $87 million USD. At an outcome level CARD-F has invested around $26 million USD from 2012-2017 and claims the creation of 65,824 ‘safeguarded’ jobs and work by the ILO assessed several sectors (Poultry, Dairy, Goats & Sheep, Almonds, Grapes & Raisins and Cotton), and returnee/IDP livelihoods options from an employment perspective, demonstrating ambitions to generate increased labour demand through value chain and productive improvement in the rural sector. Oxfam and many other NGOs are also involved in smaller scale work on value chains including high-value fruits (almonds, grapes etc.) and, in Oxfam’s case, on cashmere wool. After 15 years these programmes and the approaches that they embody have struggled to produce long-term results. In part, because the political and economic conditions for a ‘green revolution’ are not currently present in Afghanistan, and in part for three additional factors. First, these programmes tend to employ theories of change which imagine the market as a relatively ‘neutral’ space, operating to turn competitive profits into capital accumulation and subsequently investment. In reality, the market in Afghanistan is a ‘social economy’ operated to generate rents that can be distributed through the existing political economy to generate stability, and other forms of insurance for existing power-brokers. Markets are governed, and programmes that do not analyse and engage this governance are unlikely to be effective. Second, the Afghanistan state has experienced institutional challenges in pursuing urban growth and import substitution strategies in key trading cities and sectors. Finally, the long-term development approaches adopted are inherently limited in their ability to alter the dynamics of ongoing conflicts, and the politics that drives the insecurity which is the primary source of risk, vulnerability and need – and primary barrier to resilience - in major areas of the country, including Nangarhar and Kunduz.
Emergency Livelihoods Programming in the North and East of Afghanistan

The humanitarian and development communities in Afghanistan lack an official, or de facto, coordination forum for emergency livelihoods programming. A site for debate, learning and sharing could significantly improve the development of evidence-based approaches and bring together the wide range of interventions currently being carried out by different agencies with different aims. Establishing such a forum and ensuring technical capacity within it is key to putting into practice narratives about bridging the humanitarian and development divide, as well as strengthening the process for analysing programme strategies, goals and objectives. Donor’s must support such a technical forum, engage with it, and encourage the generation of a better evidence base.

Food Security & Agriculture Cluster Guidance

Alongside emergency food assistance (through cash, voucher and in-kind) target of 1,646,214 men, women and children, the FSAC Strategic Response Plan (2018) establishes a target of 725,000 persons nationally for receipt of livelihoods protection assistance; including 410,000 conflict affected non-displaced farmers; 105,000 natural disaster affected people; 100,000 crop pest impacted farmers; and 18,500 Pakistani refugees. Further assistance to 70,000 documented and undocumented returnees is envisaged. Emergency food assistance is a 2100 kcal/person/day basket initially valued at 6,000 AFN/90 USD per month for a family of 7, with a cluster recommendation to provide 2 to 3 months support for all vulnerable groups (except for 3 to 6 months for Pakistani refugees). Livelihoods interventions according to FSAC guidance include:

- Timely provision of crop seed varieties (wheat, maize, pulses and market vegetables) and fertilizers.
- Livestock protection support (vaccination, disease treatment and fodder and feed) to avoid asset depletion and maintain dietary diversity.
- Small scale poultry and kitchen garden activities to improve access to nutritious food.

Cash and Voucher Working Group Guidance

The CVWG has also produced programmatic guidance for interventions that address immediate emergency needs. Though not intended for early recovery and livelihoods programming, cash programming is a large component of current assistance packages and is an inherently flexible form of intervention with influence over asset sale and protection from livelihoods stripping. Integrating cash programming within livelihoods design and outcome monitoring is a major recommendation of this report. The current SMEB value is 17,000 AFN in first month and 11,000 AFN in second and subsequent months, with a recommendation that the ‘extremely vulnerable’ receive 2 months assistance and the ‘moderately vulnerable’ only the first month value. The high proportion of expenditures made on food by vulnerable HHs (over 60% of many urban HHs budgets according to a recent urban poverty report), and the flexible role of cash in protecting physical, human and financial assets from livelihoods stripping, in combination with the key role of debt as a coping strategy for vulnerable Afghan families means that any form of cash programming should be provided with an open mind towards emergency livelihoods impacts and outcomes.

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6 Certified wheat seed (50Kg), DAP Fertilizer (50Kg), Urea Fertilizer (50Kg): 5,800 AFN / 85 USD  
7 Animal fodder (100Kg), Straw (200Kg), De-wormer (2 LMP), Vaccination & Treatment, Drinker (1): 8,600 AFN / 125 USD  
8 Chicken-3-month-old (20), Feed (100Kg), Drinkers (2), Feeders (2), Coop (1): 20,400 AFN / 295 USD  
9 4 kinds of vegetable seeds, Fertilizer (10Kg), Basic tools (spade, harrow, sickle, digger): 7,600 AFN / 110 USD
Case Study 2 – Cash Transfers and ‘Enabling’ Livelihoods

Mr. Mohmand, 37 years old, is married with one son and four daughters. The family lives together in Chardara District of Kunduz Province. After many years in Pakistan, where he fled from war, Mr. Mohmand came home to Afghanistan but struggled to support his family through inconsistent and insecure daily labour. Some days he found work, and some days he did not. After working for a little while in a local bakery he wanted to start his own bakery business but had no means by which to make such an investment.

In July 2018, Mr. Mohmand and his family were selected for inclusion in a multi-purpose cash grant programme run by Oxfam and ADA. Of the 15,000 AFN (a very substantial some equivalent to several months regular earning) he spent a small portion on family essentials and invested the rest in bakery equipment and the rental of a small shop. Now, the shop employs three young boys in additional to himself, business is increasing, and after covering wages, rent and costs Mr. happily reports taking home at least ten breads to his family every day.

Mr. Mohmand’s situation shows that when the combination of existing skills and knowledge (baking) come together with a form of support that is both large enough to enable investment and risk-taking, flexible enough to fit to the individual’s specific capacities, and delivered in a context where security is at least minimally stable, individuals and their households will take steps on their own to adopt and improve livelihoods in ways that make sense for them. In this way, cash transfer programming can, and should be monitored for, have positive impacts on longer term household economic viability.

Oxfam and Partner Approaches

Oxfam’s programming has supported IDPs, as well as returnees from Pakistan and host community in both Nangarhar and Kunduz provinces. Oxfam has worked with ADA, AHEAD and NRco over the last 24 months to implement, or is currently implementing, emergency cash and livelihoods assistance benefitting approximately 56,770 men, women and children across roughly 8,110 HHs in several districts. Both Kunduz city and Jalalabad have high economic potential. They have excellent climates for agriculture, direct access for export to Pakistan and Tajikistan, and both are traditional trading and regional economic hubs and Jalalabad has a degree of industry and manufacturing presence. However, in addition to a lack of peace and issues of corruption and limited rule of law, there are significant “deficiencies in urban physical and socio-economic conditions”\(^{26}\). Although support is ongoing, both cities are yet to produce an urban masterplan or to articulate and implement a coherent strategy for positive urban demographic and economic growth that includes the peri-urban hinterlands. A national study of IDPs in Afghanistan in early 2018 showed that before displacement 59% of HHs were day labourers, and 28% self-employed, after displacement this shifts to 67% in day labour and 20% self-employed\(^{27}\), reflecting loss of physical assets and social connections, as well as rural-urban movements that replace subsistence level ‘self-employment’ activities in the agricultural sector with day labour in areas such as construction. Oxfam programming has focused on host communities, IDPs and returnees. However, all interventions are targeted through household level needs assessment and verification, such that assistance is provided across all groupings on a need basis.

- Emergency cash transfers, ranging from 80 – 225 USD and delivered either as a single grant or two grants spaced one month apart with the objective of supporting immediate food security, winterization, the avoidance of negative coping strategies or multi-purpose needs (3,690 HHs).
- Cash for work activities leading to the rehabilitation and/or construction of numerous small agricultural works or community projects, and eight upcoming more substantial initiatives (1,220 HHs).
- Agricultural and non-agricultural livelihoods assistance including (aligned to FSAC recommendations) certified crop seeds and fertiliser, livestock support (poultry), basic tailoring and labouring tools and an upcoming small-scale business/IGA pilot initiative (3,200 HHs).
Accompanying GBV awareness trainings (including gender perceptions, responsibilities, and equality according to Islam and Afghanistan Law), and nutrition awareness trainings in beneficiary communities.

Emergency Livelihoods Strategy and Interventions

Beneficiary Profile: Who are we programming for?

To assess potential approaches to emergency livelihoods it is vital to understand who we are programming for. The analysis below reviews programme documentation, as well as data from 601 HHs (Returnee) from a multi-purpose cash transfer project in Nangarhar, a livelihoods assessment exercise with 1,095 HHs (IDP/Returned IDP) in peri-urban and rural Kunduz and a recent September 2018 DRA needs assessment with 328 HHs (Host) in Nangarhar to draw a profile of typical target populations.

Table 1: Key Statistics by HH Type (Nangarhar Returnees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Type</th>
<th>Surveyed</th>
<th>Targeted</th>
<th>Female Headed HH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Size (average)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency Ratio (average)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rCSI (average)</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS (poor/borderline/acceptable)</td>
<td>70% / 27% / 3%</td>
<td>79% / 19% / 1%</td>
<td>75% / 25% / 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income (average)</td>
<td>2300 Afs</td>
<td>1500 Afs</td>
<td>800 Afs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Engaged in Casual Labour</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% With Some Access to Land</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sheltered in Tent or Open Space</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programme data show that Oxfam’s humanitarian work is targeting beneficiaries who typically reside in HHs that are larger than average and therefore more likely below the poverty line. Which have fewer able-bodied adults in proportion to children, the elderly and those affected by disability and chronic illness, and lower than average monthly incomes (even more so for female headed households). Overall the HHs overwhelmingly contain one, or no, breadwinners and HHs which are more likely to be labour engaged and high unlikely to have any form of access to agricultural land (although in Kunduz approximately 30% of IDPs access land via leasing and sharecropping arrangements). A significant minority of beneficiaries are living in highly unsuitable shelter situations such as tents and open spaces (again, starkly more so for female headed households). Within female headed HHs, near one half are widowed. It is for this target group that emergency livelihoods interventions must be evaluated. On a related note, the disaggregation in table 1 of surveyed and targeted HHs demonstrates the effective of household verification exercises, and the financial worth of continuing to undertake these needs and verification exercises at field level.

Graph 1: Vulnerability Profile by HH Type (Nangarhar Returnees)

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10 87% of all female headed HHs surveyed in this exercise were included in subsequent programming.
The Nangarhar HHs show high levels of vulnerability across several indicators, especially disability and chronic illness and more than 90% of targeted households contain one or less breadwinner. In short, high levels of vulnerable sit alongside limited economic engagement.

Graph 2: Primary Food Sources by HH Type (Nangarhar Returnees)

Typical households are purchasing, through cash, credit or barter, more than half of their food, and relying on gifts, charity and borrowing for another quarter. A substantial proportion of this barter is the exchange of labour for payment in food in kind (up to 45% of HHs in a February 2018 Oxfam assessment of Nangarhar\(^39\)). Further data from Kunduz show purchases as the main food source for 77% of HHs, and labour for payment in food in kind for a further 17%\(^31\). Food aid (in-kind) and own production make up relatively small components of overall food supply for most of these households. Seasonally, these data come from just prior to the main wheat harvest, so the 2% own production statistic among targeted HHs could be expected to rise by several points but remains limited by the minimal (12%) land access – meaning that few HHs will bring in their own harvests.

Graph 3: Average Monthly Food Expenditures (Nangarhar Host HHs)

Reliance on the market for food is prevalent even among poor host community households, shown in graph 3 below using data from September 2018, with the average HH spending 4304 AFN (49%) per month on food necessities.
out of a total average monthly expenditure of 8747 AFN. After food, medical and healthcare is by far the second largest monthly cost at an average of 2682 AFN (shown in graph 4).

Graph 4: Total Average Expenditure Composition (Nangarhar Host HHs)

![Graph 4: Total Average Expenditure Composition (Nangarhar Host HHs)]

Graph 5: Economic Activities by Participation Rate and HH Type (Kunduz IDPs)

![Graph 5: Economic Activities by Participation Rate and HH Type (Kunduz IDPs)]

The targeted populations affected by forced mobility have extremely limited land access and rely overwhelmingly on various forms of casual labour (and we can assume from secondary data, informal debt, asset sale and charity) for income (graph 5). Livestock ownership is also limited, with 94% of IDPs in the February 2018 assessment reporting livestock loss during displacement. Among host communities, for example Nangarhar (graph 6), land access is much higher (overall 93%), but ownership remains very limited with most HHs engaging in sharecropping or a rental arrangement.
Reported daily labour rates sit between 300 and 400 AFN (more recent data and informal programme monitoring shows further reductions in daily rates to between 250-300 AFN) for almost all types of labour when the overall survey is considered. The trend of female headed HHs reporting daily wages of 34% less on average (as well as reductions along each category) is alarming and indicative of severe discrimination when accessing the labour market.

The reported days of labour per week (graph 5) shows widespread underemployment among humanitarian beneficiaries, with both targeted and female headed HHs reporting fewer days per week of labour than the overall survey (and less than national averages from the most recent Afghanistan Conditions of Living Survey). This confirms the effects of an extremely saturated labour market across almost all sectors available to poor and vulnerable HHs.
Analysis of a second dataset, in graph 6, from assessment in rural Kunduz provides further information on typical HH livelihoods among humanitarian beneficiaries.

Small ruminant ownership (goats and sheep) ranges from 18% to 27%, with female headed HHs well represented. However, levels of crop and orchard income are very low in comparison to the 35% of HHs that report income from sharecropping (a still low figure for access to agricultural income overall). For female headed HHs the discrepancy in access to crop, orchard and even sharecropping income is stark.

Female headed HHs in Kunduz reported a complete lack of access to 'market' (non-agricultural labour), and much-reduced access to agricultural labour. However, livestock labour is more accessible (including culturally and socially) to these HHs. Overall though, access to labour is limited - in agreement with graph 5.
Graph 8: Men’s Skills (Kunduz IDPs)

Data on the presence of skills in the HH demonstrate limited skill levels among men. Those which are reported are spread across typical occupations at rates under 4%. Notable is that in female headed HHs, the only skill possessed by men in the household (presumably older boys) is handicrafts.

Graph 9: Women’s Skills (Kunduz IDPs)

Reported skills among women are clustered in tailoring (34% of HHs) and handicrafts (17% HHs, and 29% in female headed HHs specifically).

When provided with a broad range of possible categories to select from, business start-up tools for men and women and livestock (goats and sheep) are the most commonly requested by all HHs – as well as by female headed HHs. Crop seeds and fertiliser are also requested by 32% of all HHs, but only by 4% of female headed HHs. This again reflects severe land and social access difficulties. A further 17% requested tools for unskilled labour (again only 4% for female headed HHs).

Graph 10: Reported Types of Support Required\textsuperscript{11}(Kunduz IDPs)

\textsuperscript{11} Respondents were not limited in the number of assistance types that could be expressed as a need.
In summary, humanitarian programme targeted households are well below the national poverty line (reporting under 15% of the national average monthly income), severely food insecure, and highly unlikely to have access to land for agriculture (except for a minority (up to 1/3) of HHs in rural Kunduz who are engaged in sharecropping arrangements). Target households are highly dependent on market purchases, debt and charity to secure food and on casual labour (agricultural and non-agricultural) to secure marginal amounts of income. Most target households, across skill levels and types, are significantly under-employment in the currently saturated labour markets. Less than 5% of HHs report typical male skill types such as masonry, tailoring, carpentry, mechanics and electrical. HH’s report higher rates of women being skills in tailoring (34%) and handicrafts (17% in all HHs, 29% in female headed HHs), but reported female skills beyond this gender typecasts are negligible. Returnee HHs in Nangarhar do possess, however, a higher rate of marketable and urban skills, though face the same market saturation challenges. A notable minority of households maintain small livestock for household consumption and basic trade. In all cases (except small livestock) data on women’s income, skill levels, economic access to land and the labour market all show the negative impacts of gendered access restrictions.

The Structural Drivers of Vulnerability: What is our potential for impact?

To understand the drivers of vulnerability in areas of humanitarian operation we have conducted a modelling exercise, using simple multivariate linear regression and a set of HH data from Nangarhar. This analysis looks at the extent to which household income and access to labour influence basic livelihoods outcomes in comparison to other potential structural drivers of risk, need and vulnerability. We find that both monthly income and days of labour per week are positively, and statistically significantly, related to basic livelihoods outcomes. However, demographic and socio-economic characteristics; including livestock and land access, gender disparities, disability status (such as the presence of disability and pregnancy in the HH) and whether more than one breadwinner is present, play a greater role. This calls for a dose of reality as to what forms or types of ‘resilience’ or ‘recovery’ can be achieved by interventions at the individual and HH level that are not simultaneously part of a strategy to influence the community, local and national drivers of vulnerability, risk and need that are structured at the macro-economic, governance and political levels.

The model suggests that, if a HH’s monthly income were in isolation to increase by 2000 AFN (approx. 27 USD), the families FCS can be reasonably expected to increase by 0.8 points (1.6 for labour engaged HHs), and their rCSI scores to reduce by 2.6 (1.5 for labour engaged households). If a labour engaged HH were to find one more day of work per week, the families FCS might be expected to increase by 1.1 point, and their rCSI drop by 0.5. Based on the limited data available, the exercise suggests a further set of relationships covered below.

**Food Consumption Scores:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Days of Labour</th>
<th>Land Access</th>
<th>Disability</th>
<th>Pregnancy</th>
<th>Dependancy Ratio</th>
<th>Female Headed HH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Higher monthly incomes and labour participation are statistically significant and appear to increase FCS while a lack of access to land and the presence of disability in the household creates a negative outcome. Household size, dependency ratio and a female headed HH do not show a significant relationship in this data, though for labour engaged households there is a strong and significant decrease in FCS for HH’s composed of high percentages of young and adult women. For the labour engaged there is also a positive and significant affect observed from livestock ownership that is not observed in the full sample.

**Reduced Coping Strategies Index:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Labour Participation</th>
<th>Land Access</th>
<th>Disability</th>
<th>Pregnancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Higher monthly incomes, labour participation and a lack of land access are statistically significant and appear to decrease the rCSI score, while household size, a HH head under 18 years (child), only one sole breadwinner and pregnancy in the household increase the score (the former is weakly significant and the latter strongly). The model finds no statically significant relationship between rCSI and dependency ratio or female headed HH – though

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12 FCS and rCSI were the available indicators for this exercise.
13 For HHs which reported being engaged in labour (around half of total sample).
14 This specific result is unexpected, and difficult to explain or further investigate with the current data.
percent of HH composed of young and adult women is again strongly significant and increases the expected rCSI score.

**Multivariate Regression Model of FCS and rCSI (Nangarhar Data)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Consumption Score</th>
<th>FCS Model: All</th>
<th>FCS Model: Labour</th>
<th>Reduced Coping Strategies Index</th>
<th>Coping rCSI Model: All</th>
<th>Coping rCSI Model: Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>0.0733043</td>
<td>0.2037903</td>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>0.1483375</td>
<td>0.1520813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(0.365)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070) *</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency Ratio</td>
<td>-0.3021753</td>
<td>-0.2606324</td>
<td>Dependency Ratio</td>
<td>0.1741566</td>
<td>0.2382454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.467)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income (1000 AFN)</td>
<td>0.3967000</td>
<td>0.7557000</td>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>-1.336000</td>
<td>-0.7942000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022) **</td>
<td>(0.018) **</td>
<td>(1000 AFN)</td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of HH &gt;5 Female</td>
<td>-2.854802</td>
<td>-10.3773</td>
<td>Percent of HH &gt;5 Female</td>
<td>-1.503117</td>
<td>5.30401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.006) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Headed HH</td>
<td>0.0429056</td>
<td>0.0712656</td>
<td>Female Headed HH</td>
<td>1.032684</td>
<td>0.223419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.962)</td>
<td>(0.963)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.023)</td>
<td>(0.834)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Engaged</td>
<td>6.282087</td>
<td>-3.032124</td>
<td>Labour Engaged</td>
<td>2.723228</td>
<td>3.59401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011) **</td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Ownership</td>
<td>1.329725</td>
<td>3.486426</td>
<td>Pregnancy in HH</td>
<td>2.255461</td>
<td>2.723228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.027) **</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002) ***</td>
<td>(0.011) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability in HH</td>
<td>-3.037415</td>
<td>-3.437014</td>
<td>Child Headed</td>
<td>3.996756</td>
<td>1.990203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000) ***</td>
<td>(0.003) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001) ***</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days of Work Last Seven</td>
<td>1.051048</td>
<td>2.985012</td>
<td>Sole Breadwinner</td>
<td>2.985012</td>
<td>2.9975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006) ***</td>
<td>(0.001) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004) **</td>
<td>(0.078) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days of Work Last Seven</td>
<td>-0.4684015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078) *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A question of impact size:

If we hold the continuous variables for HH size, dependency ratio, income and percent of HH female at their means, the predicted FCS for a male headed household, without disability, and whom has access land, labour and livestock is 24.9. If the same HH were to be without land access, this predication drops to 19.9. If access to also labour is lost, then the prediction is 18.6. If lack of land is combined with the presence of disability the prediction is 16.9, and combining lack of land with a 2 standard deviation increase in the percent of HH members over 5 years of age who are female, we arrive at 19.1. Again, holding continuous variables at mean, a HH that is male headed, without the presence of pregnancy, with more than one adult breadwinner and access to both land and labour has a predicted rCSI of 21.4. If the same HH were to lose economic capacity and become a sole breadwinner HH, the prediction increases to 24.4. A sole breadwinner combined with a pregnancy is 26.7. A loss of access to labour, even with multiple breadwinners and no pregnancy is 24.5. The same original HH without labour access, being female headed by a sole breadwinner and with the presence of pregnancy generates a predication of 30.7.

The point here is that, while income and days of labour have a clear positive relationship with FCS and rCSI, structural factors matter much more when we explore the model. Each specific prediction value should be interpreted with healthy scepticism, but the overall trend appears to be robust. The models also explain between 21% - 45% of the variance within the dataset. This is enough to draw inferences but also highlights the importance of contextual factors that are not possible to easily assess, likely including personal relationships, conflict, and

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15 The livestock variable is not statistically reliable in the rCSI model
individual mobility histories. These unmeasured factors appear to play at least an equally strong role in determining outcomes for individual HHs but are poorly understood and captured in existing emergency livelihoods approaches. In the set of graphs annexed to this report, for example, you will find that wide variances in predicted FCS and rCSI values persist due to the significance of binary variables around genders, land access and so forth.

**Case Study 3 – Household Strategies and Structural Factors**

Mrs. Zarbanoo, 45 years old, lives with one school aged son, a school aged daughter and her elderly – 60 years old – husband in Behsud District of Nangarhar Province.

“[My] husband, aged 60, is an elder person who doesn’t have the ability to go for daily wages, nor is an employer interested to give him work because of his age, so we were suffering with many difficulties in terms of household expenses. The only means for our income was the cultivation of land [sharecropping for a village owner], my younger son and I together with my husband help to cultivate...but the land is only 1 Gerib, which is not enough to feed up our entire family.”

After struggling to get by on a 50% sharecropping entitlement of just 1 Gerib due in large part to her Husband’s age, Mrs. Zarbanoo received support from an elder son selling fruits in Pakistan, and other family, to afford to purchase one cow. The second income provided some additional buffer, although she couldn’t produce or buy animal fodder to increase the cow’s milk production, especially after managing cost-sharing for the seeds and fertilizer to plant the shared land. In early September 2018 Mrs. Zarbanoo received an additional form of support as a beneficiary of the Oxfam – NRCO poultry packages programme that provided 15 hens, 2 basket of feed 50KG each, water tool and feeder as well as vaccination.

“The hens are now producing the eggs, and I am selling them out in the village and to nearby shops to earn AFN 70-80 per day (AFN 2000-2100 monthly). This has helped me to cover some part of my family’s household expenses.”

While expressing her happiness with now having three different sources of income to try and cobble together her family’s basic needs, Mrs. Zarbanoo also expressed that the value and duration of support should be at least doubled or tripled. A more sustainable business, in her mind, would require the provision of 3x more hens, a link to the market and extension services, and at least 6 months of initial feed.

This case study shows the impact of an elderly husband, and particular the different forms of support (family remittance, humanitarian aid, sharecropping arrangements) that Mrs. Zarbanoo has pulled together to produce a minimum, but diverse, level of income.

**Evaluating Current Interventions**

For this study, the current set of emergency livelihoods interventions were assessed against certain DAC criteria (with ALNAP guidance for use in humanitarian action):

- Relevance (alignment to local needs and priorities)
- Efficiency (outputs achieved as a result of inputs)
- Effectiveness & Impact (extent to which activity achieves intended purpose / overall effects of intervention)
- Coverage (extent to which vulnerable populations are, or can be, reached)
- Connectedness & Coherence (linkages to longer-term issues and consistency with humanitarian, developmental, economic and political challenges and policies)

The assessment process was based on the analysis above of who we are programming for, the structural drivers of vulnerability and need, and a thorough review of project evaluations, post–distribution monitoring reports, humanitarian assessment and needs surveys, stakeholder discussions and HH interviews and FGDs from Kunduz and Nangarhar. These summaries are a synthesis of evidence and of course subjective, being a matter of technical
judgement as well as data. The reader is invited to contribute their own analysis of the context and professional judgement to interpret it.

1. Emergency Cash Transfer Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>High relevance for immediate household needs, livelihoods protection, prevention of asset stripping and maintenance of human, financial and physical assets. It is important to recognise that cash plays a role in livelihoods protection regardless of the immediate sectoral objective. Cash is consistently and overwhelmingly the preferred modality of assistance in all programme monitoring data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Medium to High efficiency, a recent decision to return to cash deliver through local money dealers (hawala agents) has increased the efficiency of transfers and is more appropriate to the current context (in Nangarhar and Kunduz) than transfers through mobile companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness &amp; Impact</td>
<td>High short-term impact, though lessened when access and security constraints require multiple transfers to be condensed into a single lumpsum. There is scope, where access allows for monthly transfers to be regularised, to combine a lower value transfer with further livelihoods support for vulnerable HHs. It should be kept in mind that the existing SMEB is designed primarily for the first months of a new displacement (a period with heightened costs and needs), and that lower proportions (rather than the full SMEB) should be considered in most cases; taking into account whether or not a household has experienced forced mobility and the proportion of the SMEB which the household may be expected to meet on their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Strong coverage in terms of reach within districts targeted for assistance. However, security related challenges to access, and in particular cash movements, limit the ability to reach some districts with high levels of need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectedness &amp; Coherence</td>
<td>Good connection to the wider humanitarian response – and with the objective of accountability to / empowerment of affected populations – monitoring data shows that households tend to freely (re)prioritise cash usage to their priority needs and sectors, regardless of sector imposition (and this is good). The lack of social safety nets in Afghanistan limits to the ability to link emergency cash to longer-term systems, more fundamental structural work (increased political stability, return to economic growth, and more effective state revenue systems) are required to make such safety nets feasible in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: Emergency Cash Transfers should be maintained and augmented as the priority immediate intervention to meet humanitarian needs, providing a proportion of the SMEB for recent arrivals of forced mobility (or other acute shocks) and a proportion of the FSAC food basket at key points in the lean season (or similar periods of chronic need). There is a need to reinforce that all cash is multipurpose cash from the beneficiary perspective. Expenditure patterns can be influenced by distribution values, timings and duration, but not by sectoral segmentation on the donor or agency side.

2. Cash for Work / Temporary Employment Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>High relevance – in the same ways as other forms of cash transfer and in recognition of the high rates of underemployment. CfW should continue to follow best practice by ensuring alignment to seasonality and local work priorities. It should most likely be operated for no more than 3 days per week to not interfere with other forms of labour and livelihoods systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Medium efficiency – lower than direct cash distribution due to significant lead times to procure work materials and the additional operational costs of works monitoring and administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness &amp; Impact</td>
<td>Medium Impact – lower than direct cash distribution primarily because the falling labour wage rates have resulted in agencies setting CfW daily wages at levels that do not reflect humanitarian needs when the cash value of the total transfer is considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Low to Medium Coverage – CfW activities involve similar coverage challenges as direct cash transfers, with the added dimension of requiring a higher level of monitoring over an extended period of time. This limits coverage capacity, especially in areas of high insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectedness &amp; Coherence</td>
<td>Good connection to the wider humanitarian response, and with the objective of accountability to / empowerment of affected populations – monitoring data shows that households tend to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
freely (re)-prioritise cash usage to their priority needs and sectors, regardless of sector imposition (and this is good). The lack of social safety nets in Afghanistan limits to the ability to link emergency cash to longer-term systems, more fundamental structural work (increased political stability, return to economic growth, and more effective state revenue systems) are required to make such safety nets feasible in Afghanistan.

Summary

CfW isn’t always accompanied by a strong justification of the value addition beyond unconditional cash transfers. Care should be taken to ensure that where CfW is employed: (1) the work is meaningful to the community, (2) the total value of cash to be received by the worker is meaningful in relation to their need, and (3) the CfW doesn’t displace hours that would otherwise be allocated by beneficiaries to productive and care labours. If there is a pressure to use CfW to spread the value of cash available among a greater number of beneficiaries then, in the first instance, consider whether the unconditional cash transfer value (i.e SMEB or Food Basket Valuation) has been set at too high a proportion of the total in relation to beneficiary need. Remember, a 100% value implies that without support, a household would be able to provide for 0% of their requirement. Furthermore, increase daily rates and total transfer value of CfW to ensure the link between levels of need and levels of assistance. The rationale for setting CfW rates slightly below prevailing wage rates in the real economy falls away when labour markets are so highly saturated, there is essentially no risk of a ‘real’ day of work not finding someone willing to do it. Recommended to use SMEB instead (11,000 AFN / 20 = 550 AFN = ~7.5 USD)

3. Agricultural Input Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Low to Medium Relevance – for humanitarian caseloads with limited land access, or access through forms of sharecropping, and especially in the urban and peri-urban areas near Kunduz and Jalalabad city, agricultural input distribution is often not the most relevant potential form of assistance for the majority of the targeted population. This situation is different in other regions of Afghanistan, and in the case of natural disasters such as drought. However, the focus of this report is on conflict and displacement in the North and East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Medium Efficiency – with standard procurement and distribution systems well in place, the activity is reasonably efficient. However, improved communication with beneficiaries and timeliness of distributions may improve the outcome in terms of production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness &amp; Impact</td>
<td>Medium Effectiveness – While effective in a certain season, and valuable following a specific shock, input distribution itself is unlikely to lead to longer term improvements in household or community level agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>High Coverage – identification of farmers and distribution coverage is possible at scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectedness &amp; Coherence</td>
<td>Limited connectedness - without commensurate improvements in irrigation, market facilitation and security, input distribution becomes a cyclical activity. Although these cycles may be required to prevent further livelihoods degradation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Input distribution (but in ratio to land access, perhaps 10%-30% of target group) Vegetable-gardening and small livestock interventions, though they need to be more highly resourced with funding for training, basic extension services and local housing solutions. Scope to bring women together.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Skills Training (TVET), Employment Support and IGA/Micro-Business Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>High - The expansion, and linking, of emergency livelihoods work with more integrated efforts to increase the skills base, employability and capacity of beneficiaries to earn income through markets for either labour or production is highly relevant to the needs of the target group. Though note that deficiencies in basic education and the ongoing crisis represent challenges for the capacity of the target group to engage fully and take economic risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Low – these types of programming are exceptionally resource intensive in the Afghanistan context and there is a concrete trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness &amp; Impact</td>
<td>Medium – In certain locations, where the security situation is most stable, and with certain minority segments of the target groups (those with additional education, access to income or other personal characteristic that enables engagement and risk-taking) it is possible to achieve certain outcomes in niche markets where demand is not yet fully saturated. However, there is limited evidence for the impact and effectiveness of self-employment and small-scale entrepreneurship programmes that target individuals at the subsistence level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Low – For the reasons noted above, coverage possibilities are extremely low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectedness &amp; Coherence</td>
<td>High – Given the current macro-economic situation in Afghanistan this type of programming is relatively well connected to the larger issues. However, for coherence to improve agencies must do more to recognise demand side challenges and to engage with these at an appropriate policy level. Agencies must also remain aware that in certain locations, the fundamental risk is insecurity and conflict, and this limits livelihoods related progress regardless of programme design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Consider skills training layered with placement support and based on local market assessment. This will likely require multi-year programming, and the provision of small value, long term cash assistance to enable engagement and risk taking by beneficiaries. Avoid the trap of interpreting a lack of interest from highly vulnerable populations as a ‘lack of commitment’; those who struggle day to day will need support if any engagement can be reasonably expected. Also consider micro-business development with market facilitation, registration and legal support, extensive business plan and development coaching. As noted above, the resource intensity of this programming, and its lack of appropriateness for the majority of the most vulnerable, mean that it must be seen as a pilot that can serve to leverage greater policy level change. The physical programme itself can never alter ground reality at scale.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Integrating Perspectives: Markets, Gender and Conflict Sensitivity

Integrating and strengthening the market, gender and conflict sensitivity of emergency livelihoods programming requires implementation with a much greater focus on four areas:

- Community access, credibility, and mobilisation (linking to agency footprint and risk tolerance).
- Local contextual knowledge and the sharing of this between field and programme design staff.
- Ensuring sufficient funding and time windows for the intended linkage and change objectives.
- Where gender objectives require a change in social or behavioural norms, programmes must be designed, implemented and monitored using additional specific tools that target those desired norms.  

Market Linkages and Saturation

Livelihoods are complex systems composed of individual and HH capabilities, assets and strategies. A livelihood cannot be distributed and so the debate needs to advance from ‘what livelihood is best, and what kit is therefore required’ to what, on a humanitarian time-frame and with the degrees of ground access available, can be altered about the local environment to support HHs to better apply their capabilities, assets and strategies to produce, in the short term, income and subsistence. And for those things beyond an agency’s ability to alter, what then can be

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16 For an accessible introduction to social and behaviour change work, see the GSDRC review of ‘Methods and approaches to understanding behaviour change’ available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/58590a81e5274a13070000e6/HDQ1389.pdf
done to influence change in other ways. Shifting this design thinking is key to improving the market sensitivity of emergency livelihoods response.

Nationally, 43% of Afghan workers are employed in agriculture (split almost evenly between farming and livestock), manufacturing stands at 18% and services 19.7%. Additionally, self-employment is common in skill areas with low economic (but potentially high social) entry requirements such as tailoring, weaving or in urban areas such as Jalalabad, transport and basic tradesmen sectors. Self-employment is often highly insecure and poorly paid; it is not necessarily the sign of a sustainable livelihood and can be a last-resort form of coping in advance of asset stripping. These 'subsistence' entrepreneurs are prevalent through the humanitarian target group.

The existing emergency livelihoods work relies on the existence and function of markets, especially for agriculture, labour and home-products such as handicrafts and tailoring items. However, emergency livelihoods programming is often too limited in scope, timeframe and access to meaningfully engage with the structures, processes and governance of the market itself. Adopting such objectives requires emergency livelihoods approaches to be linked to interventions that specifically seek to alter the governance of the market. In most cases this will require a policy and advocacy approach at local, national and international levels. For example, male workers are most often either underemployed (24-31 hrs/week) or overemployed (48-63 hrs./week), and this is indicative of significant labour market issues and saturation. Labour mobility (rural to urban and cross-border) is also a defining feature, and an extremely common coping strategy among vulnerable HHs. Both market saturation and labour mobility in search of demand open up key market governance issues that should be of concern to any livelihoods concerned actor.

Key Findings from the ground:

- When questioned about livelihoods expansion and recovery, the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance consistently express the desire, and need for, steady and secure employment, essential infrastructure such as irrigation, electrification and basic education, and most of all security. These fundamental needs are seen to constitute a required for individuals to accumulate capital, access markets and invest in livelihoods.
- While men rely on extensive personal contacts to collect (either in person or over the phone) market information, women possess extremely limited capacity to interact with the market. In Kunduz, some access by women (as pairs and in exceptional cases) appears possible, however in Nangarhar women have almost no access to market information due to physical confinement.
- Physical insecurity is the most commonly cited impediment to market access, development and investment of capital (notwithstanding the gendered access constraints).
- Households consistently report a desire for labour markets to provide stable and secure employment typically associated with urbanised and formal industry, above and beyond ad hoc production activities such as small-scale weaving, tailoring, handicrafts etc (i.e. ‘subsistence entrepreneurship).

Key considerations for applying market sensitive approaches to emergency livelihoods programming in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan:

- Highly saturated markets require a different approach than the typical market linkage activities that rely on bringing supply to pockets of demand. Need to shift focus onto barriers on the demand side. Agency projects cannot, in isolate, create demand – policy level work is required.
- To what extent is it possible for an external agency to ‘place’ beneficiaries within saturated labour markets where personal attributes, education levels and social capital and networks likely play the primary role as determinants of successful access?
- Is it possible for the agency to sustain the consistent field and community presence required for market facilitation and development approaches (and for gender and conflict sensitivity strategies that seek to change perceptions and behaviours at HH and community level)?
- How can emergency livelihoods evidence, learning and work on the ground be linked to policy and advocacy strategies, particularly with regards to state and economic institutions that govern markets, and the large mid-range programmes that seek to re-structure theses?

**Integrating Gender**

Oxfam assessments in Kunduz and Nangarhar consistently demonstrate the lack of women’s involvement in economic decision-making processes, and isolation in the local context related social and cultural norms. In two districts of Kunduz, for example, more than 95% of recently surveyed persons reported that women, men, boys and girls do not receive equal access to humanitarian assistance, while 92% of women report having the ability to access...
less than 25% of the HHs income, despite significant domestic, household and productive expectations. Women, along with girls and boys, are also particularly vulnerable to GBV threats and less able to access local governance forums such as CDCs, where crucial decisions on resource allocation, conflict resolution and aid inflows are often made. Unequal access to such forums reflects heightened vulnerability also to protection related threats. According to Nangarhar assessment, only 17% of women expressed feeling safe and able to express their voices on security issues and concerns, while 96% of community members reported that GBV cannot garner a community response. The same data show that 45% of respondents have noticed an increase in child labour, a severe protection concern.

Nangarhar and Kunduz are also both regarded as relatively more conservative Provinces. Overall, this adds up to a highly challenging context for livelihoods work that seeks to include a meaningful gender component.

Key Findings from the ground:

- When asked to describe, in the context of livelihoods activities, the risks and threats that are faced, and the mitigation strategies that are employed, by the opposite gender (i.e. husbands speaking of wives, and wives speaking of husbands) each gender appears to have strikingly limited knowledge of the other. Women frequently describe men as facing no challenge because they are men, while men describe women as facing no challenge because they either ‘do no activities’ or ‘stay just in the home’.
- However, our qualitative data show that men face significant insecurity, access and relationship challenges that require strategies such as altering travel routes, reducing the time of activities, and investing heavily into consensus building before undertaking certain livelihoods activities.
- Women also, far from being inactive, struggle daily to undertake a diverse set of agricultural, livestock and other production activities and, in addition to insecurity, face cultural and social barriers to basic movement and information access. Burdensome strategies such as relying on male proxies, moving in groups, and constant negotiation with male family members and community leaders are required.
- Data suggests a gendered division of access to supplementary and emergency income sources that is worth further investigation; with men appearing to have greater access and ability to take on debt when required, while women are more reliant on remittances from male family members (uncles, brothers and sons).
- The well-known limitations on women’s mobility, access and capacity to undertake livelihoods activities are explained by respondents primarily through two rationales, (1) fear of physical insecurity related to conflict and fighting and (2) social and cultural norms and the fear of ‘rumours’ and judgement on families and communities.

Key Considerations for applying gender sensitive approaches in emergency livelihoods programming in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan:

- How can the introduction of livelihoods support be used together with initiatives to increase women’s participation in economic decision-making, especially around productive assets and (re)-investment? There is a need to further specify the objectives of gender integration components in livelihoods work and to move from general ‘awareness’ to community interventions that target specific changes in behavioural norms.
- Any livelihoods programming that seeks to contribute to women’s economic empowerment should consider how the programme can address both the social and cultural norms, and the threats and risks around physical insecurity related to the conflict. Current women’s economic empowerment models appear to work more comfortably on the first aspect than the second.
- Consider integrating basic household financial and debt management training, adapted for low literacy and numeracy populations, as a wedge to increase the visibility, and potentially the value, of ‘women’s work’.
- Agencies should consider using specific gender related proxy indicators should be used to track changes in control over productive resources and the allocation of spending, rather than general indicators that track awareness and knowledge of terms. For example, “Out of 100 AFN that comes into the HH, how many AFN do you physical spend? And out of 100 AFN, how many AFN do you decide how to spend?” is a question formulation that lends itself to more specific impact tracking.
This review has also suggested that addressing severe indebtedness, harmful work such as begging and refuse collection, and child labour and child marriage are aims consistent with livelihoods related gender concerns. Agencies should consider conducting a rapid care analysis of both men and women’s labour to understand where it might be possible to either improve the productivity of time-consuming household labour tasks, or to work towards an improved intra-household capacity to negotiate a rational division of burdens.

Emergency Livelihoods and Conflict Sensitivity

Social, environmental, economic and political conflicts, with the potential to rapidly escalate into threats and acts of violence, are pervasive in areas of humanitarian operation in Afghanistan. Despite such conflicts often being informally perceived by teams in the field, formally recognising and engaging with these is rare. The most common form of conflict management is avoidance, either through programme delay or withdrawal, or by aligning community entry with the existing power brokers. Field teams from many agencies (including, for example, those implementing the citizens charter) face significant technical, capacity and operational challenges in deploying other forms of conflict management practice. In some cases, the short timeframes of humanitarian funding and access limitation also limit the extent to which it is advisable to open these issues.

Emergency livelihoods programming has the capacity to interact with the conflict context; though there is a lack of high-quality empirical evidence to support the common notion that livelihoods and employment supports peacebuilding transformation. Some research, for example, argues that exploitative experiences of employment in poor conditions with extremely low pay and a lack of recourse to express frustrations are more likely to lead to conflict than complete economic exclusion. With this caveat (that jobs and economic inclusion does not lead to an absence of conflict) in mind, a recent case study report on gender and conflict resolution in Afghanistan shows that programming that is conflict sensitive can improve impact at community level – though it is important not to loss perspective on the national and international level political issues that both drive much of conflict in the context and are beyond the capacity of communities to resolve.

Key Findings from the ground:

- Typical customary conflict resolution actors and forums, including local elders, leadership and religious figures, remain dominant for the resolution of economic, resource use and livelihoods programming related conflicts. Government is repeatedly described as a secondary, referral type, option only applied when an issue cannot be resolved locally or when certain local parties refuse to ‘buy in’ to a customary decision.
- These conflict resolution mechanisms can also be activated pro-actively as forums for mitigating risk through discussions and forming of consensus. Both local people and agencies providing assistance can engage.
- However, women have extremely limited, or no, direct access or participation rights within these mechanisms. And so, the downside to managing conflict sensitivity through these customary structures is the high likelihood of contributing to furthering existing power structures, and especially the exclusion of women.
- Though respondents are hesitant to discuss conflicts related to assistance, the primary potential cause of conflicts relates not so much to programme design and/or objectives, but to decisions on beneficiary inclusion/exclusion.
- The most common form of conflict management among implementing teams is avoidance, either through programme delay or withdrawal, or by aligning community entry with the existing power brokers. Field teams from many agencies (including, for example, those implementing the citizens charter) face significant technical, capacity and operational challenges in deploying other forms of conflict management practice.

Key Considerations for applying conflict sensitive approaches to emergency livelihoods programming in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan:
Mainstream the use of conflict analysis tools such as mapping stakeholder relationships, conflict trees, and analysis of connectors and dividers\textsuperscript{17}. These tools can be used informally with internal field staff and partner teams just after community entry, and prior to the start of programming to better understand sensitivities and potential risks.

A better understanding of risks and conflict dynamics can also lead to opportunities to practice improved conflict management on the ground, and to move beyond the current two options of disengagement or alignment with existing power brokers.

Continue moving from status (Host, IDP, Returned IDP, Documented or Undocumented Returnee) to vulnerability-based targeting (or at least the application of vulnerability criteria across diverse status groups), as both a programme quality and conflict sensitivity improvement. The assumptions made to link vulnerability and status are not upheld by a review of beneficiary data.

Directions and Challenges for Emergency Livelihoods

Emergency livelihoods programming in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan is facing several contextual and technical challenges that require more responsive coordination, programme design and implementation strategies. As covered above, target populations are highly labour and market dependent, with IDPs and returnees having extremely little access to land for agricultural production. Host communities have more access to such assets, but the most vulnerable HHs are still reliant on sharecropping arrangements. All vulnerable populations rely heavily on purchasing, bartering and charity to secure basic food needs, as well as high levels of indebtedness. Furthermore, we know that the macro-economic, governance and rule of law constraints are severe, and that while income and access to labour matters for livelihoods outcomes, other demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the HH; including livestock and land access, gender disparities, disability status and whether more than one breadwinner is present, matter more. These factors mean that short term emergency cash programming and agricultural input distributions, while necessary, are limiting in terms of impact. At the same time, there is globally a lack of evidence about what ‘works’ in terms of recovery and transition in terms of livelihoods.

There are mounting expectations from both the beneficiaries and providers of humanitarian aid, as shown in our qualitative data and discussions with stakeholders, that livelihoods assistance should provide employment, basic infrastructure and address deep-seated economic issues, as well as contribute to radical social and cultural shifts such as behavioural norms in gender and conflict management. Some of the expected outcomes associated with this are unrealistic, for example, it is not possible for emergency livelihoods work to fundamentally alter the demand landscape of large economic sectors, or to provide secure and sustainable employment. Programme expansion into skills training, employment linkages and micro-business development and other non-agricultural livelihoods areas is very challenging in the context, and the recommendations below should be taken into account. It is also vital for policy makers and donors in Afghanistan to consider carefully when an objective is achievable under a humanitarian banner, or when more efforts are needed to entice development actors to bring longer term funding and approaches into the more fragile regions where these actors have been hesitant to work thus far.

Livelihoods in Urban and Settings of Mobility

“It is high-time... knowing the risk of demand saturation and oversupply of labour in the same place, to get out of the box of community livelihood and work with the product and labour market”\textsuperscript{46} ILO (2014)

Mobility, including combinations of forced displacement, periodic movements and labour mobility\textsuperscript{47}, is a significant livelihoods factor and, together with high natural growth rates, a driver of urbanisation. Both labour mobility and urbanisation can be a great opportunity if managed well and if there is increasing programme focus on product and labour markets. Seasonal migration helps to smooth household consumption, generate remittances that can counterbalance risks to rural income generation (for example drought and flooding) and contribute to urban

\textsuperscript{17} For guidance on these tools and their usage in Afghanistan, a good starting point in the ARC and Oxfam Manual on Conflict Analysis Tools (originally developed in the context of preventing, mitigating and reducing risk of social conflicts in connection with DRR.
economic growth and livelihood diversification. Well managed urbanisation can also lead to demand generation for agricultural production, something that is currently lacking in models of agricultural development in the country. After initial cash or food distribution programming, the question is often asked why beneficiaries remain dependent on further assistance. In Kunduz and Jalalabad cities (and their hinterlands), several measures supporting labour mobility and urban-rural remittances could help to maximise economic security and minimise protection and gender risks.

- Increase levels and scope of support to micro-business and production models in comparison to skills training, pair this with longer term (at least 6 month) low level cash support (30-40% of SMEB) for basic needs and coaching from business plan development, set up and operation. Any new income generation activities mean beneficiary risk taking, and risk taking requires support.
- Support the development of coherent urban growth and development plans (for example Kunduz and Jalalabad city master plans) and support local government to reduce regulation barriers and street-level harassment of ‘subsistence’ entrepreneurs. For example, by linking planning processes to social mobilisation for street-sellers, transport workers and other marginal urban livelihoods groups.
- Work with local business and chamber of commerce type associations to highlight informal market barriers and generate evidence to contribute to decreasing market dysfunction, look for ways to apply community and political governance and advocacy approaches to governance of the market at the same time as delivering humanitarian assistance through standard channels.
- There is potential to do harm through rushed TVET, and other urban emergency livelihoods programmes that do not provide support to beneficiaries in developing the social linkages and assets necessarily to actually deploy new skills or products in the Afghanistan context.
- If it is not possible to deliver TVET curriculums that earn official certification, that are based on evidence of labour demand and that are able to be realistically resourced, then it will often be preferable to run cash transfer programming that provides beneficiaries with resources to pursue their own livelihoods strategies and investments.

Impact and Quality versus Relevance and Scale

There is a need to acknowledge the trade-off between programme impact and quality, and programme relevance and capacity to reach scale. High quality and impactful programme are possible in the areas of agricultural value chain development, or comprehensive farmer field school approaches, in skills training (in certain niche areas) with proper curriculums and employment and basic needs support, or in well designed micro-business (income generation) programmes with sufficient financial and coaching support. In some cases, this can be effective for small pools of carefully selected individuals, but it lacks efficiency, scalability and the most vulnerable are the least likely to be able to be engaged. The levels of time, funding and expertise required to design and implement programmes that are impactful and high quality directly reduce the capacity to scale, and the relevance – or capacity to engage and benefit – for the most vulnerable HHs in need of assistance. At the level of an individual agency, such programmes must be seen as a pilot, or proof of concept, to use as a foundation to lobby for higher level structural changes.

Transitional or recovery livelihoods programming in Afghanistan requires very high levels of resourcing, and individualised case management approaches to livelihoods development to be effective because of the severity of structural constraints. Markets in Afghanistan are highly personalised and social networks and capital play an outsized role. Emergency programming that targets labour market access, skills development, and micro-business must therefore adopt a ‘case management’ approach that layers training with job placement, business facilitation, and ongoing mentoring/coaching. Beneficiaries must be directly linked to suppliers and buyers at every stage, trainers must be found, identified and introduced to be trusted. Fundamental deficits in physical and social infrastructure also matter. For example, programme data from Nangahar in September 2018 shows 73% of heads of HH have no formal schooling, another 16% reached primary level and only 11% secondary or tertiary. Book-keeping training methodologies for low literacy and numeracy groups exist, but again require resourcing and time. The reality of this trade-off, and the non-scalability of models that require multi-year funding of more than 1,000 USD per beneficiary, means that such programming must be seen not as ‘the solution’, but as a pilot exercise to gather evidence and find ways to reduce the structural barriers that prevent such programming from being scaled or from being of benefit to the most vulnerable.
• Ensure to design and run intensive skills development and micro-business programming that explicitly acknowledge trade-offs in both scale and inability to target the most vulnerable (who are not ‘market ready’).
• Compensate by using programme interventions to leverage the evidence generation possible through such programmes into policy and advocacy engagement with larger multi-lateral, bi-lateral and state actors active in economic reform in the North and East of the country.
• A significant proportion of the humanitarian livelihoods caseload sits within the bottom 10-15% of the vulnerable population that will always struggle to achieve economic resilience and sustainability. Social protection discussions have largely stalled in country and must be re-invigorated if more operational efficient means of carrying this caseload are to be found (in contrast to short-term humanitarian funding with starts and stops).

Multi-Level Emergency Livelihoods Interventions

Emergency livelihoods programme design benefits from use of a standard livelihood’s framework such as the sustainable livelihoods framework below. However, one risk (especially in challenging and highly structurally constrained contexts such as insecure areas of Afghanistan) is that these frameworks draw focus primarily to household level problems, household level interventions and therefore household level solutions. Context vulnerabilities, shocks, risks and trends, and the policies, institutions and processes that either enable or limit certain livelihoods strategies become the background. Household level livelihoods outcomes are heavily influenced by the community and macro-context in which households are embedded. In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, much more focus (even in emergency programming) is needed on vertical integration and interventions that can be taken at community and policy level simultaneously with ongoing household level assistance.

Diagram 1: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
The current focus of emergency livelihoods programming is on financial and physical asset replacement. Greater focus is needed, when designing an emergency livelihoods programme (regardless of whether household level support is through cash programming, agricultural or livestock support, labour support or otherwise) to ask what barriers exist in the community context, and in the policies, institutions and processes at play, to households being able to apply the (supported) livelihoods strategy to achieve the desired livelihood outcomes. Attempting to tackle structural issues through the provision of household level assets is a narrow and weak approach.

‘Enabling’ emergency livelihoods interventions include work to decrease household time burdens and enable the re-allocation of productivity gains. Like cash, any increase in the availability of time allows beneficiaries the empowerment to make decisions about how to allocate the gains.

Design programme components that attempt to address these barriers using community and policy level interventions (in addition to the household level), that support asset endowments, market opportunities, risk management (from a livelihoods perspective) and good economic and political governance.

Layer interventions to work on multiple aspect of the livelihood’s framework simultaneously.

Avoid being caught up in arbitrary definitional boundaries between humanitarian action and development. If there are barriers to successful pursuit of a livelihoods strategy that can be, at least lessened, on a 12-month humanitarian timeframe (such as access to extension services, or community mobilisation methods to increase the safety of physical market access), then pursue these in tandem – do not expect a linear transition from relief to recovery.

Agency Access, Credibility and Footprint

Further expansion of emergency livelihoods approaches beyond short term cash assistance and input distribution requires a realistic consideration of agency access, credibility and footprint – as well as donor willingness to invest, to accept high risk programming, and to provide certainty about multi-year allocations of resource. As discussed in the market sensitivity and linkages section, it is an open question as to what extent is it possible for an external agency to ‘place’ beneficiaries within saturated labour markets where personal attributes, education levels and social capital and networks likely play the primary role as determinants of successful access. It is also challenging to sustain the consistent field and community presence required for market facilitation approaches and for gender and conflict sensitivity strategies that seek to change perceptions and behaviours at HH and community level. Some agencies have experienced success with centre based models that focus on long term engagement and physical community presence to generate support, for example for women’s economic empowerment. The operational model and footprint that is possible to sustain in areas such as Nangarhar and Kunduz is a question of security management capacity, risk tolerance and agency credibility as a neutral, impartial humanitarian actor, yet it has real implications on technical level and complexity emergency livelihoods programming feasible for implementation.

- Ensure alignment between the goals and objectives of emergency livelihoods work, and especially of any linked market facilitation, gender empowerment and conflict sensitivity outcomes and agency access at the community level. Avoid producing and acting on an implied theory of change that is not deliverable as a result of access or operational constraints.
- Design and implement emergency livelihoods programmes for the populations in need. If access is too limited for more ambitious objectives, introduce cash support to protect livelihoods and enable individual HH livelihoods strategy and simultaneously work to address barriers at a policy level. Avoid designing a programme and then shopping around for a population that is accessible enough to benefit.
- The timeliness of assistance can have a large livelihoods impact; what might a HH do in six weeks, which they might not have, if they had known that a large cash grant was coming.
The Link to Sustainable, Resilient Livelihoods and Recovery

Emergency livelihoods programming is different from a sustainable or resilient livelihoods approach. The objective is livelihoods protection, stabilisation and consumption smoothing. The focus is on what can be done quickly to enable people to access relatively immediate and short-term ways of applying their livelihoods capabilities, assets and strategies to generate income and cope with shocks. In certain places and times, emergency livelihoods work can lay the foundations for early recovery and transition to more sustainable or resilient livelihoods by providing a development ‘hold’ onto which development actors may latch. However, pushing for this transition without regard for the drivers of vulnerability, for political, macro-economic and society structures and processes, and for the dynamics of ongoing conflict can de-contextualised, ineffective, and inappropriate interventions that fail to meet either humanitarian or longer-term objectives. As the Emergency Gap project found, "the right targets must be set for the response to the many different types and stages of crises, with a strong humanitarian focus on acute needs. It is critical to ensure humanitarian financing and action in conflict, where the blurring of the lines between addressing needs and the underlying causes of human suffering is undermining the humanitarian imperative.

- In the current context, emergency livelihoods interventions should aim to smooth consumption and to enable households to develop a cushion against the next shock (resilience building, but without the expectation of a ‘resilient’ endpoint until the drivers of conflict and insecurity are resolved).
- Cash transfer programming is an effective and appropriate primary response to both acute and chronic need which should be monitored for livelihoods protection outcomes.
- Agencies have a technical and humanitarian responsibility to undertake a clear problem specification and to identify where it is possible and where it is not possible to pursue recovery and transitional approaches.
- Where it is not possible to move beyond short term assistance and livelihoods protection measures (including through cash programming), these interventions should be pursued together with policy level efforts to leverage this action to reduce the higher-level barriers to doing more. There are clear opportunities to engage with and influence urban economic growth planning, labour market structure and large-scale economic reform and rule of law programming in ways that would relieve livelihoods pressures on humanitarian caseloads.

Conclusion

Adopting and applying a systems and multi-level approach to emergency livelihoods programming is exceptionally complex and challenging. Both the humanitarian and development communities in Afghanistan have been challenged to find meaningful strategies and approaches that support people’s livelihoods by enabling people to pursue their own strategies. The fall-back position of emergency cash programming and input distribution is relevant, and impact is possible up to a point, but a more multi-faceted approach is required.

The development of effective, evidence based, approaches to emergency livelihoods programming in Afghanistan is severely hampered by the lack of a suitable technical forum and coordination mechanism, as well as limited technical capacity at implementation and policy levels. Donor risk aversion and false dichotomous between humanitarian and development funding streams also reduce programme coherence and potential for impact. Cash and agricultural programming are both relevant and effective emergency interventions, but the mandate gaps between the existing FSAC and CVWG require policy makers and donors, especially those interested in linking humanitarian and development spheres, to push for a specialised emergency livelihoods space. At a minimum, humanitarian and development actors both need to strengthen the process for analysing and weighing livelihoods programme strategies against goals and objectives, with a realistic impact chain and debate on key assumptions and risks. Such coordination models (with or without a social cohesion component) exist in Iraq, Lebanon and several other contexts.

Macro-economic, institutional and political constraints limit the relevance and appropriateness of typical livelihoods recovery interventions that assume linear progression after a ‘shock’. Humanitarian emergency livelihoods
programmes need to include both immediate relief, and efforts to address these structural barriers from the beginning of the programme. This will mean pairing policy work on issues such as market and urban governance, labour mobility and economic access with emergency relief from the start. Quantitative modelling presented in this report suggests that the social and economic structures that underlay risk, vulnerability and poverty remain more significant determinants of household level livelihoods outcomes than income alone. Addressing this requires implementing agencies to secure multi-year funding that allows for repeated, iterative emergency cash and livelihoods interventions while longer term work continues.

A dose of reality is also required in terms of ‘resilient’ livelihoods work at household and community level that doesn’t simultaneously contribute to addressing the higher-level drivers of vulnerability and risk, including district, provincial and national conflict dynamics and reforms. In an active conflict zone, many of the most vulnerable families cannot be expected to ‘graduate’ or to achieve the secure, sustainable livelihoods that would allow them to weather such severe shocks as displacement, violence or long-term economic stagnation. Providing productive assets (agricultural or otherwise) or investing in temporary employment or labour schemes may help to smooth consumption, and to provide households with assets and reserve that can then be expended to cushion the next shock. This is valuable humanitarian work that can and does reducing suffering. However, relief will still be regularly needed, and resilience will still be elusive, until the political and economic environment shifts.

The labour market in Afghanistan is under extreme pressure across the board and markets in Afghanistan are heavily ‘social’ economies. Social networks and capital play an outsized role. To ensure effectiveness, emergency programming that targets labour market access, skills development, and micro-business must therefore adopt a ‘case management’ approach that layers training with job placement, business facilitation, ongoing mentoring/coaching etc (and perhaps temporary emergency needs support). In some cases, this can be effective for small pools of carefully selected individuals, but it lacks efficiency, scalability and the most vulnerable are the least likely to be able to benefit. This also moves away from an emergency livelihoods approach in terms of the time required for effective implementation. At the level of an individual agency, such programming must be seen as a pilot, or proof of concept, to use as a foundation to lobby for higher level structural changes with both government, and large institutional funders (such as the World Bank and primary bilateral donors).

Emergency livelihoods programming in areas of Northern and Eastern Afghanistan affected by continual conflict, displacement and the influx of returnees should, we recommend, focus supporting people to access relatively immediate and short-term ways of applying their livelihoods capabilities, assets and strategies to generate income, cope with shocks and maintain a minimum level of household consumption. Larger objectives, such as establishing a new type of livelihood or generating sustained increases in income and consumption levels are unlikely to be feasible on a humanitarian time-frame and resourcing level. Development actors should be invited to undertake such programming in tandem with humanitarian actors.

Specific Intervention Menu

- Consider including basic household financial management and budgeting training for men and women based on a curriculum adapted for low literacy and numeracy populations as a part of emergency livelihoods interventions. Generating information and visibility about women’s income may be an entry-point to higher valuations of these activities, and to acknowledgement of household contributions.
- Consider providing simple household assets and, through community mobilisation approaches, training to reduce the time burden of key domestic and household tasks, for example food processing and value addition prior to consumption or sale. Monitor to understand how productive gains (in hours) are re-allocated. A Rapid Care Analysis would be an excellent entry point to inform this.
- Consider a more flexible approach to emergency livelihoods support by pairing a longer term (6 months) and lower value (20-40% monthly SMEB), with modest capital provision in month 2 for livelihoods improvement based on providing beneficiaries with support to produce a livelihoods improvement
concept. Look for and monitor areas where income security, and modest capital, can enable beneficiaries to expand or recover in their own ways.

- There is scope to pilot small scale IGA and micro-business initiatives, but it should be acknowledged up-front that these will require intensive resourcing, a multi-year timeframe and a case management approach to livelihoods to produce success rates that cannot be realistically expected to exceed 50%. Without being able to reach scale, such pilots should be strongly linked to policy and evidence generation efforts to influence the wider structural context. Only structured reform will remove the barriers to scale inherent in market based, case management, livelihoods programming.

- Look for opportunities to apply governance approaches to market functionality and rule of law challenges, both formal and informal, affecting livelihoods resilience and expansion. For example, by working with local chambers of commerce or other producer or private sector organs. Ensure that interventions have a clearly specified problem definition and tracing of linkages between household, community context and policy level.

- Consider increasing the connection between gender empowerment and livelihoods programming by using less overt entry points to bring women together, especially in urban settings or where displacement may have disrupted women’s already limited social links. For example, through urban agriculture and/or facilitating access to land for urban community kitchen gardens, with additional gender related components then being introduced.

- Producer cooperatives for bargaining and sale (especially for women) remain a potentially effective means of increasing market power and increasing direct access to the market for groups (again especially women) who are otherwise in a poor position vis a vis middleman for sale of their products. However, to be effective, such interventions require an extensive local knowledge and strong agency staff presence at community level.

- Agencies are encouraged to explore ways of linking civil society development and governance work with efforts to address the regulatory, security and other market and business focused deficiencies that represent significant barriers to livelihoods success. For example, working with local chambers of commerce, or to better link informal sellers in an urban environment to the officials that structure, regulate and secure the market environment.

- Ultimately a significant proportion of humanitarian beneficiaries are affected by a level of vulnerability that will require external support indefinitely – as is the case in all societies. Agencies are encouraged not to dismiss this as a sign of ‘aid dependency’ but rather as evidence of the need to re-start conversations about prospects for forms of social protection and safety nets as a matter of government policy in the context of strengthening institutions.

Desk Review Bibliography


Programme Documents Reviewed

- Proposal, post distribution monitoring and reporting documents for AFJR1, AFJR2, AFJR3
- Other proposal and related programme documents for further Oxfam livelihoods work.

Other Annexes

Summary Statistics of Nangarhar Modelling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (Standard Deviation)</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>18.763 (7.837)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rCSI</td>
<td>19.529 (6.814)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>601</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>7.578 (2.874)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency Ratio</td>
<td>2.599 (1.694)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income (AFN)</td>
<td>2302.280 (1910.975)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of HH &gt;5 Female</td>
<td>0.504 (0.141)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Headed HH</td>
<td>0.128 (0.335)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in Casual Labour</td>
<td>0.446 (0.497)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnancy</td>
<td>0.095 (0.293)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livestock Ownership</td>
<td>0.125 (0.331)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Land Access</td>
<td>0.775 (0.418)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability in Household</td>
<td>0.168 (0.374)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child Headed</td>
<td>0.0333 (0.180)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Sole Breadwinner | 0.938 (0.241) | 0 | 1 | 601
Days worked last seven | 3.657 (1.582) | 0 | 7 | 268

FCS and rCSI Impact Estimation Graphs

Impact of Income on FCS (All Households)

Impact of Income on FCS (Labour Engaged)
Impact of Working Days on FCS (Labour Engaged)
Impact of Income on rCSI (All Households)

Impact of Income on rCSI (Labour Engaged)
Impact of Working Days on rCSI (Labour Engaged)

Estimated Impact of Working Days on rCSI (Labour Engaged Households)

Oxfam Emergency Livelihoods and Early Recovery Programming (Late 2016 – Mid 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Intentions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash Transfers</td>
<td>120 USD</td>
<td>150 HHs (Undocumented Returnee)</td>
<td>Single Grant (Intended to cover 2 Months) (120 USD total value)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>Food security &amp; winterization, avoiding negative coping strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80 USD</td>
<td>700 HH</td>
<td>Single Grant (80 USD total value)</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>Winterization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90 USD</td>
<td>300 HH (Returned IDP) + 1065 HH (Undocumented Returnee) + 300 HH (Host)</td>
<td>2 X Months (180 USD total value)</td>
<td>Kunduz + Nangarhar</td>
<td>Multipurpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>225 USD</td>
<td>1100 HH (Undocumented Returnee) + 600 HH (IDP)</td>
<td>Single Grant (Intended to cover 2 months)</td>
<td>Nangarhar &amp; Kunduz</td>
<td>Multipurpose</td>
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<tr>
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<td>225 USD</td>
<td>600 HH (IDP/Undocumented Returnee)</td>
<td>Single Grant (Intended to cover 2 months)</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>Multipurpose</td>
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<td>90 USD</td>
<td>350 HH (IDP/Undocumented Returnee)</td>
<td>3 months coverage (270 USD total value)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>Cash for Food</td>
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<td>225 USD</td>
<td>490 HHs (IDP/Undocumented Returnee)</td>
<td>2 X Months (450 USD total value)</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>Food security, avoiding negative coping strategies and prevention of productive asset sale</td>
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<td></td>
<td>78 USD</td>
<td>1060 HHs (IDP/Returned IDP)</td>
<td>2 X Months (156 USD total value)</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>Food security; unconditional allowance for female headed</td>
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<td>Cash for Work</td>
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<td>300 HH (IDP/Returned IDP)</td>
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<td>Kunduz</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5 USD daily</td>
<td>220 HH (Host)</td>
<td>10 Days (35 USD total value)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5 USD daily</td>
<td>400 HH (Returned IDPs)</td>
<td>10 Days (50 USD total value)</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limitations to the Quantitative Modelling Exercise</strong></td>
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There are several limitations to this exercise. The data are from a needs assessment and beneficiary verification process which focused on IDP/Returne households, and in which some respondents may have sought to game their answers. The data are also from spring and must be considered in seasonal context. At this time in Nangarhar the lean season is just ending, milk production from livestock beginning and demand for agricultural labour increasing. A simple robustness check of the distribution of prediction errors in both models showed a relatively normal distribution, though both possess tails indicating that the FCS model may produce higher errors in estimating high (35+) FCS scores and the rCSI model may produce higher errors in estimating low (<15) rCSI scores. The models also possess a large number of non-continuous (‘either or’) variables such as presence of disability, or access to land, and these create challenges in producing a smooth marginal effect estimation. Humanitarian contexts are also complex and neither model explains, through the specific variables captured in the data, the majority of variance in FCS and rCSI levels among households (see outputs in annex). In summary, this exercise provides a useful indication of trends in the data, but many other variables and factors matter too.
Endnotes

5. For details on this methodology, see https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/issues/livelihoods/research-and-resources/1231-clara-tool
29 Compared using the monthly income statistics from the most recent Asia Foundation Afghanistan in 2017: A Survey of the Afghan People Report.
31 Oxfam Needs Assessment (Food Security Findings), Kunduz (Imam Sahib & Kunduz District), 10th to 18th October.
37 Oxfam Needs Assessment (Gender Equality & Gender Based Violence Findings), Kunduz (Imam Sahib & Kunduz District), 10th to 18th October.
See DACAAR’s work through women’s resource centres, [https://www.dacaar.org/?page_id=10953](https://www.dacaar.org/?page_id=10953)


On sustainable livelihoods see DFID (1999) [Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets](https://www.ennonline.net/dfidsustainableliving)


Rapid Care Analysis (RCA) is a methodology for examining gendered distributions of labour in the household that is adapted to be inclusive of unpaid care and other domestic work, available from [https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/participatory-methodology/rapid-care-analysis-620147](https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/participatory-methodology/rapid-care-analysis-620147)