



INTEGRITY
WATCH
AFGHANISTAN



NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY 2016

Afghan Perceptions and Experiences
of Corruption

www.iwaweb.org

NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY 2016

Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption

Integrity Watch Afghanistan
2016

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ABOUT INTEGRITY WATCH

Integrity Watch is an Afghan civil society organization committed to increase transparency, accountability, and integrity in Afghanistan. Integrity Watch was created in October 2005 and established itself as an independent civil society organization in 2006. The head office of Integrity Watch is in Kabul with provincial programmatic outreach in Balkh, Bamyan, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Parwan provinces of Afghanistan.

Over the last one decade, Integrity Watch's work has focused on three major components: (1) Community Monitoring, (2) Research, and (3) Advocacy.

Ever since its establishment, Integrity Watch has tried to encourage active citizenship and community mobilization through its programs. Our community monitoring work has included development of community monitoring tools, mobilizing and training communities to monitor infrastructure projects, public services, courts, and extractives industries.

Our research work has focused on policy-oriented research measuring trends, perceptions and experiences of corruption and covering wide range of corruption related issues including security and justice sectors, extractive industries, budget and public finance management, and aid effectiveness. The objective is to develop new, ground-breaking empirical research in order to set the agenda, influence decision-makers, bring to the public attention non-documented and non-explored issues.

The aim of our advocacy work has been to enhance Integrity Watch's pioneering role in advocating for knowledge-based decision-making and informed public debate on corruption and integrity issues. Our advocacy work includes facilitation of policy dialogue on issues related to integrity, transparency, and accountability. We have engaged in policy advocacy for issues that communities experience on day-to-day basis while trying to hold the government and service providers accountable. Such issues has included access to information, budget transparency and accountability, aid transparency and effectiveness, effective public services, and other issues related to anti-corruption.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Integrity Watch would like to express its appreciation and gratitude to the team responsible for the production of this fifth bi-annual National Corruption Survey. We extend our appreciation to many people but in particular to the report's author, Jean MacKenzie, whose decade of experience living in Afghanistan enabled her to bring clarity to the issues on which this survey is focused; to Ezatullah ADIB, Research Manager, of Integrity Watch who was the lead researcher responsible for the implementation of the extensive nationwide survey and data collection exercise; to Jugal Mahabir, Lecturer at the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre at the University of Johannesburg and his team who undertook the initial data analysis; and to Mohammad Edris Ayazi who was responsible for data entry supervision.

We would like to acknowledge the Afghan government authorities in Kabul and in all 34 provinces for their cooperation during our weeks of data collection and add our appreciation to the 8 Field Coordinators, 34 Provincial Supervisors, 120 Enumerators, 3 data supervisors and 15 data entry officers who were responsible for the critical task of interviewing, and recording responses from, more than 7,800 individuals in all 34 provinces.

We would also like to thank Lorenzo Delesgues, Sayed Ikram Afzali, Khwaga Kakar, and Amir Mohammad Mansory who took the time to review and comment on the initial drafts of this report.

Finally, we would especially like to acknowledge the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) for their encouragement and financial support, without which the production of this report would not have been possible.

ACRONYMS

| | |
|--|--|
| Afs | Afghani (Afghan unit of currency) |
| ANA | Afghan National Army |
| ANP | Afghan National Police |
| ANSF | Afghan National Security Forces |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| CDC | Community Development Council |
| Chief | Executive Officer (post created for Abdullah Abdullah in the National Unity Government) |
| CSIS | Centre for Strategic and International Studies |
| CSO | Central Statistics Organization |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GIROA | Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
| HOO | High Office of Oversight |
| ISIS | Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as Da'esh, IS (Islamic State) and ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) |
| IWA | Integrity Watch Afghanistan |
| MRRD | Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development |
| NCS | National Corruption Survey (biennial publication of IWA) |
| NDS | National Directorate of Security |
| NRVA | National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment |
| NSP | National Solidarity Program |
| NUG | National Unity Government: Name given to the US-brokered power-sharing agreement between Presidential candidates Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, in the wake of a hotly contested election in 2014 |
| OS | Original Sample (for the figures) |
| PC | Provincial Council |
| SIGAR | Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Body created by the US Congress to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. |
| TAF | The Asia Foundation |
| UNODC | UN Office on Drugs and Crime |
| 1 USD = 68 Afs (average used in the data, with source) | |

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghanistan is a country in crisis. The insurgency is gaining ground, and the economy is experiencing its most sustained downturn since the fall of the Taliban¹, with unemployment reaching highs of 40%².

People are fleeing the country by the hundreds of thousands. Against this background, Afghans are subjected to a government widely seen as corrupt, with administrative graft a daily blight on their lives.

When asked to name the major problems facing the country, respondents listed insecurity, unemployment and corruption, in that order. But corruption is also seen as fueling insecurity, by undermining support for the government and driving citizens towards the Taliban.

More than 70% of respondents said that corruption is now worse than it was two years ago, when the last National Corruption Survey was conducted. More and more people are paying higher amounts of money in bribes: Over the past twelve months Afghans paid more in bribes than the government is expected to generate this year in revenue from taxes, customs tariffs and other sources of income³. Corruption also retards investment, making it a significant drag on the economy.

Afghans have seen no improvement with the advent of the National Unity Government; they are discouraged, and convinced that corruption cannot be effectively tackled. This may be at least partially due to the fact that those who should be tasked with fighting or eradicating corruption — the courts, judges, prosecutors and police — are almost universally named as the most corrupt institutions in the country.

The international community also comes in for a share of the blame. Close to half of respondents doubt that the international community wants to fight corruption or supports honest officials. Nearly 40% think the international community itself is corrupt.

Afghans engage in corruption because they see no other way of procuring the services they need. Without a bribe they find it difficult to complete the simplest tasks in a reasonable time frame. Procuring a national identity card, obtaining a driver's license, or getting a school transcript can all become occasions for corruption. Larger issues, such as court cases, require greater input; the survey shows that those involved in court proceedings pay bribes more than half the time they have to interact with these institutions.

Although they say they want to fight corruption, Afghans have little idea of what concrete measures they can take. Few know where to turn, and are not convinced by the National Unity Government's expressed commitment to deal with the problem. While the NUG has created new anti-corruption institutions and vowed zero tolerance on the issue, there have been almost no appreciable results, at least none that have filtered down to the popular level. Afghans are almost evenly split on the question of whether the government of President Ashraf Ghani is more or less corrupt than that of his predecessor, Hamid Karzai. Clearly, lofty promises and soothing rhetoric will not persuade Afghans that the government is serious about tackling corruption.

The only institutions that regularly receive high marks on fighting corruption are the Mullahs and the Ulema, which are seen as quite effective. While reality shows that these bodies are not, in fact, able to curb corrupt practices to any great extent, the survey does demonstrate that there is a place where Afghans place their trust. Parliament, Provincial Councils, local commanders and international forces, on the other hand, are viewed with a great deal of suspicion.

The government must act quickly and decisively to address the problem. Reform of the judiciary and the police, along with the creation of a clear, transparent and accountable complaints management system are vital if Afghanistan is to emerge from its present malaise.

1 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/11/06/afghanistans-sluggish-growth-the-inextricable-link-between-security-and-development>

2 <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/unemployment-rate>

3 <http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1395%20Budget/1396%20National%20Budget%20-%20sent%20to%20Parliament%20-%20Mesharano%20Jirga.pdf>

INTRODUCTION

As Integrity Watch Afghanistan undertakes its 5th biennial National Corruption Survey, the country is in crisis. Afghanistan is spiraling downward in a cycle of insecurity, economic malaise and popular discontent.

Corruption, long denied by the government and ignored by the international community, is finally coming into focus as one of the main causes of the problem. There is a dawning realization that, unless the Afghan government can come to grips with the rampant corruption in the country, it will lose the confidence and support of its citizenry, something that could have disastrous consequences.

The two years since the previous survey have been extraordinarily difficult for the country and its people.

Initial euphoria over the formation of the National Unity Government in 2014 soon gave way to disappointment and disillusionment, as the government bogged down in political squabbles and partisan in-fighting. While President Ashraf Ghani and the Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, explored the boundaries of their uneasy, internationally brokered alliance, the country rapidly spun out of control.

The security situation worsened considerably, with insurgents taking their first major city in late September 2015. The fall of Kunduz, while temporary, sounded an alarm throughout the country. More and more areas of Afghanistan became “no-go” areas, closed to visitors from the capital or even neighboring provinces.

In October, 2016, Kunduz was once again under siege. Government assurances that the Afghan National Security Forces had the situation under control were belied by reports from residents and their families, who insisted that fighting continued inside the city⁴.

As this report was going to press, in November, 2016, Kunduz continued to be highly unstable, with Afghan and international forces engaged in chasing the Taliban away from the provincial capital⁵.

The southern province of Helmand was on the verge of collapse, with most districts under complete control of the Taliban, and the insurgents waging a determined battle for the capital, Lashkar Gah⁶.

The insurgents also made inroads in many other provinces, including Baghlan and Badakhshan. In the eastern province of Nangarhar, groups professing allegiance to the Islamic State have gained a foothold⁷.

In addition to its negative impact on Afghanistan’s security, the progressive withdrawal of foreign forces was accompanied by a sharp downturn in the economy. Aid dollars followed the soldiers out of the country, as the international community expressed its weariness with the lack of progress on many fronts by slashing assistance dollars. This of necessity meant cutting programs, fewer jobs, and rising unemployment.

Afghans saw the writing on the wall; tens of thousands joined the flood of refugees seeking safety and new opportunities in Europe and elsewhere. According to the European Asylum Support Office, an arm of the European Union, more than 190,000 Afghans applied for asylum in Europe in 2015, with millions more going to nearby Pakistan and Iran. Afghans make up the second largest population of asylum seekers after Syria⁸.

This was the backdrop against which IWA conducted its survey. In contrast to previous studies there were severe security restrictions on the enumerators. Large swaths of the country were off-limits.

IWA conducted a security assessment, and determined that, out of 398 districts in Afghanistan, 98 were too dangerous to allow for enumerators to travel. In another 100, enumerators were limited to the district center. In 109, enumerators were able to travel within a two-hour radius of the district center, but not to more remote areas.

It was only in 91 districts — less than 23% of the country — that IWA-trained enumerators had a free rein.

The security map below illustrates the state of play.

4 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-kunduz.html?_r=0


5 <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/05/politics/afghanistan-kunduz-operation/index.html>

6 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37609384>

7 <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/descent-into-chaos-why-did-nangarhar-turn-into-an-is-hub/>

8 www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Latest%20Trends%20August%20final.pdf <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/seeking-safety-jobs-and-more-afghanistans-mixed-flows-test-migration-policies>

Map 1: District Security Map 2016



All of this means that even the admittedly grim results that follow might well skew towards the positive. If all districts, including those now falling partially or completely under the insurgency, had been able to be included, the picture would likely have been more dismal still.

The National Unity Government has promised to curb corruption; it was a cornerstone of President Ashraf Ghani's Inaugural Address, delivered in September, 2014.

"Our people cannot tolerate corruption anymore," said the president. "I and all my government officials would start to fight against corruption from our own selves.... Here I would like to stress that we will have zero tolerance with regard to corruption within the country's institutions and would take strict actions in eliminating the causes of this evil phenomenon."

Ghani also acknowledged the role that corruption was playing in the country's deteriorating security.

"In the Judicial branch, which is the mirror reflecting Islamic Sharia and legality, we should have transparency. Unfortunately, there are allegations of corruption in this branch. Corruption in the Judicial branch paves grounds for insecurity... Corruption among our security forces and misuse of government resources is one of the reasons for insecurity."

The President's words have been amply borne out by this survey. As we shall see, an overwhelming number of Afghans see corruption as a main driver of the insurgency.

The president also promised that corrupt officials would be punished.

"Malfeasance is a crime, and the criminal should face legal action," he said. "Bribe giver and receiver are both elements of corruption, and strict legal actions shall be taken against them⁹."

But the first two years of Ghani's administration have brought little relief to his beleaguered population. Corruption is soaring, bribery is consuming ever greater chunks of the national economy, and the people of Afghanistan are rapidly running out of patience.

The survey below should serve as a wake-up call for both the Afghan government and the international community. Firm action is needed. This is no longer a luxury that the powers that be can afford to put off for a later, more advantageous time. It is a vital necessity.

9 <http://president.gov.af/en/news/36954>





1. GENERAL TRENDS

Part One of this report examines the general trends highlighted by NCS 2016. We begin by looking at broad perceptions of Afghan society, thus setting the stage for an exploration of perceived progress, or lack thereof, in political, social and economic spheres. The analysis is extended to look specifically at individual views of the current political situation in the country, and its impact on the lives of individuals. The chapter then moves to an analysis of the major problems Afghans see in their contemporary society, and how these may have shifted over the years. We conclude by assessing the progress that the government and other role players in Afghanistan have made in fighting corruption and other political, social and economic ills.

The reason for this is to see corruption, not as an isolated phenomenon, but as an integral part of the life experience of Afghans today. As we shall see in the coming chapters, corruption is tightly interwoven with other perceived problems in the society; it influences, and is, in turn, influenced by other trends. Only by taking a broader view can we hope to put corruption into its proper context, and assign it its proper weight.

1.1. General Perceptions : Overall, Afghans appear surprisingly optimistic about their home areas.

As described in the introduction to this survey, Afghanistan is currently going through an extraordinarily difficult period. Insecurity, a poor economy, massive migration, rampant corruption, and a steadily eroding faith in the future have plunged the country into crisis.

Against this backdrop, it is all the more surprising that so many Afghans expressed a relatively benign view of the situation in their own home regions over the past 12 months.

But it must be kept in mind that the very worst areas were not surveyed. As explained in the introduction, only 23% of Afghan districts were secure enough to allow enumerators unfettered access to the population. In the remaining 77% of territory there were full or partial blackouts due to insurgent activity.

With the very worst areas outside the scope of this survey, it is possible that results are not entirely representative.

Figure 1: How much progress if any, has been made in your area?




Figure 1, above, illustrates this relative satisfaction with progress locally. Overall, 45% of respondents felt that at least some progress had been made. Only 8% termed this progress “very significant,” however; most were content to note “somewhat significant” improvement. It is also unclear exactly what respondents mean by “progress”: as stated above, security has been deteriorating in many parts of the country, and the economy has been sluggish. The results seem to indicate an overall satisfaction level rather than a carefully reasoned response.


The results were not uniform throughout the country; in general, more people in Afghanistan's North (56%) experienced progress, while in the central portion of the country that figure fell to 38%.

The North includes the province of Balkh, with its capital, Mazar-e-Sharif. Mazar is an important trading center, and an area of relative security in an unstable overall environment. Balkh's powerful governor, Atta Mohammad Noor, is credited with bringing peace and prosperity to his province, while allegedly also benefiting from his position to enrich himself. Nevertheless, he retains enormous popularity in Balkh, where his autocratic rule has earned him the jocular nickname of "king" of the province.¹⁰

The lack of enthusiasm in the central areas is confirmed by the actual situation in Afghanistan; in 2016 there were several major demonstrations in Kabul and elsewhere over the rerouting of an electricity transmission line away from Bamiyan, a majority Hazara province in central Afghanistan. In April, 2016, the government announced that the electricity line would be routed through the North, over the Salang Pass. Hazara politicians called for a general strike¹¹, and thousands marched in Kabul to protest what was seen as continued discrimination against the Hazara minority.

The perception of progress is more pronounced in rural areas, as can be seen from Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Perceptions of progress by area type



While just 8% of respondents in both urban and rural areas felt that "very significant" progress had been made, 39% of rural respondents felt that "somewhat significant" progress had been made, as opposed to 31% in urban areas.


Again, these figures might be skewed by the total absence of data from the more than 25% of districts that were not surveyed due to security concerns. These were overwhelmingly in rural areas, and the urban/rural split may have been much closer had it been possible to include these districts, where progress is doubtful.

This relative optimism extended to perception of the overall situation by province. As can be seen from Figure 3, below, approximately 54% of respondents were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied.

¹⁰ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/asia/18mazar.html>


¹¹ <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/power-to-the-people-2-the-tutap-protests/>

Figure 3: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the overall situation in your province?



Map 2 Below, illustrates this satisfaction metric by province.

Map 2: Level of satisfaction by province



Balkh, with the highest satisfaction rates, has good security and a relatively healthy economy. Some of the other provinces are more difficult to gauge; Bamyan, for example, indicated a lower satisfaction level with local progress, but is among the provinces with the highest overall satisfaction rates. Kandahar, in the Taliban heartland, has experienced severe security challenges in the past, but is, at the moment, an island of relative calm.

Kunduz and Helmand are two of the most troubled provinces at the current time, with the Taliban gaining ground. But their level of dissatisfaction is lower than Farah, Ghazni, and Paktya – three provinces where the security situation has worsened sharply in recent months, but which have not experienced the major upheavals of Helmand and Kunduz.

It is also interesting to note that Kabul, which has better security and a more vibrant economy than many other provinces, is still in the “somewhat dissatisfied” category. This may be due to the sharp rise in security incidents in Kabul over the spring, when the survey was conducted. In the past year, Kabul has suffered several major bombings, which has placed its residents on edge¹².


Nangarhar, as well, has several hot spots, with reports of ISIS establishing a foothold in some districts¹³. Yet it is only “somewhat dissatisfied”. Still, it is not clear why provinces as widely diverse as Badghis, Takhar, Samangan and Urozgan, which are all from different geographical areas, express such a positive outlook, while their neighbors (Faryab, Ghazni, Baghlan) are disgruntled.

1.2. Perception of Political Situation

When discussion turned to politics, respondents were far less generous in their assessments. This negative perception of the political situation in the country is possibly a result of the constant in-fighting at the highest levels of government that has been widely reported¹⁴, and has resulted in virtual stalemate.

On the provincial level, things are fairly evenly split: Just over 38% felt that the situation was “very good” or “somewhat good,” while a slightly smaller number (35%) considered the situation to be “very bad” or “somewhat bad.” Another 22.58% declined to categorize, saying the situation was neither good nor bad.

Figure 4: How do you describe the political situation in your province?




The picture was much less ambiguous when it came to judging the political situation in Afghanistan as a whole.

12 www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/afghan-capital-kabul-rocked-explosion-160120131352851.html <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-idUSKCN0Z6035> http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/world/asia/bombing-kabul-afghan-defense-ministry.html?_r=0

13 <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/descent-into-chaos-why-did-nangarhar-turn-into-an-is-hub/>

14 www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-abdullah-ghani-taliban.html?_r=0

Figure 5: In general, how would you describe the current political situation in Afghanistan?




Respondents were quite harsh when asked to give an assessment of the general political situation in Afghanistan. Only about 22% characterized it as “very good” or “somewhat good,” while more than half of respondents seemed to feel that the political situation was “somewhat” or “very” bad.

This lack of enthusiasm for the National Unity Government should be noted at the highest levels of government, since it will make it difficult for the President and CEO to gain support for sometimes painful and difficult reforms.

1.3. Major Problems Facing Afghanistan

When asked to name the three most serious problems facing Afghanistan, the overwhelming majority (79%) of respondents put “security” front and center. This is consistent with the situation in the country, where insurgents are gaining ground and controlling ever greater swaths of territory.

Figure 6: What are the most serious problems facing Afghanistan as a country today?





As mentioned above, the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating rapidly. According to multiple media sources, the Taliban now control more territory than at any time since 2001¹⁵.

Close behind security comes unemployment, with 66% of respondents naming the lack of economic opportunity as a major obstacle. Again, this reflects the decline in assistance jobs and dollars that accompanies the withdrawal of foreign troops. Corruption was cited by 47% of the population as a major problem.

15 <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2016/06/16/afghanistan-nicholson-commander-pentagon-report-war/85972056/>
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/world/asia/afghanistan-eu-refugees-migrants.html?emc=eta1>

Figure 7: below, gives the assessment of major problems by province.





The “third-place” finish of corruption should not be interpreted as a sign that corruption is any less worrying to the population than it was in 2014, when respondents put it on an equal footing with unemployment, right behind insecurity.

It is becoming ever clearer that these three major catastrophes in Afghanistan are mutually reinforcing. As jobs and money become scarcer, the population becomes increasingly desperate. When faced with venal officials attempting to use their positions to enrich themselves, people react with anger, eroding support for the government and feeding into tolerance of, or even active support for, the insurgency.

Respondents are quite aware of this, as can be seen from the figures below.

Figure 8: Is corruption within the state facilitating the expansion of the Taliban (total and by region)?





Figure 9: Corruption within the state facilitating the expansion of the Taliban




The regional spread here is quite interesting: The South showed the lowest number of respondents convinced that corruption feeds the insurgency (33%), even though the insurgency is most robust in the South. Closest to the South is the Northeast, where the insurgency is steadily growing. Still, the overall picture is not very positive for the government.

It is again important to note that even these dismal numbers could be more favorable than the reality, since so many districts were blacked out due to insecurity.

Figure 10 delves more deeply into this issue, asking about corruption in specific institutions that might be responsible for the growth of the insurgency. This is a preview of Part Two, where we will see exactly which institutions are seen by the population as the most corrupt.

Figure 10: Corruption within which institutions is assisting in the expansion of the Taliban?



The largest share of respondents (26%) pointed to the provincial and district police as an institution whose corruption drives people towards the Taliban. Almost as many (24%) thought that it was corruption in the central government that was responsible for a growing insurgency. Problems in the courts (18%) was also an important factor in the Taliban's expansion; as has been reported elsewhere, people increasingly turn to informal mechanisms (tribal and Taliban courts) to solve their problems, given the wholesale skepticism regarding Afghanistan's judiciary¹⁶.

So it can be seen clearly from the numbers that, unless addressed, corruption has the potential to sabotage the security situation even further, putting the Afghan state itself in danger. These findings should be a wake-up call for both the Afghan government and the international community.

1.4. Addressing National Problems: Government, the International Community and the Taliban

The preceding section dealt with perceptions of major problems facing the country. As we saw, security concerns dominate, followed by unemployment and corruption. All three feed into each other, threatening the stability, and perhaps, if left unchecked, the very existence of the state.

In this next section we will examine how the Afghan people view their government as a bulwark against political, social, and economic ills.

Figure 11 shows that more than two-thirds of respondents (67%) felt that the government was not doing enough to address the problems facing the country.


Figure 11: Do you think the government of Afghanistan has done enough to address these problems over the last two years?



16 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/taliban-justice-gains-favor-as-official-afghan-courts-fail.html>


As indicated in Figure 12, this perception differs by gender; women have a marginally better perception of government's efforts in tackling corruption and other social ills than men. However overall perceptions are still largely negative.

Figure 12: Do you think the government of Afghanistan has done enough to address these problems over the last two years?



The negative assessment of the government is fairly uniform throughout the country, as can be seen in the figure below. Only in the South is opinion of the government's efforts a bit higher, with close to half of respondents (46%) saying Kabul was doing enough. In the rest of the country, fewer than a third were willing to say this.

Figure 13: Do you think the government of Afghanistan has done enough to address these problems over the last two (2) years (by region)



This must be taken as a clear signal that an increasingly desperate citizenry, living with high unemployment, a powerful insurgency, and rampant corruption among those pledged to serve and protect, may well find their support for the state declining to dangerously low levels.

1.5. Perceptions of Public and Civil Institutions in Society

Table 1, below, measures perceptions of major role players in Afghan society. People were asked to rate a variety of actors in terms of their commitment to the common good.

Table 1: In your opinion, do the people mentioned here (in the table below) work for the benefit of all people, for the benefit of some, or only for their own benefit?

| Role Player | For the benefit of all people | For the benefit of some people | For their own benefit | Don't know/ Haven't heard enough to say of |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Provincial Government of your province | 71% | 14% | 9% | 5% |
| Government of Afghanistan | 59% | 23% | 13% | 5% |
| National Army | 37% | 29% | 22% | 12% |
| National Police | 36% | 33% | 20% | 10% |
| Government of your district | 35% | 32% | 21% | 12% |
| Police Commander (Province level) | 35% | 28% | 28% | 9% |
| Police Commander of your district | 34% | 33% | 22% | 11% |
| Local Elders (Malik, Arbab, Wakel Guzar) | 34% | 32% | 22% | 12% |
| Provincial Governor | 33% | 27% | 33% | 7% |
| District Governor of your district | 30% | 37% | 22% | 12% |
| President of Afghanistan | 30% | 33% | 29% | 8% |
| Member of Community Development Councils | 30% | 34% | 25% | 11% |
| NGOs in your district and province | 29% | 30% | 25% | 16% |
| Member of Provincial Council | 25% | 36% | 30% | 9% |
| Member of Parliament of your province | 25% | 34% | 32% | 10% |
| International Forces | 19% | 22% | 36% | 23% |
| Ministers | 16% | 37% | 35% | 12% |
| Taliban | 4% | 8% | 60% | 28% |

In general, Afghans see many of these institutions as acting exclusively in their own self-interest. Government ministers, international forces, Members of Parliament, and others are not seen as servants of the people, but as officials using the power of their post to further their own goals.

The exceptions to this trend are the National Army and the National Police, where 71% and 59% of respondents, respectively, believe that they act for the benefit of all society. Again, however, we should point out that the most insecure areas were not surveyed. The view of the Afghan National Security Forces might very well be dimmer in areas where their performance has failed to protect the population.

The local police, however, did not fare as well; only 36% see provincial police as a benefit to all people, while 35% say the same about the district police.

But, as will be seen below, local police are considered one of the two most corrupt institutions in the country, along with the judiciary.

Unsurprisingly, a majority of respondents (60%) believe that the Taliban act exclusively for their own benefit.

1.6. International Community

Of particular interest are the views regarding the international community and foreign forces. In general, Afghans were not extremely flattering in their assessments of those who have come to their country with the expressed goal of fighting an insurgency and helping to rebuild the nation.

Only 35% of respondents said that they believed the international community was interested in fighting corruption, while fully 46% expressed the view that the international community was not interested in fighting corruption and did not support honest officials (49%). Nearly two-thirds had never heard any member of the international community speak out against corruption.

Figure 14: Do you believe the international community wants to fight corruption?




Figure 15: Do you believe the members of the international community are supportive of honest government officials in your province?






Figure 16: Have you heard any member of the international community speaking against corruption in Afghanistan over the last 12 months?



These results represent a significant change from 2014, when just 36% of respondents expressed the view that the international community was not fully engaged in the fight against corruption.

Figure 17: Do you believe the international community wants to fight corruption (comparison 2012-2016)



This downward trend could be yet another sign of a troubling development that has been remarked upon in many venues. The international community has all too often chosen security over anti-corruption, throwing their support behind warlords and others who preyed on the population, in the misguided belief that these powerful actors could fight the Taliban. When these strongmen go on to oppress the local population in their drive towards power and riches, the anger rebounds to their perceived backers¹⁷.

As stated in the most recent SIGAR report, “Even when the United States acknowledged corruption as a strategic threat, security and political goals consistently trumped strong anticorruption actions¹⁸.”

The result has been a steadily eroding trust in the international community, suspicion of its motivation and lack of support for its goals.

17 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0315_4up.pdf (see Human Rights Watch’s 2015 report: “Today We Shall All Die” Afghanistan’s Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity ; see also: <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/11/our-man-in-kandahar/308653/> for a chilling indictment of the US’ readiness to overlook corruption and human rights abuses to back a local strongman

18 <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/LessonsLearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf#page=33>

1.7. Perceptions on Peace Talks and Reconciliation

As reported above, insecurity is a major concern of the vast majority of the population, far outweighing anything else. The fighting in and around Kunduz continues, while in the south, Helmand Province has been almost entirely overrun. The Taliban are making inroads in the Northeast as well as in their traditional strongholds in the South and East.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the majority of respondents expressed the view that peace talks would play a major role in strengthening governance, and, consequently, in improving the government's ability to tackle the current social ills in Afghanistan.

In this regard, males expressed more confidence in the peace process than females. This could be because of a well-grounded fear that gains in women's rights might be sacrificed in the interests of peace; women suffered disproportionately during the Taliban years, when they were denied access to education, and largely restricted to the home.

Figure 18: Do you believe the successful completion of peace talks will result in the strengthening of good governance?






Figure 19 assesses the belief as to whether reconciliation between the Government and opposition groups can stabilize the country. An overwhelming 75% of respondents believe this to be true, with a greater proportion of men and rural dwellers supporting this view.

Figure 19: Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can stabilize the country?



As we saw in Figure 19, above, a minority of respondents (15%) held to the belief that reconciliation would not help to stabilize the country. Figure 20, below, examines the reasons for this pessimism.

Figure 20: Why do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups cannot help stabilize the country?



Around 13% of this minority suggested that “there will be no outcome” to the reconciliation process, an understandable reaction, perhaps, given the fitful starts and stops to peace talks over the past 15 years. Another 10% said that they are actively against reconciliation efforts as they view the armed opposition as enemies.

Others cite loss of confidence in the government as a vehicle for reconciliation and good governance going forward, with 8% of this pool of respondents saying they do not trust the government. Others (6%) indicate skepticism that the armed opposition is sincere.

It must be emphasized that these responses are from a very small population – the number sampled was just 15% of the respondent pool, which means that these answers represent minuscule percentages of the survey population — just 2% for “there will be no outcome” and 1% for “because we do not trust the government anymore.”

1.8. SUMMARY OF PART ONE

Insecurity remains a fundamental issue in contemporary Afghanistan, clearly hindering progress and increasing anxiety in the population.

The withdrawal of foreign forces and the waning commitment of the international community are also a concern, with the decline in assistance dollars and programs, giving rise to increased unemployment and poverty.

These concerns take center stage when the population is asked about their problems; corruption, as we saw, is mentioned third.

But this does not indicate that corruption is declining. As we shall see in Part Two, more people report having to give bribes or engage in other corrupt practices in the survey than in previous years. Corruption is claiming more of the economy, with ever greater amounts being consumed by corrupt officials.

The fact that corruption is mentioned third could indicate that it is becoming so common, so institutionalized, that it barely registers. It is a part of life.

But this does not translate to acceptance. As we have seen, the majority of respondents unequivocally state that corruption drives people towards the Taliban, undermining the very existence of the state.

Corruption fuels insecurity; it is also a factor in unemployment concerns, as people may feel that they are being denied jobs due to preferential treatment handed to friends or relatives of those in power (nepotism). Corruption also depresses the business climate, and retards investment that could lead to more jobs and greater prosperity. As researchers have been pointing out for years, “(B)ecause corruption agreements are not enforceable in courts of law — and because the forms and extent of bribery cannot necessarily be predicted — corruption increases uncertainty and risk for would-be investors¹⁹.”

Thus the three major concerns (insecurity, unemployment, corruption) are not distinct, but overlapping and mutually enforcing problems. One cannot be successfully tackled without the other two also being addressed.

In Part Two we will look more specifically at corruption — how prevalent it is becoming, which institutions are the most corrupt, and how Afghans feel about the phenomenon.

19 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Afghanistan_Corruption_and_Investment_Jan12.pdf

2. INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS, AND EXPERIENCES WITH, ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION

In this chapter we will look more closely at corruption — how Afghans view the problem, and how they actually experience it. As we will see, there is a gap between perception and reality that the Afghan government may find difficult to address.

We will also look at the economic impact of corruption — how it is affecting individuals and households, as well as how the amount lost to corruption compares to the overall revenues garnered by the Afghan state in its normal activities — taxation, customs, etc.

Another important element of our study will be how individuals feel about corruption, and about those who engage in it. These feelings will of necessity affect how Afghans view their government — particularly those institutions seen as most corrupt.

2.1. Overview

One of the more startling results of this survey was the extent to which bribery has increased over the past two years. Both in percentage of the population that admits to having paid bribes, and the overall amount of money lost to bribes, the rise is significant. More than 26% of Afghans say they have had to pay a bribe in the past 12 months, with an overall economic loss of over \$2.8 billion — significantly higher than the estimated \$2.17 billion the Afghan government expects to generate in domestic revenues this year²⁰.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the overwhelming majority (close to 80%) of Afghans feel that corruption is a serious problem in society. They also see the problem as growing, rather than abating — a worrying sign for a government that came into power vowing to deal with Afghanistan's pressing issues, including corruption.

The gap between experience and perception of corruption shows that views on corruption come, not just from people's personal experience, but from the overall environment.

This is likely due to the influence of friends, family, coworkers, etc., who talk about their own unfortunate experiences, but it could also be at least partially a result of the scandals around “grand corruption” in the country. The near collapse of Kabul Bank²¹, the flourishing drug trade, and the lavish lifestyles of some local officials could have a lot to do with creating the mindset that appears in responses to questions below.

Even though an analysis of “grand corruption” (defined by Transparency International as “The abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many²²,”) falls outside the scope of this survey, we must consider it as a factor in shaping public perception. The Afghan populace understandably forms its opinions in part through the news it consumes. With scandals such as Kabul Bank splashed all over the airwaves, highlighting high-level involvement in a scam that ultimately cost over \$900 million, it is not difficult to comprehend why the perception of corruption far outstrips actual experience²³.

But this mindset will be difficult for the Afghan government to change. As we see from the data below, the NUG's promises to attack corruption have as yet borne little fruit.

Despite the tough talk by the government, there have been few, if any, major anti-corruption initiatives that are seen and understood by the population. Certainly none has had any appreciable impact on the corruption that so mars the day-to-day lives of Afghans.

As Afghanistan struggles to find its way into an uncertain future, corruption looms larger than ever as a threat to stability and progress.

20 <http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1395%20Budget/1396%20National%20Budget%20-%20sent%20to%20Parliament%20-%20Mesharano%20Jirga.pdf>

21 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/asia/01kabulbank.html>


22 http://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/grand_corruption

23 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29450821> <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/asia/afghan-businessman-convicted-in-kabul-bank-fraud-is-still-free-to-make-money.html> <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-afghan-government-cancels-property-deal-with-convicted-banker-2015-11> <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/world/asia/afghanistan-corruption-financial-disclosure.html>

2.2. Perception of Corruption

The extent to which corruption has permeated the society is immediately clear from the data. More than half (55%) of respondents characterized corruption as “very serious,” while a further 24% deemed it “somewhat serious.” Just 17% were sanguine about corruption, with 6% saying it was “not too serious,” and 11% saying it was “not at all serious.”

Figure 21: In your opinion, how serious is the issue of corruption in Afghanistan




The majority of respondents also see corruption as a growing problem, with 71% saying that the situation had worsened over the past two years.

Figure 22: In your opinion, has corruption become a more significant problem over the last two years?




This figure is confirmed when respondents are asked to compare corruption in their local areas and in the country with how they felt in years past; again, more than 70% said things had become worse.

Figure 23: How would you compare the level of corruption in your local area and in Afghanistan generally, today with the level of corruption past years?



Close to three-quarters said that they had not observed improvements in a **single** public institution over the past year.

Figure 24: Do you believe there have been some improvements in reducing corruption in any public institution during the last 12 months?



2.3. Perception of Corruption Within Specific Institutions


When asked about corruption in various institutions, there was little doubt: the judiciary (judges, prosecutors, courts), along with law enforcement were almost universally at the top of the list, meaning they were considered to be corrupt at least to some extent by a wide majority (70%) of respondents. The Electoral Commissions are not far behind, with 66% of respondents classifying them as corrupt.


The National Army received the best marks overall — with fully 42% of respondents giving the military a clean bill of health (“not corrupt at all”). The media also did well, with only 24% considering media to be corrupt, and 35% viewing them as not corrupt at all.

The National Army is seen as the only bulwark against a rapidly encroaching insurgency; the reasons for such a glowing assessment may be a desperate need to believe that there is at least a hope of deliverance.

The media’s popularity, at least when it comes to identifying relatively clean institutions, is more of a mystery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many Afghans are suspicious of media allegiances, seeing foreign hands or political power behind many outlets. But few Afghans would have direct experience of the media, other than as consumers; they do not have the types of interactions that would lead them to judge reporters, editors, etc. as corrupt.

Figure 25: Perceptions about corruption in government institutions






When respondents were asked an open-ended question (“Name the three most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan”), the results track closely with those above. The courts are named almost universally, along with judges and prosecutors.

The Ministry of Education, however, comes out much worse in this line-up, ranking just behind the courts, judges and prosecutors.

This is most likely due to the fact that many Afghans have direct experience with schools and teachers, all of whom fall under the Ministry of Education. While we did not ask specifically about teachers requiring bribes to give good or passing grades to students, tales abound of such instances. The number of people who are caught in this type of graft is likely to be quite high.

Figure 26: Which three public institutions are the most corrupt?



2.4. Drivers of Corruption in Institutions

Afghans largely agree that corruption is a major problem. But when it comes to the drivers of corruption, they have diverse opinions.

Respondents were asked an open-ended question: “What do you think are the main reasons for corruption in Afghanistan?” Close to one-quarter (23%) answered “weak rule of law.” As we have already seen, Afghans consider law enforcement and the judiciary to be the most corrupt institutions in the country.

Some respondents were more understanding, citing “need for money to live” (18%) or “salaries are too low” (13%) to be the main factors. Still others listed greed (19%), abuse of power (16%) or lack of ethics and morals (5%) to be behind the growing corruption.

Relatively few (2%) said that overly long or unclear procedures for obtaining services were a major factor.

Figure 27: Reasons for Corruption






Figure 28: Why do you think these institutions are the most corrupt?



When asked what factors contribute to making the above institutions corrupt, the most cited factor was a corrupt management team (34%). This is an obvious and not very helpful answer, as it does not delve into actual motivation. As above, other frequently mentioned factors included lack of a monitoring body (16%), low salaries (12%) or lack of interest in the common good (12%).

As stated above, this is perception, not actual experience of corruption. When asked how they form such opinions, respondents cite a wide variety of sources, including friends, family, and the media.

Figure 29: On which information source do you base your assessment of the level of corruption in the institutions mentioned above?



2.5. Personal Experience of Corruption

This all adds up to a very negative picture, with over 70% of respondents convinced that corruption is getting worse.

If the figures are to be believed, they are not wrong. Based on the data below, we have calculated that close to 26.5% of respondents were forced to pay a bribe at least once in the past 12 months. This is a significant increase over past surveys, as we shall see; the amount of the average bribe has also gone up, as has the adult population aged 18 and older. Altogether, this adds up to massive increase in the amount lost to bribes.


Over the past 12 months, Afghans paid an estimated 195,791,227,740 Afghani to corrupt officials -- nearly \$2.9 billion at today's exchange rate. This is significantly more than the \$2.17 billion that the Afghan government expects to generate in revenues in 2016²⁴.

As we see from Figure 30, below, corruption is clearly on the rise, with a 5% jump in those saying they had personal experience of corruption within the previous 12 months.

One interesting trend is that in 2016 no one refused to answer the question, while in 2012 10% of respondents were reluctant to discuss their own personal experiences. In 2014 there were still 6% who would not comment.

This could suggest that more people now consider corruption to be, if not acceptable, at least something that can be openly discussed. While not conclusive, this may indicate that corruption is becoming more institutionalized in Afghanistan, a more or less normal fixture of daily life. Given the high level of anger generated by corrupt officials constantly demanding their share of “bakhshesh” this cannot be a good sign.

Figure 30: Trends in personal experience of corruption 2012-2016




As we see in Figure 31, below, those who interact with government institutions are quite likely to encounter corruption, mainly in the form of requests for bribes. Close to 60% of those who said they had encountered corruption reported that this had happened to them more than once.

This gives some sense of the prevalence of corruption within the government, and the level of anger and frustration experienced by those whose lives are blighted by it.

24 <http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1395%20Budget/1396%20National%20Budget%20-%20sent%20to%20Parliament%20-%20Mesharano%20Jirga.pdf>


Figure 31: Bribes asked as a share of visits to institutes



2.6. Bribery

Bribery is one of the most common forms of corruption throughout the world, and Afghanistan is no exception. The frequency with which bribes are demanded and paid in some institutions, particularly the courts, is indicative of just how far corruption has penetrated these organizations.

Figure 32: Bribes asked as a share of visits to institutes



According to respondents, visits to the courts result in requests for bribes more than half of the time (55%). The same is true for visits to prosecutors and municipal government offices.

Banks, community development councils, and the international community were reported to be much less corrupt, with bribes paid just 13%, 10% and 5% of the time, respectively.

As we see from Figure 33, below, the most common form of paying bribe is in cash (38%) followed by gifts or “shereeni” (10%) and livestock (8%). Demand for favors was reported by 7% of the respondents.


Figure 33: Form of bribe paid?


Figure 34, below, gives some idea of the scale of such administrative graft. Of those who reported paying a bribe, the majority paid less than 2000 Afs (about \$30 at current exchange rates). More than 20%, however, reported bribes of more than 10,000 Afs (close to \$150). The largest amounts were paid to the courts.

Figure 34: what was the amount of the bribe paid the last time you personally paid a bribe?

Figure 35, below, shows the average number of bribes paid on the last visit to a range of institutions as well as the total amount paid.

As can be easily seen from the graph, the highest incidence of bribery was at the courts and to prosecutors, confirming earlier findings which listed these institutions as the most corrupt. District government, municipalities and local elders were also significant bribe-takers, while banks and the Taliban were relatively clean.

Figure 35: Bribes paid at institutions



Compiling all of the data –how many people paid bribes, how often, and how much, gives us the total below. Comparing this with previous years, we see the very disturbing trend.


Table 2: Total amount of bribes paid 2010-2016

| Year | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Number of Afghan adults who paid bribe | 1,677,319 | 1,621,800 | 1,992,698 | 3,449,588 |
| Average bribe paid (AFS) | 9,582 | 9,528 | 13,080 | 14,115 |
| Average number of bribes paid per year | 3.36 | 4.05 | 4.05 | 4.02 |
| Total amount of Afghani paid in bribes | 54,002,157,411 | 62,582,667,120 | 105,646,837,150 | 195,791,227,740 |
| Total amount of USD paid in bribes | 1,079,669,660 | 1,254,543,390 | 1,942,037,448 | 2,879,282,761 |

2.7. Attitudes Towards Bribery

Attitudes towards corruption are understandably negative, and do not always function as a predictor of behavior. When asked whether they would give a bribe if asked, 72% of respondents said they would not, while just 21% said they would. This does not correspond to the figures above: A greater percentage of respondents said that they had actually paid bribes than the percentage of those who said they would be willing to. This shows that people would like to think of themselves as being above bribery, but when pushed into it by necessity, they conform.

Figure 36: How would you react if you were asked to give a bribe?



As we see from Figure 37, below, Afghans pay bribes because they feel there is no alternative. The various responses given by the overwhelming majority (85%) of respondents (“no other way to obtain a service,” “because everyone else is doing it,” “to speed up the process,” or “to be sure I get what I need,”) all boil down to the same thing: Corrupt officials will not provide the service they are tasked with giving if they are not additionally compensated by private citizens.

The response “to speed up the process” also hints at another type of corruption: obstruction. Without a bribe, officials may manufacture artificial impediments to a citizen’s obtaining a needed service.

A small number (3%) of respondents say that paying a bribe allows them to negotiate a lower price for a service — perhaps taxes or other fees. While not a major factor, given the small numbers of respondents citing it, this has the potential to deprive the government of much-needed revenues.

Figure 37: Why would you give a bribe?




Figure 38 suggests that the overwhelming majority (84%) of those who do pay a bribe report feeling sinful, guilty or sad following a bribery event. This is something for policymakers to keep in mind; interactions with state institutions can engender negative feelings in many of those who are forced to seek services from them. Over time, this can dangerously erode support for the state.

Figure 38: How do you feel when you pay a bribe?





Figure 39 confirms that many of the respondents also feel that society does not look favorably on those who are corrupt. Over two-thirds of the respondents feel that individuals that partake in corrupt activities are sinful (34%), venal (24%) or guilty (16%). However, about 7% of the respondents feel that those who are corrupt are smart, clever or powerful.

Figure 39 How is a corrupt person perceived in society?

In general, it appears that Afghan citizens exhibit the normal range of emotion when confronted with the necessity of paying a bribe. The act, and those who perpetrate it, are looked upon negatively in society, and only extreme need forces so many Afghans to take part. The perpetrators, as seen from Figure 38, are for the most part not constrained by law, and exist in an environment where “everyone is doing it.”

It should be noted that this survey deals with the perceptions of the bribe-givers, not the feelings of the bribe-takers. It is not yet possible to conduct a valid survey where respondents would freely admit to being corrupt. Afghanistan at least still has the shame factor – bribery and corruption are seen as negatives, no matter how widespread or accepted by those in power.

In order to come to grips with this pervasive evil, the Afghan government will have to enforce real penalties for bribe-takers, and work towards a system where corruption is not so easily accepted by those who become its victims.

But, as seen from responses above, the question is quite a complex one. Respondents frequently remark that those in power take bribes because their salaries are too low, or they need money to live. It is no secret that the Afghan government frequently delays payment of salaries, sometimes for months at a time, and even when salaries are disbursed, there is frequent “leakage” (part of a staffer’s salary may be appropriated by corrupt officials above him). The stick of punishment needs to be accompanied by the carrot of livable, regular wages²⁵.

25 <http://www.theigc.org/project/government-mobile-salary-payments-in-afghanistan/>

2.8. Nepotism

Nepotism, defined by Transparency International as a “Form of favoritism based on acquaintances and familiar relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or favour to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving,” is a difficult topic to discuss in Afghanistan. This is a country where people are seen as part of their tribe, their collective; any questionnaire will ask for Father’s and Grandfather’s names as a matter of determining who one is.

What is seen as a form of corruption in other places may seem like ordinary loyalty in Afghanistan. Certainly connections play a big part in all facets of life in Afghanistan, most likely to a greater extent than in more developed countries. The line between helping one’s people and nepotism is sometimes hard to determine.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that nepotism is rampant in Afghanistan. The former president, Hamid Karzai, was a great example of this; his numerous brothers were able to parlay their closeness to the seat of power to enrich themselves, and, in some instances, to accumulate great power²⁶.

Nor was he alone; his Vice President, the late Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, also traded on his power to enrich himself and his family²⁷.

The problem is in getting respondents to speak freely about this practice. Once it is classified as corruption, the tendency is to deny that one engages in or condones it, even when that is obviously the case.

Figure 40 shows that about 18% of respondents say they have been victims of nepotism.

Figure 40: Experience of nepotism



Figure 41 shows that 22% of people in the sample would rely on nepotism if it assisted them in securing a job. This percentage increased from 16% in 2014. Around 62% stated that they would not rely on nepotism to secure employment, which is a slight decline from the 65% that had similar views in 2014. This trend can indicate the growing problem of unemployment and the extended means people would consider to get some form of employment.

²⁶ “A Kingdom of their Own: The Karzai Family and the Afghan Disaster” By Joshua Partlow, Knopf, 2016 ISBN 9780307962645.

²⁷ http://www.alternet.org/story/144024/an_inside_look_at_nepotism_and_corruption_in_karzai%27s_afghanistan

Figure 41: Would you rely on nepotism if it was necessary to get a job?





Figure 42 traces the attitudes of people in terms of whether they would rely on nepotism to get a job over the past four years. In 2012, 16% of respondents said that they would rely on nepotism to get a job. This attitude has increased; in subsequent surveys 22% of people say they would use nepotism to obtain employment. This is rather a concerning trend as it possibly suggests that the worsening economic situation is likely making people more desperate to utilize such forms of corruption to get a job.

Figure 42: Would you rely on nepotism if it were necessary to get a job 2012-2016



2.9. Summary of Part Two

Corruption is a serious and growing problem in the minds of many Afghans. Attitudes towards state institutions, and, consequently, towards the state as a whole can be severely damaged by the high incidence of bribery and other forms of corruption within such inescapable institutions as the courts, the police, and the schools.

Afghans see this as an unavoidable part of life; most say they give bribes because “everyone is doing it,” or because “there is no other way to obtain a service.”

Those who are forced into participating in this corrupt system experience negative reactions to the act and to those who perpetuate this system. Over time, this could translate into widespread anger at and distaste for the central government.

We also saw that corruption is draining the state’s coffers; close to \$2.9 billion is being dispensed in bribes to corrupt officials — a sum far in excess of the entire annual revenue of the Afghan state.

Given the collapsing economy and increasing desperation of many Afghans, corruption could be the deciding factor in forcing citizens out of the country or into the arms of the Taliban. Very little progress will be possible without coming to grips with this problem.





3. IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND ON THE PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT

In this section, we will look at how corruption affects people's perceptions of their government and their community.

How does corruption influence the way Afghan citizens look at their government? Are people hopeful that the situation is improving, or have they made their peace with the status quo? Do Afghans believe the promises of the NUG that it will finally tackle corruption? Is frustration and anger at corruption fueling the insurgency? Are people so fed up with the constant barrage of abuse from corrupt government officials that they are ready to turn to the Taliban or other armed groups in the hopes of getting a fair deal?

The very survival of the Afghan state could well depend on the ability of the government to gain the trust and support of its people. But judging by what we have seen in previous chapters, corruption is seriously undermining that trust.

We will now look at the concrete impact of corruption on the way people look at, and feel about, their government.

3.1. Impact of Corruption on Society and on Public Service Delivery


It is quite clear from the data that Afghans are unhappy with their government, and that corruption figures prominently in the reasons for their discontent.

This widespread disaffection is due to administrative corruption — the bribery, graft, obstruction and other measures available to those in positions of power to wield against the general populace. As we saw in Part Two, it is constant and inescapable: anyone who needs a national ID card, a driver's license, or a passing grade for their child in a local school, is likely to face the need to pay a bribe. Those who run into legal trouble, or become embroiled in the court system will have much larger problems; prosecutors and judges are almost universally deemed to be the most corrupt section of the government, and the amounts necessary to get out of difficulty are fairly hefty.


All of this undermines the view prevalent in some circles that "grand corruption" is the more serious problem, while local palm-greasing is necessary to keep things moving. It is true that wrong-doing at the upper levels of government consumes vast resources and disgraces the state in the international arena and before its own citizens. But most Afghans have little experience of this level of corruption. Rather, it is the day-to-day, constant barrage of venality that erodes trust in, and support for, the government.

The following survey question was designed to elicit people's overall attitudes towards corruption — specifically, how it shapes their feelings for their government. As we will see, the effect is radical, and it is highly negative.

Q. 40 Now I would like to read you a list of statements, based on your experience, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree.


Figure 43 Corruption has negatively affected the life of the people in this area

The overwhelming majority (close to 80%) of Afghans say that corruption has had a negative impact on their lives. A mere 3% of respondents disagreed with that statement. Keeping in mind Part Two, where we saw that the percentage of those who have actually paid bribes or experienced corruption directly is much lower (26.5% and 20%, respectively), we see that corruption spreads its tentacles deeply into the society, poisoning the attitudes of many more people than have actually encountered it first-hand.


Figure 44: Because of corruption I do not trust the local public services anymore

Breaking this down further, we see that a correspondingly large number of respondents (over 70%) no longer trust public services because of the corruption. This is an extremely high percentage of the population who express negative feelings towards the people and institutions that, to a large extent, rule their everyday existence. This is not something that can easily be ignored; from trash collection to traffic police to school administration, Afghans have little faith in their government.

As we see from the figure below, many feel that their district is worse than the province as a whole; this could, perhaps, provide some small degree of solace to those at the top; Afghans seem to think it possible, even likely, that the higher-ups are cleaner and more reliable than their local service providers. But if the old maxim is true, that “all politics is local,” addressing problems at the bottom level is necessary to improve the opinion of the government as a whole.

Figure 45: Corruption is worse in our district than the province

The increasing economic desperation in Afghan society can be felt in the response below. When asked about the statement “People in the government are only there to enrich themselves,” more than half of respondents agreed. Only 11% disagreed – anger and distrust has penetrated very far indeed.


Figure 46: People in the Government are only here to enrich themselves

This high level of distrust in public service providers shows just how compromised the entire system has become: Citizens expect to be held up for a bribe in order to complete the simplest processes.

Nor are many Afghans convinced that the situation is improving. The government of former President Hamid Karzai was quite famously corrupt; it was under his administration that Afghanistan burst onto the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index in 2008, at very near the bottom of the It has remained there ever since; in 2015 it ranked 166 out of 168, with only Somalia and North Korea scoring lower²⁸.

When it comes to comparing Karzai’s government to the National Unity Government headed by President Ashraf Ghani, the respondents are almost evenly split. While 33% agreed that Karzai’s government was more corrupt, 35% disagreed. A further 18% had no opinion.


28 <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>

Figure 47: The government of Hamid Karzai was more corrupt than the current Government


This does not suggest that Afghan citizens have been successfully wooed by the NUG, which came into office promising to tackle corruption. Indeed, in the past two years, very little progress has been made, at least in the perceptions of ordinary Afghans. This will be further explored in Part Four.

When it comes to NGOs and international organizations, as many as 39% of respondents believe that these institutions are corrupt, while about 18% disagree. This is an interesting contrast to Parts One and Two, where respondents placed NGOs and international organizations pretty far down on the corruption scale, and very few said that they had actually paid bribes to international organizations. But it does correspond to the findings in Part One in which respondents expressed doubt that the international community was really interested in fighting corruption.

What this indicates is a lingering resentment of the international community, and of the NGOs that receive funds from international donors. In an environment where money and jobs are increasingly scarce, there will be growing anger against those who are seen to be profiting from international largesse, and a healthy suspicion of the motives of those with deep pockets.

Figure 48: NGOs and international organizations are corrupt

This mountain of negativity adds up to very dismal news for the government of Afghanistan: approximately 40% of respondents believe that corruption is the main reason people in their area turn to the Taliban for services they cannot trust their government to provide.

Figure 49: Because of corruption people in our area refer to Taliban

This echoes Part One, where half of respondents expressed the opinion that corruption within the state was fueling the expansion of the Taliban.

It is vitally important to note these findings, which give some indication of the extent to which corruption is contributing to the deteriorating security situation in the country. Province after province is experiencing a renewed push by the Taliban to take and control territory, and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been only intermittently successful in holding them at bay.

It is understandable that, given this situation, the Afghan government and the international community might be tempted to prioritize security over anti-corruption, thinking that one has to be dealt with before any progress can be made on the other.

But as SIGAR pointed out in its latest report, this is a false choice, with disastrous results²⁹. The anger and frustration that Afghans feel at the rampant corruption that is having such a detrimental effect on their lives and their economy is contributing to a steady erosion of trust in, and support for, the state. As we see in Figure 49, above, it also sends citizens to the Taliban in the hopes of finding a fairer, cleaner resolution for certain problems.

Taliban courts have been gaining ground over the corrupt state institutions, since the Taliban have a reputation for probity that the government, sadly, does not³⁰.

This is not a trend that should leave the Afghan government sanguine about its chances for dealing with a re-invigorated insurgency in the near future.

3.2. Attitudes towards government service providers in Afghanistan

Given the perceptions of corruption and the state described above, it is hardly surprising that most respondents have a negative view of government service providers, ascribing to them all sorts of nefarious motives and practices.

As we will see from the data below, most respondents are fairly cynical when it comes to estimating the frequency with which government officials engage in administrative corruption. More than two-thirds think it is common for service providers to ask for money directly in order to perform an official task, to create obstacles in order to extract a bribe, or to negotiate lower taxes or customs duties in return for a cut.


Whether this is actually borne out by experience is almost beside the point; the perception of corruption is influencing how Afghans feel about their government.

The following graphs indicate the extent to which corruption has permeated the national psyche; these are not records of actual experience, but perception of the frequency or rarity of certain occurrences — graft, obstruction, misappropriation of public funds.

29 <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/LessonsLearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf#page=33>

30 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/taliban-justice-gains-favor-as-official-afghan-courts-fail.html?_r=0

Figure 50: How would you assess the following attitudes of the government services providers?



There is a widespread feeling that government service providers deliberately create difficulties in order to request a bribe, which is the classic definition of obstruction. More than 80% of respondents say this is at least relatively common, while just 7% believe such a practice is uncommon.


Further evidence of this tendency towards obstruction is the 75% of respondents who are convinced that government officials will delay fulfilling a required task in order to extract a bribe. Asking directly for money is also thought to be frequent: 75% of respondents said this was common or relatively common, with only 16% saying they thought this was uncommon.

Asking for gifts or favors is also thought to be fairly standard, with nearly three-fourths of respondents replying that it is at least relatively common. Reduction of taxes and customs duties in exchange for a percentage is also believed to be a widespread practice. This is important in that it deprives the state of much-needed revenue, instead filling the pockets of corrupt officials.

Actual experience of these forms of corruption is quite a bit lower; as we see from the table below, 36% say that officials demanded bribes in all or most cases, contrasted with close to 80% who think this is a common occurrence. The results are fairly consistent throughout: whereas nearly 75% said it was common for an official to indicate that he or she wanted a bribe in the form of cash, gift or favor, the actual frequency of such incidents is closer to 35%. Only 18% said it was common to give cash to officials, while another 15% said it happened in rare cases.

So we see that actual instances of corruption are much rarer than people's thoughts and fears. But the damage to public confidence comes as much from perception as from actual experience.

Figure 51: How often did the following occur when interacting with officials?



The rampant corruption in Afghanistan will, of course, not be easy to tackle. But perhaps even more difficult will be to eradicate the widespread view that officials and the government are corrupt, held by many who have limited or no experience of such corruption.


3.3. Summary of Part Three

This section looked at the deep chasm that has opened between the Afghan people and their government, brought about in large part by the perception that the government is not interested in working for the good of the people, but merely in the business of enriching itself at the people's expense.

Actual corruption is high enough, but the perception of corruption is much higher. As in part One, many are convinced that corruption is driving Afghans towards the insurgency – or, in any case, is so severely undermining trust in the government that people may be willing to go to the Taliban for certain services that they cannot get from the government, at least not at a fair price and an acceptable standard.

Regaining public trust will not be easy; certainly no actions that have been promised or undertaken by the NUG have made a dent in the opinions of most Afghans.

But unless firm action is taken, and quite soon, the damage may become irreversible.



4. ATTITUDES AND INITIATIVES TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

This section examines whether and how individuals choose to stand against corruption, and how successful they feel themselves to be in doing so. We then look Afghans' views of the government's anti-corruption efforts, as well as those by other institutions.

To a great extent, the level of hope in the society, the strength of the conviction that it is possible to fight corruption, will dictate how much progress can be made in combatting this ill over the next months and years.

It also has a much wider significance: As more and more of the country plunges into conflict, the population's level of commitment to the state will have a profound effect on how the war will go. From the ongoing conflicts in Farah, Helmand, Kunduz and elsewhere, we see that the Afghan National Security Forces are having a difficult time holding ground against the insurgency.

As at least one analyst has remarked, this is more a factor of the popular mood than of training or courage in the military.

"The real concern becomes when people no longer believe in putting their lives on the line for their leaders or government," said Christopher Kolenda, a former commander in Afghanistan, in an interview with the New York Times in October, 2016³¹.

If the general public loses faith in the state, or believes that it is no better off with corrupt officials than it is with the Taliban, it will be that much more difficult to hold the line against the increasingly robust insurgency.

Addressing corruption, particularly the constant, day-to-day, ubiquitous graft that has so undermined public trust, is more than advisable for the current government. It is a vital necessity.

4.1. Individual behavior and attitudes to fight corruption

It seems clear that Afghans want to find a way to rid themselves of corrupt officials. But it is equally clear that they have very little idea of what they might do to make that possible.

As we will see from the data below, respondents profess to be committed to fighting corruption. When asked how they could personally improve the situation, only 8% said that there was nothing that they could do. However, when asked to name concrete actions that they might take, they were mostly at a loss.

Refusing to pay bribes is a popular response (21%), but, as we saw in Part Three, most of those who pay bribes do so because they feel they have no other option. Some think that alerting the media (19%) would help, but, as we can infer from the dearth of reporting on administrative corruption, very few Afghans actually do so, or, if they do, the media is reluctant to report on it.

The decade-and-a-half long presence of the international community can be felt in responses such as "conduct awareness-raising programs" as an answer to corruption. Grass-roots efforts to "raise awareness" on every topic from women's rights to hygiene have pumped money and energy into numerous communities over the past 15 years. It would be naïve to think that respondents actually put their faith in such activities — the small per diems and free lunches that these programs provide are much more likely to account for their popularity as a cure-all for Afghanistan's ills.

So we can assume that most Afghans are short of concrete ideas on how they might make a difference.

This may very well be because so few know where they should go to report acts of corruption. As seen in Part Three, trust in state institutions is quite low; most people think that normal channels — the courts, the prosecutors, the police — are themselves corrupt, and would not be likely to seek help there.


Also, it is worth noting that there have been few, if any, cases against officials accused of administrative corruption. Experts in the field are unaware of any successful prosecutions in past years; headline-grabbing cases such as Kabul Bank do make a splash, but the much more prevalent administrative corruption is largely untouched³².

There is a general culture of impunity, whereby both corrupt officials and their victims know that there is very little redress for abuse of power.

31 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-massacre.html?_r=0


32 <http://www.rferl.org/a/ghani-orders-reopening-of-kabul-bank-fraud-investigation/26615468.html>

Figure 52: What can you personally do to reduce corruption in Afghanistan?




As we see from Figure 53, below, more than two-thirds of respondents indicated that they had no idea of the proper channels through which to report corruption.

Figure 53: Do you know which organization to contact to report a corrupt act or to file complaints?



When pressed to name an organization to which they would turn to report corruption, the greatest number of respondents (38%) named the police.

Figure 54: What channel would you contact to report a corrupt act or to file a complaint?



The media came in a distant second, with 16% saying they would turn to public channels to report a corrupt official. Just 13% would report to the attorney general, and 10% would go to the courts. An equal number said they would report to civil society organizations, and a very few would turn to “special commissions of the upper or lower house of Parliament.” Almost no one thought that ministers or deputy ministers would be a good bet; they ranked just ahead of the Taliban.

It is hardly surprising that Afghans are confused about the proper channels for reporting corruption. The process is not at all clear, and there have, as yet, been very few successful cases against corrupt officials.

There are several bodies tasked with fighting corruption, including the newly inaugurated Anti-Corruption Justice Center, opened with great fanfare in July, 2016. According to its mandate, the ACJC will address many of the problems we have been examining in this report:

“If this center proves its ability to fight corruption and achieve its goals, the following positive changes will occur in the society

- Rule of law will improve and people will work and go after their daily lives under the protection of law and will live peacefully under laws and will enjoy what they do for a living.
- People will no longer scare of criminal and will no longer have to pay for their works to get done in government offices.
- Peoples’ trust in government will increase and the gap between public and the government will be bridged. The public will fully support the government, and in return the government will deliver desired services to the people.
- Revenues will increase and people will have to pay taxes to the government and will not be obliged to pay bribes to government officials to decrease their taxes or be exempt of taxes³³.”

But it is too soon to tell whether the ACJC will have a significant impact.

There is a police hotline, 119, established in 2009 with financial help from NATO. It handles everything from kidnapping to terrorist bomb threats to traffic accidents to hooliganism. But the hotline is not extremely active; the website (moi.gov.af) claims that in 2012 the hotline received 15,859 calls, of which “1,293 were complaints about police misconduct, misuse of police vehicles and corruption.”

This is negligible as a mechanism for dealing with the constant graft, obstruction and other forms of corruption we have been examining here.

For several years, the High Office of Oversight was tasked with anti-corruption, but it proved ineffective due to a lack of independence and operational capacity, as well as lack of political will to tackle corruption³⁴.

When the new government came into power, President Ashraf Ghani stripped the HOO of all but a few of its powers.

There is also a body within the President’s Office that is supposed to follow up on corruption complaints. The Administrative Office of the President promises to track all cases and keep the complainants informed. According to the AOP, it dealt with 2109 complaints in the first eight months of 1394 (March-November 2015), of which 25% dealt with administrative corruption. Again, this is a minuscule number compared to the actual incidence of corruption in the society.

The Supreme Court claims to have prosecuted 10,000 cases since it set up special “corruption” courts in 2010, according to the National Integrity Assessment produced by Transparency International and Integrity Watch.

“Considering the pervasive corruption in the country, in 2010, the Supreme Court established primary and appeal courts to hear corruption cases. In Sal Nama Qaza (Yearly Report by the Judiciary), published in 2014, the Judiciary provided statistics on corruption cases brought before its courts for the past five years. In 2010, the primary and appeal courts throughout Afghanistan heard 1112 cases. This number increased to 1222 in 2014.”³⁵

33 <http://www.gmic.gov.af/english/analysis/407-opening-anti-corruption-criminal-justice-center-a-practical-step-to-fight-corruption->

34 <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-16-60-SP.pdf>

35 http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/afghanistan_2015_national_integrity_system_assessment (NIS, p, 59) <https://iweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Afghanistan-National-Integrity-System-Assessment-2015.pdf>


Even if true, this would still be negligible, compared to the prevalence of corruption within Afghanistan. If even a small percentage of the estimated 3.5 million cases of administrative graft yearly were prosecuted, there should be millions of cases before the courts.

Again, all of this is understandable. There has been almost no attempt to educate the public on what its rights and duties are in the fight against corruption. According to the National Integrity Survey: “There are no specific programmes run by the public sector to educate the public on corruption³⁶.”

4.2. Process of reporting corruption


The numbers of those who said they had actually reported a crime involving corruption were quite small — just 9% of respondents. But this is more than a third of the 26.5% who said that they had paid bribes.

Figure 55: During the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household reported a corrupt act by a public official?



The greatest number of those who claimed to have reported the corruption (15%) said they had alerted the media, while a similar number (14%) said they had gone to the attorney general. Only 2% reported having gone to the police, which does not track well with Figure 54, above, which shows that many Afghans consider the police the first stop when reporting corruption. In the graph below, the Taliban were as popular as actual law enforcement when it came to turning in dirty officials.

Figure 56: To which organization was the complaint reported?



36 <https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Afghanistan-National-Integrity-System-Assessment-2015.pdf> http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/afghanistan_2015_national_integrity_system_assessment


But these figures are simply not borne out by reality. If 26.5% of the population has actually paid bribes, this would mean close to 3.5 million cases each year, conservatively speaking. If 33.9% of these incidents were reported, as claimed above, this would result in more than a million cases each year. This has not happened — even the judiciary’s claim to have opened 10,000 cases over the past 6 years (NIS) would mean that just a minute percentage of corrupt acts were ever prosecuted.

It would seem that a very small number of cases are actually reported, despite respondents’ claims that they have alerted police, the media, NGOs, etc. It is also possible that victims of administrative corruption attempt to let various organs know about the problem, but that no action is ever taken. It all boils down to the culture of impunity referred to above.

In Figure 57, below, we explore the reasons for this. Respondents were asked to choose among various explanations for why they had not reported, or would be unwilling to report, corruption. The results are worrying. Over half the respondents said that reporting the corruption would be useless (29%) or actively detrimental to them personally (29%). These figures bear out the lack of trust that most respondents have in government institutions, as we saw in Part Three.

Another 9% said that they were not sure of the correct procedure for reporting corruption, which tracks well with the results in Figure 56, above.


Figure 57: Reasons as to why people may not report acts of corruption



Nevertheless, most respondents were willing to express an opinion on measures that could help citizens feel more comfortable about reporting corruption. These centered overwhelmingly on information, with close to 60% saying that more information in the sphere of citizens’ rights (20%), anti-corruption legislation (16%), institutions that take complaints about corrupt officials (11%), or general anti-corruption awareness activities (11%) would help in the fight.

These responses indicate that Afghans are eager to help reduce corruption; but they will also need assurance that their complaints will not come back to haunt them. There is a trust deficit that will have to be remedied before any anti-corruption information campaigns will bear fruit.

Figure 58: Factors that can help citizens combat corruption



Below is a roundup of respondents' feelings about reporting corruption. They were read a list of statements and asked whether they agreed or disagreed. What is interesting here is that so many people either declined to give an opinion ("Neither agree nor disagree") or flat out refused to answer. In five out of the nine questions, more than 40% would not commit to a stance on the topic under discussion.

The questions were not in and of themselves terribly controversial; in all cases the issue had been raised before in a different way. But the rapid-fire style of this question seems to have put people on their guard; they were reluctant to give answers that could be perceived as incriminating.


What emerges is a damning indictment of the whole process. Respondents clearly showed that they understood the prevalence of corruption in their society, but felt helpless to do anything about it. Only 18% disagreed with the statement "people are willing to protect interests through bribery," while 46% agreed, and another 36% did not voice an opinion.

When asked whether "people abstain from paying bribes for public services," just 32% agreed, while 26% disagreed and 42% declined to give an opinion. Only 16% disagreed with the statement "the reporter of corruption is not protected from potential harassment," while 42% agreed outright and another 42% did not give their opinion. Just 25% agreed that "the process of reporting corruption is easy," while only a third said that "people know to which organization they forward the complaints report."

Bribery is clearly a distasteful necessity: 56% agreed that "people pay money to bribe government authorities because they have no other way." Only 14% disagreed.

Just 38% of respondents agreed that "people of the area report a corrupt act by public or state officials," although, as we have already seen, even this figure is likely to be wildly optimistic.

Figure 59: Perception statement



The responses themselves, and the degree of apprehension and mistrust indicated by the high numbers of those who would not commit themselves, is a troubling sign. People feel forced into paying bribes, have no idea to whom they can turn for help, and are afraid that getting involved may hurt them personally. This is still more evidence of the culture of impunity that predominates in Afghanistan today.

4.3. Level of Confidence that Corruption Can Be Addressed

In this section we will look at respondents' perceptions of how the Afghan government and other institutions are doing in the fight against corruption. This is closely tied to the issue of trust in the government, which we examined in Part Three.


The responses, we shall see, are somewhat contradictory: In general, interviewees were willing to give the government more credit for fighting corruption than is, perhaps, warranted, given their overwhelmingly negative views on the possibility of success.

The first step in gauging people's assessment of the government's efforts was to probe the level of belief that corruption could be effectively addressed.

Here the results were quite disappointing. An overwhelming 75% are pessimistic, saying that corruption either cannot be reduced at all (37%) or can only be reduced to a certain degree (37%). Only 4% think that it can be completely eradicated, and 12% think it can be substantially reduced.

This suggests that graft, obstruction, etc. have become so embedded within Afghan society that it is regarded as a fact of life, an institution that will not soon disappear.


Figure 60: To what extent you think corruption can be reduced in Afghanistan?



One of the reasons that Afghans are so convinced that corruption is entrenched could be that they are almost completely unaware of anything the government is doing against it.


According to the results in Figure 61, fully 81% of respondents knew of no measures being taken by the Afghan government to fight corruption.

Figure 61: Are you aware of any anti-corruption measures being taken by the Government of Afghanistan?



But despite the worrying lack of faith that corruption can be eradicated, a surprisingly robust percentage of respondents expressed a belief that there is a widespread desire to fight corruption in various government offices. Over half (52%) of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the current government wanted to fight corruption; the same percentage expressed belief in the willingness of the President's office to tackle the problem. The Office of the Chief Executive did not do as well: only 39% said they thought that Abdullah's team was interested in fighting corruption. Even fewer (38%) felt that way about the Office of the Special Representative of the President for Reform and Good Governance, possibly because this institution is relatively new.

Figure 62: The institutions mentioned here have a sincere desire and will to combat corruption



Since most respondents said that corruption could not be significantly reduced, and were unaware of any government efforts in this regard, it is unclear how these figures were derived. It seems likely that this is a general perception of these offices, rather than a reasoned response to the actual question.

In addition to the central government and other government institutions, there are public and non-governmental or civil society organizations that play a role in monitoring and evaluating corruption and its impact on society. Ultimately, such organizations contribute to the battle against corruption by identifying its root causes and making the public aware of such activities.

As we see from the table below, Afghans are much more generous in their assessments than the international community, which has given the High Office of Oversight a failing grade in fighting corruption.³⁷ More than half of respondents, by contrast, said that HOO was either very effective (21%) or somewhat effective (38%) in fighting corruption. Just 12% echoed the dim views of the international community.

The Attorney General's Office was given similarly rosy marks; again, more than half said that the AGO was either very effective (18%) or somewhat effective (35%). This despite the fact that the Attorney General's Office was ranked as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country.

Somewhat bizarrely, the Office of the Special Representative for Good Governance got higher marks for effectiveness (50%) than for a "sincere desire and will to combat corruption," (39%) as seen above.

37 <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/LessonsLearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf#page=33>

Table 3: Effectiveness in fighting corruption

| Effectiveness of Public Agencies | Very Effective | Somewhat Effective | Somewhat Ineffective | Completely Ineffective | Do Not Know | Refused |
|--|----------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------|---------|
| High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption | 21% | 38% | 14% | 12% | 13% | 1% |
| Office of the Attorney General | 18% | 35% | 18% | 17% | 11% | 1% |
| Office of the Special Representative of the President in Good Governance | 18% | 32% | 19% | 16% | 14% | 1% |
| Human Rights Commission | 17% | 37% | 19% | 15% | 13% | 1% |

In Figure 63, below, respondents were asked to rank the effectiveness of various public, private, civil society, religious and social institutions in terms of their efforts in reducing corruption.

Over a third of respondents felt that the Afghan government and courts were ineffective in dealing with corruption. This result conforms to the analysis in Figure 26, above, where most people felt that the courts were one of the most corrupt institutions in the country.

On the contrary though, 39% also felt that the government was very effective in dealing with corruption. This seems to reflect general attitude towards the government, rather than actual opinions on corruption; in graph after graph, we have seen respondents say that corruption cannot be eradicated, they are unaware of any government activities to fight corruption, etc.

Figure 63: The most effective institution in reducing corruption in Afghanistan




Figure 63 also shows that 41% of respondents felt that the Mullahs and Ulamas were the most effective institutions in reducing corruption. This was the highest proportion of “5” or “very effective” scores afforded to any of the institutions under assessment³⁸.

The lowest scores belonged to international forces, local commanders, private companies, Parliament and Provincial Councils; this should also be seen as a general referendum on these institutions, rather than a carefully considered assessment of their corruption-fighting activities. It does echo the results in Part One, where 46% of respondents expressed doubt that the international community was interested in fighting corruption, and 49% said that the international community was not supportive of honest officials.

It is a dash of cold water for the international community – their efforts are not being viewed favorably by the people they say they are trying to help.

4.4. Summary of Part Four

The results in Part Four show a clear determination to address corruption, coupled with an equally clear ignorance of any effective mechanisms for doing so.

While respondents may talk tough in a survey setting, saying they would refuse to pay bribes, report corrupt officials, or otherwise fight corruption, in practice they do very little.

This is due to lack of awareness of their rights, the law, and specific avenues of redress; it is also due to a distressing lack of faith that there is any real means of reducing or eradicating corruption in Afghanistan today.

Most Afghans mistrust the government; those tempted to complain about graft or other forms of corruption are dissuaded by fear of retribution, or an equally paralyzing conviction that nothing will be done even if the crime is reported. While many said that more information would help them to feel more comfortable, the level of trust in the government would have to rise significantly before significant numbers of people would start turning in corrupt officials.

The government will also have to demonstrate that it has the will and the ability to tackle corruption — something that it has not yet done to the satisfaction of most respondents. While more than half of all respondents say that they believe the government wants to fight corruption, close to 75% say they do not think that corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated. Even those who give the central government the benefit of the doubt do not think that it can really do much to improve the situation.

This shows a strong belief that corruption is entrenched in the society — a conviction that the government may find difficult to combat.

The respondents demonstrated much more faith in Mullahs and the Ulemas as a means for combatting corruption. This is evidence of Afghanistan’s traditional mindset; while it does not necessarily provide a roadmap for reform, it does show where Afghans place their trust.

38 See IWA’s study of religious leaders in the fight against corruption, in which the power of the clerics as social mobilizers in the fight against corruption is amply documented: <https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ulama-Report-English-6.pdf>



5. CONCLUSION

The National Corruption Survey 2016 shows a country in crisis. Afghans are losing faith in their government, losing faith in their future, and are unsure of what, if anything, they can do to remedy the situation.

Insecurity and unemployment are making life all but untenable for many, sending hundreds of thousands into migration. Corruption, which even before this latest survey was at levels that consistently put Afghanistan very close to the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, has, in the minds of Afghan citizens, worsened precipitously. Bribery is more prevalent, and is claiming ever greater amounts of money.

This constant, day-to-day administrative graft is undermining trust in the government, and making the security situation even worse. A majority of Afghans feel that corruption is fueling the insurgency — people are not willing to fight and die for a government they do not respect.

Afghans do not feel that their government is doing enough to fight corruption, and many doubt that the President and his Chief Executive Officer are truly committed to the battle.

The international community also comes in for a share of the blame; nearly half of respondents think that the international community is not interested in fighting corruption, while an uncomfortably large number (nearly 40%) suspect that the foreigners are themselves corrupt.

It is clear that Afghans lack a clear idea of what they themselves can do in such a situation. Refusing to pay bribes would likely mean that they were unable to procure necessary services; reporting a corrupt official could provoke vengeance.

The government, say respondents, has not provided clear channels through which citizens can report corrupt officials safely and efficiently. Most people have very little idea of where to go, or what to do; the very organs to which many would address their complaints — such as prosecutors, courts, and police — are themselves identified as the most corrupt institutions in the country.

When it comes to corruption, it is clear that there is a culture of impunity in Afghanistan that will be very difficult to eradicate.

But it cannot be impossible. To concede defeat in the fight against corruption would be to consign Afghanistan to a very dark future indeed. A robust insurgency, massive migration, and a steadily dwindling faith in the ability of the state to protect its citizens would spell disaster for Afghanistan, a country that has already endured so much.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan urges the government to undertake necessary reforms as quickly as possible. The sooner that the following recommendations are implemented, the sooner Afghanistan can begin to make progress in tackling its problems.

5.1. Recommendations

1. **Establish an Independent Judiciary:** Given the nearly universal perception that the courts, judges, prosecutors are corrupt, reforming the justice sector must be a high priority for the government. There is very likely no other institution that has such potential for sending Afghans into the arms of the insurgency; those living in areas near to Taliban, or under Taliban control, often prefer to have disagreements settled by the Taliban courts, rather than taking their chances with the despised state institutions. There are several steps that can assist in making the judicial sector more transparent:
 - **Open Trials:** If the public were allowed to monitor trials, as is mandated in the Constitution, there would be a much more limited scope for corruption.
 - **Community Engagement:** According to preliminary results of an independent study undertaken by the University of California San Diego, community monitoring can go a long way towards promoting accountability and transparency in the courts
 - **Independent Judicial Services Commission:** Judges, judicial staff should be appointed and trained by an independent commission, free from the influence of the Government, National Assembly or Supreme Court

2. **Establish clear and transparent mechanisms for dealing with corruption within the Afghan National Police (ANP):** Along with the judiciary, the police are seen as corrupt by a large swath of the population. The data is a bit problematic, since respondents gave overall high marks to the National Police, while rating their local police much less favorably. But it does emerge that there are corruption problems within the ANP that must be addressed. The following steps would help:

- Establish an independent commission within the ANP to oversee merit-based hiring and promotions. This could be similar to the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). This commission would be tasked with processing petitions for promotion and appointments based on transparent procedures and criteria.
- Establish clear guidelines and procedures for processing corruption-related complaints through the 119 hotline, and establish a body with the power to investigate such complaints, independent from the MoI and ANP.
- Strengthen the Office of the Police Ombudsman, so that it can effectively investigate complaints related to the police and report regularly to the public

3. **Create a channel through which citizens can report corrupt officials without fear of reprisals:** While the government will need to vet complaints to ensure they are valid, they must protect the identity of the complainant as much as possible, if citizens are to feel secure.

- These complaints should be able to be monitored through a public channel; those who report corruption should be able to see the progress of their case, and should receive feedback.
- There should be publicly available audits of the complaints system, so that citizens can see what is happening.
- Establish an ombudsman system: An effective complaints management system would need an ombudsman to ensure that the process was secure, transparent, and effective.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Methodology

METHODOLOGY

This was a countrywide survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan on Afghans' perceptions and experiences of corruption, and an assessment of how corruption impacts their lives and communities. Since 2007, this is the fifth biennial survey of its kind by Integrity Watch. The survey offers insights to the high level government authorities, political leaders, CSOs, think tanks and public officials about Afghans' perception of corruption and their expectations from the state and political leaders of the country.

The target population for this survey was Afghans age 18 years and older. According to population data from the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) of Afghanistan (Settled Population by Sex and Age Groups -2014-15), around 48 percent of the provincial population is 18 and over. This means that the total of the target population was 13,021,401 (total population of Afghanistan is = 27,101,365).

In this study, the sampling frame was a list of villages or *nahias*, using various village databases in each of the selected districts as research location. The representative sample villages were drawn at random from the list in each district.

SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATION

Integrity Watch Afghanistan administered a country level public opinion survey in one hundred Thirty-Seven (137) sample districts including Nahias in all thirty-four (34) provinces of Afghanistan. The sample size for the whole country was calculated to obtain a 1.1% margin of error at 95% confidence level with an estimate of 50 percent response distribution (among male and female). The total number of respondents was 7810. To increase demographic variation and taking into account the budget considerations, the research team distributed 10 surveys per sampling point, which accounts for a total of 781 sampling points in all one hundred and thirty-seven districts of thirty-four provinces.

PROVINCE AND DISTRICT SELECTION

Integrity Watch conducted a security assessment of all 34 provinces, together with the security committee and research team, and developed a four-part, color-based security ranking system. The system/classifications outline the level of access survey teams could achieve and the relevant survey methodology, including clustering and possible bias, at each level. Security classifications were determined through consultation with field coordinators and provincial networks.

- **Green:** Green districts were completely open to survey teams. All villages were included in sampling lists.
- **Amber:** In amber districts, all villages within approximately two hours of the district center were surveyed. Travel times beyond two hours from the district center meant that survey teams had to make multiple trips to each remote village. In semi-permissive districts, making repeated visits to the same area increases the risk that survey teams could be intercepted by anti-government elements. Therefore, sampling points in these districts were clustered within two hours of the district center.
- **Red:** Red districts were highly insecure, meaning surveys could only conduct survey in the district centers. This can consist of household surveys of residents of the district center and villages surrounding the district center. The higher degree of clustering in red districts introduces a correspondingly higher degree of selection bias than was the case with amber districts
- **Black:** Black districts were those where the absence of GIRoA control made even district centers too dangerous for survey teams. Moreover, extensive Anti-Government Elements checkpoints in these districts made it impossible to transport survey materials to the district centers, even when the survey teams traveled in separate vehicles. In this survey, the districts colored black were not covered at all; no one from our team traveled for survey purposes to this class of the districts.

URBAN-RURAL STRATIFICATION

According to the municipality administration, populations living within municipal boundaries are classified as urban, and those living outside municipal boundaries are classified as rural. In some provinces, municipal boundaries are not clearly defined. According to the CSO population yearbook for 2014-15, urban populations are mostly oriented in provincial centers and very rarely in a few major districts. However, not necessarily all parts of the provincial centers and districts are within the municipal boundaries. Even in the provincial capital/city, some villages lie outside of the municipal boundary. Urban areas are divided into *nahias* by the municipality administration, and in this study urban participants were representative of *nahias* and were drawn from *nahias* within the municipal boundaries. The sample is distributed proportionally to urban-rural population size of each district using population data from the CSO 2014-15.

SETTLEMENT-VILLAGE/SAMPLING POINT SELECTION

In this survey a village in a rural area and a *nahia* in an urban area are called a sampling point. At this stage, within districts the sampling frame was the list of all villages in the rural area and list of all *nahias* in urban area. Sampling point selection for urban areas: As described earlier, urban areas are divided into *nahias* within municipal boundaries. Because there was no population data available about *nahia* sizes within the municipal boundaries, the survey was distributed equally among *nahias*.

Sampling point selection for rural areas: Within districts, villages were assigned a number on a serial number list. Using a simple random-sampling generator (Random.org), the village numbers are chosen at random until the desired sample size reached. Because the CSO lacks accurate population counts for rural villages, villages/sampling points cannot be drawn proportionally.

Table 1: Sampling plan

| Total Population >18 - 2015 CSO | | | | | Province-Wise Sampling Size (1.11% @ 95%) | | | Cluster Based Calculation (10 questionnaire/cluster) | | | Sample Districts | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|---------|--------|---|----------|----------|--|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| No | Province | Total Population >18 | Urban | Rural | Province-Wise SS | Urban SS | Rural SS | Provincial SS | Urban Sample Size | Rural Sample Size | Provincial Capital | Rural District |
| 1 | Kabul | 2069215 | 1743766 | 325449 | 1241 | 1046 | 195 | 124 | 104 | 20 | 1 | 4 |
| 2 | Kapisa | 213184 | 732 | 212452 | 128 | 0 | 127 | 13 | 0 | 13 | | 3 |
| 3 | Parwan | 320520 | 28057 | 292463 | 192 | 17 | 175 | 19 | 2 | 18 | 1 | 4 |
| 4 | Maidan Wardak | 288261 | 1460 | 286801 | 173 | 1 | 172 | 17 | 0 | 17 | | 3 |
| 5 | Logar | 189422 | 4686 | 184736 | 114 | 3 | 111 | 11 | 0 | 11 | | 2 |
| 6 | Nangrahar | 730832 | 108772 | 622060 | 438 | 65 | 373 | 44 | 6.5 | 37.3 | 1 | 7 |
| 7 | Laghman | 215383 | 2436 | 212946 | 129 | 1 | 128 | 13 | 0 | 13 | | 3 |
| 8 | Panjshir | 74211 | — | 74211 | 45 | 0 | 45 | 4 | 0 | 4 | | 1 |
| 9 | Baghlan | 438097 | 87163 | 350934 | 263 | 52 | 210 | 26 | 5 | 21 | 1 | 4 |
| 10 | Bamyan | 216052 | 6085 | 209968 | 130 | 4 | 126 | 13 | 0 | 13 | | 3 |
| 11 | Ghazni | 593392 | 28488 | 564904 | 356 | 17 | 339 | 36 | 2 | 34 | 1 | 7 |
| 12 | Paktika | 210170 | 1341 | 208829 | 126 | 1 | 125 | 13 | 0 | 13 | | 3 |
| 13 | Paktya | 266580 | 11687 | 254893 | 160 | 7 | 153 | 16 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 3 |
| 14 | Khost | 277670 | 5540 | 272129 | 167 | 3 | 163 | 17 | 0 | 16 | | 3 |
| 15 | Kunar | 217721 | 6576 | 211146 | 131 | 4 | 127 | 13 | 0 | 13 | | 3 |
| 16 | Nooristan | 71540 | — | 71540 | 43 | 0 | 43 | 4 | 0 | 4 | | 1 |
| 17 | Badakhshan | 459308 | 17714 | 441594 | 275 | 11 | 265 | 28 | 1 | 26 | 1 | 5 |
| 18 | Takhar | 473828 | 61353 | 412475 | 284 | 37 | 247 | 28 | 5 | 23 | 1 | 5 |
| 19 | Konduz | 485174 | 121225 | 363949 | 291 | 73 | 218 | 29 | 7 | 22 | 1 | 4 |
| 20 | Samangan | 187198 | 13995 | 173202 | 112 | 8 | 104 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 2 |
| 21 | Balkh | 634933 | 231276 | 403656 | 381 | 139 | 242 | 38 | 14 | 24 | 1 | 5 |
| 22 | Sar-e-Pul | 270022 | 20639 | 249383 | 162 | 12 | 150 | 16 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 3 |
| 23 | Ghor | 333667 | 3348 | 330319 | 200 | 2 | 198 | 20 | 0 | 20 | | 4 |
| 24 | Daikundi | 205176 | — | 205176 | 123 | 0 | 123 | 12 | 0 | 12 | | 2 |
| 25 | Urozgan | 186865 | 6636 | 180230 | 112 | 4 | 108 | 11 | 0 | 11 | | 2 |
| 26 | Zabul | 146898 | 5784 | 141114 | 88 | 3 | 85 | 9 | 0 | 8 | | 2 |
| 27 | Kandahar | 587738 | 205016 | 382722 | 353 | 123 | 230 | 35 | 12 | 23 | 1 | 5 |
| 28 | JowzJan | 259769 | 54841 | 204928 | 156 | 33 | 123 | 16 | 3 | 12 | 1 | 2 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|---------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|------|-------------|------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| 29 | Faryab | 481088 | 57702 | 423385 | 289 | 35 | 254 | 29.0 | 4 | 26 | 1 | 5 |
| 30 | Helmand | 446442 | 25942 | 420500 | 268 | 16 | 252 | 27 | 2 | 25 | 1 | 5 |
| 31 | Badghis | 239612 | 7001 | 232612 | 144 | 4 | 140 | 14 | 0 | 14 | | 3 |
| 32 | Herat | 907115 | 257094 | 650022 | 544 | 154 | 390 | 54 | 15 | 39 | 1 | 8 |
| 33 | Farah | 244878 | 17657 | 227221 | 147 | 11 | 136 | 15 | 1 | 14 | 1 | 3 |
| 34 | Nemroz | 79440 | 12539 | 66900 | 48 | 8 | 40 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | | 13021401 | 3156551 | 9864850 | 7810 | 1893 | 5917 | 781 | 191 | 590 | 19 | 118 |

Table 2: List of Enumerators

| No | Province | Total Population >18 | Urban | Rural | Province-Wise Sample Size | Urban Sample Size | Rural Sample Size | # Male Enumerators | # Femal Enumerators | Provincial Supervisor |
|----|---------------|----------------------|---------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Kabul | 2069215 | 1743766 | 325449 | 1241 | 1046 | 195 | 6 | 6 | 1 |
| 2 | Kapisa | 213184 | 732 | 212452 | 128 | 0 | 127 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 3 | Parwan | 320520 | 28057 | 292463 | 192 | 17 | 175 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 4 | Maidan Wardak | 288261 | 1460 | 286801 | 173 | 1 | 172 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 5 | Logar | 189422 | 4686 | 184736 | 114 | 3 | 111 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 6 | Nangrahar | 730832 | 108772 | 622060 | 438 | 65 | 373 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 7 | Laghman | 215383 | 2436 | 212946 | 129 | 1 | 128 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 8 | Panjshir | 74211 | — | 74211 | 45 | 0 | 45 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9 | Baghlan | 438097 | 87163 | 350934 | 263 | 52 | 210 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 10 | Bamyan | 216052 | 6085 | 209968 | 130 | 4 | 126 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 11 | Ghazni | 593392 | 28488 | 564904 | 356 | 17 | 339 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 12 | Paktika | 210170 | 1341 | 208829 | 126 | 1 | 125 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 13 | Paktya | 266580 | 11687 | 254893 | 160 | 7 | 153 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 14 | Khost | 277670 | 5540 | 272129 | 167 | 3 | 163 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 15 | Kunar | 217721 | 6576 | 211146 | 131 | 4 | 127 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 16 | Nooristan | 71540 | — | 71540 | 43 | 0 | 43 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 17 | Badakhshan | 459308 | 17714 | 441594 | 275 | 11 | 265 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 18 | Takhar | 473828 | 61353 | 412475 | 284 | 37 | 247 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 19 | Konduz | 485174 | 121225 | 363949 | 291 | 73 | 218 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 20 | Samangan | 187198 | 13995 | 173202 | 112 | 8 | 104 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 21 | Balkh | 634933 | 231276 | 403656 | 381 | 139 | 242 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 22 | Sar-e-Pul | 270022 | 20639 | 249383 | 162 | 12 | 150 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 23 | Ghor | 333667 | 3348 | 330319 | 200 | 2 | 198 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 24 | Daikundi | 205176 | — | 205176 | 123 | 0 | 123 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 25 | Urozgan | 186865 | 6636 | 180230 | 112 | 4 | 108 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 26 | Zabul | 146898 | 5784 | 141114 | 88 | 3 | 85 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 27 | Kandahar | 587738 | 205016 | 382722 | 353 | 123 | 230 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 28 | JowzJan | 259769 | 54841 | 204928 | 156 | 33 | 123 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|---------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 29 | Faryab | 481088 | 57702 | 423385 | 289 | 35 | 254 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 30 | Helmand | 446442 | 25942 | 420500 | 268 | 16 | 252 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 31 | Badghis | 239612 | 7001 | 232612 | 144 | 4 | 140 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 32 | Herat | 907115 | 257094 | 650022 | 544 | 154 | 390 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 33 | Farah | 244878 | 17657 | 227221 | 147 | 11 | 136 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 34 | Nemroz | 79440 | 12539 | 66900 | 48 | 8 | 40 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | | 13021401 | 3156551 | 9864850 | | | | 60 | 60 | 34 |

GENDER STRATIFICATION

The research team stratified gender breakdown in each province proportionally to male/female ratio in the population. According to the CSO population yearbook 2014-15 this ratio is 51:49. In each province, equal number of female and male respondents are allocated per sampling point. In order to meet the gender-split in each sampling point and to minimize gender gap, equal number of male and female enumerators were deployed at each sampling location.

HOUSEHOLD SELECTION

In order to randomly select the households in a sampling point, a Systematic Random Sampling (SRS) method is used. Information on the list of households at the sampling point level were not available with the CSO, households are selected according to the following systematic random procedure. For each sampling point, interviewers assigned a starting point. Generally, for both urban and rural areas, a recognizable location such as Masjid, basic health centers, bazaars or schools were selected as a starting point. In urban areas, the interviewer moved to the assigned direction from the starting point and stops at the fifth street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route and start interviewing at one randomly selected livable household which was within the first five households on the right from the beginning of the street/lane. From then on, each fifth inhabitable household was interviewed. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine was each fifth apartment. In rural areas, the interviewers started from a Masjid or the bazaar which were usually located in the center of the village and moved through the village from right to the left interviewing each fifth inhabitable wall in a compound (qala), in these compounds; households are counted in an anti-clock wise direction starting from the gate to the qala.

TRAINING AND FIELD WORK

For this survey, only those enumerators were selected who had extensive experience of research and familiarity with the field methodology in quantitative survey methods. All enumerators were recruited from the same districts where field work was taking place. This was because of three reasons; first, the local interviewers may be familiar with local issues so they could administer the instrument more effectively. Second, participants on occasion would feel more comfortable with local interviewers than those coming from Kabul. Third, local enumerators and facilitators were more insulated from potential security threats.

In order to meet the representative sex ratio at each sampling point, couples or a team including persons of both genders were recruited from each district.

The enumerators, supervisors and field coordinators were selected on a written test from our nationwide network of field staff across the country who had passed successfully at least ten research and survey projects. They had worked in different survey projects with different research areas such as gender, governance, health, socioeconomic, public opinion and security. They were already familiar with basic technical and practical issues of a survey. The criteria for the selection of enumerators is follow;

- They should be from the local area/province where the survey is taking place.
- They must have prior experience in survey work and higher education background.
- They should not be under the age of 18.
- They must be able to travel to villages/district far from the district/provincial center.
- They must not be a member of the police, provincial council, or any other element of local government.
- They must not be relatives of the managerial staff of the project and of the HQ staff of Integrity Watch.

A two-step training program was conducted to prepare the field staff prior to the fieldwork. As a first step, a task-specific methodology (TSM) training session was conducted to train eight (8) field coordinators for two days by the research manager. Field coordinators were from the various parts of the country familiar with the culture norms and geographical situation of the research locations. They were briefed on the nature of the study and were trained in topics ranging from the specific sampling methodology to interview techniques.

As second step, the research manager and field coordinators from the headquarters travelled to the provinces to conduct training for 120 local male and female enumerators for a two-day period in eight (8) zonal locations including 1) Kabul, 2) Nangrahar, 3) Paktia, 4) Bamyan, 5) Kandahar, 6) Herat, 7) Mazar-e-Sharif and 8) Konduz provinces. The surveyors were training in the main and predominant languages of the areas in which they were sent to conduct the fieldwork. The research manager and field coordinators conducted the training sessions which were designed to contribute the following skills set;

- Day 1: Basic concepts of survey and interviews, introduction and rapport-building, sampling techniques, and sampling-point and respondent selection;
- Day 2: Familiarization with each question, using follow-up questions, recording data, consistency in interview technique, and role-playing, Quality-control discipline, including supervision of surveys, spot-checking, and back-checking.

SECURITY ISSUES

The field work was conducted with prior permission from the local provincial governments. The field coordinators prior to data collection shared a letter from Integrity Watch and sectorial government departments for the field work permission. The safety of the field staff was the highest priority. Integrity Watch security committee and research team assessed the security situation from all available sources before the field teams were deployed to the locations of the study. The team analyzed the on-the-ground situation before teams were deployed to the field and in each district, facilitators were required to check in with field coordinators or provincial supervisors if cell phone connections were available. Each field coordinator reported to the Research Department every day during the field work.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Ensuring respondents' and field teams' confidentiality is a top priority to Integrity Watch. All staff members were trained on the ethics involved in survey research. Integrity Watch personnel, including local researchers and survey teams abide by the highest standards of the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). Under the guidelines of the AAPOR, disclosure of the project data without the managers' and clients' permission, and use of respondent-identifiable data beyond the specific survey, is prohibited.

Annex 2: Questionnaire

| | | |
|--|---|-------------------|
| Questionnaire ID | | |
| Interviewer: | Code: _ _ _ Name: _____ | |
| Year: | 2016 | |
| Month of Interview: | | |
| Numeric day of Month: | _ _ | |
| Region | | |
| Province | | |
| District Name | | |
| Within the Municipality? | Yes – Urban No – Rural | |
| IF Urban, Municipal District #: | Municipal District #: _____ Locality Name: _____ | |
| IF Rural, Village Name and Code: | Village Code: _____ Village Name: _____ | |
| Sampling Point Name / Code: | Code: _____ | |
| | Name: _____ | |
| Interviewee Gender | 1 - Male 2 – Female | |
| Interview number in the Sampling Point | | |
| Data Editing | Data Entry | Data Verification |
| REMARKS | | |

HOUSEHOLD SELECTION

| | 1 st Attempt | 2 nd Attempt | 3 rd Attempt | Reason of substitution |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| Original House | ___ : ___ | ___ : ___ | ___ : ___ | Refused to interview/outright refusal at the door Problem in household selection No one at home No eligible (18+) sample at home The selected subject is out of reach |
| Substitute House #1 | ___ : ___ | ___ : ___ | ___ : ___ | Refused to interview/outright refusal at the door Problem in household selection No one at home No eligible (18+) sample at home The selected subject is out of reach |
| Substitute House #2 | ___ : ___ | ___ : ___ | ___ : ___ | Refused to interview/outright refusal at the door Problem in household selection No one at home No eligible (18+) sample at home The selected subject is out of reach |

HOUSEHOLD ROSTER

*List the subjects (18+) in this household from oldest to youngest.

| No. | Age | Relationship to Head of household |
|-----|-----|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | | |

Kish Grid – (Interviewee Selection)

| Kish Grid: | | Number of eligible respondents | | | | | | | |
|--|---|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Last digit of interview number in the SP | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 3 |
| | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 |
| | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 8 |
| | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 5 |
| | 7 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 7 |
| | 8 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 2 |
| | 9 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 1 |

INFORMED CONSENT

Salam! My name is _____. I am from Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the mission of integrity watch is to put corruption under the spotlight through community monitoring, research and advocacy. This project is a countrywide survey of the Integrity Watch Afghanistan on Afghans' perceptions and experiences of corruption and assessment of how corruption impacts their lives and communities.

We would very much appreciate your participation in this survey.

About the survey: You will be asked to respond to questions about corruption, your experience and behavior which I am going to ask from you. You will be asked about your opinion, thought and feelings about each question. Please answer all the questions as honestly as possible. Some questions may seem similar but this is necessary to ensure that certain concepts are being assessed correctly.

Length of the interview: This interview will take between 15 to 20 minutes.

Benefit: The survey has no direct benefit to you. However your views will help in improving the processes of fighting against corruption.

Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this interview is voluntary. However, we request you to participate in this survey fully since what you tell us is very important to us.

Confidentiality: Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. This interview is for the sole purpose of research. There will be no identifiable information disclosed to third parties.

At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the survey?

May I begin the interview now?

Yes.

No. (Go to the next household)

Signature of Interviewer: _____ Date: _____

A. Interviewer, code physical condition of the house.

1. Conex (غروفه)
2. Relief tent
3. Ordinary tent
4. Temporary construction
5. Mud house with windows
6. Raw brick building
7. Baked brick building
8. Stone built building
9. Concrete house

Other (Specify): _____

B. How many attempts were made at this house until the eligible person was reached?

1. One attempt
2. Two attempts
3. Three attempts

C. Is this an intercept interview or a standard random face-to-face interview?

1. Intercept interview
2. Standard random face-to-face interview

(Z-1) RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGAN

AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, FOR 2:24 PM)

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|

GENERAL

1. Generally speaking, how much progress, if any has been made in your area within the last 12 months?

1. Very significant progress
2. Somewhat significant progress
3. Not much progress
4. No progress at all
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

2. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the overall situation in your province?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

3. How do you describe the political situation in your province?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Somewhat bad
5. Very bad
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

4. In general, how would you describe the current political situation in Afghanistan?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Somewhat bad
5. Very bad
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

5. **In your opinion, what are the most serious problems facing Afghanistan as a country today?** *[multiple answer: accept 3, do not read the list]*

1. Insecurity
 2. Access to education
 3. Corruption
 4. Access to health
 5. Illegal drugs
 6. Access to justice
 7. Presence of armed groups
 8. Access to water and electricity
 9. Lack of development
 10. Lack of political freedoms
 11. Unemployment
 12. Other, please specify
- 98) D20
 refused

6. **Do you think the government of Afghanistan has done enough to address these problems over the last two (2) years?**

1. Yes
 2. No
- 98) Do not know
 99) Refused

7. In your opinion, do the people mentioned here (in the table below) work for the benefit of all people, for the benefit of some, or only for their own benefit?

| No | People | For the benefit of all people | For the benefit of some people | For their own benefits | Don't know / Haven't heard enough to say of |
|----|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|---|
| 1 | Government of your district | | | | |
| 2 | District Governor of your district | | | | |
| 3 | Police Commander of your district | | | | |
| 4 | Provincial Government of your province | | | | |
| 5 | Provincial Governor | | | | |
| 6 | Police Commander (province level) | | | | |
| 7 | Member of Provincial Council | | | | |
| 8 | Member of parliament of your province | | | | |
| 9 | National Police | | | | |
| 10 | National Army | | | | |
| 11 | Ministers | | | | |
| 12 | Government of Afghanistan | | | | |
| 13 | President of Afghanistan | | | | |
| 14 | Member of Community development Councils | | | | |
| 15 | NGOs in your district and province | | | | |
| 16 | Local Elders (Malik, Arbab, Wakil Guzar) | | | | |
| 17 | International Community / forces | | | | |
| 18 | Taliban | | | | |

CORRUPTION [ASK ALL]

8. In your opinion, how serious is the issue of corruption in Afghanistan?

1. Very Serious
2. Somewhat Serious
3. Not too Serious
4. Not at all Serious [go to Q13]
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

9. In your opinion, has corruption become a more significant problem over the last two years?

1. Yes
2. No [go to Q13]
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

10. What do you think, are factors causing corruption in Afghanistan? [do not read the options]

1. Need for money to making living
2. The ambition to become rich as quick as possible
3. The salaries are lower than every day's needs
4. No ethics or morals
5. Weak role of law
6. Abuse / misuse of power
7. Long or unclear procedures of the services
8. Others:
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

11. How would you compare the level of corruption in your local area and in Afghanistan generally, today with the level of corruption past years? Is the current level of corruption.... [choose from the options]

1. Much higher than past years
2. Somewhat higher than past years
3. Same as the past years
4. Somewhat lower then past years
5. Much lower than past years
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

12. Do you believe there have been some improvements in reducing corruption in any public institution during the last 12 months?

1. Yes

2. No

98) Do not know

99) Refused

13. I am next going to read out the names of various groups and public institutions. For each one, please let me how corrupt, if at all, you think that they are?

| Institution | Corrupt to a great extent | Corrupt to some extent | Corrupt to a very limited extent | Not corrupt at all | DK | Refused |
|---|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|----|---------|
| Office of the President | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Parliament | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Afghan Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Law Enforcement Agencies (Police, Attorney General) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Office of Chief Executive | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Banks | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Courts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Defense | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Finance | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Commerce | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Justice | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Interior | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Education | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Higher Education | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Water and Energy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Transport | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Health | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and disabled | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|
| Ministry of Mining and Petroleum | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Municipalities | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| High Office of Oversight | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Supreme Audit Office | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Members of Parliament | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Judges and Prosecutors | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Ministers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Provincial Government and Provincial Governor | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| District Government and district governors | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Healthcare (Hospital, Clinics and pharmacy) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Education (Primary Schools, Secondary, University and Private University) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| National Army | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Electoral Commissions | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Custom Services | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Tax Services | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| National Procurement Authority | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Police | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Media | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Political Parties | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| NGOs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Community Leaders | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Other | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |

14. Among the institutions I just mentioned, please name the three most corrupt sectors or institutions, and rank them.

| | |
|---|---|
| | <i>[Write the institution name in the cell below]</i> |
| 1 st most corrupt institution / sector | |
| 2 nd most corrupt institution / sector | |
| 3 rd most corrupt Institution / Sector | |
| Do not know | 98 |
| Refuse | 99 |

15. Why do you think these institutions are the most corrupt? [do not read the options]

1. The management team is corrupt
 2. The salaries of staff are too low
 3. They do not have interest for citizen or common good
 4. The education of the staff is too low
 5. There is no monitoring body
 6. The staff are asked to get bribes
 7. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

16. On which information source do you base your assessment of the level of corruption in the institutions mentioned above? Please choose top three resources, ranking the most important first. [Interviewer: prompt respondents to rank top 3 sources by importance]

| Reasons | Importance | | |
|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | 1 st important | 2 nd important | 3 rd important |
| Personal experience (you have had to provide cash, gifts or favor) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Talk with relatives or family | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Talk with friends and people around | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Information about corruption given by NGOs | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Information provided by the media (TV, radio, newspaper, internet, Facebook, etc...) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Other, please specify | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 98) Do not know | | | |
| 99) Refused | | | |

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

17. Have you personally as an individual experienced corruption over the last 12 months?

1. Yes
2. No [go to Q19]
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

18. If yes, how many times have you personally faced corruption over the last 12 months?

1. Once
2. Twice
3. Three times
- 4) Four times
- 5) Five to ten times
- 6) more times

19. In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family, had contact with the following institutions? If yes, did you have to pay a bribe? What was the amount, gift or Shereeni? [read each institution name and fill in the columns]

| Institutions / organizations / individuals | Contacted services in last 12 months (Yes / No) | If contacted, asked to pay bribe? (Yes / No) | If paid bribe, then how much? <i>[interviewer: if DK or refused, use codes 98 & 99 in a circle]</i> | |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| | | | Amount paid last time | Total amount paid during past 12 months |
| Government of your district | | | | |
| District Governor of your district | | | | |
| Police Commander of your district | | | | |
| Provincial Government of your province | | | | |
| Provincial Governor | | | | |
| Police Commander (province level) | | | | |
| Member of Provincial Council | | | | |
| Member of parliament | | | | |
| National Police | | | | |
| Government of Afghanistan in Kabul | | | | |
| Banks | | | | |
| Municipalities | | | | |
| Courts | | | | |
| Prosecutors | | | | |
| Member of Community development Councils | | | | |

| | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| NGOs in your district and province | | | | |
| Local Elders (Malik, Arbab, Wakel Guzar) | | | | |
| NATO / ISAF / International Community | | | | |
| Taliban | | | | |
| Other, Please specify | | | | |

20. You said that you or a member of your household has had to pay a bribe, which form of bribe have you experienced?
[multiple responses]

1. Paid cash
2. Offered a gift or Shereeni
3. Paid in livestock (goat, cow, sheep etc)
4. Paid in harvest (wheat etc)
5. Exchange of favor or service
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused
6. Other, please specify

21. What was the amount of the bribe paid the last time you personally paid a bribe??

1. Less than 100 Afs
2. Between 100 Afs and 500 Afs
3. Between 501 Afs and 2,000 Afs
4. Between 2,001 Afs and 10,000 Afs
5. More than 10,000 Afs

22. Have you or your household faced corruption in the judiciary over the last 12 months?

1. Yes
2. No – in this duration I never been to judiciary
3. No – I went to judiciary but I did not face corruption
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

23. Whenever you have contacted officials in the public sectors, government institutions, how often did the following happen? Did this happen in all cases, most cases, rare cases or no cases at all? [read all categories]

| | All Cases | Most Cases | Rare Cases | No Cases at all | Has not contacted officials | DK | Refused |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|----|---------|
| The official directly demand cash, gift or favor | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| The officials did not demanded directly but showed that they expect a cash, gift or favor | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| You give cash to the officials | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| You give a gift to the officials | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| You do the official a favor | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| You are asked to do a favor to relatives of the official | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| You use personal connections to get the issue done | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |

24. Where did you pay the bribe? [multiple answers if more than one]

1. At Hawala office
2. At home
3. At work place
4. At district police headquarter
5. At province police headquarter
6. Other, please specify

98) Do not know

99) Refused

25. Have you or a member of your household been victim of nepotism either in the state administration or with NGOs, international organizations or private companies during the last 12 months?

[definition of nepotism: the practice among those with power or influence of favoring relatives or friends, especially by giving them jobs for which outsiders might be better qualified]

1. Yes
2. No [go to Q27]

98) Do not Know

99) Refused

26. Where did you face nepotism?

1. At *Hawala* office
2. At home
3. At work place
4. At district police headquarter
5. At province police headquarter
6. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

27. Would you rely on nepotism if this is necessary to secure a job?

1. Yes
2. No
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

28. How would you react if you were asked to give a bribe? Would you give the bribe or would you not give it?

1. I would give it
2. I would not give it *[go to Q30]*
3. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not Know
- 98) Do not Know

29. Why would you give it? *[do not read pre-coded responses options]*

1. Because everyone gives it
2. Because there is no other way I can obtain the service
3. I would be able to negotiate a lower price
4. To speed up the process
5. To be sure I get what I need
6. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

30. How do you feel when you pay bribe? *[do not read pre-coded responses options]*

1. Guilty
2. Sinful
3. Sad
4. Relieved
5. Worried
6. Poor

- 7. Honoured
- 8. Powerful
- 9. Other, specify _____
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

31. In your opinion, how is a corrupt person perceived in the Afghan society? [do not read pre-coded responses options]

- 1. Guilty
- 2. Sinful
- 3. Poor
- 4. Powerful
- 5. Clever, smart
- 6. Nasty
- 7. Selfish (self-centered)
- 8. Venal
- 9. Other, specify _____

INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR [ASK ALL]

32. In your opinion, what can you personally do to reduce corruption in Afghanistan? List concrete actions you would be willing to undertake to help combat corruption. [multiple responses; do not read responses]

- 1. Not paying bribes for public services
- 2. Reporting corruption to media
- 3. Refuse to do favors to officials or to their relatives
- 4. Reporting corruption CSOs
- 5. Reporting corruption to public bodies
- 6. File a case against corrupt officials
- 7. Participate in awareness campaigns against corruption
- 8. There is nothing I can do
- 9. If other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

33. Do you know what institutions to contact in order to report a corrupt act of official?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No [go to Q35]
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

34. What channel would you contact to report a corrupt act or to file the complaints? *[do not read the options; Accept all possible responses]*

1. Police
2. The attorneys or the attorney general
3. District courts, provincial courts or the Supreme court
4. The special commissions of upper or lower house (Meshrano or Wolesi Jirga)
5. Ministers or deputy ministers
6. CSOs
7. Media
8. Taliban
9. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

35. During the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household reported a corrupt act by a public official?

1. Yes
2. No *[go to Q38]*
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

36. To which organization was the complaint reported? *[multiple answers]*

1. The attorneys or the attorney general
2. District courts, provincial courts or the Supreme court
3. The special commissions of upper or lower house (Meshrano or Wolesi Jirga)
4. Ministers or deputy ministers
5. CSOs
6. Media
7. Taliban
8. Informal / Tribal leaders
9. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

37. How would you rate your level of satisfaction with the feedback you received as a result of your corruption report?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
5. No feedbacks received
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

38. Some people in Afghanistan are unwilling to report corrupt actions because of various reasons. I will list some of these possible reasons, please tell me which of the following you personally consider as a reason for not reporting corruption to the relevant authorities. [read the options, single answer only]

1. Those who report corruption will be subject to retribution/revenge
2. No action will be taken even if corruption reported
3. It's not worth reporting corruption if I am not personally hurt by it
4. Most people who indulge in corruption only do so because of economic hardship
5. Our society does not reward those who report corruption
6. Lack of evidence to prove
7. Lack of clarity about corruption proceedings
8. Do not know the relevant institution responsible for corruption cases
9. Official would delay the corruption reporters work
10. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

39. Would you protect your interests through bribery if you had an opportunity to do so?

1. Yes
2. No
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

40. Now I would like to read you a list of statements, based on your experience, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree.

[Interviewer: please read each statement and circle the appropriate number]

| Statements | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neither Agree not disagree | disagree | Strongly disagree | DK | Refused |
|---|----------------|-------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|----|---------|
| Corruption has negatively affected the life of the people in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Because of corruption I do not trust the local public services anymore | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Corruption is worse in our district than the province | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| NGOs and international organizations are corrupt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People in the Government are only here to enrich themselves | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Because of corruption people in our area refer to Taliban | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Government of Hamid Karzai was more corrupt than the current Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |

41. On a scale of one to five where one is highly common and five highly uncommon, how would you assess the following attitudes of the government service providers in Afghanistan?

| | Highly Common | Common | Relatively common | uncommon | Highly uncommon | DK | Refused |
|---|---------------|--------|-------------------|----------|-----------------|----|---------|
| Creating difficulties in order to request for a bribe | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Asking directly for money | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Asking for gifts in return for small services | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Not performing official task in an appropriate time while expecting to be offered a bribe | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Reducing taxes and customs duties in exchange for taking a percentage of them | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |

42. Now I would like to read you a list of statements, based on your experiences, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, Neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree?

[Interviewer: please read each statement and circle the appropriate number]

| Statements | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neither Agree nor disagree | disagree | Strongly disagree | DK | Refused |
|--|----------------|-------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|----|---------|
| People of the area report a corrupt act by the public or state officials | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People know to which organization they forward the complaints report | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| The process of corruption reporting is easy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| The reporter of corruption is not protected from potential harassment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People receive feedbacks as result of the corruption report | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People abstain from paying bribes for public services | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People are willing to participate in awareness campaigns against corruption | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People are willing to protect their interest through bribery | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| People pay money or bribe to the government authorities because they have no other way | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |

ANTI-CORRUPTION [ASK ALL]

43. To what extent you think corruption can be reduced in Afghanistan? [Read the options]

1. Corruption cannot be reduced at all
 2. Corruption can be reduced to a certain degree
 3. Corruption can be substantially reduced
 4. Corruption can be completely eradicated
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

44. Are you aware of any anti-corruption measures being taken by the Government of Afghanistan?

1. Yes
 2. No [go to Q47]
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

45. Please state which one?

.....

.....

46. How well or badly is the government doing at fighting corruption in government?

1. Very effective
2. Somehow effective
3. Not very effective
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

47. Do you agree or disagree that the current government of Afghanistan has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

48. Do you agree or disagree that the office of the President has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

49. Do you agree or disagree that the office of the Chief Executive has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

50. Do you agree or disagree that the office of the Special Representative of the President for Reform and Good Governance has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

51. Are you aware of the following public agencies? How effective has this agency [read from the list] been in fighting corruption?

| | Aware? | | Effectiveness in Fighting Corruption? | | | | | |
|--|--------|----|---------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|----|---------|
| | Yes | No | Very effective | S/W effective | S/W ineffective | Completely ineffective | DK | Refused |
| High Office of Oversight and anti-corruption | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Office of the Attorney General | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Office of the Special Representative of the President in Good Governance | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Human Rights Commission | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Integrity Watch Afghanistan | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |
| Other, please specify; | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 98 | 99 |

52. Which of the following do you think help citizen's combat corruption? [probe: multiple responses allowed]

1. Information about citizens' rights in the area of corruption
2. Information about anti-corruption legislation
3. Information about institutions you may complain about officials' behavior
4. Free legal advice to formulate your corruption complaints
5. Free legal support in collecting information and evidence related to corruption cases
6. Free legal support in development and submission of corruption case documents
7. Free representation in court
8. Anti-corruption awareness activities
9. Information about budget and expenditures
10. Other, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

53. On a scale of one to five where one is the least effective and five is the most effective, who is the most effective in reducing corruption in Afghanistan?

| | Least efficient = 1 most efficient = 5 | | | | | DK | Refused |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---------|
| Afghan Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| United Nations, other international organizations | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| ISAF | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Media | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Private Companies | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Mullah and Ulama's | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Tribal and local influential | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Commanders | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Parliament | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Provincial councils | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Courts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Attorney general office and prosecutors | | | | | | | |
| CSOs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Integrity Watch Afghanistan | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Community Based Monitoring Programs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| Others, please specify | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |

54. When you think about people combating corruption, who are the persons in Afghanistan you view most favorably?
[probe: multiple answers up to three]

1.
2.
3.

98) Do not know

99) Refused

55. In your opinion, how easy is it for government officials to use public funds for their own benefits?

1. very easy
2. somewhat easy
3. not easy at all

98) Do not know

99) Refused

56. Do you believe that international community wants to fight corruption?

1. Yes
2. No

57. Do you believe the members of the international community are supportive of honest government officials in your province?

1. Yes
2. No
- 98) Do not know\
- 99) Refused

58. Have you heard any member of the international community speaking against corruption in Afghanistan over the last 12 months?

1. Yes
2. No *[go to Q60]*
- 98) Do not know\
- 99) Refused

59. If yes, who have you often heard speaking?

1. United Nations officials
2. ISAF
3. Officials of other international organizations
4. United States government officials
5. European government officials
6. Others, please specify
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

60. Have you heard the Taliban denouncing corruption in the Afghan state?

1. Yes
2. No
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

61. In your view, is corruption within the state facilitating the expansion of the Taliban?

1. Yes
2. No *[go to Q64]*
- 98) Do not know\
- 99) Refused

62. If yes, corruption within which institutions is helping the most expansion of the Taliban?

1. Provincial and District Governor Offices
2. Provincial and District Police
3. Courts
4. Attorney's General Office and prosecutors
5. Customs
6. Central government
7. Other, specify _____

63. What is your perception about the role of the Taliban in relation to corruption?

1. They promote corruption
2. They help in the fight against corruption
3. Fight against corruption is not a priority for them

64. Do you believe that the successful completion of peace talks will result in the strengthening of good governance in Afghanistan?

1. Yes
2. No
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

65. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can help stabilize the country?

1. Yes [go to Q68]
2. No
- 98) Do not know
- 99) Refused

66. If not, why? [open ended question]

.....

.....

67. Do you have a family member or close relative who works for...

| | Yes | No | DK | Refused |
|--|-----|----|----|---------|
| Government? | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| Parliament? | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| Police | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| Attorney General Office | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| International organization or Company? | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| Office of the provincial governor | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| Office of the district governor | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

D1. What is the gender of the interviewee?

1. Male
2. Female

D2. What is the age of the interviewee?

Refused

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|

D3. Are you the head of the household?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused

D4. How many people, both male and female, live in your household?

Refused

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|

D5. How many of the people you said are living in your household are 18 years of age and above?

Refused

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|

D6. How many of all the people living in your household earn money for the work they do?

Refused

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|

D7. What is your marital status?

1. Single
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Widow(er)
5. Refused

D8. What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

1. Never went to the school and received no informal education
2. Informal education at home
3. Primary (1-6 years)
4. Secondary (7-9 years)
5. High School /Vocational High School (10-12 years)
6. Institute (13-14 years) or some university (13-15 years)
7. University bachelor degree diploma (16 years completed)
8. University (Post-graduate >16 years)

- 9. Some Madrassa/Mosque
- 10. Some vocational training
- 99) Refused

D9. What is your household's average monthly income by all the people living in your household? - I mean all types of income from all sources.

- 1. Less than 2,000 AFN
- 2. 2000-4000
- 3. 4001-6000
- 4. 6001-8000
- 5. 8001-10000
- 6. 10,001-15,000 AFN
- 7. 15,001-20,000 AFN
- 8. 20,001-25,000 AFN
- 9. 25,001-40,000 AFN
- 10. More than 40,000 AFN
- 98) Don't Know
- 99) Refused

D10. What is your main occupation?

- 1. Stay at home male (who does not do household chores)
- 2. Housewife/Homemaker
- 3. Farmer/Animal Raiser
- 4. Shopkeeper
- 5. Unskilled Daily Wage Laborer
- 6. Semi-Skilled Worker (Bricklayer, Mason, Painter, Driver, Cleaner)
- 7. Skilled Artisan (Metal Smith, Plumber, Bakery, Electrician, Carpenter)
- 8. Educational Professional (Teacher, Professor)
- 9. Medical Professional (Doctor, Nurse, midwife, pharmacy, Health worker)
- 10. Traditional Medicine Expert (Unani)
- 11. Civil Servant (Government Employee)
- 12. Employee in Factory
- 13. Employee in NGO
- 14. Military (Officer, Police, Army)
- 15. Media (Journalist, Reporter, Presenter, Cameraman)
- 16. Security Guard/Gate Keeper
- 17. Businessman/Trader
- 18. Community Leader (Village head, Shura head)

19. Street Vendor
20. Student (School/University)
21. Religious Student (Madrasa)
22. Religious Leader (Mullah, Imam)
23. Apprentice to Artisan
24. Home-based Industry (Carpet Weaver/Sewing/Embroidery)
25. Tailoring
26. Unemployed
- 98) Other (Specify): _____
- 99) Refused

D11. What is your ethnicity?

1. Pashtun (Continue to D.12)
2. Tajik
3. Hazara
4. Uzbek
5. Turkmen
6. Arab
7. Qezelbash
8. Sadat
9. Bayat (Skip to D13)
10. Pashayee
11. Nuristani
12. Baloch
13. Aimaq
14. Gujar
15. Panjabi
16. Jat
17. Kyrgyz
- 98) Other (specify): _____
- 99) Refused

D12. (If Pashtun only) What is your tribe? Specify: _____

98) Don't Know

99) Refused

D13. What is your religion?

1. Sunni Muslim

2. Shia Muslim

3. Ahl-e Hanood

4. Other (Specify): _____

Refused

RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (Z-2)

Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:

"Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few hours or days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him/her do that, could I please have your telephone number?"

Telephone number: _____

"If my supervisor calls you by telephone, he/she will begin by asking if you were surveyed in the last few hours/days. He/she will **not ask** you for your name or address. If someone you don't know contacts you by telephone and asks for your name and/or address you should end the call and not talk to them."

Interviewer Certification: "I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by _____."

Signed

Date

Interviewer Code

D-14. Interviewer: Including yourself, How many people were present for the interview?

Number of the people: _____

D-17. Interviewer: Please indicate which, if any, of the questions caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview. **(Write down the number of the question numbers, in order of mention).**

a. First Mention: _____

b. Second Mention: _____

c. Third Mention: _____

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE SUPERVISOR:**D-18. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?**

1. Yes
2. No

D-19. Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check from the central office
4. Not applicable

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See IWA’s study of religious leaders in the fight against corruption, in which the power of the clerics as social mobilizers in the fight against corruption is amply documented:

<https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ulama-Report-English-6.pdf>



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