

A SURVEY OF THE

AFGHAN PEOPLE

AFGHANISTAN IN 2019



The Asia Foundation

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The Asia Foundation

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JAWZJAN

BALKH

FARYAB

SAR-E-PUL

SAMANGAN

BADGHIS

BAMYAN

HERAT

GHOR

WARDAK

DAIKUNDI

GAZNI

FARAH


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
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KANDAHAR



REGIONS



PREFACE

In 2019, deep political divisions, structural governance challenges, and economic insecurity continue to impede a durable peace and development progress in Afghanistan. The most recent interruption of peace talks with the Taliban, delay in Afghan presidential elections results, and ongoing questions over international troop presence are creating even more uncertainty for the people of Afghanistan.

Against this backdrop, the importance of reliable data on the views of Afghan citizens cannot be overstated. *Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People*, The Asia Foundation's fifteenth annual public opinion survey in Afghanistan focuses on issues important to Afghans: security, elections, governance, the economy, and other essential themes. The annual *Survey* provides a rare glimpse of the views of Afghan citizens in all 34 provinces.

The longest-running barometer of public opinion in Afghanistan, the *Survey* has gathered the views of more than 129,800 Afghans since 2004. A key indicator for the *Survey* has been whether Afghans are optimistic or pessimistic about the country's direction. In 2019, Afghans report an increase of optimism, with 36.1% of respondents saying the country is going in the right direction, up from 32.8% in 2018.

Given the importance of peace, elections, and reconciliation this year, new questions explored Afghan attitudes towards these critical issues. On peace talks, we ask Afghans if they are aware of efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban, whether they support or oppose such efforts, and whether they feel sufficiently represented in the talks. The majority of Afghans say they would not vote for a president who accepted a peace agreement with the Taliban, which jeopardize women's education (65.6%), women's ability to work outside the home (65.0%), or if the central government lost territory (65.8%).

Afghans perceive progress in some public services, including access to electricity, healthcare, education, and drinking water. Education continues to be a priority for Afghanistan and a major problem for Afghan women, and we explore these gains and reversals in this year's *Survey*. Not surprisingly, the data continues to show that Afghans who have more confidence in the government have a lower desire to leave the country.

The Asia Foundation is committed to closing data gaps to help advance informed policymaking. On the ground, we continue to engage our local and regional partners in our core program areas of governance and law, women's empowerment, and education. While prospects for a sustainable political settlement remain unclear, it is notable that the international community, working hand and hand with Afghan partners, continues to show a dedication and commitment to development efforts that improve the lives of the people of Afghanistan.

David D. Arnold

President, The Asia Foundation

November 2019

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ACSOR-Surveys, a subsidiary of D3 systems, Inc., worked closely with the Foundation to conduct all survey fieldwork. The Foundation is grateful for ACSOR's facilitation of third-party monitoring by Sayara Research, and for their commitment to quality-control best practices in one of the world's most challenging research environments. Special thanks are due to Managing Director Ashraf Salehi of ACSOR and Sayara Research's Haroon Rasheed for their professionalism and attention to detail. The General Directorate for the Office of the Minister of Interior provided valuable assistance in securing permission to conduct fieldwork, while the Afghan National Statistics and Information Authority (formerly the Central Statistics Organization) provided population estimates used for the formulation of survey weights.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People is The Asia Foundation's fifteenth annual public opinion survey in Afghanistan. The longest-running barometer of public opinion in Afghanistan, the *Survey* has gathered the views of more than 129,800 Afghans since 2004, and provides a longitudinal portrait of evolving public perceptions of national mood; security; the economy; service delivery; governance; political participation, including elections and peace and reconciliation with the Taliban; access to media; the role of women; and migration.

A key indicator for the *Survey* over time has been whether Afghans are optimistic or pessimistic about the country's direction. Findings reveal the impact that peace talks have had on optimism in the country. While optimism in 2018, at 32.8%, was effectively unchanged from 2017, Afghans this year report a slightly higher level of optimism, with 36.1% of respondents saying the country is going in the right direction, and in explaining reasons for their optimism, those who say "peace / end of war" has increased notably from 16.4% to 26.3% this year.

The longest-running barometer of public opinion in Afghanistan, the *Survey* has gathered the views of more than 129,800 Afghans since 2004.

A national sample of 17,812 Afghan respondents aged 18 years and above were surveyed face-to-face across all 34 provinces from July 11 to August 7, 2019. A team of 1,279 enumerators (604 females, 675 males) and 35 field supervisors conducted the fieldwork. The sample is 51% male and 49% female, 18% from urban households and 82% from rural households, and weighted to be gender balanced (50:50) and nationally representative (75.1% rural, 24.9% urban) using the most recent 2018–2019 population data from the National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA). This year's margin of error at the 95% confidence interval with $p=.5$ is $\pm 1.16\%$ based on a design effect estimate of 2.475.

Of the respondents, 15,930 (89%) were randomly selected, while 1,882 (11%) were the subject of "intercept" interviews, which are conducted with individuals who live in inaccessible areas but are not randomly selected. All data presented in the report represents the 15,930 randomly selected individuals unless otherwise indicated.

As in previous years, The Asia Foundation's longstanding research partner, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) conducted the fieldwork for this project, while its parent company, D3 Systems, Inc., provided analytical and methodological support. Since 2013, Sayara

Research has led the third-party verification of the fieldwork, a best practice for survey research in challenging environments. Additional quality-control measures were implemented at every step of the process by The Asia Foundation and its partners to ensure methodological consistency for longitudinal comparisons. In total, 36% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control. Together with its partners, the Foundation is committed to quality-control processes guided by principles of validity and reliability. The survey data is publicly available for further analysis at <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey>.

Every year, new questions are added following feedback from key stakeholders and users of the *Survey*. Given the importance of peace, elections, and reconciliation this year, questions were added to further explore Afghan attitudes towards these critical matters. On peace talks, new questions this year ask Afghans whether or not they are aware of efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban, whether they support or oppose such efforts, and whether they feel sufficiently represented in the talks. Afghans who oppose peace talks are asked *why*. Other new questions probe their intention to vote (or reasons not to vote), their criteria for an ideal president, and their policy priorities for a president they would vote for.

A set of questions ask Afghans what they might be willing to sacrifice to reach a peace deal, including the constitution, democratic elections, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, a strong central government, the current court and judicial system, women's rights, equality between groups, the presence of foreign military forces, and foreign economic assistance. Afghans are also asked whom they most trust to defend their needs and interests at the negotiating table.

Education continues to be a priority for Afghanistan and a major problem for Afghan women, and this year we ask Afghans whether they have any school-age children, whether those children attend school, and if not, why not. And finally, acknowledging the growing impact of social media and the internet, we ask Afghans what their main uses of the internet are.

An in-depth discussion of the *Survey* methodology is provided in appendix 1. The sample demographic is provided in appendix 2, and the entire *Survey* questionnaire can be found in appendix 3.

NATIONAL MOOD

DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY. This year, the proportion of Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction has increased.

Optimism about the nation's direction was at its highest in 2013, before declining, year by year, to an all-time low in 2016 over concerns about the economy, difficult elections, and the effects of radical reductions in foreign troops. This year, 36.1% of respondents say the country is going in the right direction, up from 32.8% last year, while 58.2% say the country is going in the wrong direction, down slightly from 61.3% in 2018.

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM. Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction cite improved security (55.7%, up from 51.8% in 2018), and reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure at 48.6% (close to last year's 47.9%). For ease of interpretation and reporting, the open-ended responses to this question are consolidated into themes, aggregated among those who cite improved security (55.7%) are those who specifically say "peace / end of the war" 26.3%, a significant increase from 16.4% in 2018 and the second most frequent response overall after "reconstruction" (32.1%). Some 24.2% cite improvements in governance, down from 28.8% in 2018, while 14.0% cite improved rights for women, up from 11.7% in 2018, and 14.2% cite economic improvement, up from 11.2% in 2018.

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM. Afghans who say the country is moving in the wrong direction point to insecurity/crime (74.7%), the economy (41.5%), and the state of governance (31.1%). Lack of infrastructure/services (7.2%), foreign intervention (6.6%), and injustice / human rights concerns (4.6%) are also reasons given.

LOCAL MOOD. In addition to asking about problems, the *Survey* asks respondents what is going well in their local area. Respondents this year are most likely to point to infrastructure improvements (38.3%), followed by agricultural development (23.2%), educational opportunities (18.5%), improved security (12.3%), and public services (9.6%). This year, 15.2% of respondents say that nothing is going well in their local area, and 6.2% say they don't know.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN THE LOCAL AREA. Respondents are also asked to name the biggest problems in their area. Responses include lack of utilities / public services (39.6%), lack of employment opportunities (32.7%), insecurity/crime (35.9%), lack of infrastructure (21.0%), economic issues (18.3%), lack of educational opportunities (10.3%), and governance/justice issues (7.2%). Insecurity/crime has risen 4 percentage points this year after a four-year plateau, while lack of utilities has dropped 5 percentage points.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN. Respondents are most likely to say that lack of educational opportunities is the biggest problem facing women (43.2%), followed by lack of rights (34.1%), lack of employment opportunities (24.1%), violence (18.1%), lack of services (13.7%), and economic concerns (9.6%).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH. In 2019, lack of employment opportunities is by far the most-cited issue (72.0%), followed by lack of educational opportunities (38.5%), personal/mental health issues (18.5%), economic concerns (14.6%), and violence/insecurity (9.1%).

SECURITY

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY. This year, 74.5% of respondents say that they always, often, or sometimes fear for their personal safety. This represents an increase of over 3 percentage points since 2018 (71.1%) and a new high for the *Survey*. Fear for personal safety has risen every year since 2012, when it stood at

48.2%. Looking beyond the recent year-on-year increases, the 2019 figure represents an almost 100% increase from the first time the question was asked, in 2006 (39.6%), and a sizeable increase from 2012, when fear for personal safety was at its third-lowest point (48.2%). Fear while participating in an election is also at its highest recorded level (63.3%). This fear has increased by more than 50% since the question was first asked, in 2006 (41.1%), and it is representative of a longitudinal trend of rising fear and insecurity across much of the country. Increased fear is not restricted to elections: the number of respondents who report some or a lot of fear while participating in a demonstration has also reached its highest level ever, 75.2%, roughly a 25% increase over 2006 (60.6%). Fear when encountering the Taliban (93.1%) is nearly the same as in 2018 (93.6%), as is fear when encountering ISIS/Daesh (95.0% in 2019, 94.9% in 2018).

CRIME AND VIOLENCE. The number of respondents who say that they or someone in their family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year saw a negligible decrease, from 18.6% in 2018 to 17.7% this year. By gender, males (18.3%) are marginally more likely to have suffered from violence or crime than females (17.1%).

By type, physical attacks or beatings are the most commonly reported criminal acts (36.0%), down 5 percentage points from 2018. Both urban and rural respondents are 5 points less likely to have experienced violence or crime in 2019 than in 2018 (urban, 36.8% vs. 42.1%; rural, 32.3% vs. 37.4%). Physical attacks or beatings are the most common answer among both males (37.8%) and females (34.1%), although for both, the figures are lower than 2018.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES. When respondents consider who provides security in their local area, a majority of 58.4% cite the Afghan National Police (ANP), an 11-point decline from 2018 (68.9%). Respondents in urban areas (79.2%) are more likely to name the ANP than those in rural areas (51.3%). Respondents in Nimroz (91.1%) and Kabul (85.6%) are most likely to name the ANP as the local security provider, while respondents in Sar-e-Pul (30.5%) are least likely.

The number of respondents who strongly agree that the ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan is at its lowest recorded level, 36.4%, down from 39.3% in 2018 and approximately 25% lower than 2007, when the question was first asked. The number of respondents who would strongly or somewhat agree with a family member's decision to join the ANP has risen by 3 percentage points, to 73.4%. Respondents in rural areas (74.4%) are marginally more likely to agree with such a decision than those in urban areas (70.3%).

Perceptions of the Afghan National Army (ANA) remain broadly similar to 2018, with a negligible increase in those saying the ANA is improving (57.5%, up from 56.9% in 2018). There are also minimal changes from 2018 in those saying the ANA helps to improve security (53.4% strongly agree), while the percentage who say the ANA protects civilians stands at 51.8%. A slight increase can be seen in those who say the ANA is honest and fair, from 58.3% in 2018 to 59.7% in 2019.

GROUPS THAT POSE A SECURITY THREAT. The number of Afghans who say that a group poses a threat to the security of their local area (36.4%) is almost identical to 2018 (35.8%). In an open-ended follow-up asking which group poses a threat, the Taliban continue to be the top response, at 68.9%. The Taliban are seen as more of a threat in rural areas (75.9%) than urban (37.2%). A 50% increase is noted, however, in those who cite criminals/thieves as a threat to the local area, from 24.9% in 2018 to 37.6% in 2019. The number of respondents who cite Daesh/ISIS as a local security threat has decreased by 4 percentage points, to 12.4%, which reflects the diminished capabilities of that group.

This year, the proportion who say they have no sympathy with the Taliban has grown by almost 3 percentage points, from 82.4% in 2018 to 85.1% this year. The proportion of respondents who have a lot or a little sympathy for the Taliban is 13.4%, similar to 2018. But among respondents who express sympathy for the Taliban, the proportion who say they don't know why they feel this sympathy has increased four-fold, from 6.2% in 2018 to 28.6% in 2019.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION. Some 64.0% of those surveyed say reconciliation with the Taliban is possible, a 10 percentage point increase over 2018 (53.5%). Males (69.6%) are more optimistic than females (58.5%) by more than 10 points. Increased media coverage of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks have raised public awareness of the talks, as reflected in a new question this year that shows 77.4% of respondents overall are aware of efforts to negotiate with the Taliban. A new question in 2019 gauges Afghan support for efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. This year, the proportion of people who strongly or somewhat support these efforts stands at 88.7%.

Despite high levels of unemployment and poor economic conditions, the proportion of Afghans who strongly or somewhat agree that antigovernment elements (AGEs) considering reintegration should be given government assistance, jobs, and housing has risen 12 percentage points, from 68.7% in 2018 to 81.0% this year.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMY. The *Survey* finds that people remain deeply concerned about their household economy. Of the 58.2% of Afghans surveyed who say that the country is going in the wrong direction, 26.6% cite unemployment, 12.8% cite the bad economy, and 4.2% cite high prices. More than three-quarters of respondents (77.7%) perceive economic difficulties to be the biggest problem facing youth,¹ and this is consistent regardless of gender or place of residence.

HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION. This year, 54.9% of respondents say the employment opportunities for their households have worsened, similar to last year (57.2%). There is some variation by place of residence: 63.6% of urban residents say the employment opportunities for their households have declined, compared to 52.0% of rural residents. This year, 31.1% of respondents say that the financial situation of their household has worsened, compared to 34.1% last year, while 47.9% say

their situation has remained the same. Intuitively, when employment opportunities improve, household finances should also get better and vice versa, and this is indeed reflected in the data.

EMPLOYMENT. The *Survey* doesn't attempt to determine the official unemployment rate for the country. This is done by the NSIA. The *Survey* does, however, ask respondents if they earn money through some activity, in order to measure their involvement in the economy and how it impacts perceptions.

Overall, 45.9% of respondents this year say they are involved in an activity that generates money, similar to 46.3% last year. Across all age groups, income earning is least common among 18- to 25-year-olds (36.2%)—presumably because they are students or lack job skills—and those of age 75 or above (36.1%). Generating an income is more common among respondents aged 26 to 65 years, more than half of whom (50.2%) say they earn income. Lack of a social safety net in the country adds further pressure to the job market.

WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY. When the *Survey of the Afghan People* asks respondents about the major problems faced by women, unemployment (23.9%) is a key concern, followed by domestic violence (16.9%), lack of women's rights (13.5%), forced marriage (12.2%), and poverty (8.7%). This holds true when the data is disaggregated by rural or urban place of residence, age, or gender.

Fewer than one-fifth of respondents, 18.6%, say that female members of their family contribute to household income, slightly down from 19.1% last year and 20.0% the year before. By place of residence, 86.5% of urban respondents and 79.6% of rural respondents say female members of the family do not contribute to household income.

HOUSEHOLD ASSETS. Information about household assets and how their ownership is allocated is useful in understanding people's living conditions. This year, 69.3% of respondents say their household owns at least one TV, a number that has gradually increased over the years. Respondents in urban areas, where electricity is more available, are more likely to own a TV than rural respondents (91.0% vs. 61.9%), but this rural-urban gap has declined over time. The five-year average rate of TV ownership for 2007–2011 was 28.2% in rural areas and 81.9% in urban areas. The five-year average for 2015–2019 has increased to 58.3% in rural areas and 89.5% in urban areas.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME. Each year, respondents are asked to estimate their monthly household income. In 2019, 23.9% of respondents report an income of less than AFN 5,000 per month, 65.8% have an income of AFN 5,001–20,000 per month, and 9.0% have an income greater than AFN 20,000 per month.² The higher income groups have been growing over the years, while the lowest income group has been steadily shrinking.

DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY. The public's perception of the nation's electricity supply has improved slightly, with 20.2% of respondents reporting that the situation has gotten better, up from 16.4% in 2018.

The source of electricity differs depending on demographic characteristics. The vast majority of urban respondents (90.9%) get their power from the grid, while over half (53.0%) of rural respondents get their power from solar panels and 27.7% get their power from the grid. Some 7.1% of rural respondents report that they have no household electricity, compared to 0.9% of urban respondents.

NUTRITION AND ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE. The *Survey* asks respondents about the quality of food in their diet and whether it has improved since last year. At the national level, 18.4% of Afghans report better diets in 2019. This number is slightly better than 2018 (17.1%), although it falls far below the 2007 figure (31.6%). In 2019, 51.5% of Afghans say the quality of their diet has remained the same, while 29.7% report that it is worse than last year. The percentage of Afghans who say their household's health and well-being have declined in the past 12 months has gradually increased, from 11.2% in 2007 to 24.6% in 2019, while 22.2% say their household's health and well-being are better this year, and 52.6% say they are unchanged.

In recent rounds, the *Survey* has asked respondents about their access to clean drinking water at the household level. Nationally, 23.8% of respondents in 2019 report that access to clean drinking water has improved in the past 12 months, 47.9% say it has remained the same, and 27.9% report that it has worsened. These figures have improved since 2018, when 18.6% said it was better and 37.2% said that it was worse.

EDUCATION. In 2019, 23.2% of Afghan respondents report that the quality of school services has improved, while 53.5% think it has stayed the same and 22.7% say it has worsened. Urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to report an improvement (28.8% vs. 21.3%).

The 2019 *Survey* asks respondents additional questions regarding the number of male and female school-age children in the household and whether they attend school. Some 77.6% of households have school-age girls, and 83.3% have school-age boys. As to whether these children attend school, *Survey* results reveal that girls are less likely to attend than boys. Of the 5.8% of respondents whose boys do not attend school, more than one-third cite work as the reason (37.7%). And of the 14.9% who do not send their girls to school, 19.9% say their girls do not need education.

AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. In 2019, respondents are most likely to be aware of the reconstruction or building of roads or bridges in their area (37.8%), followed by the building of new mosques (29.8%), drinking-water projects (29.3%), agricultural programs (25.5%), healthcare (24.6%). The largest jump in awareness is for drinking-water projects, which increased from 24.2% in 2018 to 29.3% in 2019.

GOVERNANCE

SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE. Satisfaction with the performance of different levels of the Afghan government has increased continuously over the last five years. Around two-thirds of Afghans in 2019 (65.7%) believe that the National Unity Government (NUG) is doing a good job (20.1% very good, 45.6% somewhat good), a 6-point increase from 2018 (59.6%) and a 9.5-point increase from 2017 (56.2%). Satisfaction with the performance of provincial governments (64.5%) is also higher than 2018 (61.3%).

On a related matter, the *Survey* asks Afghans how successful they think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people in their area. More than half of respondents, 69.3%, say a little or a lot, the highest level of confidence reported so far.

The relationship between confidence in one's member of parliament and satisfaction with provincial government and the relationship between level of fear and satisfaction with provincial government remain consistent in 2019. Respondents who express "some" or "a lot" of confidence in their MPs are more likely to say the provincial government is doing a good job (76.3%) than those who report "not much" or "no confidence at all" (51.3%). And conversely, respondents who fear for their safety are less likely to express satisfaction with provincial government.

CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS. Overall, confidence in governmental and nongovernmental organizations has increased, with the exception of the Independent Election Commission, which has seen confidence drop from 43.3% in 2018 to 42.3% in 2019. As in previous years, Afghans have the most confidence in religious leaders (71.2%). Compared to 2018, confidence in MPs has gone up by 10.2 percentage points, from 42.3% in 2018 to 52.6% in 2019, the highest level so far. Confidence in the following organizations has improved since last year: government ministers (up 6.1 percentage points, to 44.4%), national NGOs (up 4.0 percentage points, to 53.3%), provincial councils (up 4.7 percentage points, to 55.6%) and international NGOs (up 4.9 percentage points, to 47.3%).

CORRUPTION. Overall, 81.5% of respondents in 2019 say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole, consistent with last year. At the same time, 15.6% say corruption is a minor problem, and 2.5% say corruption is not a problem at all.

Some 67.9% of Afghans surveyed say corruption is a major problem in their daily life, similar to 70.6% in 2018. More than one-fifth of respondents, 23.1%, call corruption a minor problem, and 8.3% say it is not a problem.

Respondents are asked how often they encounter corruption among various authorities and institutions, and, depending on the institution, experiences of corruption vary.

A majority of respondents say they encountered corruption "in no cases" when dealing with the Afghan National Police (57.6%), the Afghan National Army (67.9%), the judiciary/courts (45.2%), Da

Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (state-owned power supply company) (57.8%), hospitals/clinics (60.6%), while applying for a job (50.8%), seeking admission to schools/university (67.9%), or while receiving official documents from schools/universities (62.6%).

JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The *Survey* asks Afghans about their level of satisfaction with the available dispute-resolution services. Some 16.6% of respondents say they are very satisfied with dispute-resolution services, 52.3% say they are somewhat satisfied, 21.7% are somewhat dissatisfied, and 8.2% are very dissatisfied, much as in 2018.

Among those Afghans who have used dispute-resolution services, 46.6% report taking their case to a *shuraljirga*, 41.5% to state courts, and 25.2% to the Huquq Department. Urban respondents are more likely to use a state court (52.2%) or the Huquq Department (30.2%) to resolve their disputes, while rural respondents are more likely to use a local *shuraljirga* (48.0%).

Afghans are asked their opinion of the dispute-resolution institutions they use. Similarly to previous years, 81.2% of Afghans say that local *shuras/jirgas* are fair and trusted, 74.4% say they follow local norms and values, 74.2% say they are effective at delivering justice, and 73.2% say local *shuras/jirgas* resolve cases quickly and efficiently—all much higher proportions than users of the Huquq Department or the state courts.

As in 2018, the most common cases taken to dispute resolution are disputes over land (49.2%), family problems (17.8%), property other than land (11.4%), commercial disputes (8.5%), traffic accidents (8.2%), and divorce (2.9%).

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

POLITICS AND RELIGION. This year, 57.4% of respondents say that religious leaders should be consulted in politics. This is a decline of almost 3 percentage points from 2018 and the second-lowest figure since the *Survey* first asked this question, in 2006. Some 40.0% say that religious leaders should not be involved in politics, an increase of almost 2.3 percentage points over 2018 and the second-highest figure since the *Survey* first asked this question, in 2006.

EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS. The number of people who report some or a lot of fear while voting is now at 63.3%, its highest level ever. While this is a small increase over 2018 (62.4%), it is 22 percentage points higher than 2006, when the question was first asked. The number of people who report no fear while voting is at its lowest recorded level (36.4%), 21 percentage points below 2006, when the figure was at its highest (57.0%) and when the question was first asked.

When asked about levels of fear when running for public office, the number of respondents who say they would have no fear is 26.5%, a 4 percentage point increase over 2018 (22.4%) and the most since 2013 (38.6%).

Fear while participating in a demonstration is now at its highest level ever, 75.2%, which is up 14.7 percentage points over 2006 (60.6%).

DEMOCRACY. More than half of Afghans, 65.1%, are either very or somewhat satisfied with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. This represents a 3.7 percentage point increase over 2018. It should be noted that presidential elections had not taken place yet before the 2019 *Survey*, and in 2018 parliamentary elections had not taken place, however, for 2019, respondents have the parliamentary elections to refer back to when considering if they feel democracy works.

A majority of Afghans (57.9%) continue to believe that it is safe to publicly criticize the government, up from 55.6% in 2018.

ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. The number of Afghans who believe that they can have some or a lot of influence over local (district/provincial) government decisions has increased since 2018, from 52.9% to 54.2%. This is the second-highest figure in *Survey* history, exceeded only in 2014 (55.9%), and it continues the trend of year-on-year increases since 2016.

Longitudinal trends identified in the *Survey* suggest that a person's socioeconomic status correlates with their support for democracy. Respondents who say that their household financial situation has improved are more likely to be satisfied with democracy (76.1%) than those who say their financial situation has gotten worse (55.2%). There are also longitudinal trends correlating confidence in government ministries with satisfaction with democracy.

ELECTIONS. Among *Survey* respondents, 58.6% say that they voted in the parliamentary election. More males (66.9%) claim to have voted than females (50.3%). When respondents who did not vote are asked why, the predominant answers are insecurity (30.2%), fraud (20.1%), "it's not beneficial" (18.7%), and injustice (16.0%). During fieldwork for the 2019 *Survey*, a majority of Afghans (80.9%) were aware of the upcoming presidential elections. Awareness is higher among males (85.7%) than females (76.1%). Figures for awareness among rural/urban respondents are similar to 2018. Television is by far the biggest source of election information (55.5%), with radio a distant second (22.9%).

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. A majority of Afghans (50.4%) say that fraud undermines free and fair elections, followed by corruption (14.9%) and insecurity (9.0%). Public expressions of concern over electoral fraud, corruption, and mismanagement, however, do not seem to have altered Afghans' assessment of elections: there has been no change over the last year in the number of Afghans who believe that the next elections will be free and fair—52.4% in 2018; 52.3% in 2019.

DECISION TO VOTE. The *Survey* asks respondents whether they have registered to vote in the elections. The number of Afghans who say they have registered to vote this year (75.1%) is up by 7 percentage points from 2018 (67.6%). While respondents who believe elections are not free and fair most commonly cite fraud as the reason, those who say they are not going to vote point first to insecurity (34.0%), followed by "it's not beneficial" (16.6%) and fraud (16.0%).

Roughly 65.0% say they probably or definitely would not vote for (a) a president who would accept a peace agreement with the Taliban even if women were no longer allowed to go to school (65.6%), (b) a president who would accept a peace agreement with the Taliban even if women could no longer work outside the home (65.0%), or (c) a president who would accept a peace agreement with the Taliban even if the central government lost territory (65.8%).

WOMEN IN POLITICS. A majority of men (62.0%) wish to be represented in parliament by a male, while the proportion of males who say they wish for a female representative is at its lowest level in the history of the *Survey*, 4.2%. The proportion of males who say it makes no difference whether a man or a woman represents them (33.0%) remains similar to previous years.

The number of Afghans who say women should be allowed to vote is at its highest level (89.3%), marginally above the figure for 2018 (87.7%) and 5 percentage points above the figure for 2008 (84.1%). A majority of Afghans (59.2%) continue to believe that women should be allowed to decide for themselves whom to vote for, while the proportion who say men should advise them has fallen to the low of 16.9% established in 2017.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION. 64.0% of respondents say that reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible. Regionally, respondents in the East (76.9%) and the South West (72.9%) are most likely to say that reconciliation is possible, while respondents in the Central/Highlands region (37.7%) are least likely to say that reconciliation is possible.

In a new question this year, Afghans are asked whether they are aware of efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. More than three-quarters (77.4%) indicate that they are aware of peace efforts.

In a subsequent question, 88.5% of Afghans indicate that they either strongly or somewhat support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban.

Among the 9.7% of respondents opposed to peace talks, almost half (46.5%) are unable to articulate a reason for their opposition. One-third, or 32.4%, say “war will get worse,” 17.1% say “more people will die,” 16.2% say “it’s useless,” 15.1% say “the Taliban are cruel,” 14.3% say “the Taliban are corrupt,” and 11.2% say “Pakistan does not want peace.”

Almost half of respondents, 48.6%, say they feel sufficiently represented in the peace talks. This year, 33.6% of respondents overall, up substantially from 25.8% last year, say they strongly agree that antigovernment elements who express willingness to reintegrate into society should receive government assistance, jobs, and housing.

The *Survey* asks respondents what is important to protect as part of a peace agreement. A majority of 54.7% says protecting the current constitution is very important, followed by a strong central government (53.6%), freedom of speech (46.0%), and freedom of the press (46.4%). Just 17.3% overall say the presence of foreign military forces is important to protect.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA

SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION. This year, 86.7% of respondents identify family and friends as a source of news and information. 57.3% of Afghans say they get their news and information from radio, a significant decrease from 62.9% in 2018, continuing the downward trend in radio listenership since 2013. The *Survey* shows that 65.9% of respondents in 2019 watch television as a source of news and information, an 11.2 percentage point increase since 2013, when the question was first posed. 45.3% of respondents cite the mosque as a source of news and information, a slight decrease from 48.0% last year, and 38.8% of Afghans count on community *shuras* for news and information, down slightly from 40.0% in 2018.

ACCESS TO THE INTERNET AND USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. This year, the *Survey* shows that 14.4% of Afghans use the internet as a source of news and information. For the first time, the *Survey* asks internet users to describe their online activities. Among the 29.7% of respondents who personally have access to the internet, the most common activities include Facebook and other social media (70.6%) and keeping up with the news (41.1%).

ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PUBLIC OPINION AND BEHAVIOR. The *Survey* shows that those who use the internet as a source of news and information are slightly more likely to fear for their personal safety (78.2%) than those who use radio (75.8%) or television (74.0%). Those who use radio as their main source of news and information are more likely to feel sympathy for the Taliban (16.5%) than those who use television as their primary source (Taliban 11.5%). Those who use the internet as a source of news and information are more willing to leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity (46.4%) than those who watch television (40.7%) or listen to radio (36.0%). Getting news and information from television and the internet is positively correlated with favorable perceptions of democracy.³

Afghans who get their news and information from radio and *shuras* also tend to have less favorable views of women working outside the home⁴ than respondents who use television and the internet,⁵ and they are less likely than television and internet users to favor equal education for women.

Awareness of peace negotiations is highest among those who get their news and information from the internet (88.8%), radio (82.6%), or the mosque (80.1%), followed by television (79.0%), community *shuras* (78.8%), and friends and family (78.1%).

When asked if reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, those who use the internet are more likely to say it is possible than those who use other sources of news and information.

WOMEN IN SOCIETY

WOMEN'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE. The *Survey* asks Afghans whether in the past two years they have had a dispute with another party that they were unable to settle, and if so, where they sought resolution. This year, 20.6% of respondents say they had a dispute in the past two years, down from 23.1% in 2018. Slightly more men (21.1%) than women (20.2%) report disputes, and rural respondents are significantly more likely to report a dispute (24.3%) than urban respondents (9.9%).

Of those respondents who had disputes, 25.2% report taking them to the Huquq Department, up from 27.0% in 2018. Men (25.9%) were slightly more likely than women (24.4%) to take disputes to the *huquq*, and urban respondents (30.2%) were more likely than rural (24.5%).

This year, 49.2% of disputes were about land, up from 46.8% in 2018. Family problems accounted for 17.8%, down from 19.0% in 2018; disputes over property other than land accounted for 11.4% this year, similar to last year's 11.9%; commercial disputes accounted for 8.5%, close to last year's 8.9%; and traffic accidents made up 8.2% of disputes taken to mediating bodies this year, similar to 8.5% in 2018. Divorces made up 2.9% of mediated disputes.

CUSTOMS AND TRIBAL PRACTICES. This year, 9.3% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree with the practice of *baad*, giving away a daughter to resolve a dispute, similar to 2018's 9.5%. There is a slight increase this year in those who strongly or somewhat agree with the practice of *baddal*, exchange of daughters in marriage between families, (27.2% this year, up from 25.2% in 2018). Acceptance of *miras*, a daughter's inheritance from her father, continues to be overwhelming, with 89.9% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreeing with the practice, close to last year's 90.2%.

PERCEPTIONS OF APPROPRIATE DRESS IN PUBLIC. Overall, the burka is still the most popular choice of dress for women in public spaces (32.1%, up from 30.9% in 2018), followed by the niqab (27.6%), the chador (14.1%), the close-fitting hijab (17.9%), the loose-fitting hijab (7.6%), and no covering (0.7%, up from 0.5% last year). Approval for the tight- and loose-fitting hijabs, which women working in the public sphere are more likely to wear, are at the highest levels since the question was first asked. Women are more likely than men to prefer the chador (women 15.6%, men 12.5%), the close-fitting hijab (women 20.2%, men 15.6%), and the tight-fitting hijab (women 8.4%, men 6.8%), and men are more likely than women to prefer the burka (men 36.6%, women 27.6%).

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. Again, this year, respondents are presented with several hypothetical leadership roles for women and asked if they would approve. Respondents are more likely to strongly agree with a woman becoming a member of a community development council (32.9%) than becoming CEO of a large company (25.2%), becoming governor of a province (25.1%), becoming a minister or cabinet member (24.3%), or running for president of Afghanistan (22.1%). In general, as the hypothetical positions grow in status and public prominence, approval declines. Overall, women are more supportive than men of women's access to leadership positions.

To better understand attitudes towards women in the political sphere, respondents are asked if they prefer a man or a woman as their political representative or if gender does not matter. In results similar to last year's, 43.6% of respondents say they prefer a man (43.7% in 2018), 17.5% say they prefer a woman (19.9% in 2018), and 38.0% say it makes no difference (35.6% in 2018).

When asked how women should decide to vote, 59.2% of Afghans say that women should decide whom to vote for on their own, 16.9% say men should decide for them, and 23.2% say women should decide in consultation with men

EDUCATION. The *Survey* asks respondents generally about women's educational opportunities, and approval for women's education has continued to climb this year, to 86.6%, up from 84.0% in 2018. To the proposition that women should have the same educational opportunities as men, women are more likely than men to strongly agree (50.6% vs. 40.3%), and men are more likely than women to somewhat agree (44.1% vs. 38.3%).

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES. Since its inception, the *Survey* has asked respondents if women should be allowed to work outside the home. This year, a record high number of Afghans support women working outside the home, with 76.0% saying they approve, up from 70.3% in 2018. Respondents who say women should not be allowed to work outside the home are asked why, and, like last year, the most common reasons are worries about uncertain conditions (23.4%), the sentiment that women are not needed outside the home (18.7%, up 6 points from last year), that it is against Islamic law (17.4%), and worries about security (11.3%).

Overall, Afghans who support women's rights have many of the following characteristics: they are female, say they have no fear for their personal safety, are better educated, live in an urban area, feel safe participating in sociopolitical activities, use the internet, want to leave Afghanistan, are single, and have a higher level of confidence in the Afghan National Security Forces.

MIGRATION

WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE. This year, the willingness to leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity has grown to 37.9%, up marginally from 36.8% in 2018.

REASONS FOR LEAVING. Insecurity is a strong motivating factor for Afghans seeking to leave the country. In 2019, domestic insecurity is the most commonly cited reason for migration. Of the 37.9% of respondents who say they would leave Afghanistan, just over three quarters (77.7%) identify insecurity as the main reason for leaving. Around half, 51.6%, cite unemployment, and 28.4% cite weak government (including corruption, injustice, and high prices).

Survey data continues to show that Afghans who have more confidence in the government have less desire to leave the country than those who are less confident in the government. For example, only

32.3% of those who say the NUG is doing a very good job are willing to leave Afghanistan, compared to 44.5% who say the NUG is doing a very bad job. Respondents who say that the country is moving in the wrong direction are more willing to migrate than those who say the country is moving in the right direction (41.9% vs. 33.0%).

Having a family member outside the country can also influence the decision to migrate. In 2019, 39.2% of Afghans report having a relative or close friend living in another country, and they are more likely to express a desire to leave than those who do not have any family member abroad (46.3% vs. 32.6%).

Some 40.7% of those who use television to get news and information say they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity, compared to 36.0% of those who rely on radio, 38.4% of those who rely on community *shuras*, and 39.3% of those who rely on the mosque.

PROMOTING THE DECISION TO STAY. In 2011, when the *Survey* first asked respondents about their intention to leave the country, 64.9% said they would not leave Afghanistan. In 2019, just 56.5% say they would not leave the country if given opportunity. The *Survey* asked those respondents for the main reasons why they would stay in Afghanistan. A majority gave reasons that relate to Afghan identity and reflect a sense of connection to Afghanistan: for example, “It’s my country” (50.2%), “I love my country” (47.4%), and “I feel comfortable here” (11.7%). An additional 16.9% say they are restricted from leaving the country, and 12.5% say they would stay in the country to “serve Afghanistan.”

The *Survey* also asks respondents more specifically what, if anything, the government can do to make them stay in Afghanistan. A majority call for improvements in the security situation (75.1%), followed by improved opportunities (61.4%), including better employment opportunities and access to education. A comparatively small proportion cite improving the economy (12.2%) and infrastructure (6.6%). This pattern of responses is similar to 2018.

ENDNOTES

- 1 This figure represents a combination of multiple responses: lack of employment (70.4%), poor economy (13.4%), costly marriages (2.4%), high cost of living (1.2%), and joining AGEs due to unemployment (0.6%).
- 2 On average, at the time of fieldwork in July 2019, USD 1.00 was equivalent to AFN 80.3011. “Exchange Rates,” Da Afghanistan Bank website, July 11, 2019, https://dab.gov.af/exchange-rates?field_date_value=07%2F11%2F2019.
- 3 Satisfaction with democracy is positively correlated with the use of television and the internet as sources of news and information (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.0172 and 0.0263, respectively).
- 4 Support for women working outside the home is negatively correlated with the use of radio and community *shuras* (Spearman correlation coefficient -0.1247 and -0.029, respectively).
- 5 Support for women working outside the home is positively correlated with the use of television and the internet as source of news and information (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.2187 and 0.0336, respectively).



1 NATIONAL MOOD

For 14 years, the *Survey* has asked Afghans whether they think the country is moving in the right or the wrong direction and why. Levels of optimism rose fairly steadily from 2006 and throughout the military surge of 2010 to 2013, then plummeted from 2014 through 2016, as the pullout of foreign military forces ushered in a period of diminishing foreign aid and growing insecurity, coupled with disputed presidential elections. Incremental increases in positive national mood in 2017 and 2018 indicated a tentative optimism and improved confidence in government. This year, the level of optimism has again increased slightly, with 36.1% of respondents in 2019 now saying the country is going in the right direction, up from 32.8% in 2017 and 2018. One of the main drivers of this optimism are the number of respondents who cite “peace / end of war”, an increase from 16.4% in 2018 to 26.3% in 2019. This brings the levels of optimism close to that reported in 2015, before the drop in 2016, when just 29.3% of Afghans said they were optimistic about the direction of their country.

Despite worries about the veracity of Taliban claims that they would support women’s rights and girls’ education... the talks brought a widespread sense of hope that more than 40 years of continual conflict could be resolved.

Increased optimism this year might be linked to attitudes about the peace talks between the Taliban and the U.S. government, held throughout the spring and summer of 2019 in Doha, Qatar, even as data was being collected for this report. Despite worries about the veracity of Taliban claims that they would support women’s rights and girls’ education, and a general doubt that the Taliban would continue peace talks with the elected government of Afghanistan if the U.S. did pull out troops, the talks brought a widespread sense of hope that more than 40 years of continual conflict could be resolved. This year, 64.0% of Afghans say that reconciliation with the Taliban is possible, up 10 percentage points from 2018. Yet some doubt that reconciliation will be possible, with hardline Taliban fighters claiming they will align themselves with ISIS/Daesh if the Taliban makes treaties with the United States and the government of Afghanistan.¹ There has also been considerable doubt that the talks have adequately addressed the need for building post conflict stability, particularly if Taliban demands for the full withdrawal of U.S. troops are met.² While these peace talks were in full swing during *Survey* data collection, U.S. president Donald Trump abruptly ended them following several high profile attacks, including one that killed civilians and a U.S. service member in Kabul City in early September.³ These attacks followed intense campaigns by the Taliban in the capitals of Kunduz, Baghlan, and Farah Provinces highlighting aggressive efforts to increase their territorial control in Afghanistan.⁴

The collapse of the peace talks in early September led to a frantic effort to ramp up presidential campaigns for the September 28 elections, which most thought would be postponed if the talks continued. The Taliban threatened voters throughout the campaigns, more insistently than in past elections and more successfully.⁵ With 63.3% of respondents reporting fear for their personal safety during elections (see chapter 2, “Security”), voter turnout was as low as 20% of eligible voters,⁶ and as this report goes to press, tensions are mounting between the two frontrunning candidates, the CEO, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, and the incumbent president, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, with both parties claiming victory. Although the collapse of the peace talks and disappointing presidential election will likely be memorable highlights of 2019, these occurred after respondents had been interviewed for this year’s *Survey*.

The social fabric of Afghan life is becoming more diverse and at times more integrated. Co-ed cafes are becoming popular in the major urban areas, a burgeoning fashion industry is championing traditional styles, and sports, once deeply divisive, are becoming a more uniting force. Cricket, once considered a Pashtun sport,⁷ is now enjoying extensive coverage by Pashtun- and Dari-speaking news outlets, and the Afghan national football team, in a widely approved move, was bailed out by President Ghani this year. Newer arenas are opening up, and mixed martial arts has recently become wildly popular,⁸ with competitors coming from diverse ethnic backgrounds and welcoming athletes from other countries.

At the same time, in early 2019, the Afghan economy continued to be affected by severe drought and the World Bank estimates that half the country, or 16 million people, are below the poverty line and close to 10 million are living in a state of food crisis.⁹ International aid and donor assistance continue to decline and government economic-sector entities remain understaffed.¹⁰ Afghan migrants continue to be sent back from Turkey, typically without the support of the International Organization for Migration,¹¹ and unemployment is a significant concern for Afghans, especially youth. On a positive note, snowfall in the winter of 2018–19 has led to an easing of the drought, and it is predicted economic growth will improve this year and next, after last year’s abrupt drop.¹² This chapter examines Afghans’ opinions of their country’s trajectory, the problems and positive changes in their local areas, the challenges facing youth and women, and self-reported levels of personal happiness.

1.1 DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they’re going in the wrong direction?

Q-2. (If Q-1 answer is “right direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q-3. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

NATIONAL MOOD: DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY

Optimism about the trajectory of Afghanistan was at its highest in 2013, before plummeting, year by year, to an all-time low in 2016, attributed to concerns with the economy, difficult elections, and the effects of radical reductions in foreign troops. This year, 36.1% of respondents say the country is going in the right direction, up from 32.8% last year, and 58.2% say the country is going in the wrong direction, down from 61.3% in 2018.

NATIONAL MOOD: DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY




FIG. 1.1: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

As in previous years, respondents living in rural areas are more likely than those living in urban areas to say they are optimistic (37.3% vs. 32.5%) or don't know (6.2% vs. 3.0%), and urban respondents are more likely than rural to say the country is going in the wrong direction (64.2% vs. 56.1%).

Men (38.9%) are more likely to be optimistic than women (33.3%), also similar to earlier years. Respondents over 55 are the most likely to say the country is going in the wrong direction (62.0%), while respondents 18–25 years old are the most likely to say the country is going in the right direction (37.5%).

Among male respondents, those living in rural areas are more likely to report optimism than those living in urban areas (rural 39.8%, urban 36.7%). Rural women are significantly more likely than urban women to report optimism (rural 35.0%, urban 27.0%). Since 2009, urban women have consistently

reported lower rates of optimism than other demographics, and the gap has remained significant since 2015. Women in rural areas have experienced decreased economic participation and education mobility in recent years, which reduces their exposure to some types of crime and violence. Urban women who report pessimism about the direction of the country cite concerns about crime and insecurity and concerns about the economy, perhaps reflecting their growing participation in economic activities and their increased mobility in urban areas, where terrorist attacks have been on the rise. However, there has been a 6-point increase in optimism among urban women since 2018, in keeping with the rising optimism among all demographic groups.

NATIONAL MOOD, BY GENDER AND URBAN/RURAL



FIG. 1.2: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction?

Respondents in different regions of the country continue to show significant variation, with those in the South West (52.8%), the East (51.9%), and the South East (44.3%) significantly more likely to say the country is going in the right direction than those in the North West (25.1%), the Central/Highlands region (28.6%), the West (29.3%), the Central/Kabul region (30.3%), and the North East (33.5%). Optimism declined significantly over the last year in the provinces of Ghazni (from 30.4% in 2018 to 23.5% this year), Herat (from 33.4% to 23.8%), and Bamiyan (from 28.4% to 22.2%). Other provinces had significant increases in optimism, including Baghlan (from 21.3% in 2018 to 30.0% this year), Kunduz (from 28.3% to 36.8%), Farah (from 12.2% to 28.4%), Kandahar (from 39.8% to 48.9%), Uruzgan (from 38.5% to 49.8%), and Daikundi (from 24.0% to 34.6%). Some of these

provinces, particularly Baghlan and Kunduz, have experienced high levels of insurgent violence and have been the target of intense Taliban operations in recent years. Both provinces were again targeted by the Taliban for large-scale military operations this year, but these attacks had not begun at the time of data collection for the *Survey*. Paktika (70.5%) and Helmand (64.2%) continue to have the highest rates of optimism this year, and Panjshir (8.4%, up from 2.4% in 2018) continues to have the lowest.

NATIONAL MOOD, BY PROVINCE



NATIONAL MOOD, BY PROVINCE



FIG. 1.3: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction? (Percent who say "right direction.")

While most ethnicities remained within 1.5 percentage points of last year's rates of optimism, Pashtuns who say the country is going in the right direction jumped 6 percentage points, from 42.5% to 48.5%. Pashtun intercept interviews also show a 6-point increase, from 34.0% to 40.0%. Tajiks (29.3%), Uzbeks (25.9%), and Hazaras (25.8%) are significantly less likely to say the country is going in the right direction.

OPTIMISM, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 1.4: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction? (Percent who say "right direction.")

Higher levels of formal education are associated with higher rates of optimism, and those who report higher levels of personal happiness are more likely to report optimism. Respondents who express confidence that the judicial system will punish guilty parties are more confident in the direction of the country, and, conversely, those who report a lack of confidence in the judicial system are more likely to say they think the country is going in the wrong direction.

REASONS: RIGHT DIRECTION

Each year, *Survey* respondents are asked to give two reasons why they think Afghanistan is going in the right or wrong direction. (Because each respondent gives two reasons, the proportions reported in the next section sum to greater than 100%.) For ease of interpretation and reporting, the many responses to this question have been consolidated into several themes. That said, notable findings on some specific responses within the themes are highlighted where appropriate. (Please see appendix 3 for a complete list of all responses.)

Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction are asked to give two reasons for their optimism. Compared to 2018, respondents this year more often cited improved security (55.7%, up from 51.8% in 2018). Aggregated into improved security is “peace / end of war” which has increased from 16.4% in 2018, to 26.3% in 2019.

Reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure, at 48.6%, is close to last year’s 47.9%. Improved governance is 24.2%, down from 28.8% in 2018. Improved rights for women is up to 14.0% from 11.7% in 2018, and economic improvement is up to 14.2% from 11.2% in 2018. Early 2019 saw improvement in snowfall and rain after two years of intense drought affecting two-thirds of the country’s provinces. Over 80% of Afghans depend on agriculture for their livelihood, so droughts have far-reaching effects on the country’s economy and household finances.¹³ Afghans in urban areas are significantly more likely to cite reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure than those in rural areas (58.4% and 45.7%, respectively).

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM, BY YEAR




FIG. 1.5: Q-2. (If Q-1 answer is “right direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

When asked to give two reasons for saying they are optimistic, men (60.8%) are significantly more likely than women (49.6%) to cite improved security as one of those reasons. This is likely due to men’s greater participation in the public sphere, where many violent attacks occur. Women are more likely than men to cite reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure (women 50.3%, men 47.2%) and improved rights for women (women 16.4%, men 11.9%). Rural men are more likely than urban men to cite improved security (62.4% vs. 56.7%) and improved rights for women (13.2% vs. 8.2%), and urban men are

more likely than rural men to cite reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure (urban 57.6%, rural 43.3%). Urban women are more likely than rural women to cite reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure (urban 59.8%, rural 48.2%), and rural women are more likely than urban women to cite improved security (rural 50.7%, urban 44.8%) and improved governance (rural 24.6%, urban 18.5%).

Pashtuns are significantly more likely than Tajiks to cite improved security as a reason for optimism (63.1% vs. 48.1%), and Tajiks are significantly more likely than Pashtuns to cite reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure as a reason (58.1% vs. 42.7%). Pashtuns are slightly more likely than Tajiks to cite improved governance (24.0% and 21.8%, respectively) and economic improvement (16.3% and 12.4%, respectively), and Tajiks are slightly more likely than Pashtuns to cite improved rights for women (Tajiks 15.2%, Pashtuns 12.2%). Hazaras are more likely than other ethnicities to cite improved rights for women (18.2%), which might reflect the greater overall support for women’s rights found among Hazara respondents.

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 1.6: Q-2. (If Q-1 answer is “right direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

REASONS: WRONG DIRECTION

After being asked their opinion of the country’s trajectory, those Afghans who say the country is going in the wrong direction are asked to give two reasons for their pessimism. Longitudinal and quantitative analyses using this question are limited because the question is open-ended and yielded multiple different responses this year. However, the largest concerns are clear. Insecurity/crime is cited by 74.7%

of respondents, followed by the economy (41.5% of respondents) and the state of governance (31.1% of respondents). Lack of infrastructure/services (7.2%), foreign intervention (6.6%), and injustice / human rights concerns (4.6%) are also cited. Parliamentary elections held in the fall of 2018 were marred by problems with violence, perceived corruption, and ineffective polling systems, with some results declared invalid, lowering overall confidence in government.

While there is little variation by region for the most commonly cited concern (insecurity/crime), there is significant variation regarding the economy and governance. Respondents in the Central/Kabul region (53.3%) and the North East region (40.7%) are more likely to report concerns with the economy than those in the South West (33.1%) and the West (34.3%). Respondents in the West (43.5%) are more likely than those in the Central/Kabul region (24.6%) to cite concerns with governance. Respondents in the South East are more likely than others to cite foreign intervention as a cause for pessimism (12.8%), and they are also more likely than others to cite lack of international assistance (3.1%). The South East has been the site of much military activity since the fall of the Taliban, and because it has been very insecure, there has been much less international development activity in this region.

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM, BY REGION




FIG. 1.7: Q-3. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Among those who say the country is moving in the wrong direction, Afghans in urban areas are significantly more likely to cite concerns with the economy than those in rural areas (urban 51.6%, rural 37.6%), while Afghans in rural areas are more likely than those in urban areas to cite concerns with

governance (rural 32.8%, urban 27.0%) and foreign intervention (rural 8.1%, urban 2.9%). Urban men are significantly more likely to cite concerns with the economy as a reason for saying the country is going in the wrong direction (52.6% of urban men vs. 40.8% of rural men), and rural men are more likely to cite lack of infrastructure/services (8.2% of rural men vs. 4.1% of urban men) and foreign intervention (8.7% of rural men vs. 2.7% of urban men). Likewise, urban women are significantly more likely than their rural counterparts to cite concerns with economy (urban 50.4%, rural 34.8%), and rural women are significantly more likely than urban women to cite concerns with governance (32.7% of rural women and 18.9% of urban women).

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM, BY URBAN AND RURAL




FIG. 1.8: Q-3. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

The peace talks and the long-delayed presidential election have been at the forefront of public discourse in Afghanistan this year. Afghans’ stated belief that reconciliation with the Taliban might be possible has grown significantly more common since last year, with 64.0% of respondents saying it is possible, up from 53.5% in 2018 and 52.3% in 2017 when the question was first asked. Yet, belief in reconciliation does not necessarily go hand in hand with optimism about the trajectory of the country, and ethnic divisions are stark. Among Pashtun respondents who say reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, 55.3% are optimistic about the direction of the country and 41.1% are pessimistic, compared to just 29.8% optimism among Pashtuns who say reconciliation is not possible.

This higher optimism among those who say reconciliation is possible can be observed in other ethnicities, but respondents of other ethnicities are significantly more likely to be pessimistic about the direction of the country, whether they say reconciliation is possible or not. Among Tajik respondents who say reconciliation is possible, 32.9% are optimistic and 61.9% are pessimistic; among Uzbek respondents who say reconciliation is possible, 29.0% are optimistic and 59.3% are pessimistic; and among Hazaras who think reconciliation is possible, 30.9% are optimistic and 65.0% are pessimistic. These ethnic patterns mirror what is reported when respondents are asked if they plan to vote. Pashtuns who plan to vote are overwhelmingly more likely to be optimistic (66.0% optimistic and 31.6% pessimistic), but optimism is not positively correlated with planning to vote among Tajiks (36.6% optimistic and 57.7% pessimistic), Uzbeks (30.4% optimistic and 60.7% pessimistic), or Hazaras (30.6% optimistic and 59.0% pessimistic).

1.2 LOCAL MOOD

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

WHAT IS GOING WELL IN THE LOCAL AREA

In addition to asking about problems, the *Survey* asked respondents what is going well in their local area. This year, 15.2% of respondents say that nothing is going well in their local area, down from 17.8% last year, and 6.2% say they don't know, up from 5.5% last year. Respondents are most likely to say that infrastructure is going well in their area (38.3%, up from 32.9% in 2018), followed by agricultural development (23.2%, up from 19.9% in 2018), educational opportunities (18.5%, up from 17.7% in 2018), improved security (12.3%, down from 16.7% in 2018), and public services (9.6%, up from 8.0% in 2018).

WHAT IS GOING WELL IN YOUR AREA




FIG. 1.9: Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

Among those respondents who say that the country is moving in the right direction, the most commonly cited issues when asked what is going well in their local area were infrastructure (47.8% of respondents listed this as one of the two reasons they gave), agricultural development (24.6%), educational opportunities (22.6%), improved security (17.8%), and public services (11.6%). Just 4.7% of those who say the country is moving in the right direction say that nothing is going well in their local area. Those who say the country is moving in the wrong direction are significantly more likely to say nothing is going well (21.5%), and less likely than those who are optimistic to cite infrastructure or agricultural development (infrastructure 33.4%, agriculture 22.4%). They are also less likely to cite improved security, at just 9.1%.

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM




FIG. 1.10: Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*
Q-1. *Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?*

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA

All respondents were asked to name up to two of the biggest problems in their area. Responses include lack of utilities / public services (39.6%), lack of employment opportunities (32.7%), insecurity/ crime issues (35.9%), lack of infrastructure (21.0%), economic issues (18.3%), lack of educational opportunities (10.3%), and governance/justice issues (7.2%). Insecurity/crime has risen 4 percentage points this year after a four-year plateau, while lack of utilities has dropped 5 percentage points.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA




FIG. 1.11: Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

Great variation is seen in the local problems cited by respondents from different regions. Lack of utilities / public services and insecurity/crime issues were the most frequently cited problems overall, and respondents in the Central/Highlands region were the most likely to cite lack of utilities / public services (56.4%), while those in the South West were the least likely to cite this (27.9%). Attempts to bring consistent electrical power to the Central/Highlands provinces of Bamiyan and Daikundi have been notoriously problematic,¹⁴ and the capital city of Bamiyan still lacks robust, reliable power. While most of the country gets its power primarily from large providers in neighboring countries, Bamiyan Province has not been on these routes. Recent development projects to provide power from local micro-hydropower plants are slowly achieving success, but on a small scale.¹⁵

However, the Central/Highlands region is also significantly less likely to cite insecurity/crime issues as a problem in their local area (8.1% of respondents), reflecting the well-known peacefulness of the region and relative lack of active armed opposition groups. The West (48.2%), South East (45.3%), and South West (37.9%) are more likely than other regions to cite insecurity/crime issues as the biggest local problem. Lack of infrastructure is most likely to be cited by those in the North East (29.2%) and North West (26.3%), and least likely in the South West (13.9%) and the West (14.8%). The Central/Highlands region is significantly more likely to cite economic issues (37.1%) than all other regions (ranging from 14.6% to 22.9%).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
LACK OF UTILITIES / PUBLIC SERVICES	41	47	35	28	34	44	56	42
INSECURITY/CRIME ISSUES	35	25	45	38	48	32	8	35
LACK OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	31	37	33	33	34	35	32	29
LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE	21	18	20	14	15	29	24	26
ECONOMIC ISSUES	15	21	23	20	15	15	37	20
LACK OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES	8	14	9	11	13	10	9	10
GOVERNANCE/ JUSTICE ISSUES	6	9	10	15	6	5	1	4
CONFLICTS IN COMMUNITY	2	2	4	8	3	2	1	1
ENVIRONMENTAL/ NATURAL DISASTER	6	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
DON'T KNOW	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	2

FIG. 1.12: Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

The gender of respondents is not a factor in the perception of local problems; all categories of response, disaggregated by gender, fall within 2 percentage points.

1.3 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem? (Allow two answers.)*

Afghans are asked what are the two biggest problems facing women in their area, and there has been little variation in the past seven years. Respondents are most likely to say that lack of educational opportunities is the biggest problem facing women (43.2%), followed by lack of rights (34.1%), lack of employment opportunities (24.1%), violence (18.1%), lack of services (13.7%), and economic concerns (9.6%).

BIGGEST LOCAL PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN




FIG. 1.13: Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?*

While urban and rural respondents are equally likely to say that lack of educational opportunities is the biggest problem facing women, rural respondents are significantly more likely to cite lack of rights/participation/justice (37.8%) than urban respondents (23.0%). Afghans from different regions have diverse concerns, with those in the North East (54.0%) and Central/Highlands (53.1%) more likely to cite lack of educational opportunities than those in the South West (25.7%). Likewise, those in the North East (43.0%), North West (37.1%), and Central/Highlands (37.0%) are more likely than those

in the South West (8.1%) and South East (13.2%) to cite lack of employment opportunities as the biggest problem facing women. This probably does not reflect greater opportunities for education in the South East or for education and employment in the South West, but rather the greater salience of other issues in those regions, where women traditionally lack access to education or the freedom to seek employment.¹⁶

The significant differences between respondents of different ethnicities mirror some of the regional differences. Uzbeks (48.2%) and Tajiks (46.0%) are more likely to cite lack of educational opportunities than Pashtuns (40.2%) or Hazaras (41.3%). Uzbeks (39.6%), Tajiks (29.2%), and Hazaras (28.4%) are significantly more likely to cite lack of employment opportunities than Pashtun respondents (14.2%). Pashtun respondents (47.4%) are significantly more likely than Tajiks (25.0%), Uzbeks (26.1%), or Hazaras (24.7%) to say that lack of rights/participation/justice is the biggest problem facing women in their area. Pashtuns (22.9%) are also significantly more likely to cite violence as the biggest problem than respondents of other ethnicities (Tajiks 14.4%, Uzbeks 15.3%, Hazaras 16.2%).

Women are more likely than men to say lack of educational opportunities (women 44.9%, men 41.6%), lack of rights/participation/justice (women 36.0%, men 32.1%), violence (women 20.6%, men 15.6%), and economic concerns (women 11.3%, men 7.8%) are among the two biggest problems facing women in their area. Men are more likely to cite lack of employment opportunities (men 24.4%, women 23.8%), lack of services/infrastructure (men 16.5%, women 10.9%), and insecurity (men 5.2%, women 4.0%). Men (4.2%) are also more likely than women (2.5%) to say that nothing is a problem for women in their area.

1.4 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH

KEY QUESTION

Q-6. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in Afghanistan? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

With its high fertility rate, relatively short average life span, and declining infant and child mortality rate, Afghanistan has one of the world's fastest-growing youth populations. Over 63% of the population is under 25 years old, and 46% is under 15 years old.¹⁷ This youth population, proportionally among the largest of any country and facing a lack of education and employment opportunities, has become a focus of the Afghan government's attention.¹⁸ Greater awareness of citizens' rights and an active civil society have increased youth political engagement.¹⁹ In 2018, President Ghani established a National Youth Parliament,²⁰ engaging youth from each province to give voice to regional concerns and national issues.

Respondents were first asked in 2015 to describe the two biggest problems facing youth. Overall, there has been little variation since then, and in 2019, lack of employment opportunities is easily the most-cited issue (72.0%, down from 74.7% in 2018), followed by lack of educational opportunities (38.5%, down from 40.3%), personal/mental health issues (18.5%, up from 17.0%), economic concerns (14.5%, down from 15.1%), and violence/insecurity (9.1%, up from 8.9%).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH




FIG. 1.14: Q-6. *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing youth in Afghanistan? What is the next-biggest problem? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

There is significant variation between urban and rural respondents, with urban Afghans significantly more likely than rural to cite lack of employment opportunities (81.1% vs. 68.9%) and personal/mental health issues (25.2% vs. 16.3%). Rural Afghans are significantly more likely than urban to say lack of educational opportunities is one of the biggest problems facing youth (42.0% vs. 28.2%). Respondents from the South West region (4.3%) are more likely than others to cite morality/religious issues, which could reflect more conservative cultural traditions.

Respondents in all regions were most likely to cite lack of employment opportunities as one of the biggest problems facing youth. There is some variation here, with respondents in the North East (78.6%) and the Central/Kabul (78.4%) are more likely than those in the South West (65.1%) or the South East (63.3%) to say that it is one of the biggest problems. Respondents from some of the more insecure provinces are more likely to cite violence as the biggest problem facing youth, though some of the provinces with the greatest insecurity, such as Helmand, did not cite violence more frequently,

perhaps due to the more restricted area of sampling. Respondents are more likely to cite violence as a problem for youth in Logar (19.3%), Paktia (18.1%), Sar-e-Pul (16.2%), Zabul (18.3%), and Uruzgan (22.6%). Despite fairly high levels of service delivery, 25.2% of respondents in Panjshir say that lack of service/utilities/infrastructure is the biggest problem facing youth.

While age was not a significant predictive factor for responses to this question, educational attainment showed more variation. Those with no formal education are significantly more likely than those with a university education to say that lack of educational opportunities is the biggest problem facing youth (40.2% vs. 35.5%). As education levels go up, respondents are more likely to say that lack of employment opportunities is the biggest problem facing youth, with 69.1% of those with no formal schooling saying lack of employment opportunities is the biggest problem, compared to 76.8% of those with a university education.

Male and female respondents are equally likely to cite lack of educational opportunities (men 38.3%, women 38.8%), personal/mental health issues (men 19.1%, women 18.0%), economic concerns (men 13.6%, women 15.5%), and violence/insecurity (men 8.8%, women 9.5%), but men are slightly more likely to cite lack of services/utilities/infrastructure (men 7.0%, women 4.2%) and significantly more likely to cite lack of employment opportunities (men 76.2%, women 67.7%). This last disparity is probably due to the higher proportion of men who seek work outside the home, whereas women are often unable to seek formal employment, particularly in rural areas.

1.5 SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS

KEY QUESTION

D-16. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

Respondents are asked to report on their own happiness, and despite the low levels of optimism about the direction of the country, the majority of Afghans continue to say they are very or somewhat happy (81.4%, up from 80.7% in 2018). Some 15.4% say they are not very happy, and 3.2% say they are not at all happy.

Regionally, respondents in the East are highly likely to report being very or somewhat happy (86.5%), and those in the South East (77.4%), West (77.0%), and North West (77.6%) are slightly less likely to report being very or somewhat happy. Respondents who are single (82.5%) or married (81.3%) are more likely than widowed respondents (75.5%) to say they are very or somewhat happy, urban respondents (82.8%) are more likely to say they are very or somewhat happy than rural respondents (80.9%), and men (82.0%) are more likely than women (80.7%) to say they are very or somewhat happy.

SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS, BY REGION




FIG. 1.15: D-16. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

There is no strong correlation between age and self-reported happiness. Respondents in the 18–25 age cohort (82.4%), are slightly more likely to say they are very or somewhat happy than those aged 26–35 (81.4%), 36–45 (81.0%), 46–55 (78.7%), or over 55 (81.9%).

Self-reported happiness is correlated with a number of factors. Urban respondents and those with higher incomes are more likely to say they are happy. Also more likely to report happiness are: single Afghans those with more education, those who believe their household financial situation has improved, those who have a positive view of the prospects for reconciliation, and those who are optimistic about the trajectory of the country. (These variables account for 8.2% of the variation in the independent happiness variable).

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2 SECURITY

Violence and insecurity remain high across Afghanistan in 2019, with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) entrenched in conflict with the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The Global Peace Index now lists Afghanistan as the least peaceful country in the world, replacing Syria.¹ Afghans continue to bear the brunt of the violence, and both ANDSF and civilian casualties continue to be high: Afghan national security advisor, Hamdullah Mohib, says at least 50 people per day die “in the fight against terrorism” in Afghanistan,² and President Ashraf Ghani indicated 45,000 ANDSF had made “the ultimate sacrifice” since he took office in September 2014.³ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program reported 14,000 battle-related deaths in the first half of 2019.⁴ and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented a 27% increase in civilian deaths from the first to the second quarter of 2019.⁵ This grim landscape is reflected by the 74.5% of respondents who say in this year’s *Survey* they often fear for their personal safety, the highest rate since the *Survey* began and almost 50% higher than the rate for the same question in 2006 (39.6%).

The Taliban has remained a formidable opponent and has been able to sustain pressure on the Afghan government, the ANDSF, and Afghanistan’s international partners through its attacks on both military and civilian targets.

The Taliban has remained a formidable opponent and has been able to sustain pressure on the Afghan government, the ANDSF, and Afghanistan’s international partners through its attacks on both military and civilian targets. The Taliban announced its annual spring offensive on April 12, and, unlike 2018, there was no short-term ceasefire for the Eid period.⁶ Throughout 2019, the Taliban has continued to demonstrate its capacity to threaten district centers, attack well-defended military installations, and attack compounds with an International Military Force (IMF) presence and those housing ANDSF and government entities.⁷ Additionally, for the third time, they were able to launch a coordinated, large-scale offensive targeting Kunduz city.⁸ While the attack was quickly repelled, it highlights the continued ability of the Taliban to threaten provincial capitals. The group continues to control or contest more territory than at any other point since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.⁹ The violence has intensified and casualties have increased as the Taliban and U.S. officials have undertaken peace talks.^{10,11} This is reflected in the percentage of people continuing to report fear while encountering the Taliban in this year’s *Survey*, which has remained nearly unchanged, from 93.6% in 2018 to 93.1% in 2019.

The ANDSF and IMF have increased their operations against the Taliban countrywide, but it has come at a price: progovernment forces were reportedly responsible for more civilian fatalities than the Taliban and other armed opposition groups.¹²

The ANDSF continues to face recruitment and retention issues,¹³ instances of “ghost soldiers,” high levels of casualties,¹⁴ and operational challenges.¹⁵ Adding to ANDSF challenges, as many as 18 terrorist groups are reported to be operating in the country.¹⁶ This highlights not only the security issues that the ANDSF faces, but also the complex nature of the security environment, and leads to questions about how peaceful any peace settlement will ultimately make the country. Challenges aside, the Afghan National Police (ANP) continues to be viewed as the entity most responsible for providing local security, although the percentage of Afghans who say this has dropped 10 percentage points, to 58.4%. The number of respondents who strongly agree that the ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan is at its lowest recorded level, 36.4%, a decrease from 39.3% in 2018 and approximately 12% lower than in 2007, when the question was first asked. The Afghan National Army (ANA), at 38.4%, has been replaced in the views of Afghans by the people themselves (38.7%) as the next-most responsible for local security.

This year, there is optimism regarding peace talks between the United States and the Taliban. Sustained military pressure on Taliban commanders¹⁷ helped to drive this process. The main premises of any deal were the withdrawal of U.S. troops and a Taliban commitment that Afghanistan would never again be used as a base for terrorist groups. There were concerns, however, that any deal might undermine the Afghan government, destabilize security, and result in the loss of hard-won gains—in women’s rights and girl’s education, for example. This optimism is reflected in this year’s *Survey*, where 64.0% of those interviewed say that reconciliation is possible, a 10-point increase over 2018 (53.5%). The fragile nature of the peace talks, however, was exposed after the *Survey* fieldwork. On September 9, United States President Donald Trump cancelled the talks after a Taliban attack in Kabul city on September 7 that killed a number of people, including a U.S. soldier.¹⁸ Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad said of the talks: “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”¹⁹

The Afghan government was sidelined from the talks²⁰, as the Taliban refused to negotiate with them. That said, some intra-Afghan dialogues were held in Moscow, Russia,²¹ and Doha, Qatar.²² The spectrum of attendees was varied, with civil society, politicians, media, and women’s advocates among those present.²³ While the talks did not result in anything tangible, they were viewed as confidence-building measures, which could pave the way for more substantive steps in the future. However, in an early sign of how difficult intra-Afghan talks may be, scheduled talks between Taliban and Afghan delegates in Doha, Qatar, were postponed after the Taliban objected to the size of the visiting delegation.²⁴

On the Afghan government side, a Consultative Peace Loya Jirga, convened by President Ashraf Ghani, was hosted in Kabul starting April 29.²⁵ The jirga was attended by some 3,000 delegates and was used to obtain a national consensus for possible peace talks with the Taliban. Among a host of demands, the delegates called for an immediate and permanent ceasefire, which was rejected by the Taliban. The loya jirga, however, was boycotted by a number of influential parties and political figures, who claimed that they were not consulted about the jirga, that there were no persuasive purposes for holding the jirga, and that it would not aid in solving existing issues within the country.²⁶

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Daesh) has sought to continue to impact the Afghanistan security environment. While they have been weakened in their previous strongholds, in the east of Afghanistan, they remain a threat²⁷ and retain the capacity to defend themselves and conduct mass-casualty attacks to weaken public support for the Afghan government.²⁸ The group has also clashed with the Taliban. Given the ongoing peace talks between the Taliban and U.S. officials, it is expected that ISIS/Daesh will continue efforts to undermine the talks. Additionally, the group is likely to court Taliban members who may be disillusioned with the peace talks. There is little change in the proportion of respondents who report fear while encountering ISIS/Daesh (95.0%).

2.1 FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-27. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

Q-47. *Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration. (c) Running for public office. (d) Encountering ANP. (e) Encountering ANA. (f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country. (g) Encountering international forces (Western military only). (h) Encountering the Taliban. (i) Encountering ISIS/Daesh.*

Fear for personal safety is now at its highest recorded level, with 74.5% of respondents indicating that they fear for their personal safety. This represents an increase of over 3 percentage points since 2018 (71.1%). Fear for personal safety has risen every year since 2012, when it was 48.2%. Aside from recent year-on-year increases, the 2019 figure represents an almost 100% increase from the first time the question was asked, in 2006 (39.6%), and a sizeable increase from 2012, when fear for personal safety was at its third-lowest point (48.2%). Interestingly, the number of respondents in Nimroz province who report fear for personal safety has decreased approximately 40%, from 62.6% in 2018 to 39.0% this year. Another noticeable decrease in fear for personal safety, from 29.9% in 2018 to 21.4% this year, is seen in Badakhshan.

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY




Fig 2.1: Q-27. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family’s safety? (Percent who say “always,” “often,” or “sometimes.”)*

Fear while participating in an election is also at its highest recorded level (63.3%), and this fear has increased by over 50% since the question was first asked, in 2006 (41.1%), and is representative of a longitudinal trend of rising fear and insecurity across much of the country. Respondents’ increased fear of voting may be attributed to the 2018 parliamentary elections process, which, according to UNAMA, saw a deliberate Taliban campaign of “violence and intimidation” that resulted in record numbers of civilians killed and injured on election day²⁹. This campaign included attacks by improvised explosive device, indirect fire, and small arms fire, along with abductions, threats, and intimidation of voters.³⁰

FEAR WHILE DOING DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES




Fig. 2.2: Q-47. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration. (c) Running for public office. (d) Encountering ANP.

FEAR WHILE VOTING




Fig 2.3: Q-47. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (Percent who say "some fear" or "a lot of fear.")

Increased fear is not restricted to elections: the number of respondents who report some or a lot of fear while participating in a demonstration is now at its highest level ever (75.2%), which represents an approximately 24% increase over 2006 (60.6%). Recent insurgent attacks targeting demonstrations may be a factor in this.^{31,32,33} Respondents who report some or a lot of fear while participating in a demonstration are most common in Nuristan (91.7%), Uruzgan (91.6%), Farah (89.3%), Logar (88.5%), and Badghis (87.8%). The percentage of respondents claiming fear when participating in a demonstration is lowest in Bamyán (40.8%) and Panjshir (31.8%).

Fear when encountering the Taliban (93.1%) is nearly the same as in 2018 (93.6%), as is fear when encountering ISIS/Daesh 95.0% in 2019 compared with 94.9% in 2018. The changes, while marginal, speak to the Taliban's nationwide reach and increased activity on the one hand, and the more geographically and numerically limited presence of ISIS on the other.

The Taliban's ability to close highways and roads,^{34,35} and incidents involving improvised explosive devices,³⁶ continue to be reflected in this year's *Survey*, with 79.9% of respondents reporting some or a lot of fear when traveling from one part of the country to another. Respondents in Uruzgan (88.8%), Faryab (87.3%), Sar-e-Pul (86.3%), Khost (86.1%), Badakhshan (85.7%), Ghazni (85.6%), and Kabul (84.6%) are most likely to report some or a lot of fear when traveling. When considering only those reporting a lot of fear, this figure is highest among respondents in Bamyán (58.0%), Uruzgan (46.2%), Herat (42.5%), and Jawzjan (42.1%). Respondents in Paktia (36.6%), Paktika (35.5%), and Panjshir (35.1%) are most likely to report no fear when travelling. When disaggregated by gender, there are interesting findings. Overall, 34.3% of females report a lot of fear when traveling. However, this figure is significantly higher among females in Ghazni (65.6%), Panjshir (57.4%), and Bamyán (48.4%). Similar differences are reported among males. Overall, 32.3% of males report a lot of fear when traveling, but this figure is doubled in Bamyán (65.3%) and is significantly higher in Herat (45.6%) and Uruzgan (44.3%).

2.2 CRIME AND VIOLENCE

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-30. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year?*

Q-31. *(If Q-30 answer is yes) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

Q-32. *(If Q-30 answer is yes) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family, or not?*

Q-33. *(If Q-30 answer is yes) Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?*

The number of respondents who said that they or someone in their family had suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year saw a negligible decrease, from 18.6% in 2018 to 17.7% this year. When assessed by gender, males (18.3%) were marginally more likely to report that they have suffered from violence or a criminal act than females (17.1%). Respondents in Wardak province (36.8%) are most likely to have suffered from violence or a criminal act, while respondents in Bamyan (2.5%) and Panjshir (2.7%) are least likely. When disaggregated by region, respondents in Central/Kabul (15.0%) and the South West (29.8%) reported increases over 2018, while decreases were reported in all other regions. Experiences of violence or crime in Central/Kabul (15.0%) were at the highest for that province since the *Survey* began asking the question, 2.5 percentage points higher than 2018.

By type, physical attacks or beatings were the most commonly cited criminal or violent act (36.0%), down 5 percentage points from 2018. Physical attacks or beatings were the most common answer among both males (37.8%) and females (34.1%), although both figures are lower than 2018.

TYPES OF CRIME OR VIOLENCE, BY RURAL AND URBAN




FIG 2.4: Q-31. (If Q-30 answer is yes) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

When determining whom to report a crime to, respondents still prefer the ANP, at 48.3%, up from 45.7% in 2018, while reporting a crime to a shura or elder remains the second choice, at 35.8%, a nearly 5-point decrease from 2018.

2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-21. Which group would you say is most responsible for providing security in this village/gozar? And the second most? (Allow two mentions.)

Q-22. Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference? (a) ANA. (b) ANP. (c) ALP.

Q-23. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment. (a) ANA. (b) ANP. (c) ALP. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

Q-24. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANA protects civilians.

Q-25. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes.

Q-26a. Would you agree or disagree with a family member's decision to join the Afghan National Police?

Q-26b. (If Q-26a answer is "disagree") Why would you disagree with their decision?

When respondents consider who provides security in the local area, the ANP is most frequently cited, at 58.4%, a 10.5-point decrease from 2018 (68.9%). Respondents in urban areas (79.2%) are more likely to name the ANP than those in rural areas (51.3%). Respondents in Nimroz (91.1%) and Kabul (85.6%) are most likely to name the ANP as the local security provider, while respondents in Sar-e-Pul (30.5%) and Zabul (22.2%) are least likely.

Significant changes can be noted in other areas. "The people themselves" (38.7%) narrowly replaces the ANA (38.4%) as the group second-most likely to be identified as responsible for local security. The proportion of respondents citing the people themselves (38.7%) has risen 600% since 2018 (5.5%). This change is most extreme in Bamyan, where 74.1% of those interviewed indicated that the people themselves were responsible for providing security. Interestingly, less than 1% of respondents in Panjshir and Bamyan cited the ANA as the provider of security.

Responses regarding respondents' perceptions of the ANP have all followed a downward trajectory this year. Respondents who say that the ANP is getting better at providing security have decreased slightly since 2018, to 44.4%. In addition, the number of respondents who say the ANP is getting worse has increased to 27.0%.

The number of respondents who strongly agree that the ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan is at its lowest recorded level, 36.4%, down from 39.3% in 2018 and approximately 25% lower than 2007, when the question was first asked. A decrease of 3 percentage points is also noted for respondents who "strongly agree" that the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes, down from 34.8% in 2018 to 31.7% this year. The perception that the ANP is honest and fair has declined slightly to 41.3%.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE




FIG 2.5: Q-25. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (a) The ANP is honest and fair. (b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANP protects civilians. (Percent who say "strongly agree.")

The number of respondents who strongly or somewhat agree with a family member's decision to join the ANP has risen by 3 percentage points, to 73.4%. Respondents in rural areas (74.4%) are marginally more likely to agree with the family member's decision than those in urban areas (70.3%). Given ongoing concerns over high levels of ANDSF casualties and fatalities, it is no surprise that the number one reason for disagreeing with a family member's decision to join the ANP is that the death toll is

too high (43.5%, up from 32.1% in 2018). Interestingly, despite continued violence, the number of people citing insecurity as a reason for disagreeing with a family member’s decision to join the ANP has decreased from 22.2% in 2018 to 19.3% in 2019.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY




Fig 2.6: Q-24. I’m going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (a) The ANA is honest and fair. (b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANA protects civilians. (Percent who strongly agree.)

Perceptions of the ANA remain broadly similar to 2018, with a negligible increase in those saying the ANA is getting better (57.5%, as opposed to 56.9% in 2018). Respondents in the East are significantly more likely to say that the ANA is getting better (82.3%), while those in the Central Highlands are least likely (29.0%). The Central Highlands theme continues when disaggregating by province, with respondents in Bamyan (28.5%), Daikundi (29.5%), and Panjshir (34.6%) the least likely to say the ANA is getting better, while respondents in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar (84.8%) and Kunar (90.6%) are the most likely to report that the ANA is getting better.

There are negligible changes from 2018 in those saying the ANA helps to improve security (53.4% strongly agree), while those who say the ANA protects civilians is at 51.8%. A slight increase can be seen in those who say the ANA is honest and fair, from 58.3% in 2018 to 59.6% in 2019.

In July 2018, President Ashraf Ghani indicated that the Afghan government would not be able to support the ANSF for six months without U.S. support,³⁷ a point further corroborated by the former

head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Joseph Votel, who testified in March 2019 that the ANDSF remains “dependent on...coalition support.”³⁸ These persistent concerns over the ANDSF’s ability to operate without international support continue to be reflected in the *Survey*, with 83.5% of respondents saying they somewhat or strongly agree that the ANA needs foreign support, and 80.7% saying the same for the ANP. Both figures remain consistent since 2016.

PERCEPTION THAT THE ANA AND ANP NEED FOREIGN SUPPORT




FIG. 2.7: Q-23. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) ANA. (b) ANP. (Percent who somewhat or strongly agree.)

2.4 GROUPS WHO POSE A SECURITY THREAT

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-28. In your view, does any group currently pose a threat to the security of this local area?

Q-29. (If Q-28 answer is yes) Who do you think poses a threat to the security of this local area? (Ask open-ended, record up to two mentions.)

The number of Afghans who say that a group poses a threat to the security of the local area (36.4%) is almost identical to 2018 (35.8%). In an opened ended follow-up, respondents are asked which group poses a threat, the Taliban continue to be the number one response, at 68.9%. The Taliban appear more of a threat in rural areas (75.8%) than urban (37.2%). Disaggregating by ethnicity, the Taliban are most

identified as a threat by Hazaras (80.2%) and, while still high, least by Tajiks (61.7%). Interestingly, the percentage of Uzbeks who consider the Taliban a threat is down by almost 6 points from 2018, to 74.4%.

A 50% increase is noted, however, in those who cite criminals/thieves as a threat to the local area (37.5% in 2019, compared with 24.9% in 2018). The number of respondents citing ISIS/Daesh as posing a threat to local security has decreased by 4 percentage points, to 12.4%, which reflects the diminished capabilities of the group.

GROUPS WHO POSE A SECURITY THREAT, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 2.8: Q-29. Who do you think poses a threat to the security of this local area? (Allow two mentions.)

This year, the proportion of respondents who have a lot or a little sympathy with the Taliban is 13.4%, similar to 2018 (15.9%). Respondents who say they have no sympathy with the Taliban have increased almost 3 percentage points, to 85.1%, since 2018 (82.4%). Urban respondents (88.6%) are more inclined than rural respondents (83.9%) to claim to have no sympathy at all. Respondents from Zabul (56.1%) and Uruzgan (50.5%) express the highest levels of sympathy with the Taliban. Despite being the highest, however, sympathy for the Taliban among Zabul respondents is still 20 percentage points lower than the 2018 level of 65.9%.

Afghan political and religious figures and foreign commentators have continually questioned the Taliban’s moral principles, given that their attacks harm mostly innocent Afghan civilians.^{39,40,41,42} However, despite this the number of respondents claiming they don’t know why they have sympathy for

the Taliban has increased four-fold, from 6.1% in 2018 to 28.6% in 2019.⁴³ Increased Taliban media visibility due to peace talks and a well documented increase in civilian casualties caused by ANDSF and IMF⁴⁴ may be factors for this increase in the inability to articulate reasons for sympathy.

SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS




FIG. 2.9: Q-66a. Thinking about the reasons why the Taliban have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the Taliban? **Q-70a.** Thinking about the reasons why Daesh has been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the Daesh? (Percent who say “a lot of sympathy.”) (Note: question was disaggregated in 2017 to ask specifically about sympathy with Taliban and ISIS/Daesh Q-66a and Q70a, respectively.)

2.5 RECONCILIATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-59. *Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, or impossible?*

Q-60. *In your opinion, what is the main reason why the Taliban are fighting against the Afghan government?*

Q-61. *Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

Q-62. *Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?*

Q-63. *(If somewhat or strongly opposed in Q-62) Why are you opposed to efforts to negotiate with the Taliban?*

Q-64. *Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

Q-67. *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? (a) The current constitution. (b) A democratic system. (c) Freedom of speech. (d) Freedom of the press. (e) A strong central government (f) The current judicial and court system. (g) Women's rights. (h) Equality among different groups of people (regardless of ethnicity, class, etc.). (i) The presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. (j) Foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan.*

Q-68. *If formal peace negotiations begin, who do you believe must be most trusted to defend your needs and interests at the negotiating table? (Allow two mentions.)*

At the same time, they say they have little sympathy, optimism surrounding the U.S.-Taliban peace talks is reflected in the increased number of Afghans who say that reconciliation is possible. Among those surveyed, 64.0% say reconciliation is possible, a 10 percentage point increase over 2018 (53.5%). Males (69.6%) are more optimistic than females (58.5%) by over 10 percentage points.

RECONCILIATION WITH TALIBAN




FIG. 2.10: Q-59. Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, or impossible?

By province, respondents in Uruzgan (84.8%), Kunar (83.8%), and Paktika (80.1%) report the highest levels of optimism. Continuing trends observed in 2018, the lowest levels of optimism for reconciliation are reported in the provinces of Daikundi (31.5%), Panjshir (42.6%), and Bamyán (44.1%). However, the figure of 42.6% in Panjshir is notable, because it represents almost a 300% increase in optimism over 2018 (11.3%).

Looking by region, other notable increases in optimism can be seen. In Central/Kabul, the number of respondents who say reconciliation is possible has risen by 15 percentage points, to 67.3%. Additionally, there is a 10-percentage point increase in the North East (59.3%). Reversing downward trends from 2018, respondents in the South West (72.9%), the North West (55.2%), the West (60.5%), and the Central Highlands (37.7%) all show increased optimism for reconciliation.

RECONCILIATION WITH TALIBAN: POSSIBLE, BY YEAR





FIG. 2.II: Q-59. Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, or impossible? (Percent who say possible.)

Increased media coverage of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks raised public awareness of the talks, as reflected in a new question this year that shows 77.4% of respondents overall are aware of efforts to negotiate with the Taliban. There are gender differences, with 83.3% of males and 71.4% of females aware of these efforts.

When assessed regionally, findings reflect those found within the provinces, with the East (88.8%), South East (83.7%), and South West (83.6%) displaying the highest levels of awareness. Respondents from the Central Highlands region show the lowest levels of awareness (43.5%).

Disaggregating by province, respondents in Panjshir report the highest levels of awareness (97.8%). High levels of awareness are also reported in Kunar (92.9%), Nangarhar (89.8%), Uruzgan (89.5%), Nuristan (89.2%), Helmand (88.8%), and Paktia (88.3%). Indeed, levels of awareness are high across most of the country. Only Daikundi (31.4%) and Ghor (49.6%) display awareness levels below 50.0%.

AWARENESS OF EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, BY PROVINCE



Fig. 2.12: Q-61. Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban? (Percent who say yes.)

A new question in 2019 gauges Afghan support for efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. This year, the percentage of people who strongly support or somewhat support efforts to negotiate a peace agreement is 88.7%.

Despite high levels of unemployment and poor economic conditions, the number of Afghans who say that they strongly agree or somewhat agree that Antigovernment Elements (AGE) considering reintegration should be given government assistance, jobs, and housing has risen 12 percentage points, from 68.7% in 2018 to 81.0% this year. Given that reintegration of former AGEs will be a significant part of any future peace talks, it is no surprise to see the percentage of Afghans who strongly or somewhat support reintegration efforts has risen by almost 12 percentage points in a year.

Males (84.0%) are more likely to support reintegration efforts than females (78.0%). And respondents in urban areas (85.0%) are more likely than those in rural areas (79.6%). By province, support for reintegration is highest among respondents in Nangarhar (90.2%), Uruzgan (96.1%), and Baghlan (90.1%) and lowest among respondents in Panjshir (58.6%), Wardak (60.6%), Nimroz (61.6%), Ghazni (62.9%), and Kapisa (66.0%).

By region, respondents in the East (88.6%) display the highest levels of support for reintegration, while those in the South East display the lowest (71.0%).

In spite of the optimism surrounding peace negotiations, 9.7% of all respondents say they are opposed to peace talks with the Taliban. In a follow-up, open-ended question on why they are opposed, 32.4% of respondents fear that “war will get worse and more” because of negotiations, 17.1% are concerned that “more people will die,” and another 16.1% of respondents fear that negotiations are “useless.” The character of the Taliban themselves is also given as a reason to oppose negotiations, with 15.1% of respondents saying the Taliban are “cruel” and 14.3% claiming the Taliban are “corrupt.” The influence of regional players is also noted, with 11.2% of respondents saying that “Pakistan does not want peace.”

For the first time, the *Survey* asks respondents an open-ended question about who should represent Afghanistan at the negotiating table. A plurality of Afghans (37.7%) name President Ashraf Ghani. The national unity government (33.5%) and religious leaders (21.8%) place second and third, respectively. Despite Afghan government concerns at the time, a high-profile meeting between Afghan figures and the Taliban in Moscow, Russia, appears to have been beneficial to former President Hamid Karzai, with 21.0% of respondents suggesting he should represent Afghanistan at the negotiating table.

The talks have been largely U.S. led. Afghans are concerned over the role of the U.S. and other international entities and they appear to be pessimistic that the international community is able to represent their needs and interests in any talks. Not one international figure or entity garnered more than 10.4%—the United Nations (9.2%), Zalmay Khalilzad (8.1%), Saudi Arabia (4.0%), Qatar (3.6%), NATO (1.9%), America (1.8%), or Russia (1.0%)—which may indicate that most Afghans believe in the much-vaunted, Afghan-led Afghan-owned peace process, and are suspect of anything internationally driven. However, views are mixed when comparing urban and rural, the former respondents are more likely to cite an international figure such as the international community, the United Nations and Zalmay Khalilzad, than rural respondents.

REPRESENTATION DURING PEACE TALKS, BY STRATA

	RURAL RESPONDENTS	URBAN RESPONDENTS
	%	%
ASHRAF GHANI	38	37
NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT	33	34
RELIGIOUS LEADERS	23	18
HAMID KARZAI	20	24
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT	14	11
DON'T KNOW	12	12
ABDULLAH ABDULLAH	11	9
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	9	14

UNITED NATIONS	9	10
ZALMAY KHALIZAD	7	11
SAUDI ARABIA	5	2
QATAR	4	1
TALIBAN	3	1
NATO	2	2
AMERICA	1	3
RUSSIA	1	1

Fig. 2.13: Q.68a/b: *If formal peace negotiations begin, who do you believe must be most trusted to defend your needs and interests at the negotiating table? (Allow two mentions).*

Concerns persist about just what may be compromised to negotiate peace. Respondents are offered a list of items and asked to identify whether each one is important or unimportant to consider in a peace agreement. Items include the constitution, democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, strong central government, the judiciary, women’s rights, equality among different groups, the presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan, and foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan.

Women’s rights,⁴⁷ the ANDSE, human rights, constitutional rights,⁴⁸ a strong central government, and other post-2001 achievements have been variously cited by Afghans in the media as potential red lines in any negotiations. In this year’s *Survey*, 87.1% of respondents say it is very important or somewhat important that the current constitution be protected in any agreement with the Taliban. A strong central government (83.8%), women’s rights (78.5%), freedom of speech (80.1%), freedom of the press (79.0%), and equality (78.9%) are also seen as very important or somewhat important by respondents. More females (55.9%) than males (53.6%) say protection of the constitution is very important. Males (44.8%) are more likely than females (39.2%) to say equality among different groups of people, regardless of ethnicity, class, etc., is very important in any peace negotiations. The continued presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan is viewed by 53.2% of Afghans as not too important or not important at all in any negotiated deal.

To the question “In your opinion, what is the main reason why the Taliban are fighting against the Afghan government?” the answer “to gain power” remains number one at 26.1%, a 3 percentage point increase since 2018. The presence of foreign troops has been at the forefront of Taliban grievances, and in this year’s *Survey*, 18.9% of respondents cite the presence of foreign troops or the international community as a reason why the Taliban are fighting. This is a 4 percentage point increase over 2018 (15.2%) and more than a 200% increase since 2017 (6.4%). Most other responses share statistical similarities with those recorded in 2018. The fractious nature of ISIS/Daesh, and its lack of a discernable objective in Afghanistan, is likely a reason that a plurality of respondents (18.1%) answered “don’t know” when asked why ISIS/Daesh were fighting the Afghan government.

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3 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

Since Afghanistan's 2014 transition, when Afghan forces assumed control of security from international forces, the Afghan economy has persistently experienced sluggish growth: 1.4% annual growth in 2015, 2.3% in 2016, 2.7% in 2017, and 1.0% in 2018, the slowest since 2001.¹ International official aid, a main driver of this growth, dropped from USD 6.5 billion in 2010 to USD 4.3 billion in 2015 and has continued to fall since then.² Nevertheless, the government remains dependent on grants, and a major part of its budget (51% of the budget for the fiscal year 2018/2019) is funded through donor assistance.³ According to the World Bank, there are two major reasons for the economic downturn of 2018. First, in late 2017 and early 2018, Afghanistan experienced the worst drought in decades, which has caused a sharp decline in agricultural and livestock productivity. Second, the business environment and investor confidence deteriorated due to intensifying violence and ongoing political uncertainty.⁴

Poverty has grown deeper and more widespread due to drought conditions, internal displacement, and low economic growth. The bulk of the poor population lives in drought-affected rural areas, leading to a large increase in the number of the displaced, which has reached a record level of 298,000 individuals. Roughly 54% of the population now lives below the national poverty line, compared to 38.3% in 2011–12.

Poverty is inextricably linked with the quality and quantity of employment in the economy, especially when there is no social safety net for the unemployed. Nearly one-fourth of the labor force is unemployed in Afghanistan, and 20.5% of those who are working are underemployed,⁵ both staggeringly high numbers. Unemployment is markedly higher for women than men across all age categories and education levels.⁶ Among all age groups, youth (15 to 24 years old) and senior citizens (age 65 and above) suffer from higher levels of unemployment than others.⁷ More than half of respondents, 55.0%, say the employment opportunities for their households have worsened. And, more than one-third, 31.1%, say that the financial situation of their household has worsened.

Despite the drought that brought reduced agricultural production and the threat of higher domestic food prices, inflation remained modest in 2018 due to lower food and vegetable prices in the greater region and increased imports of those items into the economy.⁸ The afghani depreciated 9.0% against the U.S. dollar in 2018, largely due to global strengthening of the dollar and to some extent to the outflow of U.S. dollars from Afghanistan to neighboring economies. The afghani's rapid depreciation against the U.S. dollar continued through the first half of 2019, prompting concerns about rising prices (especially for grain prices).⁹ There is little evidence to suggest that the depreciation against the U.S. dollar caused major hardship for Afghan firms and households in 2018, but the full effects of depreciation in 2019 are not yet known.

Despite the many challenges, the National Unity Government performed well fiscally.¹⁰ Domestic revenue increased by 9.5% in the first five months of fiscal year 1398 (Dec 22, 2018, to May 21, 2019) compared to the same period the year before.¹¹ This achievement was mostly due to the collection of taxes and arrears, improved efficiency, and license fees.¹² The election season may also have contributed to a slowed down economic development pace and plans.

This chapter includes overall perceptions of the economy, employment, and households' financial situation; women's participation in household economic activity; and self-reported estimates of household income and assets.

3.1 OVERALL PERCEPTION OF THE ECONOMY

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-3a/b. (If Q-1 answer is "wrong direction.") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Q-6a/b. In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem?

Q-7a/b. What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today?

Q-13. (If Q-12 answer is "some of them" or "none of them.") Why don't the children go to school?

Q-96c. (If Q-96 answer is yes.) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

The *Survey* consistently finds people are deeply concerned about their household economy. Of the 58.2% of Afghans surveyed who think that the country is going in the wrong direction, 26.6% cite unemployment, 12.8% cite the bad economy, and 4.2% cite high prices. More than three-quarters of respondents (77.7%) perceive economic difficulties to be the biggest problem facing youth,¹³ and this is more or less consistent regardless of gender or place of residence.

This year, the *Survey* added a new question for households with school-age children who don't go to school, asking them why they don't go to school. The most frequent responses are economic concerns like "they need to work" (12.3% for girls and 37.7% for boys), transportation difficulties (17.3% for girls and 16.4% for boys), and "cannot afford tuition or school supplies" (8.7% for girls and 6.9% for boys). Other major reasons include girls don't need education (19.9%), poor quality of education (girls 11.9%, boys 13.1%), and the unavailability of school in their area (girls 6.4%, boys 3.4%). The findings are consistent when disaggregating for urban or rural place of residence.

When the *Survey* asks about major problems faced by women, one-third of respondents (33.2%) say the poor economy.¹⁴ This is the third-most frequent answer after lack of educational opportunities and lack of women’s rights (43.2% and 34.1%, respectively). In addition, when the *Survey* asks those willing to migrate why they would leave the country, economic concerns are consistently among the primary reasons by 73.9% of respondents.¹⁵

ECONOMIC CONCERNS

REASONS FOR BEING PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY	UNEMPLOYMENT 27%, POOR ECONOMY 13%, HIGH PRICES 4%
PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH	UNEMPLOYMENT 72%, POOR ECONOMY 15%
PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN	UNEMPLOYMENT 24%, POVERTY 10%
REASONS FOR LEAVING THE COUNTRY	UNEMPLOYMENT 52%, POOR ECONOMY 20%
REASONS FOR CHILDREN NOT GOING TO SCHOOL (GIRLS)	THEY NEED TO WORK 12%, CANNOT AFFORD 9%
REASONS FOR CHILDREN NOT GOING TO SCHOOL (BOYS)	THEY NEED TO WORK 38%, CANNOT AFFORD 7%

FIG.3.1: Q-3a/b. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? **Q-6a/b.** In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem? **Q-7a/b.** What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem? **Q-13.** (If Q-12 answer is “some of them” or “none of them.”) Why don’t the children go to school? **Q-96c.** (If Q-96a answer is yes.) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

3.2 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

KEY QUESTION

Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (b) Employment opportunities. (c) Availability of products in the market (e.g., rice, wheat, oil). (d) Quality of food in your diet.

Each year, respondents are asked whether their household financial situation and employment opportunities have gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse compared to a year ago. This year,

55.0% of respondents say the employment opportunities for their households have worsened, similar to last year (57.2%). There is some variation by place of residence: 63.6% of urban residents say the employment opportunities for their households have declined, compared to 52.0% of rural residents. Across provinces, reports of worsening employment prospects are numerous, ranging from highs of 79.2% in Panjshir, 71.7% in Kabul, and 69.5% in Jawzjan to lows of 25.6% in Laghman, 32.5% in Wardak, and 33.8% in Logar.

HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES, BY PROVINCE



FIG.3.2: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (b) Employment opportunities. (Percent who say worse.)

This year, 31.1% of respondents say that the financial situation of their household has worsened, compared to 34.1% last year, while 47.9% report that their situation has remained the same. Intuitively, when employment opportunities improve, household finances should also get better and vice versa, and this is indeed the case. Some 64.5% of those who report better employment opportunities also report that the financial situation of their household has improved, compared to 8.6% of those whose employment opportunities have worsened.

HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION, BY PROVINCE




FIG.3.3: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (Percent who say worse.)

When asked about the availability of basic products in the market, such as wheat, rice, and oil, 13.8% say it has improved in the past 12 months, more than half of respondents (53.7%) report that availability has remained the same, and 32.1% say it has declined. When asked about the quality of food in the household, 18.4% of respondents report an improvement, 51.5% of them say it has remained the same, and 29.7% of them report a deterioration.

Respondents who show greater awareness of development projects in their area are more likely to say their household situation has improved than those who are less aware.

IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION




FIG. 3.4: Q-10. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school opening. (c) New private school opening. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Health care (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (j) Programs in agriculture. (k) New factories opened. (l) Building new mosques. Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.*

EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES




FIG. 3.5: Q-10. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school opening. (c) New private school opening. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Health care (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (j) Programs in agriculture. (k) New factories opened. (l) Building new mosques. Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (b) Employment opportunities.*

3.3 EMPLOYMENT

KEY QUESTIONS

D-3. *Do you yourself do any activity that generates money?*

D-4. *(If D-3 answer is yes.) What type of activity is that?*

The *Survey* doesn't attempt to determine the official unemployment rate for the country. This is done by the National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA). The *Survey* does, however, ask respondents if they earn money by doing any activity, in order to measure their involvement in the economy and how it impacts perceptions.

Overall, 45.9% of respondents this year say they are involved in an activity that generates money, compared to 46.3% last year. Across all age groups, income earning is least common among 18- to 25-years-olds (36.2%)—presumably because they are students or lack job skills—and those of age 75 or above (33.1%). Generating an income is more common among respondents aged 26 to 65 years, more than half of whom (50.2%) say they do earn income. Lack of a social safety net in the country adds further pressure to the job market.

EARNING INCOME, BY AGE




FIG.3.6: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.) **D2.** How old are you?

By region, the proportion of respondents who report earning an income ranges from 42.5% in Central/Kabul to 50.8% in the Central Highlands, comparable to their 2018 scores of 41.6% and 49.8%, respectively. By province, respondents in Uruzgan, Jawzjan, and Samangan report the highest levels of income generation (78.9%, 63.9%, and 55.6% respectively), while Paktia, Kapisa, and Badghis report the lowest (31.4%, 36.6%, and 36.9%, respectively).

EARNING INCOME, BY PROVINCE



FIG. 3.7: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.)

There is a large gap in the proportion of male and female respondents who earn an income. Some 81.9% of male respondents, but just 10.4% of female respondents, say they earn money, the latter figure a marginal increase from 9.4% in 2016, when the question was first introduced. Provincial data show 0.4% of women earn money in Helmand, 3.6% in Kunar and Wardak, and 3.8% in Badakhshan, the lowest scores in the *Survey*. Jawzjan, at 33.1%, is the province with the largest proportion of women who report earning an income, followed by Uruzgan (28.4%) and Ghazni (25.9%).

WOMEN EARNING INCOME, BY PROVINCE



FIG. 3.8: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Female respondents only, percent who say yes.)

This year's data show that individuals with greater educational attainment are more likely to be involved in the economy than those who lack education.

For those respondents with formal education, there is little variance in participation in the labor force among those with one to six years (54.0%), seven to nine years (58.6%), and 10 to 12 years (53.7%) of formal education only (no madrasa years). However, this is significantly less than those with 13+ years of formal education (74.8%) without madrasa education.

Formal education plays an important role in women's employment. Among female respondents with a formal education up to 16 years (65.4%) and up to 14 years (59.6%) say they earn money, compared to only 6.5% of female respondents with no formal education.

According to the International Labor Organization, Islamic madrasa education plays a significant role in labor-force participation of men and women: employment rates for madrasa graduates are higher, and unemployment is lower. This is also true of teacher-training graduates, who find employment at rates just slightly lower than madrasa graduates.¹⁶

Islamic madrasas may also play a role in individual earning power. *Survey* data shows 54.8% of respondents with Islamic madrasa education are participating in the labor force, compared to only 31.5% of those who have neither formal education nor madrasa education.

EARNING INCOME, BY EDUCATION TYPE AND LEVEL




FIG. 3.9: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.) **D-9.** How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa? (Percent who have only madrasa education without a formal education.) **D-10.** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa? (Percent who have any other education and no madrasa education)

Disaggregating by the type of economic activity, 43.8% of rural respondents are engaged in farming (either on their own or another’s land), 11.9% are skilled workers or artisans, and 9.8% are engaged in informal sales or business.¹⁷ While urban residents are more dispersed across various job categories, 17.2% are engaged in informal sales or business, 13.5% are skilled workers or artisans, 12.8% are self-employed professionals, and 12.2% are small-business owners.

EMPLOYMENT TYPE, BY GENDER



FIG. 3.10: D-4. (If D-3 answer is yes.) And what type of activity is that? **D-1.** Gender.

This year, skilled worker / artisan is the most frequently reported occupation for women, at 26.4%, up from last year's 19.8%. Schoolteacher is the second-most common job for women (23.8%). The top three occupations for male respondents, by comparison, are farming (38.2%), informal sales (12.4%), and skilled work (10.5%).

There are differences by region. In Central/Kabul, respondents' activities are more widely distributed by sector, while in other regions agriculture employs more people than all other categories. In the Central Highlands, 79.6% of respondents say they work on farms, compared to 16.1% in Central/Kabul.

EMPLOYMENT TYPE, BY REGION




FIG.3.11: D-4. (If D-3 answer is yes.) And what type of activity is that?

3.4 WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY

KEY QUESTIONS

D-8. Do female members of the family contribute to this household's income, or not?

Q-85. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?

Substantial underrepresentation of women is a key factor that characterizes the labor market in Afghanistan. According to the *Afghan Living Condition Survey 2016–17*, the unemployment rate is 41.0% for women, compared to 18.3% for men.¹⁸ When respondents are asked in the *Survey of the Afghan People* about the major problems faced by women, the economic issues of unemployment (23.9%) and poverty (8.7%), taken together, far outweigh individual issues such as domestic violence (16.9%), lack of women's rights (13.5%), and forced marriages (12.2%). This holds true when disaggregated by rural or urban place of residence, age, or gender.

than one-fifth of respondents, 18.6%, say that female members of their family contribute to household income, slightly down from 19.1% last year and 20.0% the year before that. By place of residence, 86.5% of urban respondents and 79.6% of rural respondents say female members of the family do not contribute to household income. At the provincial level, women are least likely to contribute to household income in Panjshir (3.1%), Zabul (4.0%), and Parwan (5.2%) and most likely to contribute in Nuristan (60.9%), Bamyan (51.8%), and Ghazni (50.5%).

This year, 75.9% of respondents say women should be allowed to work outside the home, up notably from 70.3% last year.

The *Survey* also asks respondents whether they think women should be allowed to work outside the home. This year, 76.0% of respondents say women should be allowed to work outside the home, up notably from 70.3% last year.

3.5 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS

KEY QUESTIONS

D-5. *How many of the following does your household have? (b) Motorcycle. (c) Car. (d) TV. (h) Jeribs of land. (i) Livestock (not poultry).*

D-15c. *How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?*

Information about household assets and how their ownership is allocated is useful in understanding people's living conditions. This year, 69.3% of respondents say their household owns at least one TV, a number that has gradually increased over the years (for example, from 61.3% in 2016). Respondents in urban areas, where electricity is more available, are more likely to own a TV than rural respondents (91.0% vs. 62.0%), but this rural-urban gap has declined over time. The five-year average rate of TV ownership for 2007–2011 was 28.2% in rural areas and 81.9% in urban areas. The five-year average for 2015–2019 has increased to 58.3% in rural areas and 89.5% in urban areas.

The motorcycle as a means of transportation is more common among rural than urban residents, perhaps because public transportation is more readily accessible and cost effective for urban dwellers. Some 47.5% of respondents overall own a motorcycle—53.2% of rural residents and 30.6% of urban dwellers. The equivalent figures for 2018 were 50.5% rural and 28.2% urban.

The higher cost of owning and maintaining a vehicle such as a car or truck is evidenced by the smaller percentage of respondents, 26.7%, who say they own one. The differences by stratum are minor: 28.6% of urban respondents and 26.0% of rural respondents.

Mobile-phone ownership has continued to increase among households, with 91.4% of respondents this year saying at least one member of their household owns a mobile phone, up from 89.5% last year and 86.6% in 2017. Of those who have a mobile phone in their household, 46.3% have an internet connection, a percentage that has grown rapidly from the 25.5% in 2015 when the question was first asked.

Land is a more stable asset than others, such as car or a mobile phone. *Survey* data shows that average rates of land ownership change little from year to year. This year’s data is consistent with previous years’ findings about land ownership: 41.2% of respondents say their household owns one to five jeribs of land,¹⁹ 9.9% say they own six to 10, and 10.9% say they own more than 10 jeribs of land.

HOUSEHOLD LAND OWNERSHIP

	RURAL	URBAN	OVERALL
	%	%	%
0	26	73	38
1–5 JERIBS	48	20	41
6–10 JERIBS	12	3	10
11–20 JERIBS	7	2	6
OVER 20 JERIBS	6	2	5

FIG. 3.12: D-5. *How many of the following does your household have? (h) Jeribs of land.*

Another *Survey* question asks respondents if they have experienced a dispute in the last two years and, in a follow-up, what type of dispute it was (see chapter 5, “Governance”). This year, 20.6% of respondents say they had a dispute. Disputes over property are the most common: 49.2% were said to be over land, 11.4% concerned other kinds of property and 8.5% involved business issues. Land disputes are more frequent in rural areas (50.8%), where agricultural activities are more common, than in urban areas (37.7%).

Livestock is an important asset for rural dwellers, who rely on it as a part of their livelihood. The *Survey* asks how much livestock (other than poultry) the household owns. There is a small decrease in livestock ownership this year compared to previous years, from 58.7% and 59.3% in 2014 and 2015, respectively, to 57.0% in 2019. This slight decrease can be attributed to the drought and poor agricultural conditions.

Of the 57.0% of respondents who say they own livestock, 15.7% are urban and 71.0% are rural. Livestock ownership is highest in the provinces of Wardak (97.9%), Paktika (94.1%), and Khost (91.9%) and lowest in Balkh (42.6%), Baghlan (41.5%), and Kabul (11.4%).

AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME




FIG.3.14: D-6. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

The region with the highest proportion of respondents in the lowest income group is the Central Highlands, where 71.5% reported a monthly income below AFN 5,000. The majority of respondents in all other regions report having a monthly income between AFN 5,000 and AFN 20,000.

AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY REGION




FIG.3.15: D-6. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? **D-7.** (If D-6 answer is “refused” or “don’t know.”) If you are unsure of the actual monthly amount, what’s the general range? Again, this is for your whole household.

3.7 WEALTH AND HAPPINESS

KEY QUESTIONS

D-6. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

D-16. In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?

Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?

Survey respondents are further asked how happy they are in their lives. In 2019, 81.4% of respondents say they are happy, a slight increase from 76.7% in 2017 and 80.8% in 2018.

There is a positive correlation between the economic performance of a household and the level of happiness of its members. Those who say their household’s economic situation has improved are more likely to say they are happy (89.4%), while those who say their household situation has worsened are less likely (72.2%). This relationship holds true across various income groups and household employment situations.

HAPPINESS AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF HOUSEHOLD




FIG. 3.16: D-16. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy? (Percent who say “very happy” or “somewhat happy.”) Q8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.*

ENDNOTES

- 1 World Bank website, “GDP growth (annual %)—Afghanistan,” accessed Oct. 1, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=AF>.
- 2 World Bank website, “Net official development assistance received (current US\$)—Afghanistan,” accessed Oct. 1, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=AF>.
- 3 Ministry of Finance (MoF), Citizens’ Budget: *A simplified version of the National Budget 1398* (MoF, Feb. 19, 2019), [https://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/Fiscal_Year_1398/1398%20Citizen%20Budget%20\(English%20Version\).pdf](https://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/Fiscal_Year_1398/1398%20Citizen%20Budget%20(English%20Version).pdf).
- 4 Habiburrahman Sahibzada, Tobias Akhtar Haque, and Bernard James Haven, *Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2019), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/546581556051841507/Building-Confidence-Amid-Uncertainty>.
- 5 Central Statistics Organization (CSO), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016–17* (Kabul: CSO, 2018), <https://washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2018-07/Afghanistan%20ALCS%202016-17%20Analysis%20report.pdf>.
- 6 Anirban Dasgupta, Rohin Anhal, and Apurva Bhatnagar, *Employment Scenario in Afghanistan from 2007–08 to 2013–14*, Asia-Pacific working paper series (International Labour Organization, 2019), https://www.ilo.org/newdelhi/whatwedo/publications/WCMS_681336/lang--en/index.htm.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Sahibzada et al., *Afghanistan Development Update* (see note 4).
- 9 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), *Economic and Social Development*, Report to the United States Congress (SIGAR, July 30, 2019), <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-07-30qr-section3-economic.pdf>.
- 10 Sahibzada et al., *Afghanistan Development Update* (see note 4).
- 11 SIGAR, *Economic and Social Development* (see note 9).
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 This figure represents a combination of multiple responses: lack of employment (70.4%), poor economy (13.4%), costly marriages (2.4%), high cost of living (1.2%), joining AGEs due to unemployment (0.6%).
- 14 This figure represents a combination of multiple responses: lack of employment (23.9%), poverty (8.7%), not given share of inheritance (2.0%), and lack of market for crafts (0.6%).
- 15 This figure represents a combination of three responses: unemployment (51.6%), poor economy (20.0%), and high prices (1.2%).
- 16 Dasgupta et al., *Employment Scenario* (see note 7).
- 17 A form of economic activity that is unregistered or unregulated by the state.
- 18 Central Statistics Organization (CSO), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016—2017*, (Kabul: CSO, 2018), <https://www.nsia.gov.af:8080/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ALCS-2016-17-Analysis-report-.pdf>
- 19 One jerib is equal to 2000 square meters.
- 20 On average, at time of fieldwork in July 2019, USD 1.00 was equivalent to AFN 80.3011, exchange rate at Da Afghanistan Bank website: “Exchange Rates,” https://dab.gov.af/exchange-rates?field_date_value=07%2F11%2F2019



4 DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Over the past decade, Afghanistan has achieved many important targets, including improvements in education, water and sanitation, and primary healthcare services, and this has translated into measurable declines in infant, child, and maternal mortality. In 2019, however, the security situation across Afghanistan worsened, causing mass displacement, injuries, and deaths.¹ This, together with an increase in returnees from Pakistan and Iran over the past several years, has placed a heavy burden on healthcare and other services for both host and displaced communities.² For example, immunization rates across the country are still low, reaching just over 60% of children aged 12–23 months.³ As a result, 215 measles outbreaks affected nearly 3,000 people in 2018, particularly those in hard-to-reach areas.⁴ And just 13% of people living with HIV have coverage for antiretroviral medication.⁵

Many disparities in service coverage exist across the country, including disparities by urban or rural residence, socioeconomic status, and geography, even down to the district level. These inequalities are due in part to the Taliban, who are active across Afghanistan, controlling 15% of all districts and contesting another 29%.⁶ For example, according to a 2019 report by an independent research organization, in Nad Ali district, Helmand province, service provision is very poor. This district is home to between 95,000 and 180,000 individuals and is divided between government-controlled and Taliban-held areas.⁷ In insurgency-controlled areas, education, healthcare, development projects, water supply, electricity, media, and telecommunications are monitored and controlled by the Taliban. Health services are inadequate, there are no female doctors or nurses in the district's five health facilities, only a few midwives, so women in these areas do not have access to healthcare, and vaccination campaigns must adhere to strict guidelines that have resulted in less effective implementation.⁸ The curriculum and staffing of schools are tightly regulated, and girls attend only until grade six. Lastly, though some households have solar panels, there is no electrical grid, and private telecommunication companies are banned from the area.⁹

The growing insecurity across Afghanistan includes armed attacks on health facilities, frequent in 2019. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), there were 34 attacks in the first quarter of 2019 alone.¹⁰ This caused 87 medical facilities to close, affecting an estimated 5.6 million people¹¹ and causing enormous repercussions for a health system already burdened by limited resources. Health workers in Afghanistan have underscored the urgent need for structural change to the system to make sure that modern medicines, equipment, and hospital space are available for the 1.9 million people who require emergency medical services each year.¹²

There are several organizations, including the United Nations, helping the government of Afghanistan to close the gap in access to health facilities and service coverage more generally. The WHO's work in

Afghanistan is guided by a two-year cycle, and the WHO–Ministry of Public Health Joint Country Plan 2018–2019 has several priority areas that include health emergencies and strengthening health systems.¹³ In February 2019, Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS), with support from the Aga Khan Foundation, expanded the *Sehatmandi* project to Bamyan and Badakhshan provinces, after reports of successful experiences managing provincial hospitals in Namyān and Faisabad.¹⁴ The project manages operation of the health system on a pay-per-performance basis, which offers financial incentives to service providers for delivering quality health services. The overall aim of this strategy is to increase provision of services and improve accountability of doctors, nurses, and other healthcare workers. In Bamyan and Badakhshan, AKHS will oversee the management of two provincial hospitals, five district hospitals, 24 comprehensive health centers, 158 basic and primary health centers, and more than 1,000 village health posts. The larger *Sehatmandi* project, which began in the summer of 2018, will cover 31 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and aims to reach vulnerable populations with basic and underutilized services such as nutrition counseling and family planning.

In addition to attacks on healthcare facilities, attacks on schools have escalated, rising from 68 in 2017 to 192 last year,¹⁵ perhaps due to the use of schools as polling stations during last year’s elections.¹⁶ The situation is hampering children’s ability to get an education across the nation. Recent statistics estimate that 3.7 million children are out of school, 60% of whom are girls.¹⁷ In 2018, tertiary school enrollment reached only 10% of eligible students, though it was notably higher for males than for females (14.6% vs. 5.1%).¹⁸ The Government of Afghanistan, Education Cannot Wait, UNICEF, and a coalition of UN and NGO partners and donors launched a US\$157 million, multiyear program (2018–2021) to support education efforts in Afghanistan, with a particular focus on girls, internally displaced persons, and communities of returned refugees.¹⁹ This program will use community-based education initiatives to overcome the current barriers associated with access to education, including the inaccessibility of schools that have been closed due to security issues.²⁰

Afghanistan relies mostly on imported electricity from Central Asian countries, with transmissions vulnerable to insurgency attacks that at times can lead to blackouts lasting for days in Kabul and other cities. Though Afghanistan’s supply of electrical power has improved in recent years, ongoing challenges in this sector contribute to inequalities across the country and are a barrier to the nation’s economic growth. These challenges arise from weak sector governance, financial instability, and a growing Afghan population, all of which make it difficult to meet the increased power demands year after year.²¹ In 2019, the United States Energy Association and USAID issued a call to assess the electricity sector and provide strategic recommendations on how to advance the management and functioning of Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, Afghanistan’s national power utility.²² Though results of the assessment are not yet available, they are expected to guide improvements in this sector.

This chapter looks at access to services across Afghanistan in 2019, including electricity, food, water, healthcare, and education.

4.1 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (g) Electricity supply.*

Q-9a. *What is the main source of electricity in this household?*

Q-9b. *(If response given to Q-9a) On a typical day, how many hours do you have access to electricity in this household?*

Q-9c. *(If response given to Q-9a) What are the main uses of electricity?*

The public's perception of the nation's electricity supply has improved slightly, with 20.2% of respondents reporting that the situation has gotten better, up from 16.4% in 2018.

Urban respondents (32.7%) are more than twice as likely as rural respondents (15.9%) to report that electricity has gotten better. Around one-third of rural respondents (34.8%) say the situation has gotten worse. Individuals living in the North East (31.1%), the Central/Kabul region (24.8%), and the North West (23.1%) are more likely to report better access to electricity, while those living in the Central/Highlands region (6.6%) are least likely to report better access. By province, respondents living in Kanduz are most likely to report improved access to electricity (45.3%), while those in Kunar (62.2%), Nangarhar (49.9%), and Zabul (47.6%) are most likely to report that access has worsened.

The source of electricity differs depending on demographic characteristics. The vast majority of urban respondents (90.9%) get their power from the city power (grid), while just over a quarter of those living in rural areas (27.7%) get their power from the grid and over half (53.0%) rely on solar panels. Some 7.1% of rural respondents report that they have no household electricity, compared to 0.9% of urban respondents.

SOURCE OF ELECTRICITY, BY RURAL AND URBAN




FIG. 4.1: Q-9a. *What is the main source of electricity in this house?*

In most regions, solar panels are the most commonly cited source of electricity. The exceptions are the Central/Kabul, North East, and North West regions, where respondents rely mostly on power from the grid. Households with no electricity are most common in the North West (12.9%) and the South West (11.4%). By province, 25.4% of respondents in Sar-e-Pul, 21.2% of respondents in Nuristan, 15.5% in Paktia, and 15.1% in Helmand report having no electricity in the household.

The *Survey* also asks respondents who have access to electricity how many hours per day it is available. For almost half of respondents (46.4%), electricity is available 10 hours per day or less. For 15.4% of Afghans, electricity is available for 11 to 15 hours per day, while for 37.5%, electricity is available for 16 to 24 hours per day. Comparing urban and rural respondents, a significantly lower proportion of urban respondents have access to electricity for just five hours per day or less (urban 5.2%, rural 25.5%), while the proportion who have access 16–24 hours per day is higher among urbanites (urban 67.9%, rural 26.5%). In the Central/Highlands region, 75.4% of respondents have electricity for just five hours or less per day, while a majority have 16–24 hours of electricity per day in the Central/Kabul region (58.1%) and the North West (51.5%) (figure 4.2). By province, electricity is available most often in Kunduz (16–24 hours per day, 79.1%) and Kabul (16–24 hours per day, 76.6%), and least often in Daikundi (five hours or less per day, 81.1%) and Bamyan (five hours or less per day, 69.5%).

HOURS OF ELECTRICITY ACCESS, BY REGION




FIG. 4.2: Q-9b. On a typical day, how many hours do you have access to electricity in this household?

Among those that have access to electricity, the *Survey* asks about their two main usages. Similar to 2018, electricity is mainly used for lighting (72.9%), followed by television (28.0%) and fans or air conditioning (23.8%).

4.2 NUTRITION AND ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (d) Quality of food in your diet. (f) Health/well-being of your family members. (j) Access to clean drinking water. (k) Access to irrigation facilities

Q-17. In the past 12 months, have you or has anyone in your household visited a public hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?

Q-18a. (If Q-17 answer is yes) What type of services did you receive at the public hospital or clinic? (Allow two mentions.)

Q-18b. (If Q-17 answer is yes) How satisfied were you with the services you received at the public hospital or clinic? Were you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Q-18c. (If Q-17 answer is yes) How many minutes did it take you to reach the public hospital or clinic from your home?

Q-19. In the past 12 months, have you or has anyone in your household visited a private hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?

Q-20a. (If Q-19 answer is yes) What type of services did you receive at the private hospital or clinic? (Allow two mentions.)

Q-20b. (If Q-19 answer is yes) How satisfied were you with the services you received at the private hospital or clinic? Were you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Q-20c. (If Q-19 answer is yes) How many minutes did it take you to reach the private hospital or clinic from your home?

QUALITY OF FOOD

The *Survey* asked respondents about the quality of food in their diet and whether it has improved from last year. At the national level, 18.4% of Afghans report better diets in 2019. This has improved slightly from 2018 (17.1%), though the number falls far below the 2007 figure (31.6%). In 2019, 51.5% of Afghans feel the quality of their diet has remained the same, while 29.7% report that it is worse than the previous year.

There are no differences between urban and rural populations. Female respondents (20.5%) are more likely than males (16.3%) to say their diet has improved, and they are less likely than males to report a worsening diet (females 27.6%, males 31.8%). There is notable variation across provinces. About one-third of respondents in most provinces say the quality of their diet has declined, with the highest rates in Zabul (45.7%) and Daikundi (40.5%). In 2018, these figures were only 34.1% in Zabul and 21.9% in Daikundi, suggesting severe food insecurity and shortages in these provinces in the past year.

PERCEPTIONS OF FOOD QUALITY: WORSE




FIG. 4.3: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (d) Quality of food in your diet. (Percent who say worse.)

HEALTHCARE

Afghanistan has improved healthcare delivery and access over the past 18 years, and these efforts have resulted in tremendous improvements in maternal and child health and mortality.²³ However, the resurgence of insecurity and political instability over the past decade has hampered progress.

The *Survey* shows that the percentage of Afghans who feel the health and well-being of their households have declined in the past 12 months has gradually increased, from 11.2% in 2007 to 24.6% in 2019. In 2019, 22.2% feel that their household's health and well-being is better, while 52.6% say it is the same as last year. There are no differences between males and females, or between urban and rural respondents.

Afghanistan has improved healthcare delivery and access over the past 18 years, and these efforts have resulted in tremendous improvements in maternal and child health and mortality. However, the resurgence of insecurity and political instability over the past decade has hampered progress.

PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD HEALTH/WELL-BEING




FIG: 4.4. Q-8: Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (f) Health/well-being of your family members.

In most regions, about one-fourth of respondents report a decline in their household's health and well-being in the past 12 months. The figure is highest in the Central/Highlands region (32.6%) and lowest in the North East (20.5%). By province, the largest proportions of respondents reporting a decline in well-being were in Zabol (37.9%), Uruzgan (36.6%), and Herat (30.8%), while the lowest was in Panjshir (8.6%).

PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD HEALTH/WELL-BEING: WORSE



FIG. 4.5: Q-8: Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (f) Health/well-being of your family members. (Percent who say worse.)

Since 2018, the *Survey* has asked detailed questions about healthcare access and utilization in Afghanistan. When asked if the respondent or anyone in the household visited a public hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment in the past 12 months, 59.0% in 2018 and 60.4% in 2019 responded affirmatively. There are no meaningful differences between male and female respondents, though rates are slightly lower among urban respondents (57.0%) than rural respondents (61.6%). Badakhshan (92.1%), Kunar (80.5%), Paktia (80.4%), Bamiyan (77.4%), and Wardak (74.3%) have the highest rates of public healthcare utilization in the past 12 months.

USE OF PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC



FIG. 4.6: Q-17. *In the past 12 months, have you or has anyone in your household visited a public hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment? (Percent who say yes.)*

In 2019, 37.1% of Afghans who sought healthcare at a public facility say they received “good quality medicine,” following by “better examination” (25.6%), “health services” in general (19.7%), and “vaccination” (17.9%). Results are generally similar among urban and rural respondents, with a greater number of rural respondents than urban respondents saying they received “health services” and “vaccinations” (figure 4.7).

TYPES OF SERVICES RECEIVED IN PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC, BY RURAL AND URBAN

	URBAN	RURAL	NATIONAL LEVEL
	%	%	%
GOOD QUALITY MEDICINE	35	38	37
BETTER EXAMINATION	23	26	26
HEALTH SERVICES	13	22	20
VACCINATION	11	20	18
EXTENSIVE CARE	6	10	9
BLOOD PRESSURE CHECK AND TREATMENT	8	7	8
MIDWIFE ADVISORY	7	6	7
LABORATORY TESTS	8	5	6

FIG. 4.7: Q-18a. (If Q-17 answer is yes) What type of services did you receive at the public hospital or clinic?

When asked about their satisfaction with the care they received at public health facilities, 28.7% report being very satisfied, 48.8% are somewhat satisfied, and 14.2% are either somewhat or very dissatisfied. There is no variation by respondent gender or urban/rural residence.

The *Survey* asked those who sought public healthcare about the average time it took to reach the public facility. Over half of respondents (55.0%) say that it took 30 minutes or less, one-third (33.5%) report 31–60 minutes, and around one in 10 (9.8%) say it took over 60 minutes. There is no variation by respondent gender, but there are some differences between urban and rural respondents. More urban respondents than rural say it took 30 minutes or less to reach a public facility (rural 66.8%, urban 51.3%). More rural respondents than urban say it took over 60 minutes (rural 11.3%, urban 5.3%).

LENGTH OF TIME TO REACH PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC, BY DEMOGRAPHICS

	MALE	FEMALE	RURAL	URBAN	NATIONAL LEVEL
	%	%	%	%	%
1–30 MINUTES	56	54	51	67	55
31–60 MINUTES	33	35	36	27	34
OVER 60 MINUTES	10	9	11	5	10
DON'T KNOW	1	2	2	1	2

FIG. 4.8: Q-18c. (If Q-17 answer is yes) How many minutes did it take you to reach the public hospital or clinic from your home?

Afghans are less likely to receive private healthcare than public healthcare. In 2019, 41.0% of all respondents say they received care from a private hospital or clinic in the past 12 months, compared to 60.4% who received care at public institutions. The private healthcare figure is similar to 2018 (39.2%) and does not vary by respondent gender. Afghans residing in urban areas are more likely to use private health services than those in rural areas (47.9% vs. 38.6%). Variation by province is notable, with the highest rates of private care in Paktia (62.5%), Badakhshan (62.4%), Khost (62.3%), and Zabul (55.2%) and the lowest in Panjshir (10.6%), Badghis (20.5%), Sar-e-Pul (20.7%), Farah (21.1%), and Faryab (22.6 %).

USE OF PRIVATE HOSPITAL OR CLINIC



FIG. 4.9: Q-19. *In the past 12 months, have you or has anyone in your household visited a private hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment? (Percent who say yes.)*

The services most commonly received at private health facilities in 2019 were “good quality medicine” (37.0%), “better examination” (26.6%), and “health services” in general (19.1%), which is similar to the responses on public facilities.

TYPES OF SERVICES RECEIVED IN PRIVATE HOSPITAL OR CLINIC, BY RURAL AND URBAN

	RURAL	URBAN	NATIONAL LEVEL
	%	%	%
GOOD QUALITY MEDICINE	38	34	37
BETTER EXAMINATION	27	27	27
HEALTH SERVICES	21	15	19
EXTENSIVE CARE	10	5	9
LABORATORY TESTS	7	10	8
BLOOD PRESSURE CHECK AND TREATMENT	6	8	7
ULTRASOUND	6	6	6
MIDWIFE ADVISORY	5	5	5
VACCINATION	6	4	5
GENERAL SURGERY	5	4	5
X-RAY	4	5	4

FIG. 4.10: Q-20a. (If Q-19 answer is yes) What type of services did you receive at the private hospital or clinic?

Satisfaction with healthcare appears to be higher among those using private facilities rather than public. In 2019, 38.0% of private health facility users are “very satisfied,” 45.9% are “somewhat satisfied,” and 10.7% are either “somewhat” or “very” dissatisfied. Trends are similar for 2018 and 2019. Female respondents are generally more satisfied with the services provided than males (42.9% vs. 33.6% “very satisfied”). Residents of urban areas also report greater satisfaction than rural dwellers (43.5% vs. 35.8% “very satisfied”).

The average time to reach a private health facility was one to 30 minutes for 52.6% of respondents, 31 to 60 minutes for 30.0% of respondents, and over 60 minutes for 15.6% of respondents (figure 4.11). There are no major differences by respondent gender, though slightly more males than females say it took over 60 minutes to reach a private facility (17.9% vs. 13.1%). More urban respondents than rural respondents say it took 30 minutes or less to reach a private facility (76.1% vs. 42.8%). In contrast, more rural respondents than urban respondents needed at least 60 minutes to get to a private hospital or clinic (20.4% vs. 4.2%).

LENGTH OF TIME TO REACH PRIVATE HOSPITAL OR CLINIC, BY DEMOGRAPHICS

	MALE	FEMALE	RURAL	URBAN	NATIONAL LEVEL
	%	%	%	%	%
1–30 MINUTES	53	52	43	76	53
31–60 MINUTES	28	33	35	19	30
OVER 60 MINUTES	18	13	20	4	16
DON'T KNOW	1	2	2	1	2

FIG. 4.11: Q-20c. (If Q-19 answer is yes) How many minutes did it take you to reach the private hospital or clinic from your home?

ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER

Access to clean water is a basic human right, yet its availability and accessibility are often severely limited in developing countries. Given water's role in food security, disease prevention, and overall health, clean water access is fundamental to attaining many of the Sustainable Development Goals. Afghanistan has experienced continued shocks to its water systems over the past several decades, ranging from widespread drought to severe contamination from poor development and improper sewage channels.

In recent rounds, the *Survey* has asked respondents about their access to clean drinking water at the household level. Nationally in 2019, 23.8% of respondents report that access to clean drinking water was better in the past 12 months, 47.9% say it remained the same, while 27.9% report that it worsened. These figures have improved since 2018, when 18.6% said it was better and 37.2% said that it was worse. In 2019, there are differences between urban and rural respondents. Some 42.8% of urban respondents and 49.6% of rural respondents report that conditions are the same as the previous year, while 33.5% of urban and 26.1% of rural respondents say that access to clean drinking water has worsened.

Access to clean drinking water varied significantly across regions (figure 4.12). The percentage of respondents who indicated that water access had worsened in the past 12 months was about one-third in most regions except the South East (19.6%) and the East (23.3%), where rates were slightly lower.

ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER, BY REGION




FIG. 4.12: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (j) Access to clean drinking water.

According to respondents, access to clean drinking water had worsened most severely in Zabul (55.3%), Jawzjan (44.9%), Daikundi (42.4%), Takhar (40.6%), Kabul (38.5%) and Nimroz (38.4%) in the past 12 months.

ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER: WORSE




FIG. 4.13: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (j) Access to clean drinking water. (Percent who say worse.)

IRRIGATION FACILITIES

Closely linked to environmental shocks and food security in predominantly rural Afghanistan, access to irrigation facilities was made part of the *Survey* in 2018 and again this year. In 2018, 9.3% of respondents nationally reported better access to irrigation than the year before, 51.4% reported no change, and 36.8% reported that their access to irrigation had worsened. These figures have improved notably in 2019, to approximately 14.1% (better), 58.1% (no change), and 26.2% (worse).

Notable differences can be observed between urban and rural households. Some 6.4% of urban households, vs. 16.7% of rural households, reported better access to irrigation; 67.2% urban vs. 55.0% rural reported no change, and 22.1% urban vs. 27.6% rural reported worse access to irrigation facilities compared to the previous year. Across geographic regions, approximately one-fifth to one-third of respondents report that access has worsened.




FIG. 4.14: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (k) Access to irrigation facilities.

The extent to which access to irrigation got better varies among regions, with the Central/Highlands and Central/Kabul regions having the lowest rates (7.0% and 8.0%, respectively), while the South West and the East have the highest rates (20.9% and 22.9%, respectively). Alarming, 40% or more of respondents in some provinces say access to irrigation facilities has grown worse since last year, including Zabul (63.5%), Takhar (45.0%), Daikundi (44.8%), Uruzgan (44.3%), Ghor (41.4%), and Jawzjan (40.4%).

ACCESS TO IRRIGATION FACILITIES: WORSE



FIG. 4.15: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (k) Access to irrigation facilities. (Percent who say worse.)

4.3 EDUCATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (h) Quality of school services (teachers and curriculum).*

Q-11. *How many school-age children are there in this household? How many are boys and how many girls?*

Q-12. *Do all of them, some of them, or none of them attend school? (Write number.)*

Q-13. *(If Q-12 answer is "some of them" or "none of them") Why don't the children go to school?*

Q-15. *(If there are children attending school and Q-12a or Q-12b answer is "all of them" or "some of them") How many minutes of walking does it take your child to reach the closest school?*

Q-16. *(If there are children attending school and Q-12a or Q-12b answer is "all of them" or "some of them") Is the school public or private?*

In 2019, 23.2% of Afghan respondents report that the quality of school services has improved, while 53.5% think it has stayed the same and 22.7% feel it has worsened. Urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to report an improvement (28.8% vs. 21.3%). By province, those in Zabul (55.8%), Uruzgan (44.4%), and Ghazni (30.4%) are significantly more likely than respondents in other provinces to say the quality of school services has gotten worse. In contrast, respondents in Helmand (39.6%), Khost (37.7%), Samangan (33.0%), Kapisa (30.8%), and Laghman (29.6%) are more likely than respondents in other provinces to say school services have improved.

The 2019 *Survey* asks respondents additional questions regarding the number of male and female school-age children in the household and whether they attend school: 77.6% of households have school-age girls, and 83.3% have school-age boys.

As to whether these children attend school, *Survey* results reveal that girls are less likely to attend than boys (figure 4.16).

GENDER OF CHILDREN ATTENDING SCHOOL




FIG 4.16: Q-12. (If there are school-age children in household in Q-11) Do all of them, some of them, or none of them attend school?

The reasons why children do not attend school differ depending on their gender and by demographic characteristics.

Of the 5.8% of respondents whose boys do not attend school, more than one-third cite work as the reason (37.7%). And among the 14.9% who do not send their girls to school, 19.9% say their girls do not need education.

REASONS WHY CHILDREN DO NOT ATTEND SCHOOL




FIG. 4.17: Q-13. (If Q-12 answer is “some of them” or “none of them”) Why don’t the children go to school?

For rural respondents, the most-cited reasons for not sending girls to school are because girls do not need education (21.1%), transportation difficulties (18.1%), and quality of education (12.4%). For urban respondents, the reasons include unaffordable tuition (16.8%), “girls have to work” (15.2%), transportation difficulties (11.0%), and “girls do not need education” (10.9%).

Reasons for keeping girls out of school differ by region. Most respondents in the Central/Kabul region (16.9%), the East (18.1%), and the South East (29.3%) cite transportation difficulties; those in the South West (31.1%), the West (19.2%), and the North East (19.6%) say girls do not need education; and those in the Central/Highlands region (37.3%) and the North West (15.7%) say that girls need to work. The provinces with the highest proportion of respondents who mention tuition are Kunduz (24.0%), Daikundi (21.1%), and Khost (20.0%). The highest proportions of respondents who say girls need to work are in Bamyan (47.8%) and Badakhshan (35.1%). Respondents who cite quality of education are most common in Ghor (29.5%) and Uruzgan (20.0%). Transportation difficulties are most commonly mentioned in Paktia (45.0%) and Panjshir (40.7%), and those who say girls do not need education are most common in Nuristan (46.2%), Helmand (37.5%), and Zabul (36.0%).

For both rural and urban respondents, the most-cited reason for not sending boys to school is the need to work (rural 38.8%, urban 30.1%).

When asked about the length of time it takes for a child to reach the closest school, an overwhelming 77.5% say it takes 30 minutes or less, while 18.7% say 31 to 60 minutes and 2.2% say it takes over an hour for their child or children to walk to school.

There are small differences between urban and rural respondents, with urban children taking slightly less time to walk to school than rural children (e.g., 22.7% of urban children take 10 minutes or less to walk to school, compared to 13.3% of rural children; 2.3% of urban children take 45 to 60 minutes to walk to school, compared to 6.6% of rural children).

Among children who are attending school, 91.3% attend public schools and 5.1% attend private schools, while only 0.1% attend madrassa. Sending a child to a private school is more common among urban than rural respondents (11.0% vs. 3.2%). Private school attendance is more likely in the Central/Kabul region (8.4%) and the South East (8.2%) and least likely in Central/Highlands (0.4%).

4.4 AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

KEY QUESTION

Q-10. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school. (c) New private school. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking-water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements. (j) Agricultural programs. (k) New factory. (l) New mosque.*

As in previous years, the 2019 *Survey* probes Afghans' awareness of development projects (figure 4.18). In 2019, respondents are most likely to be aware of the reconstruction or building of roads or bridges in their area (37.8%), followed by the building of new mosques (29.8%), drinking-water projects (29.3%), agricultural programs (25.5%), healthcare (24.6%), government-supplied electricity (21.5%), irrigation projects (20.1%), new government schools (18.4%), new private schools (18.0%), reconciliations with antigovernment elements (12.0%), new private universities (7.6%), and new factories (6.4%). When compared to 2018, awareness of each type of project is higher, with the exception of healthcare projects, which fell slightly, from 25.7% in 2018 to 24.6% in 2019. The largest jump in awareness is for drinking-water projects, which increased from 24.2% in 2018 to 29.3% in 2019.

AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE LOCAL AREA




FIG. 4.18: Q-10. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school. (c) New private school. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking-water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements. (j) Agricultural programs. (k) New factory. (l) New mosque.

Survey findings show the positive correlation between awareness of local development projects and improvements in household economic performance (see chapter 3, “Economic Growth and Employment”).

Awareness of development projects also has a correlation with factors including optimism about the direction of the country, confidence in government, confidence in parliament, and satisfaction with government performance. This relationship holds true by urban/rural and by region.

Among those who say they are unaware of any development projects, 23.8% say the government is heading in the right direction. Optimism increases gradually by the number of development projects in the local area, to 65.8% among those who are aware of more than seven development projects.




FIG. 4.19: Q-10. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school. (c) New private school. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking-water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements. (j) Agricultural programs. (k) New factory. (l) New mosque. Q-1: Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? (Percent who say right direction.)*

This relationship is consistent by urban/rural status and by region. It also holds true for intercept respondents:²⁴ among those who say they aren't aware of any development projects, only 24.3% are optimistic about the direction of the country, compared to 61.6% of those who are aware of more than seven projects.

Awareness of development projects also has a positive relationship with ratings of government performance. Just 14.3% of those who are not aware of any development projects say the national government is doing a "very good" job, compared to 42.4% who are aware of seven or more projects in their local area. And when asked how successful the government has been in improving the living conditions of people in the local area, just 8.5% of those who aren't aware of any development projects say "a lot," compared to 38.8% of those who are aware of seven or more projects in the local area.

4.5 ECONOMIC STATUS AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

KEY QUESTION

Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (d) Quality of food in your diet. (f) Health/well-being of your family members. (g) Electricity supply. (h) Quality of school services (teachers and curriculum).

The proportion of all respondents who say their household's financial situation has worsened in the past year has climbed from 9.5% in 2007 to 31.1% in 2019.




FIG. 4.20: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.

This proportion has been declining, however, since hitting a peak in 2016. Among those whose household finances have worsened, figure 4.21 shows other dimensions (quality of food, health/well-being, electricity supply, quality of school services) that have gotten better or worse. Most of those with worsening household finances feel that these other dimensions have also gotten worse or stayed the same, with only small proportions reporting improvements in the quality of food (5.8%), health/well-being (12.4%), electricity supply (16.6%), and the quality of school services (16.8%).

ACCESS TO SERVICES, BY WORSENE FINANCIAL SITUATION

	(D) QUALITY OF FOOD	(F) HEALTH/WELL-BEING	(G) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	(H) QUALITY OF SCHOOL SERVICES
	%	%	%	%
BETTER	6	12	17	17
THE SAME	42	49	43	51
WORSE	52	38	39	32
DON'T KNOW	0	1	1	1

FIG. 4.21: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (d) Quality of food in your diet. (f) Health/well-being of your family members. (g) Electricity supply. (h) Quality of school services. (Percentage of those with a worsened financial situation who say “better” or “worse” for items d, f, g, and h.)

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5 GOVERNANCE

After three years of delay, the third parliamentary elections in Afghanistan were held on October 20, 2018.¹ Around 70% of the newly elected members of parliament are relatively young and new to the political scene.² The newly constituted lower house experienced a contentious opening when heated arguments and a brawl over the new leadership erupted during the first session, creating anxiety among Afghans.³ Political elites and international observers criticized this behavior as indicating a “weak” legislature, while some pointed an accusatory finger at President Ashraf Ghani.⁴ The subsequent imprisonment of all former commissioners of the Independent Election Commission and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission for large-scale administrative fraud during the parliamentary elections cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the elections.⁵

Given the relative infancy of the new parliamentarians, there is a higher level of expectation in this parliament than in previous years. For example, despite the issues around plenary sessions and absenteeism,⁶ it seems expectations by Afghans from this parliament are much higher than the previous years – more than half of Afghans surveyed this year (52.6%) express confidence in their member of parliament, the highest level of confidence recorded so far. On March 20, 2019, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced a delay in the presidential elections, specifically citing issues resulting from the amended electoral law and new reforms. On April 20, the Afghan Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent president and his vice presidents should continue to serve until the election of the new president.⁷ The court’s ruling came after an announcement by the IEC that the presidential election would be held on September 28, more than four months after the end of the president’s five-year constitutional term.⁸

At the same time, peace negotiations—with the prospect of a cease-fire—and fair, transparent elections continue to be high priorities for Afghans in 2019. While the government placed its emphasis on holding elections on schedule, the international community focused on a peace process, still others wanted both elections and peace negotiations to move forward simultaneously.⁹ To find a common approach to peace talks with the Taliban, President Ghani commenced a four day *loya jirga* (grand council) with more than 3,200 delegates.¹⁰ However, some presidential candidates and politicians, including Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, refused to participate in this consultative process.¹¹ According to the *Survey*, more than two-thirds of Afghans (88.7%) express their support (strongly or somewhat) for peace-talk efforts, and Afghans are more likely this year to cite prospects for peace among their reasons for optimism: 26.3% in 2019 vs. 16.4% in 2018.

On September 9, the peace talks came to a sudden halt with a tweet by U.S. president Donald Trump. At the time of writing, there is no indication that they will be resumed. However, news of a Special

Representative Zalmay Khalilzad meeting with the Taliban delegation led by its cofounder, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, emerged in October. U.S. officials have not confirmed the meeting and at the time of writing remain adamant that there have been no new negotiations since President Trump called them off.¹² See chapter 6, Political Participation, for more discussion on the peace talks.

While elections and peace talks are prominent in the Afghan milieu in 2019, the issue of corruption is also salient. This chapter explores attitudes on governance in Afghanistan, including perceptions on corruption, dispute resolution mechanisms, local justice, and confidence in government institutions

5.1 SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-27. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

Q-57. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (m) Your member of parliament.*

Q-58. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) National Unity Government. (b) Provincial government. (c) Municipal authorities (urban residents only). (d) District government (rural residents only).*

Q-100. *How successful do you think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in your area: a lot, a little, or not at all?*

Satisfaction with the performance of different levels of Afghan government has increased continuously over the last five years.

Satisfaction with the performance of different levels of Afghan government has increased continuously over the last five years. Around two-thirds of Afghans in 2019 (65.7%) believe that the National Unity Government (NUG) is doing a good job (20.1% very good, 45.6% somewhat good), a 6-point increase from 2018 (59.6%) and a 9.5-point increase from 2017 (56.2%). Respondents in the South West (72.6%), the North East (66.4%), the Central/Kabul region (61.5%), and the North West (60.2%) report significant increases in satisfaction with the NUG's performance compared to 2018 (respectively 68.2%, 54.0%, 51.2%, and 48.1%). Satisfaction with the performance of provincial governments (64.5%) is also higher than 2018 (61.3%). Rural residents (66.7%) are more satisfied with provincial governments' performance than urban residents (58.0%). More than half of urban residents, 60.0%, express satisfaction

with municipal authorities, up from 52.3% in 2018, and 59.0% of rural respondents believe that district government is doing a good job (very good or somewhat good), up from 54.4% in 2018.

SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE




FIG. 5.1: Q-52. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) National Unity Government. (b) Provincial government. (c) Municipal authorities (urban residents only). (d) District government (rural residents only). (Percent who say “very good job” or “somewhat good job.”)

Male respondents who express satisfaction with the NUG’s performance have increased by 8.7 percentage points, from 57.3% in 2018 to 66.0% in 2019. Satisfaction with the NUG rose noticeably in urban areas, from 52.3% in 2018 to 64.6% in 2019, and it has risen by 32.8 percentage points in Baghlan, 22.7 points in Sar-e-Pul, 19.8 points in Parwan, 14.7 points in Kunduz, 12.7 points in Kandahar, and 12.3 points in Balkh. In many other provinces, such as Ghazni, Nimroz, and Herat, satisfaction has decreased. Respondents in the East (85.0%), South West (72.6%), and North East (66.4%) express the highest levels of confidence, while respondents in the Central/Highlands region express the lowest (49.6%).

The *Survey* asked Afghans how successful they think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in their area. More than half of respondents, 69.3%, say a little or a lot, the highest level of confidence reported so far.

On a related matter, the *Survey* asked Afghans how successful they think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in their area. More than half of respondents, 69.3%, say a little or a lot, the highest level of confidence reported so far. Regionally, respondents in the East (77.8%), South West (77.5%), and West (75.8%) express the highest level of confidence, while respondents in the Central/Highlands region express the lowest level of confidence (58.2%).

HAS GOVERNMENT IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS IN LOCAL AREA?




FIG. 5.2: Q-100. *How successful do you think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in your area: a lot, a little, or not at all? (Percent who say “a lot” or “a little.”)*

As indicated earlier, confidence in the provincial government has increased, from 61.3% in 2018 to 64.5% in 2019. By strata, rural respondents (66.7%) express more confidence than urban respondents (58.0%). There are no significant differences by gender, but the perceptions of male respondents have improved compared to last year, with 64.1% of male respondents expressing satisfaction with provincial government in 2019, up from 58.3% in 2018.

Among urban respondents, there has been a 5.9 percentage point increase in satisfaction since last year, from 52.1% in 2018 to 58.0% in 2019. Regionally, Afghans express growing satisfaction with provincial government in the East (2018: 74.2%; 2019: 77.9%), North East (2018: 59.8%; 2019: 73.6%), North West (2018: 61.0%; 2019: 65.2%), and Central/Kabul region (2018: 51.1%; 2019: 57.4%). Afghans in the South East report decreased satisfaction with provincial government (64.7% in 2018, 57.0% in 2019).

By province, respondents in Panjshir (97.5%), Samangan (90.6%), Laghman (82.0%), Wardak (79.1%), and Baghlan (78.4%) express the highest levels of satisfaction, whereas the lowest levels were reported in Zabul (36.1%), Ghazni (42.2%), Kabul (49.3%), Paktika (55.2%), and Sar-e-Pul (57.5%).

The relationship between confidence in one’s member of parliament and satisfaction with provincial government and the relationship between level of fear and satisfaction with provincial government remain the same in 2019. Respondents who express “some” or “a lot” of confidence in their MPs are more likely to say the provincial government is doing a good job (76.3%) than those who report “not much” or “no confidence at all” (51.3%). Also, respondents who fear for their safety are less likely to express satisfaction with provincial government.

CONFIDENCE IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, BY LEVEL OF FEAR




FIG. 5.3: Q-58. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item], is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (b) Provincial government. (Percent who say “very good job” or “somewhat good job.”) **Q-27.** How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family’s safety?

5.2 CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

KEY QUESTION

Q-57. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (c) Independent Election Commission. (d) Community development councils. (e) Community shuras/jirgas. (f) Government ministers. (g) International NGOs. (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV. (i) National NGOs. (j) Parliament as a whole. (k) Provincial councils. (l) Religious leaders. (m) Your member of parliament.

The *Survey* asks respondents to rate their level of confidence in different governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Overall, confidence in governmental and nongovernmental organizations has increased, except for the Independent Election Commission, which has dropped marginally, from 43.3% in 2018 to 42.3% in 2019. The failure of the IEC to conduct fair parliamentary elections across the country in 2018, the involvement of IEC members in election fraud,¹³ and delays in the presidential elections by the IEC¹⁴ may have contributed to this marginal decrease.

As in previous years, Afghans had the most confidence in religious leaders (71.2%). Compared to 2018, confidence in MPs has gone up by 10.2 percentage points, from 42.3% in 2018 to 52.6% in 2019, the highest level so far. Rural respondents express more confidence in their MPs than urban respondents (55.0% vs. 45.6%), and more confidence in parliament as a whole than urban respondents (50.2% vs. 37.1%). Overall confidence in parliament is 46.9% in 2019.

Confidence in the following organizations has improved since last year: government ministers (up 6.1 percentage points, to 44.4%), national NGOs (up 4.0 percentage points, to 53.3%), provincial councils (up 4.7 percentage points, to 55.6%) and international NGOs (up 4.9 percentage points, to 47.3%).

CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION		57	67	54	59	60		66	36	34	38	43	42
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	64	65	64	61	68	66	63	65	61	53	58	58	60

COMMUNITY SHURAS/JIRGAS	72	69	67	66	70	68	65	69	64	62	66	65	67
GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	57	51	53	54	56	55	45	47	42	36	36	38	44
INTERNATIONAL NGOS	64	64	66	54	56	53	51	53	44	44	42	42	47
MEDIA SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	62	63	62	57	69	71	68	73	67	65	66	67	69
NATIONAL NGOS	60	62	61	55	54	54	51	57	50	48	49	49	53
PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE				59	62	62	50	51	42	37	37	40	47
PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	70	65	62	62	67	66	58	58	52	47	48	51	56
RELIGIOUS LEADERS					74	73	65	70	64	66	67	69	71
YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT							47	52	43	35	35	42	53

FIG. 5.4: Q-57. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (c) Independent Election Commission. (d) Community development councils. (e) Community shuras/jirgas. (f) Government ministers. (g) International NGOs. (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV. (i) National NGOs. (j) Parliament as a whole. (k) Provincial councils. (l) Religious leaders. (m) Your member of parliament. (Percent who say “some” or “a lot of” confidence.) (Note: blanks represent years the question was not asked.)*

5.3 CORRUPTION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-43. *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (a) Officials in the municipality/district office. (b) Provincial governor's office. (c) Customs office. (d) Afghan National Police. (e) Afghan National Army. (f) Judiciary/courts. (g) Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (state-owned power supply company). (h) Hospitals/clinics. (i) When applying for a job. (j) Admissions to schools/university. (k) When receiving official documents from schools/university.*

Q-44. *Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (a) In your daily life. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole.*

Efforts to reduce corruption in Afghanistan are ongoing. During 2018 and 2019, more than 30 high-level corruption cases were prosecuted by Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC).¹⁵ To date, the ACJC's primary court has convicted a number of senior officials, including deputy ministers, military generals, members of provincial councils, mayors, and a governor.¹⁶

In an effort to reduce opportunities for corruption in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), particularly the reporting of nonexistent "ghost" soldiers on personnel rolls, the American-backed Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) was introduced in May 2019. The APPS, relying on biometric registration of soldiers, has resulted in the registration of 10,000 fewer ANA and 25,000 fewer ANP members than those reported to SIGAR in the previous quarter. Compared to the same quarter in 2018, the ANDSF's reported strength has decreased by 41,777 soldiers.¹⁷

Since 2006, the *Survey* has asked Afghans about their perceptions of corruption—whether it's a major problem, a minor problem or no problem at all—in Afghanistan as a whole and in their daily life.

Overall, 81.5% of respondents in 2019 say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole, identical with last year (81.5%). At the same time, 15.6% say corruption is a minor problem, and 2.5% say corruption is not a problem at all.

Regionally, perceptions of corruption as a major problem in Afghanistan have risen in the South West (from 73.3% in 2018 to 83.0% in 2019) and the East (from 78.7% in 2018 to 84.5% in 2019) and declined in the South East (from 78.1% in 2018 to 68.8% in 2019) and the North West (from 82.0% in 2018 to 77.2% in 2019).

By province, respondents in Panjshir (96.8%), Helmand (95.0%), Nangarhar (93.1%), and Kabul (92.9%) are the most likely to say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan, while respondents in Paktia (50.0%), Sar-e-Pul (56.3%), Ghor (57.0%), and Paktika (57.1%) are least likely. Urban respondents are more likely to say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan (88.7%) than rural respondents (79.0%).




FIG. 5.5: Q-44. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole. (Percent who say “major problem” or “minor problem.”)

Some 67.9% of Afghans surveyed say corruption is a major problem in their daily life, 2.7 percentage points lower than the 70.6% in 2018. More than one-fifth of respondents, 23.1%, call this a minor problem, and 8.3% say it is not a problem at all.

Perception of corruption as a major problem in daily life is highest in Helmand (93.7%), Badghis (85.2%), Uruzgan (83.4%), Nangarhar (83.2%), and Kabul (82.7%) and lowest in Paktika (30.4%), Panjshir (35.6%), Nimroz (42.0%), Kapisa (47.7%), and Paktia (50.1%).

Urban residents (75.6%) are more likely to see corruption as a major problem in their daily lives than rural residents (65.3%), and males (71.7%) are more likely than females (64.2%). This result for females represents a notable decline from 70.6% in 2018.

The differences between urban and rural respondents may be attributable to the more frequent contact urbanites have with government officials and institutions (e.g., universities), which may result in higher expectations that bribes will be necessary simply to navigate an urban setting.

PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN DAILY LIFE




FIG. 5.6: Q-44. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (a) In your daily life. (Percent who say “major problem” or “minor problem.”)

Respondents were asked how often they encounter corruption among various authorities and institutions, and, depending on the institution, experiences of corruption vary.

Respondents are more likely to say they do not experience corruption when dealing with the Afghan National Police (57.6%), the Afghan National Army (67.9%), the judiciary/courts (45.2%), Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (state-owned power supply company) (57.8%), hospitals/clinics (60.6%), while applying for a job (50.8%), seeking admission to schools/university (67.9%), or while receiving official documents from schools/universities (62.6%).

Urban respondents are more likely to say they do not experience corruption than rural respondents. The latter rural respondents are more likely to experience corruption “in most cases” than urban respondents.

EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION, BY STRATA

RURAL	IN NO CASES (%)	IN MOST CASES (%)
OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICT OFFICE	44	22
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	47	17
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	55	15
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	65	11
JUDICIARY/COURTS	44	19
DA AFGHANISTAN BRESHNA SHERKAT (STATE-OWNED POWER SUPPLY COMPANY)	52	16
HOSPITALS/CLINICS	56	14
WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	47	17
ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY	63	12
WHEN RECEIVING OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY	59	13
URBAN		
OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICT OFFICE	62	13
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	64	13
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	66	11
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	78	6
JUDICIARY/COURTS	52	14
DA AFGHANISTAN BRESHNA SHERKAT (STATE-OWNED POWER SUPPLY COMPANY)	69	7
HOSPITALS/CLINICS	73	7
WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	61	13
ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY	80	6
WHEN RECEIVING OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY	73	8

FIG. 5.7. Q-43: *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations. Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (a) Officials in the municipality/district office. (b) Provincial governor's office. (c) Customs office. (d) Afghan National Police. (e) Afghan National Army. (f) Judiciary/courts. (g) Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (state-owned power supply company). (h) Hospitals/clinics. (i) When applying for a job. (j) Admissions to schools/university. (k) When receiving official documents from schools/university.*

5.4 JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-35. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the available dispute-resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

Q-36. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the state court, Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?*

Q-37. *(If Q-36 answer is yes) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single response. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one.)*

Q-38. *(If Q-36 answer is yes) Were you fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?*

Q-39. *(If Q-36 answer is yes) Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Allow more than one response.)*

Q-40. *(If Q-39 answer is "Huquq Department") And now let's turn to the local Huquq, Department. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department? (a) Local huquqs are fair and trusted. (b) Local huquqs follow the local norms and values of our people. (c) Local huquqs are effective at delivering justice. (d) Local huquqs resolve cases quickly and efficiently. (e) Local huquqs treat men and women equally.*

Q-41. *(If Q-39 answer is "state courts") Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? (a) State courts are fair and trusted. (b) State courts follow the local norms and values of our people. (c) State courts are effective at delivering justice. (d) State courts resolve cases timely and promptly. (e) State courts treat men and women equally.*

Q-42. *(If Q-39 answer is "shura/jirga") And now let's turn to village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas? (a) Local shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted. (b) Local shuras/jirgas follow the local norms and values of our people. (c) Local shuras/jirgas are effective at delivering justice. (d) Local shuras/jirgas resolve cases timely and promptly. (e) There should be local women's shuras/jirgas.*

Afghanistan's current dispute-resolution and formal justice sector is known for lengthy procedures, corruption, and influence by politicians. In many areas of the country, people still resort to the informal justice sector and resolve their issues through informal procedures. In urban and rural areas, the lack

of qualified judges, perceived corruption in formal justice institutions, inaccessibility of courts, and the traditional reliance on informal dispute resolution, compounded by frequent episodes of insecurity, all contribute to Afghans' preference for informal justice.¹⁸ Sources including the United Nations report a shortage of Afghan courts throughout the country. The latest reports suggest that Afghan courts function in only 232 of Afghanistan's 378 districts. Similarly, the Attorney General's Office has a presence in only 283 districts. Legal services provided by the Ministry of Justice are more accessible, available in 336 districts.¹⁹

The *Survey* asks Afghans about their level of satisfaction with the available dispute-resolution services. Some 16.6% of respondents say they are very satisfied with dispute-resolution services, 52.3% say they are somewhat satisfied, 21.7% are somewhat dissatisfied, and only 8.2% are very dissatisfied, much as in 2018.

Regionally, satisfaction has increased in the Central/Kabul region (from 60.9% in 2018 to 66.1% in 2019), the East (from 73.3% in 2018 to 75.1% in 2019), the South East (from 61.1% in 2018 to 65.2% in 2019), the South West (from 65.7% in 2018 to 70.1% in 2019), and the North East (from 71.5% in 2018 to 75.0% in 2019). Respondents in the Central/Highlands region report a 9.1 percentage point decrease in their satisfaction this year, from 83.1% in 2018 to 74.0% in 2019.

USE OF STATE COURT, HUQUQ, OR SHURA/JIRGA TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE




FIG.5.8: Q-36. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the state court, Huquq Department, or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not? (Percent who say yes.) (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)*

Among those Afghans who have used dispute-resolution services, 46.6% report taking their case to a *shural/jirga*, 41.5% to state courts, and 25.2% to the Huquq Department. Urban respondents are more likely to use a state court (52.2%) or the Huquq Department (30.2%) to resolve their disputes, while rural respondents are more likely to use a local *shural/jirga* (48.0%).

This year, 20.6% of Afghans report bringing a problem or dispute to either a state court, a Huquq (rights) Department, or a local *shural/jirga*. This is a decline from 23.1% in 2018.

By ethnicity, Pashtuns (25.9%) are more likely to report using one of these institutions than Uzbeks (19.7%), Hazaras (18.1%), and Tajiks (16.0%).

Afghans are asked their opinion of the dispute-resolution institutions they used. Similarly to previous years, Afghans have a lot of confidence in local *shuras/jirgas*: 81.2% of Afghans say that local *shuras/jirgas* are fair and trusted, 74.4% say they follow local norms and values, 74.2% say they are effective at delivering justice, and 73.2% say local *shuras/jirgas* resolve cases quickly and efficiently—all much higher proportions than users of the Huquq Department or the state courts.

OPINIONS ABOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTIONS

	HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	STATE COURT	LOCAL SHURA/JIRGA
	%	%	%
FAIR AND TRUSTED	73	66	81
FOLLOWS NORMS OF THE PEOPLE	63	57	74
EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	62	53	74
RESOLVES CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY	54	47	73

FIG. 5.9: Q-40 to Q-42. And now let's turn to the [insert item]. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the [institution]? (a) It is fair and trusted. (b) It follows the norms and values of our people. (c) It is effective at delivering justice. (d) It resolves cases quickly and efficiently. (Percent who "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" about the institution they used.)

TYPES OF CASES TAKEN TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION




FIG. 5.10: Q-37. (If Q-36 answer is yes) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single response. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one.)

As in 2018, the most common cases taken to dispute resolution are disputes over land (49.2%), family problems (17.8%), property disputes other than land (11.4%), commercial disputes (8.5%), traffic accidents (8.2%), and divorce (2.9%).

The types of cases most commonly taken to dispute resolution vary by gender, with females more likely than males to report family problems (females 21.1%, males 14.7%) and divorce cases (females 3.7% and males 2.1%) and males more likely to report commercial disputes (females 6.3%, males 10.7%).

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6 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The political situation in Afghanistan has been fluid and unstable throughout much of 2019. The terms of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah as joint heads of the National Unity Government ended on May 22.^{1,2} However, this was officially extended by the Supreme Court.³ Despite the legal extension, a number of political opponents, including the Council of Presidential Candidates,⁴ have questioned the NUG's legitimacy and called for a caretaker government to be installed.⁵ (In addition to calls for an interim government due to the "end" of Ghani's term, there have been numerous calls for the establishment of an interim government to take part in peace talks with the Taliban.) Political opponents indicated there would be mass protests should President Ghani retain his position. But, despite their pronouncements, President Ghani's opponents have been unable to galvanize their supporters or the wider Afghan population to further their cause, and President Ghani and the NUG have largely continued as normal. That said, there is still ire directed at President Ghani, and there are persistent accusations from some that he had abused his political powers.^{6,7,8}

The presidential elections, originally scheduled for April 20, were postponed until July 20, and then to September 28.⁹ There had been concerns that the presidential elections would be cancelled again due to U.S.-Taliban peace talks. President Ghani continuously indicated throughout 2019, however, that his aim was for the elections to go ahead as scheduled, and they did.

The presidential elections took place on the heels of parliamentary elections in 2018 that were marked by violence, fraud, intimidation, threats from the Taliban, and harassment of voters and election workers in the weeks and months leading up to the election.¹⁰ UNAMA reported that during the three days that voting took place, there were over 400 casualties (56 dead, 379 injured) and 108 incidents of election-related violence, which is higher than the previous four elections.¹¹

Despite this campaign of violence and intimidation,¹² approximately 3.2 million Afghans voted in 2018.¹³ At the time of the field interviews for the *Survey*, which took place from July 11 – August 7, 2019 these threats and attacks did not appear to have dampened voter appetite, with one-third of respondents in this year's *Survey* indicating that they planned to vote in the upcoming presidential election. However, while respondents may find it easy to say they will vote, their ability to vote can be hampered by not only violence and intimidation, but also distance to polling stations and the actual desire to vote.

There continue to be concerns regarding the capacity of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to conduct free and fair elections. After a long delay, the parliamentary election results from October 2018 were finally released (with the exception of Ghazni province,¹⁴ where insecurity prevented voting), meaning that after a four-year delay, a new parliament could finally be inaugurated on April 26, 2019.¹⁵

Despite this, concerns about transparency have lingered. For example, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) nullified all 2018 parliamentary election results for Kabul province, claiming “mismanagement, violations of the electoral law, dereliction of duty by the IEC, and a lack of transparency.”¹⁶ The nullification was later overturned by a new ECC¹⁷ and the results allowed to stand. This did not allay concerns over electoral management, however. Highlighting voter concerns, Afghan citizens reported close to 20,000 cases of fraud related to the 2018 parliamentary elections.¹⁸ To date, the Attorney General’s Office has only pursued prosecutions in a handful of those complaints, indicating a possible lack of capacity to investigate, or perhaps a lack of will. Such was the concern over the capacity of the IEC that on February 12, 2019, President Ghani dismissed 12 electoral commissioners and replaced them, on March 4, with a new commission.¹⁹ The previous IEC members were reported to the Attorney General’s Office for electoral crimes^{20,21} and have been sentenced to prison for five years each.²² The resulting public skepticism is reflected in the number of Afghans surveyed who say they believe that elections are free and fair, which stands at 52.3%.

The capacity of the IEC to administer elections was further thrown into question by reports suggesting that as many as 2,000 of the country’s 7,378 voting stations would be closed on polling day 2019,²³ meaning that concerns over voter representation would likely persist. Taliban threats to disrupt the elections²⁴ and a complex attack targeting President Ghani’s vice presidential running mate²⁵ may also have dampened voter enthusiasm, as evidenced by reports of a record low voter turnout.²⁶

The political environment was further complicated by ongoing talks between U.S. and Taliban officials. Up until September 9, after a series of meetings, a U.S.-Taliban agreement appeared tantalizingly close, but after a Taliban attack in Kabul city killed a U.S. soldier, President Trump cancelled the peace talks, later declaring them “dead.”²⁷ For the moment, peace talks appear to be resurfacing with Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad engaging in meeting with regional representatives from Russia, China, and Pakistan, alluding to the possible resumption of US-Taliban peace talks.²⁸

An oft-stated and unwavering message has been the Taliban’s refusal to recognize the Afghan government, referring to them as a “corrupt and illegitimate puppet of foreign powers”²⁹ and refusing to enter into any form of negotiations with them. This Taliban stance held firm throughout the U.S.-Taliban talks. In a positive development, however, there has been exploratory intra-Afghan dialogue (albeit without official government representation) between Taliban officials, Afghan politicians, influential figures, and members of Afghan civil society, in Moscow, Russia, and Doha, Qatar. The last round of intra-Afghan talks ended on July 8, with a joint “Resolution of Intra Afghan Peace Conference”³⁰ in which a number of proposals for future negotiations were included. Little of the resolution was enforceable, however, and there appears to have been little in the way of tangible progress, but the talks may have acted as an ice-breaking measure and set the stage for more substantial discussions in the future.

The Afghan government has taken steps to prepare themselves for future talks by dissolving the High Peace Council Secretariat, establishing a State Ministry of Peace Affairs,³¹ and forming an “inclusive” government negotiating team.³² The composition of the team has not been made public, however,³³

leading to questions from political observers, Afghan figures,³⁴ and the Taliban about the influence that some powerful figures may have in the team, and raising further questions as to its mandate and political authority. This chapter explores political participation in Afghanistan.

6.1 POLITICS AND RELIGION

KEY QUESTION

Q-45. *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*

This year, 57.4% of respondents say that religious leaders should be consulted in politics. This represents a decline of 2.3 percentage points from 2018 and is the second-lowest figure since the *Survey* first asked this question, in 2006. Some 40.0% say that religious leaders should not be involved in politics, an increase of almost 3 percentage points over 2018 and the second-highest figure since the *Survey* first asked this question, in 2006.

By gender, males are more likely than females to say that religious leaders should be consulted or involved in politics (males 60.6%, females 54.2%). Females are more inclined than males to say that religious leaders should *not* be involved in politics (females 42.4%, males 37.5%).

Rural respondents (59.2%) are more likely to support the idea than urbanites (52.1%). Disaggregating by province, respondents in Panjshir (98.5%) and Badakhshan (88.6%) are more likely to support the involvement of religious leaders in politics, while respondents in Faryab (42.4%), Badghis (44.4%), and Farah (45.8%) are least likely to support the idea.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN POLITICS




FIG. 6.1: Q-45. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view? (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)

The number of people who report some or a lot of fear while voting is now at its highest level ever (63.3%).

6.2 EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS

KEY QUESTION

Q-47. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration. (c) Running for public office.

The number of people who report some or a lot of fear while voting is now at its highest level ever (63.3%). While this is a small increase over 2018 (62.4%), it is 22 percentage points higher than 2006, when the question was first asked. The number of people who report no fear while voting is at its lowest recorded level (36.4%), 21 percentage points below 2006, when the figure was at its highest (57.0%) and when the question was first asked.

FEAR WHILE VOTING




FIG. 6.2: Q-47. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (Percent who say “some fear” or “a lot of fear.”)

When asked about levels of fear when running for public office, the number of respondents who say they would have no fear stands at 26.5%, a 4 percentage point increase over 2018 (22.4%) and the most since 2013 (38.6%). Males (30.7%) are significantly more likely than females (22.4%) to say they would have no fear when running for public office. However, females (31.4%) are significantly more likely than males (22.6%) to say they would have a lot of fear when running for public office. Disaggregating by region, respondents in Zabul (60.7%) and Nuristan (59.8%) are most likely to report a lot of fear when running for public office, while those in Bamyan (6.4%) and Panjshir (5.4%) report the lowest levels of fear.

An increase from 73.1% in 2018, fear while participating in a demonstration is now at its highest level ever, 75.2%, which represents an approximately 14.7 percentage point increase over 2006 (60.6%). Respondents who express a lot of fear of participating in a demonstration are most common in Zabul (54.8%), Nuristan (48.0%), Paktia (43.3%), Faryab (42.7%), Farah (42.6%), and Jawzjan (42.4%). The percentage of respondents claiming no fear when participating in a demonstration is highest in Panjshir (67.8%), Bamyan (58.0%), and Nimroz (49.8%).

6.3 DEMOCRACY

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-46. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you (a) Very satisfied? (b) Somewhat satisfied? (c) Somewhat dissatisfied? (d) Very dissatisfied?*

Q-48. *In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government, while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. Thinking back to a year ago, how safe did you feel expressing your opinions about the government in public?*

Q-49. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions: a lot, some, very little, or none at all?*

Q-57. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. (f) Government ministers.*

More than half of Afghans, 65.1%, are either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. This represents a 3.7 percentage point increase over 2018. It should be noted that before the 2018 *Survey*, parliamentary elections had not taken place, while for 2019, respondents have the parliamentary elections to refer back to when considering if they feel democracy works.

A small increase in satisfaction is noted among rural respondents, from 62.3% in 2018 to 64.8% in 2019, while a more substantial, 7 percentage point increase is observed among urban respondents, from 58.9% in 2018 to 65.9% in 2019. Females (67.4%) are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works than males (62.8%).

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY




FIG. 6.3: Q-46. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. (Percent who respond “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied.”) (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)*

A majority of Afghans (57.9%) continue to believe that it is safe to publicly criticize the government, a slight increase over the 55.6% who responded to the same question in 2018. Surprisingly, females (60.0%) are more inclined to feel it is safe to publicly criticize the government than males (55.8%). When disaggregated by strata, those in rural areas (56.8%) are less likely to feel that they can publicly criticize the government than those in urban areas (60.9%). A majority of respondents in Panjshir (94.1%) feel that it is safe to publicly criticize the government, while respondents in Zabul (30.6%), Faryab (34.4%), and Nuristan (38.5%) display less optimism.

The number of Afghans who believe that they can have some or a lot of influence over local (district/provincial) government decisions (54.2%) has increased negligibly since 2018 (52.9%). This is the second-highest figure in *Survey* history, exceeded only by 55.9% in 2014, and it continues the trend of year-on-year increases since 2016. Disaggregating by gender, males (55.3%) are marginally more likely than females (53.0%) to feel they have influence over local government decisions.

Longitudinal trends identified in the *Survey* suggest that a person’s socioeconomic status correlates with their support for democracy. Respondents who say that their household financial situation has improved are more likely to be satisfied with democracy (76.1%) than those who say their financial situation has gotten worse (55.2%).

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, BY HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION




FIG.6.4: Q-46. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. (Percent who respond “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied.”)* **Q-8.** *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)*

There are also longitudinal trends correlating confidence in government ministries and satisfaction with democracy.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, BY CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES




FIG. 6.5: Q-57. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. (f) Government ministers. (Percent who say "a lot of confidence" or "no confidence at all" in government ministers.) Q-46.* *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you (a) Very satisfied? (b) Somewhat satisfied? (c) Somewhat dissatisfied? (d) Very dissatisfied? (Very or somewhat satisfied.) (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)*

6.4 ELECTIONS

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-50a. *Did you vote in the parliamentary elections held in October 2018?*

Q-50b. *Why didn't you vote? (a) Because of insecurity. (b) Injustice. (c) It is not beneficial. (d) Because of fraud. (e) Not interested. (f) Because of bad leadership. (g) Because of fear of Taliban. (h) Don't have a voting card. (i) Because of corruption. (j) Do not have a Tazkira (national ID card). (k) Do not have time. (l) Do not have permission. (m) Lack of polling stations. (n) Interference by America.*

Q-51a. *Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months?*

Q-52. What was your main source of information about the elections? (a) TV. (b) Radio. (c) Newspaper. (d) Village chief / community leaders. (e) Schoolteacher. (f) Religious leader. (g) Friends, family, and neighbors. (h) Pamphlets. (i) Government employees. (j) Villagers. (k) Facebook. (l) Messages via mobile.

Q-53a. When people talk about elections, they often use the term “free and fair.” By “free,” they generally mean that all people have the chance to vote as they wish. By “fair,” they generally mean that all candidates/parties follow the rules and are given equal access to the public, and votes were counted correctly and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair,” in general do you think the next election in Afghanistan will be free and fair, or not?

Q-53b. What makes you think this election will not be free and fair?

Q-54. Have you registered yourself for the elections?

Q-55a. Do you plan to vote in this election?

Q-55b. Why don't you plan to vote in this election?

Q-56a. In your opinion, what are your most important criteria for an ideal President? Anything else?

Q-56b. When thinking about who to vote for in the upcoming election, would you definitely vote for, probably vote for, or definitely not vote for: (a) A president who will fight against corruption even if people close to him are involved in corruption. (b) A president who will get a peace agreement with the Taliban, even if women are no longer allowed to go to school. (c) A president who will get a peace agreement with the Taliban, even if women no longer work outside the home.

Among *Survey* respondents, 58.6% say that they voted in the parliamentary election. More males (66.9%) claim to have voted than females (50.3%). By province, respondents were most likely to say they had voted in the historically more permissive central regions of Bamyan (88.1%), Daikundi (87.7%), and Panjshir (86.7%) and least likely in Zabul (30.1%). It is unsurprising, given Afghanistan's largely rural population, that rural residents were a higher percentage of all voters (59.8%) than urban residents (55.0%).

When respondents were asked why they did not vote, the predominant answers were insecurity (30.2%), fraud (20.1%), “it's not beneficial” (18.7%), and injustice (16.0%). When disaggregated by gender, males are most likely to cite insecurity (31.4%), while females are most likely to say insecurity (29.3%) followed by, “it is not beneficial” (17.4%). Respondents in the West (43.7%) and the East (43.0%) are most likely to say they did not vote because of insecurity, while those in the Central/Highlands region are significantly less likely to cite insecurity (5.0%). However, those in the Central/Highlands region are significantly more likely to cite not having a voting card (24.2%), not having a national ID card (23.0%), injustice (7.8%), fraud (7.1%), and not having permission (1.1%) than in any other region.

Respondents in the South East are overwhelmingly more likely to cite a lack of polling stations (46.7%) as a reason for not voting.

REASONS FOR NOT VOTING IN 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION




FIG. 6.6: Q-50b. (If Q-50a answer is no) Why didn't you vote?

REASONS FOR NOT VOTING IN 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, BY GENDER




FIG. 6.7: Q-50b. (If Q-50a answer is no) Why didn't you vote?

During fieldwork for the 2019 *Survey*, a majority of Afghans (80.9%) were aware of the upcoming presidential elections. Awareness is higher among males (85.7%) than females (76.1%). Figures for awareness among rural/urban respondents are similar to 2018.

When disaggregated by region, respondents display the highest levels of awareness in the South East (86.8%) and Central/Kabul (86.0%). Respondents in the Central/Highlands display the lowest levels of awareness of the presidential elections (58.0%).

Provincial differences are significant. Respondents in Panjshir (95.6%), Samangan (91.7%), Kunar (90.9%), Jawzjan (90.4%), and Kabul (90.2%) display the highest levels of awareness. By a significant margin, respondents in Daikundi (46.0%) display the lowest levels of awareness.

High levels of awareness are further evidenced by the vast majority of respondents (96.3%) who accurately identified the type of election (presidential) taking place this year. Less than 4.0% said it was anything other than a presidential election.

Television is by far the biggest source of election information (55.5%), with radio a distant second (22.9%). Unsurprisingly, urban respondents (85.9%) were almost twice as likely as rural respondents (44.4%) to cite TV as their main source of election information. There is little difference, when disaggregating by gender, between the proportion of males (55.5%) and females (55.6%) who say TV is their main source of election information. Radio is the source of election information most cited by rural respondents (29.4%). Respondents who say that their main source of election information is friends, family, and neighbors decreased significantly, from 14.7% in 2018 to just 8.0% this year.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE ELECTION, BY STRATA




FIG. 6.8: Q-52. (If Q-51a answer is yes) What was your main source of information about the elections?

For some, the concept of democracy cannot succeed without a genuine and democratically elected government that can be held accountable to its citizens.³⁵ Elections provide such an opportunity. When elections are not seen as free and fair, they fail to give an impression of true democracy.³⁶ Further, the freedom and fairness of elections is called into doubt when votes are reported to have been garnered through force, coercion, fraud, or corruption or when polling stations cannot be established in insecure parts of a country.³⁷ Public expressions of concern over electoral fraud, corruption, and mismanagement do not seem to have altered Afghans' perceptions regarding free and fair elections, however: there has been no significant change over the last year in the number of Afghans who say they believe that the next elections will be free and fair—52.4% in 2018; 52.3% in 2019. When broken down by ethnicity, Pashtuns are the most likely to believe that the next elections will be free and fair (59.8%), while Tajiks are the least likely (46.7%). Interestingly, a 5.7 percentage point decrease is noted amongst Uzbeks (51.2%) since 2018.

ELECTION AWARENESS, BY GENDER, LOCATION, AND EXPOSURE TO TELEVISION




FIG. 6.9: Q-51a. Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months? (Percent who say yes.) **Q-73.** Do you watch television programs? (Percent who say yes.)

A majority of Afghans (50.4%) believe that fraud undermines free and fair elections, followed by corruption (14.9%) and insecurity (9.0%). When disaggregated by ethnicity, fraud remains the predominant answer amongst all respondents; however, Tajiks (59.5%), Hazaras (52.3%), and Uzbeks (61.1%) are significantly more inclined than Pashtuns (33.8%) to cite fraud.

The *Survey* asked respondents whether they have registered to vote in the elections. The number of Afghans who say they have registered to vote this year (75.1%) is up by 7.5 percentage points from 2018 (67.6%). The number of males (83.2%) and females (66.7%) who say they have registered to vote has increased since 2018 (male 74.8%, female 59.6%).

The parliamentary elections in 2018 drew a historically low turnout, pointing to voter concerns over security, fraud, and corruption. These concerns, however, are not reflected in this year’s *Survey*, in which 95.7% of respondents indicated they plan to vote in the upcoming presidential elections.

While fraud is cited as the reason that elections are not free and fair, respondents are most likely to say they are deterred from voting because of insecurity (34.0%), followed by “it’s not beneficial” (16.6%) and fraud (16.0%). Assessed by gender, insecurity is the predominant answer among males (34.4%) and females (33.6%). Females are significantly more likely to be deterred from voting because of fear of the Taliban (14.5%) than are males (4.6%).

REASONS FOR NOT INTENDING TO VOTE IN UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BY REGION




FIG. 6.10: Q-55b. (If Q-55a answer is no) Why don’t you plan to vote in this election?

Disaggregating by ethnicity, Hazaras (57.4%) are most likely to cite insecurity as their reason for not voting, while 28.8% of Uzbeks say, “it is not beneficial,” and 26.0% of Tajiks point to fraud.

A majority of Hazaras (57.4%) cite insecurity as the reason for not voting, while “it is not beneficial” is the main response among Uzbeks (28.8%), and Tajiks primarily cite fraud (26.0%).

When asked about the most important criteria for an ideal president, Afghans say they should be an honest, just, and fair person (35.7%). Other responses include “should not be a traitor” (26.1%), “should be patriotic” (24.2%), “someone who serves the people” (23.1%), “not corrupt” (19.4%), “someone

who fulfils their promises” (18.0%), and “should be a pious, devout Muslim” (16.4%). These findings mirror the 2018 *Survey* when respondents were asked about the most important criteria for an ideal MP, and they reflect the traits that Afghans wish to see in all who are involved in politics.

CRITERIA FOR AN IDEAL PRESIDENT




FIG. 6.11: Q-56A. *In your opinion, what are your most important criteria for an ideal president?*

A stable and strong economy can help stabilize a country.³⁹ In Afghanistan, where the economy has largely stagnated,⁴⁰ a quarter of the labor force is reportedly unemployed, and 80% of employment is precarious, with many Afghans relying on ad hoc day labor, self-employment, or unpaid work.⁴¹ This economic uncertainty appears to be prominent in the thoughts of Afghans, 84.4% of whom say they would definitely or probably vote for a president who knows how to improve the economy.

Economic uncertainty appears to be prominent in the thoughts of Afghans, 84.4% of whom say they would definitely or probably vote for a president who knows how to improve the economy.

A UNAMA report identifies corruption as a continuing issue in Afghanistan, “eroding public trust and confidence in government institutions and hindering efforts to bring lasting peace and prosperity to the country.”⁴² The widespread public concern over corruption is highlighted by the 71.1% of respondents who say they would definitely or probably vote for a president who would fight against corruption, even if people close to him were involved in corruption.

Anxieties over any future peace deal and the possibility of concessions to the Taliban also shape respondents’ views. Roughly 65.0% say they would probably not or definitely not vote for (a) a president who would get a peace agreement with the Taliban even if women were no longer allowed to go to school (65.6%); (b) a president who would get a peace agreement with the Taliban even if women no longer could work outside the home (65.0%); or (c) a president who would get a peace agreement with the Taliban even if the central government lost territory (65.8%).

6.5 WOMEN IN POLITICS

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-89. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament? (a) A man. (b) A woman. (c) No difference.*

Q-92. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*

Q-93. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men.*

A majority of men (62.0%) wish to be represented in parliament by a male, while the proportion of males who say they wish for a female representative is at its lowest level in the history of the *Survey*, 4.2%, more than 45.5% lower than in 2006 (7.7%). The proportion of males who say it makes no difference who represents them (33.0%) remains broadly similar to previous years’ findings.

Among female respondents, 30.7% say they wish to be represented in parliament by a female, a 5 percentage point decrease from 2017 (35.7%). The percentage of women who say it makes no difference, 43.0%, is a notable increase from 37.8% in 2018.

Disaggregating by province, 83.2% of respondents in Uruzgan and 80.9% of respondents in Paktika say they prefer to be represented by a male. Interestingly, more respondents in Farah would prefer to be represented by a female (37.1%) than by a male (31.8%). A majority of respondents in Samangan (61.6%), Jawzjan (61.0%), Bamyan (57.5%), Balkh (57.4%), Nimroz (54.8%), Kabul (51.7%), and Faryab (51.6%) say it makes no difference.

The number of Afghans who say women should be allowed to vote is at its highest level (89.3%), marginally above the figure for 2018 (87.7%) and 5 percentage points above the figure for 2008 (84.1%).

Surprisingly, more males (89.6%) than females (88.9%) say women should be allowed to vote. The figure for males is the highest ever recorded and represents an almost 9 percentage point increase over 2008 (81.0%).

When considered by province, respondents in Panjshir (99.3%), Bamyan (99.1%), and Kabul (97.0%) are most likely to say that women should be allowed to vote. By a substantial margin, respondents in Zabul (33.8%) are least likely to say women should be allowed to vote. The historical figures for Zabul show a significant change in attitudes towards women voting. In 2008, 74.3% of respondents in Zabul said that women should be allowed to vote. This year's figure of 33.8% represents a decline of over 50%. Other, more positive long-term changes are noted in Uruzgan (25.5% in 2008; 69.3% in 2019) and Kunar (56.4% in 2008; 93.8% in 2019). When considered by region, there appears to be little fluctuation in attitudes, although respondents in the South West have the lowest acceptance of women voting.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN VOTING, BY REGION




FIG. 6.12: Q-93. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men. (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)*

A majority of Afghans (59.2%) continue to believe that women should be allowed to decide for themselves when voting, while the proportion who say men should advise them has returned to the low of 16.9% established in 2017.

Disaggregating by province, 90.0% of respondents in Bamyan and 84.9% of respondents in Panjshir believe that women should be allowed to decide for themselves, compared to a low of 24.7% in Nuristan, 25.5% in Helmand, and 26.1% in Zabul.

6.6 PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-61. *Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

Q-62. *Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?*

Q-63. *(If Q-62 answer is “somewhat opposed” or “strongly opposed”) Why are you opposed to efforts to negotiate with the Taliban? (Allow two responses.)*

Q-64. *Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

Q-65. *Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that those antigovernment elements who lay down their arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should receive government assistance, jobs, and housing?*

Q-67. *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides will have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say each is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (a) The current constitution. (b) A democratic system. (c) Freedom of speech. (d) Freedom of the press. (e) A strong central government. (f) The current judicial and court system. (g) Women’s rights. (h) Equality among different groups of people (regardless of ethnicity, class, etc.). (i) The presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. (j) Foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan.*

As cited in Chapter 2, 64.0% of respondents say that reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible. Regionally, respondents in the East (76.9%) and the South West (72.9%) are most likely to say that reconciliation is possible, while respondents in the Central/Highlands region (37.7%) are least likely to say that reconciliation is possible.

In a new question this year, Afghans are asked whether they are aware of efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. More than three-quarters (77.4%) indicate they are aware of peace efforts.

AWARENESS OF PEACE TALKS WITH TALIBAN



FIG. 6.13: Q-61. Are you aware of efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban? (Percent who say yes.)

In a subsequent question, 88.5% of Afghans indicate that they either strongly or somewhat support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban.

SUPPORT FOR PEACE TALKS, BY REGION



FIG. 6.14: Q-62. *Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?*

Only 9.7% of respondents are opposed to peace talks, and in a follow-up question gauging the reasons for their opposition, almost half (46.5%) of this small group were unable to articulate a reason for their opposition. One-third of those opposed to peace talks, 32.4%, said “war will get worse,” 17.1% said “more people will die,” 16.2% said “it’s useless,” 15.1% said “the Taliban are cruel,” 14.3% said “the Taliban are corrupt,” and 11.2% said “Pakistan does not want peace.”

Almost half of respondents, 48.6%, say they feel sufficiently represented in the peace talks. Male respondents are more likely to feel represented than female respondents (51.8% vs. 45.4%). The sense of representation is higher among more-educated respondents. For example, only 46.6% of those with no formal education feel represented in the peace talks, compared to 53.1% of those with a university education.

On the other hand, nearly half of respondents (46.2%) say they do not feel sufficiently represented in the peace talks, and these respondents are less likely to support those negotiations. Just 43.4% of those who feel unrepresented strongly support the peace talks, compared to 67.2% of those who do feel represented; and just 52.2% of those who feel unrepresented say that reconciliation is possible, compared to 76.8% of those who do feel sufficiently represented. These are significant differences.

This year, 33.6% of respondents overall, up substantially from 25.8% last year, say they strongly agree that antigovernment elements who express willingness to reintegrate into society should receive government assistance, jobs, and housing. The greatest increase can be seen among residents of the East region (13.8%), the Central/Highlands region (12.7%), the North West (6.7%), the North East (7.0%), and the West (10.4%).

PROVIDING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE, JOBS, AND HOUSING TO ANTIGOVERNMENT ELEMENTS WHO ARE WILLING TO REINTEGRATE INTO SOCIETY




FIG. 6.15: Q-65. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that those antigovernment elements who lay down their arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should receive government assistance, jobs, and housing?

The *Survey* asks respondents what is important to protect as part of a peace agreement. A majority of 54.7% says protecting the current constitution is very important, followed by a strong central government (53.6%), freedom of speech (46.0%), and freedom of press (46.4%). Just 17.3% overall say the presence of foreign military forces is important to protect, with a high of 33.6% in the Central/Highlands region and a low of 9.2% in the North East region.

IMPORTANCE OF PEACE AGREEMENT CONTENTS, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION	60	59	59	49	44	45	67	62
A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM	44	36	48	30	32	27	63	44
FREEDOM OF SPEECH	59	48	56	37	33	32	61	45
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS	60	49	53	36	31	38	54	45
A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	63	65	60	48	40	45	58	49
THE CURRENT JUDICIAL AND COURT SYSTEM	40	41	40	28	31	35	51	39
WOMEN'S RIGHTS	57	48	52	36	38	32	64	48
EQUALITY AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PEOPLE (REGARDLESS OF ETHNICITY, CLASS, ETC.)	52	42	45	38	33	33	48	41
THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN	19	20	16	17	16	9	34	19
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN	49	49	38	34	29	27	49	37

FIG. 6.16: Q-67. (Ask all.) It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides will have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say each is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (a) The current constitution (b) A democratic system. (c) Freedom of speech. (d) Freedom of the press. (e) A strong central government. (f) The current judicial and court system (g) Women's rights. (h) Equality among different groups of people (regardless of ethnicity, class, etc.). (i) The presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. (j) Foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan. (Percent who say "very important.")

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خدا وطن وظیفه



فصلی ۳۴۴*۴۲#
صبح قابل استفاده میباشد.



7 ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA

The media plays a critical role in democratic societies, acting as a watchdog over the three branches of government. The role of the media includes scrutinizing government promises, policies, and operations and keeping the public engaged and informed by providing news and fact-based information. In Afghanistan, government limitations and threats from antigovernment elements hinder the ability of the media to fulfill these essential functions.

In 2019, Reporters Without Borders (RWB) ranked Afghanistan's media environment 121 out of 180 countries in its World Press Freedom Index,¹ a drop from 118 in 2018. This decline is likely due to ongoing insecurity in the country and direct threats against the media.² A June 2019 statement issued by the Taliban against media organizations stated, "reporters and staff members will not remain safe."^{3,4}

In response, President Ashraf Ghani reaffirmed the importance of the press, saying that "attacks on media organizations [are] in contradiction to human and Islamic values."⁵

Afghanistan continues to be the deadliest country in the world for journalists. A total of 66 have been murdered in Afghanistan since 2001,⁶ 21 in 2017,⁷ and at least 14 in 2018.^{8,9} As women have become increasingly visible as journalists, threats against them have also increased.¹⁰ Targeted attacks, including bombings and assassinations, continue to threaten the media and fatalities continue in 2019.

79.0% of respondents say freedom of the press is important to protect in any peace agreement, highlighting the value that Afghans place on access to media and information.

Violence and insecurity are not the only factors weakening Afghan media. Access to information is enshrined as a fundamental right in article 50 of the Afghan constitution and article 34, guaranteeing "inviolable" freedom of expression,¹¹ but media outlets continue to have their licenses revoked for various reasons. The Ministry of Information and Culture reports that in 2018 and 2019 the licenses of approximately 100 media outlets were cancelled.¹² Further, although the media (and the public) have access to more information under the Afghanistan Access to Information Law the government has failed to effectively implement it.¹³

At the same time, the Access to Information Commission, established under the 2018 Access to Information Law, has made progress including addressing registered complaints, public awareness

campaigns, creation and monitoring of information offices, and capacity building programs. The Government Media and Information Center has provided training to 3,000+ individuals in access to information.¹⁴

This year, respondents were asked a new question: “It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement?” Almost 80% of respondents say freedom of the press is important to protect in any peace agreement,¹⁵ highlighting the value that Afghans place on access to media and information.

The following chapter highlights Afghans’ access to news and information and the impact of the media in shaping their perceptions.

7.1 SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-71. *Do you listen to radio programs?*

Q-72. *(If Q-71 answer is yes) You said you listen to the radio. How many hours do you listen to it on an average day when you listen to the radio?*

Q-73. *Do you watch television programs?*

Q-74. *(If Q-73 answer is yes) You said that you watch television. On an average day when you watch television, how many hours do you watch it?*

Q-79. *Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.*

D-5. *How many of the following does your household have? (c) TV.*

D-15a. *Do you personally use a mobile phone, or not?*

D-15c. *How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?*

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION




FIG. 7.1: Q-79. Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.

RADIO

In 2019, 57.3% of Afghans say they get their news and information from radio, a significant decrease from 62.9% in 2018, continuing the downward trend in radio listenership since 2013. Listening to radio continues to be more prevalent in rural areas (62.4%) than urban areas (42.2%), as rural residents generally have less access to TV and the internet.

Afghan males (62.2%) are more likely to say they listen to radio than females (52.4%). By region, the use of radio as a source of information is highest in the South West (81.7%) and the South East (80.1%), and lowest in the Central/Highlands region (25.4%) and the Central/Kabul region (47.7%).

TELEVISION

The *Survey* shows that 65.9% of respondents in 2019 watch television as a source of news and information, an 11.2 percentage point increase since 2013, when the question was first posed. Television is more common among urbanites (91.1%) than in rural areas (57.3%). Afghan males are more likely to say they get news and information from television than females (67.5% and 64.2%, respectively). By region, television as a source of news and information is more frequently cited in Central/Kabul (83.0%), followed by the West (76.6%) and the North West (69.9%). It is less used as a main source of news and information in the South West (34.7%) and East (41.0%).

By ethnicity, Tajiks (77.8%) and Hazaras (77.1%) are more likely to get their information from television than other ethnic groups. Not surprisingly, television viewership is more common among younger Afghans—68.6% of those aged 18–25, compared to 62.2% of those over 55. Some 87.4% of respondents with a university education get their news and information from television, compared to 55.7% of those without a formal education.

TV OWNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN




FIG. 7.2: Q-79. Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (b) Television. **D-5.** How many of the following does your household have? (c) TV. **X-1b.** How many of the following does your household have? (TV.) (Note: gaps represents years the question was not asked.)

THE INTERNET

Approximately 17.6% of the Afghan population uses the internet, a sixteenfold increase over the 1.1% who were internet users in 2006.¹⁶

This year, the *Survey* shows that 14.4% of Afghans use the internet as a source of news and information. Urban respondents are more likely to do so than rural respondents (30.5% vs. 9.0%). Disaggregating by gender, we find that 23.2% of men, but just 5.6% of women, use the internet as their main source of news and information. By region, the highest rate of internet usage is reported in Central/Kabul (25.8%), followed by the South East (18.3%). The lowest rate is reported in the Central/Highlands region (2.9%).

Using the internet as a source of news and information is more common among the young and better educated. Some 20.6% of those who are 18–25 years old say they use the internet for this purpose, compared to just 7.3% of those over 55 years of age. Those with more than 12 years of formal education say they use internet for news and information at considerably higher rates than those with no formal education (45.9% vs 2.8%).

For the first time, the *Survey* asks internet users to describe their online activities. Of the 29.7% of respondents who personally have access to internet, the most common activities include using Facebook and other social media (70.6%) and keeping up with the news (41.1%).




FIG. 7.3: Q-78. (If Q-77 answer is yes) Why do you use the internet? Anything else?

Male respondents are more likely to say they use the internet for Facebook and other social media than are females (72.3% vs. 64.1%). By strata, Afghans in urban areas are slightly more likely to report using Facebook (73.5%) than rural respondents (67.6%).

USE OF THE INTERNET, BY GENDER AND LOCATION




FIG. 7.4: Q-78. (If Q-77 answer is yes) Why do you use the internet? Anything else?

MOSQUES

Mosques commonly serve as locations for prayer as well as an important source of information for Afghans. This year, 45.3% of respondents cite the mosque as a source of news and information, a slight decrease from 48.0% last year. Afghans who get their news from the mosque are far more frequently male (70.1%) than female (20.5%). Afghans over age 55 (59.9%) are more likely to say they get news and information from the mosque than those aged 18–25 (42.7%). By region, those who get their information from mosques are most common in the North East (54.8%) and the North West (52.3%) and lowest in the South West (37.0%), the Central/Highlands region (36.3%), and the South East (33.9%).

COMMUNITY SHURAS

In 2019, 38.8% of Afghans count on community *shuras* for news and information, down slightly from 40.0% in 2018. Getting news and information from community *shuras* is significantly more common among males (56.6%) than females (21.1%) and more common in rural areas (41.3%) than in urban (31.4%). (figure 7.5).

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION, BY GENDER AND LOCATION




FIG. 7.5: Q-79. Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.

Afghans over age 55 (53.4%) are more dependent on *shuras* for their news and information than Afghans aged 18–25 (35.9%). By region, the proportion of Afghans who say they obtain information from *shuras* is highest in the Central/Highlands region (59.5%), followed by the West (48.3%), and the proportion is lowest in the Central/Kabul region (29.8%) and the South East region (28.3%).

FAMILY AND FRIENDS

This year, 86.7% of respondents cite family and friends as a source of news and information, the highest rate since this question was first asked, in 2016. Those who rely on family and friends as sources of news and information are more slightly likely to be rural (87.2%) than urban (85.0%) and slightly more likely to be male (88.2%) than female (85.2%). Afghans who live in the North East are most likely to report using family and friends as a source of news and information (91.2%). The lowest rate is reported in the East (82.1%).

7.2 ACCESS TO THE INTERNET AND USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

KEY QUESTIONS

D-15d. And how many members of your household own mobile phones that can access the internet, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?

Q-76. Do people in this area have access to the internet, either through a cable connection, a wireless/wifi connection, or cellular data (e.g., 2G or 3G)?

Q-77. (If Q-66 answer is yes) Do you personally have access to the internet?

Given that only 17.6% of the Afghan population say they use the internet, as noted above, this year, over half of respondents (51.9%) say their area has access to the internet, a significant increase from 40.2% in 2018. This development is particularly evident in Central/Kabul, where respondents with internet access have increased from 58.9% in 2016 to 72.1% in 2019. Internet access has also increased notably in the South East—from 46.6% in 2016 to 66.0% in 2019—and in the North East—from 31.0% in 2016 to 52.7% in 2019.

PERSONAL ACCESS TO THE INTERNET




FIG. 7.6: Q-77. (If Q-66 answer is yes) Do you personally have access to the internet?

In terms of personal access to the internet, significant differences are noted by gender, strata, age and education. Males (44.3%) are significantly more likely to have personal access to the internet than

females (13.1%). Internet access in urban areas (42.0%) is almost double that in rural areas (22.9%). And Afghans aged 18–25 are more than twice as likely to have personal internet access as Afghans over age 55 (39.6% vs. 15.3%).

Personal access to the internet increases significantly with educational attainment, from just 7.7% of respondents with no formal education to 79.0% of Afghans with a university education.

7.3 ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PUBLIC OPINION AND BEHAVIOR

As 2019 *Survey* findings reveal, the media continues to influence society in ways that can be advantageous, bring legitimacy, or promote cultural, national, fundamentalist, or political agendas.

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-79. *Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.*

Q-27. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

Q-66a. *Thinking about the reasons why the Taliban have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the Taliban?*

Q-70a. *Thinking about the reasons why Daesh have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for Daesh?*

Q-46. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders.*

Q-59. *Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, or impossible?*

Q-61. *Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

Q-62. *Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?*

Q-64. *Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

Q-85. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?*

Q-83. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?*

Q-92. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*

Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.*

Q-58. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item], is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? a) National Unity Government.*

SECURITY

As more Afghans get their news and information from radio, television, and the internet, the influence of these media on public opinion is growing. Twenty-four-hour news from journalists and citizens now delivers real-time updates on violence, crime, and attacks by armed opposition groups to a large portions of Afghan society, and *Survey* data shows a correlation between the types of media consumed and respondents' reported levels of fear. The *Survey* shows that those who use the internet as a source of news and information are slightly more likely to fear for their personal safety (78.2%) than those who use radio (75.8%) or television (74.0%).

Those who use radio as their main source of news and information are more likely to feel sympathy for the Taliban (16.5%) than those who use television as their primary source (11.5%). Insurgent groups are known to have the capability to spread propoaganda through radio broadcasts, which may be a factor in the higher levels of sympathy for insurgents among radio listeners.

Where respondents get their news and information also correlates with the desire to leave the country. Those who use the internet as a source of news and information are more willing to leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity (46.4%) than those who watch television (40.7%) or listen to radio (36.0%).

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT

Afghanistan remains hobbled by decades of war and internal conflict, where the prospect of a peaceful and democratic society remains mired in political uncertainties. As with previous years, in 2019 there is a correlation between the source of news and information and perspectives on democracy and government.

Obtaining news and information from television and the internet is positively correlated with favorable perceptions of democracy.¹⁷

Obtaining news and information from the radio is positively correlated with favorable perceptions of the NUG's performance, whereas those who rely on television and the internet for their news and information are more likely to have an unfavorable view of the NUG's performance.¹⁸

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Afghans who get their news and information from radio and *shuras* tend to have less favorable views of women working outside the home¹⁹ than respondents who use television and the internet,²⁰ and they are less likely than television and internet users to favor equal education for women.

PERCEPTION OF WOMEN RIGHTS, BY MEDIA TYPE




FIG. 7.7: Q-79. Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family. **Q-83.** Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Percent who strongly agree.) **Q-85.** Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?

Respondents who get their information from radio or the mosque are also less likely than internet or television users to support women's right to vote.²¹

Sources of news and information also relate to opinions of women's clothing. This year's *Survey* once again shows a correlations between where respondents get their news and the style of dress they feel is appropriate for women in public.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC




FIG. 7.8: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (1) Burka. (2) Niqab. (3) Chador. (4) Form-fitting hijab. (5) Loose hijab. (6) No head covering.*

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY MEDIA TYPE




FIG. 7.9: Q-79. Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family. **Q-90.** In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.

A preference for the more conservative burka (image 1) is more common among radio listeners (39.2%) than television viewers (23.8%). This image is the most popular in all news-and-information categories except television viewers and internet users. A plurality of television viewers (28.5%) favor the niqab (image 2) over other coverings. Internet users prefer the niqab (27.3%) and the form-fitting hijab (26.9%) (image 4) over other head coverings.

Overall, a significant majority of Afghans say that they are aware of the peace negotiations (77.4%) and they strongly or somewhat support efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban (88.7%).

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

This year, the *Survey* asked several questions about peace talks: Are respondents aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban? Do they support negotiations for a peace deal? Do they feel they are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?

Overall, a significant majority of Afghans say that they are aware of the peace negotiations (77.4%) and they strongly or somewhat support efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban (88.7%). Awareness of peace negotiations is highest among those who get their news and information from the internet (88.8%), radio (82.6%), or the mosque (80.1%), followed, at roughly uniform rates, by television (79.0%), community *shuras* (78.8%), and friends and family (78.1%).

AWARENESS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, BY SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION




FIG. 7.10: Q-61. Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban? **Q-79.** Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community *shuras*. (g) Friends and family.

Regardless of which tool respondents use to obtain news and information, support for efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban is very high at around 90%.

SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, BY SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION




FIG. 7.11: Q-62. *Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?* **Q-79.** *Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.*

Asked if they feel sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban, 48.6% of respondents say yes. The proportion is highest among those who use radio (52.8%) and the internet (52.2%), and lower among those who use television to obtain news and information (47.4%).

When asked if they think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, those who use the internet are more likely to say it is possible than those who use other sources of news and information.

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TALIBAN, BY SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION




FIG. 7.12: Q-59. Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible, or impossible? **Q-79.** Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television. (d) Internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.

ENDNOTES

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- 2 Abdul Kadir Sadiqi, “At least two killed in Afghan TV bus bombing in Kabul,” *Reuters*, August 4, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack-media/at-least-two-killed-in-afghan-tv-bus-bombing-in-kabul-idUSKCN1UU0HT>.
- 3 “UNAMA asks Taliban to rescind threat against media,” *Kabul Times*, June 29, 2019, <https://www.thekabultimes.gov.af/2019/06/29/unama-asks-taliban-to-rescind-threat-against-media/>.
- 4 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Statement by Tadamichi Yamamoto on Taliban threats against media in Afghanistan,” news release, June 27, 2019, <https://unama.unmissions.org/statement-tadamichi-yamamoto-taliban-threats-against-media-afghanistan>.
- 5 Ibrahim Rahmini, “Local Afghan Journalist Killed by Unknown Assailants,” *VOA*, July 14, 2019, <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/local-afghan-journalist-killed-unknown-assailants>.
- 6 RWB, “2019 Press Freedom Index” (see note 1).
- 7 Hasib Danish Alikozai, “Report: 21 Journalists Killed in Afghanistan in 2017,” *VOA*, January 3, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/report-21-journalists-killed-afghanistan-2017>.
- 8 Casualty numbers for 2018 vary from 10 to 15. See “Violations of press freedom barometer,” Reporters Without Borders website, accessed October 13, 2019, <https://rsf.org/en/barometer?year=2018>.
- 9 Much of this data is available at the Committee to Protect Journalists website, https://cpj.org/data/killed/asia/Afghanistan/murdered/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&typeOfDeath%5B%5D=Murder&start_year=2019&end_year=2019&group_by=year.
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- 12 Gulabuddin Ghubar, “Almost 100 Media Outlets Stop Operation In Two Years: Official,” *Tolo News*, May 3, 2019, <https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/almost-100-media-outlets-stop-operation-two-years-official>.
- 13 Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), *Afghan’s Access to Information Survey–2017* (Kabul: IWA, August 2017), <https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Afghans-Access-to-Information-Survey-2017.pdf>.
- 14 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Government Media and Information Center, “New Members of the Access to Information Commission Introduced,” accessed October 23, 2019, <https://www.gmic.gov.af/english/press-releases33/641-new-members-of-the-access-to-information-commission-introduced>.
- 15 Very or somewhat important.
- 16 Afghan internet usage statistics: 6,538,124 internet users, 17.6% of the population. Internet World Stats website, “Afghanistan–internet usage, broadband, and telecommunications reports,” <https://www.internetworldstats.com/asia/af.htm#links>.
- 17 Satisfaction with democracy is positively correlated with the use of television and the internet as sources of news and information (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.0172 and 0.0263, respectively).
- 18 Perception of the NUG’s performance is positively correlated with the use of radio as source of news and information and negatively correlated with the use of television (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.116 and -0.0424, respectively).
- 19 Support for women working outside the home is negatively correlated with the use of radio and community *shuras* (Spearman correlation coefficient -0.1247 and -0.029, respectively).
- 20 Support for women working outside the home is positively correlated with the use of television and the internet as source of news and information (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.2187 and 0.0336, respectively).
- 21 Support for women’s right to vote is negatively correlated with the use of radio, and positively correlated with use of the internet or television as a source of news and information (Spearman correlation coefficient -0.0849, 0.0745, and 0.2283, respectively).



8 WOMEN IN SOCIETY

Peace talks with the Taliban have been at the center of public attention this year, and as discussions took the form of potential concessions on each side, they hit a nerve for many Afghans, particularly women. The stark contrast became apparent between the position and rights of women in society during the Taliban era and their place in Afghanistan today, for while there may be a long way yet to go, envisioning a retreat to the Taliban era's rules shows how much society has changed, and how deeply women's lives have been affected by those changes.

Peace talks with the Taliban have been at the center of public attention this year, and as discussions took the form of potential concessions on each side, they hit a nerve for many Afghans, particularly women.

The peace talks also dramatized the fragility of those gains, and how, if they are not acknowledged, valued, and protected—not just for the good of Afghan women, but for the health, welfare, and prosperity of the nation as a whole—they can be lost, given away as the price for peace.

While gender equity is enshrined in the Afghan constitution, this year's talks have exposed the distance between what was promised and what has been done. Women have been present in peace talks only twice since 2005,¹ a glaring absence highlighted even more by the choice of attendees this year. Afghan women have been involved in grassroots and subnational efforts to build peace at the provincial and community levels,² yet, so far they have had no role or profile on the international stage in negotiations to date.

Women have made significant gains. In the military, for example, as of mid-2019, there are approximately 4,500 women in the Afghan National Defense Security Forces. At the same time, they are often denied the opportunities for development and advancement available to their male counterparts, stalling their careers. And, as in other countries, sexual abuse and gender-based violence are a problem.³

Women are entering new social spheres and making their marks in artistic and creative fields as well. A movie directed by an Afghan woman was a contender for an Oscar this year,⁴ and Afghan women are active in the street-art scene in Kabul.⁵ Afghanistan's first female kickboxing competitor took the stage in one of several sports now open to women.⁶

Overall approval of a woman's right to vote rose this year from 87.7% in 2018 to 89.3% in 2019. Support for women's equal access to education also grew from 84.0% in 2018 to 86.6% this year. Since the fall of the Taliban, women have become economically invaluable. According to the Afghanistan Women's Chamber of Commerce and Industries, investments by women now reach more than USD 77 million and provide jobs for 77,000 individuals nationwide.⁷ Women make up 27% of the national parliament and are politically active at lower levels as well, with one of Afghanistan's first female mayors entering office this year in Wardak, a traditionally conservative province.⁸ International donors continue to invest in girls' education,⁹ and the attention to maternal health is paying off, with fewer women dying from childbirth.

This chapter examines Afghan attitudes on issues that disproportionately affect women. These include access to justice, marriage and inheritance practices, the right to political participation, educational opportunities, and economic advancement, as well as women's perceptions of safety and security.

8.1 WOMEN'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-80. *In your area, is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?*

Q-81. *(If Q-80 answer is yes) What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

While the Afghan constitution affirms women's rights, and the 2009 Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law is a clear step forward, Afghan women are still subject to some of the highest rates of intimate partner violence in the world and have very limited access to justice.¹⁰

When asked if they know a place where women specifically can take their problems to be resolved, 21.9% of respondents say yes, up from 19.0% in 2018. Urban respondents (15.6%) are less likely than rural respondents (24.1%) to know a place, while men (22.6%) are more likely than women (21.2%) to say they know of such a place for women. Wide variation is seen among regions and provinces. In the Central/Highlands region, only 8.0% of respondents say they know a place, and in the Central/Kabul region, 13.1% say they do. Respondents in the West (16.1%), East (19.6%), South West (21.7%), North West (23%), and North East (27.1%), are significantly less likely to know of a place than respondents in the South East (47.0%). The provinces where respondents are most likely to know of a place are Panjshir (98.0%), Samangan (73.5%), and Khost (62.2%), and the least likely are Farah (5.9%), Parwan (5.8%), Balkh (4.9%), and Nuristan (4.1%).

Of those who say they do know a place, 42.1% cite the Department of Women's Affairs (DOWA), the provincial arm of the Ministry of Women's Affairs; 13.9% say a district office; 6.8% say the Human Rights Council;¹¹ and others cite a variety of local, traditional bodies. These include the local council (6.7%), the village *shura* (2.2%), the women's *shura* (3.1%), *qawm* elders (7.2%), or police (3.7%, mostly made up of the 16.8% of respondents in the Central/Kabul region who cite this).

There are strong regional differences in the institution or authority people are most likely to cite as a place specifically for women to resolve disputes. The DOWA is most often cited by respondents in the South West (57.7%), the North East (46.1%), and the East (45.1%) and least likely in the Central/Kabul region (30.5%), where 16.8% of respondents say the police, a far higher proportion than the 0.0% to 2.7% in all other regions. The district office is most likely to be cited by respondents in the East region (25.7%), and least likely in the South West (6.6%), the West (7.8%), and the Central/Highlands (8.9%).

8.2 CUSTOMS AND TRIBAL PRACTICES

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-82. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? (a) The practice of *baad* is acceptable. (b) The practice of *baddal* is acceptable. (c) A daughter is entitled to part of her deceased father's inheritance (*miras*).

Q-90. In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.

Q-94. What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married?

Q-95. What do you think is the best age for a man to get married?

BAAD, BADDAL, AND MIRAS

Every year, the *Survey* asks respondents about their perceptions of three cultural practices related to women: *baad*, *baddal*, and *miras*. *Baad* is the traditional practice of giving away a daughter to another party as a penalty or payment to settle a debt or resolve a dispute, grievance, or conflict between families. Because the exchange is usually one-sided, with the bride going to live with the husband's family, she can often be the target of abuse.¹² Despite awareness campaigns, *baad* still happens,¹³ though according to the Civil and Liberal Initiative for Peace, less frequently as rural areas become more educated.¹⁴ *Baddal* is the exchange of daughters in marriage between families. This is often a form of forced marriage, and may have economic implications (e.g., there is generally no bride price or dowry involved).¹⁵ *Miras* is a woman's right to an inheritance from her father. There has been a slow, steady decline in acceptance of *baad* and *baddal*, and an increase in support for *miras*.

This year, the vast majority of respondents, 90.3%, strongly or somewhat disagree with the practice of *baad*. Just 9.3% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree with the practice of *baad*, (similar to 2018’s 9.5%). Women (8.5%, down from 10.5% in 2018) are less likely to approve of the practice than men (10.1%, up from 8.8% in 2018). Rural residents are more likely to support *baad*, with 10.8% saying they strongly or somewhat agree with the practice, down from 11.5% in 2018. Of urban residents, 4.6% say they agree, up from 3.3% in 2018. Rather than a change in values, this may reflect the general trend of rural Afghans moving to urban areas looking for work or safety.¹⁶

Income level, like last year, is somewhat associated with approval of *baad*, with those in the lower income brackets (except for the very lowest, less than AFN 2,000 per month) more likely to agree with the practice, and those in the upper brackets, especially the highest (AFN 40,000 per month—about USD 500), least likely to approve (see figure 8.1). It may be that *baad* represents an option for conflict resolution that appeals to poorer families because it does not require money. Like income, as the level of education goes up, support for *baad* goes down. Age of respondent is not a factor.

BAAD IS ACCEPTABLE, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME




FIG 8.1: Q-82. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? (a) The practice of *baad* is acceptable. **D-6.** For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

When broken down by region, the differences are apparent. Respondents in the West (22.7%) are significantly more likely than any other region to strongly or somewhat agree with the practice of *baad*.

Next are respondents in the East (12.2%) and the South East (10.8%), while those in the Central/Kabul region are least likely (2.6%). Some ethnic differences can be seen, with Pashtuns (10.5%) and Hazaras (10.3%) more likely to strongly or somewhat agree with *baad* than Tajiks (8.9%) or Uzbeks (5.2%).

BAAD IS ACCEPTABLE, BY URBAN VS. RURAL




FIG. 8.2: Q-82. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? (a) The practice of baad is acceptable. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

This year, there is a slight increase in those who strongly or somewhat agree with the practice of *baddal* (27.2% this year, up from 25.2% in 2018), and there is a corresponding drop in those who strongly or somewhat disagree (72.5% this year, down from 74.4% in 2018). The number of those who strongly disagree has dropped from 52.2% in 2018 to 49.3% in 2019, and the number of those who somewhat disagree or somewhat agree has increased slightly, with those who somewhat disagree rising from 22.3% in 2018 to 23.1% this year, and those who somewhat agree rising from 18.9% in 2018 to 20.2% this year. Men are more likely to strongly or somewhat agree with *baddal* (29.8%) than women (24.6%). Pashtuns (26.8%), Tajiks (26.5%), and Uzbeks (25.3%) are equally likely to strongly or somewhat agree with *baddal*, and Hazaras (33.4%) are most likely. Rural respondents (30.2%) are significantly more likely than urban respondents (18.3%) to strongly or somewhat agree.

There is considerable variation by region and province. Respondents in the Central/Kabul region are less likely to strongly or somewhat agree with the practice of *baddal* (19.5%) than those in the South West (23.3%), East (24.6%), Central/Highlands (25.4%), South East (29.9%), North West (30.9%), West (33.0%), or North East (35.3%) regions. The provinces where respondents are most likely to approve are Wardak (64.0%), Badakhshan (52.2%), and Samangan (55.9%), and those where respondents are least likely to approve of *baddal* are Kapisa (6.9%), Helmand (7.4%), and Panjshir (10.7%). Overall, as education goes up, approval of *baddal* goes down. Of respondents with no education, 27.5% say they approve, compared to 22.6% of those with 13 or more years of education.

BADDAL IS ACCEPTABLE, BY EDUCATION LEVEL




FIG 8.3: Q-82. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? (b) The practice of *baddal* is acceptable. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.) **D-10.** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa?

Acceptance of *miras*, a daughter’s right to an inheritance from her father, continues to be overwhelming, with 89.9% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreeing, roughly equal to last year’s 90.2%. Women (90.4%) and men (89.3%) are almost equally supportive. Urban respondents (91.7%) are slightly more supportive than rural (89.2%), but both are overwhelmingly supportive. Ethnicity, region, education, and income are not strong factors. There are two provinces with significantly lower rates of approval than others, Sar-e-Pul (65.6%) and Ghor (73.7%), but the majority of those surveyed accept *miras*.

PERCEPTIONS OF APPROPRIATE DRESS IN PUBLIC

Since 2014, the *Survey* has asked respondents to look at an image of six women wearing different garments and choose which is most appropriate as public dress. Manner of dress, particularly what is revealed and what is concealed, is an important issue in Afghanistan and in neighboring Muslim countries. Understanding perceptions of what is considered appropriate can indicate shifts in attitudes towards women and society.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC




FIG. 8.4: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (1) Burka. (2) Niqab. (3) Chador. (4) Form-fitting hijab. (5) Loose hijab. (6) No head covering.*

Overall, the burka is still the most popular choice (32.1%, up from 30.9% in 2018), followed by the niqab (27.6%), the chador (14.1%), the close-fitting hijab (17.9%), the loose-fitting hijab (7.6%), and finally, no covering (0.7%, up from 0.5% last year). Approval for the tight- and loose-fitting hijabs, which women working in the public sphere are more likely to wear, are at the highest levels since the question was first asked (see figure 8.5).

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY YEAR




FIG. 8.5: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?*

Women are more likely than men to prefer the chador (women 15.6%, men 12.5%), the close-fitting hijab (women 20.2%, men 15.6%), and the tight-fitting hijab (women 8.4%, men 6.8%), and men are more likely than women to prefer the burka (men 36.6%, women 27.6%).

In general, higher levels of education are associated with less conservative styles of dress, although preference for the niqab and the chador are not particularly correlated with education level. Those who prefer the burka are more likely to be less educated, and those who prefer the close-fitting and loose-fitting hijab are likely to be more educated. There is no correlation with education among the very small percentage of respondents who say that an uncovered head is the most appropriate public dress style.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY EDUCATION LEVEL




FIG. 8.6: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?* **D-10.** *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa?*

Pashtun respondents (51.2%) are significantly more likely than Tajiks (22.8%), Uzbeks (20.3%), or Hazaras (8.1%) to choose the burka. Tajiks (30.7%) and Uzbeks (32.3%) are most likely to choose the niqab, and Hazara respondents (34.7%) are most likely to choose the close-fitting hijab. Rural respondents are significantly more likely than urban respondents to choose the burka (36.6% vs. 18.8%), and urban residents are significantly more likely than rural residents to choose the tight-fitting hijab (urban 27.2%, rural 14.7%) and the loose-fitting hijab (urban 14.0%, rural 5.4%). There is significant variation among regions, with those in the South West overwhelmingly preferring the burka (74.1%), compared to just 7.2% in the Central/Highlands region. Regions least likely to prefer the burka are most likely to prefer the close-fitting and loose-fitting hijab.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY REGION



FIG. 8.7: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?*

IDEAL AGE FOR A WOMAN TO MARRY

Pursuant to the Afghan Civil Code (1977), the legal age for marriage in Afghanistan is 16 years for females and 18 years for males, although girls can be married at age 15 with the permission of their guardian or the court.¹⁷ Despite the recent push to end child marriage, including a call in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for an end to the practice globally by 2030, a significant number of Afghan girls and boys are married before their 18th birthday.¹⁸

Each year since 2014, Afghans have been asked what age they think is ideal for a woman or a man to get married (see figure 8.8). Overall, respondents choose a younger ideal age for a woman than for a man, and respondents are more likely to suggest ages under 18 as ideal for women than for men.

IDEAL AGE FOR MARRIAGE




FIG. 8.8: Q-94. What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married? **Q-95.** What do you think is the best age for a man to get married?

The most commonly given ideal ages for a woman to marry are 18 years (30.6% of respondents), 20 years (26.6%), 19 years (8.3%), and then 25 years (5.3%). Answers overall range from 12 to 30 years old, but the great majority of respondents give an age between 16 and 26. Less than 1% think a good age is 13 or 14. Overall, men (96.1%) and women (96.9%) are equally likely to give an age between 16 and 26, and men are slightly more likely than women to give an age below 16 (3.6% of men and 1.5% of women). Slightly more rural residents (2.7%) than urban residents (1.9%) say an age under 16 is the ideal age for a woman to marry. There are some regional differences among those choosing the youngest ages. Those in the South West (5.5%) and the Central/Highlands region (4.2%) are more likely than respondents in other regions to choose an age under 16. Those in the South East (1.1%), the North West (1.2%), and the Central/Kabul region (1.2%) are the least likely. Overall, the number of respondents giving ages under 16 has fallen by more than half, from a high of 5.4% in 2015 to 2.5% this year.

A broader range of ages is deemed ideal for men, with 14 to 44 years cited as the best age for a man to get married. Among the most frequently suggested ages are 20 years (23.7%), 25 years (20.8%), 22 years (11.1%), 18 years (9.5%), and 30 years (5.1%), with only 1.3% of respondents giving an age below 18. Overall, 91.8% of men and 82.7% of women give an age between 18 and 26 years as the best age for a man to get married, and there is greater variation than in the ages given for women. There are considerable differences between rural and urban respondents: 1.4% of rural residents and 0.9% of

urban residents choose an age under 18 years, 88.4% of rural residents and 83.9% of urban residents give an age between 18 and 26 years, and 9.9% of rural residents and 15.1% of urban residents prefer 27 to 36 years old. There is little regional variation in preference for the younger age brackets, but some regions are much more likely than others to favor the older bracket of 27 to 36 years: Central/Kabul (16.4%) and the North East (13.7%), for example, compared to the South West (2.2%) and the East (6.9%).

8.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-88. *Thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a community development council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for president of Afghanistan.*

Q-89. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the national parliament?*

Q-91. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone based on merit?*

Q-92. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*

Q-93. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men.*

The *Survey* asks respondents if they strongly or somewhat agree or disagree that women should have access to certain leadership roles, including seats on community development councils (CDCs), the office of governor, CEO of a large company, minister or cabinet member, or running for president.

Of the leadership roles presented, respondents are more likely to strongly agree with a woman becoming a member of a CDC (32.9%) than becoming CEO of a large company (25.2%), becoming governor of a province (25.1%), becoming a minister or cabinet member (24.3%), or running for president of Afghanistan (22.1%). In general, as the hypothetical positions grow in status and public prominence, approval declines. Overall, women are more supportive than men of women's access to leadership positions. Men are most likely to strongly or somewhat approve of a woman becoming a CDC member (men 67.3%, women 75.2%), followed by CEO (men 53.4%, women 61.3%), governor of a province

(men 50.9%, women 59.9%), minister or cabinet member (men 51.7%, women 60.8%), and finally, running for president (men 43.2%, women 54.2%).

STRONG OPINIONS ON WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS




FIG. 8.9: Q-88. Do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (a) Member of a community development council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for president of Afghanistan. (Percent who strongly agree or strongly disagree.)

There is considerable regional variation in approval of women in leadership roles. Respondents in the South West are the least likely to approve of women in every suggested role, except running for president which the North West is even less likely to approve of. Residents of the Central/Highlands region are the most likely to approve of every role for women. In the Central/Highlands region, 93.9% of respondents approve of access to CDC membership, 88.0% approve of access to a governorship, 83.9% approve of access to being a CEO, 82.8% approve of access to being a minister or cabinet member, and 78.4% approve of a woman running for president. In contrast, 43.1% of residents from the South West region approve of women having access to CDC membership, 32.1% approve of governorship, 32.1% approve of being a CEO, 33.1% approve of being a minister or cabinet member, and 35.1% approve of running for president. Residents of the North East are slightly less likely to approve of women running for president, at 34.0%. This sort of regional disaggregation can reflect cultural values in different parts of the country, but it should not be considered a proxy for ethnicity, with which it does not reliably align.

Overall, urban residents are more likely to approve of all the roles for women than rural residents.

To better understand attitudes towards women in the political sphere, respondents are asked if they prefer a man or a woman as their political representative or if gender does not matter. In results similar to last year's, 43.6% of respondents say they prefer a man (43.7% in 2018), 17.5% say they prefer a woman (19.9% in 2018), and 38.0% say it makes no difference (35.6% in 2018). The largest variation can be seen in the gender of the respondent, with men significantly more likely to prefer a man (61.3% of men vs. 26.1% of women). Only 4.2% of men prefer a woman for political representation, compared to 30.7% of women; and 33.0% of men say that gender makes no difference, compared to 43.0% of women, responses similar to last year's.

Rural respondents are more likely to state a gender preference for representation than to say that gender doesn't matter. Of rural respondents, 45.6% say they prefer a man, 18.2% say they prefer a woman, and 35.1% say it makes no difference, whereas 37.8% of urban respondents say they prefer a man, 15.4% say they prefer a woman, and 46.4% say no difference. Ethnicity is an important factor, with Tajiks (42.5%), Uzbeks (49.6%), and Hazaras (52.8%) most likely to say they have no gender preference, compared to just 26.0% of Pashtuns. Pashtuns are most likely to prefer male representation (57.2%), significantly more often than Tajiks (37.7%), Uzbeks (34.0%), or Hazaras (26.1%). Income level and education are not clear indicators, although those with no education are more likely to choose female representation, possibly because the lowest education bracket contains more women than men. As respondents get older, they are slightly more likely to prefer male representation.

As with questions about representation, the *Survey* asks respondents if they think political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, for men and women equally, or for anyone, based on merit. There are no major shifts this year from last year. "Mostly for men" is the top choice (38.7% this year, 39.9% last year), "for men and women equally" is second (31.7% this year, 31.4% last year), "for anyone, based on merit" is third (19.7% this year, 19.5% last year), and "mostly for women" is last (9.6% this year, 8.9% last year) (see figure 8.10).

PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS




FIG. 8.10: Q-91. Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone, based on merit? (Note: “anyone, based on merit” added in 2018.)

Men (52.9%) are significantly more likely than women (24.6%) to say political leadership positions should be mostly for men, and women (14.2%) are more likely than men (4.9%) to say mostly for women. Women are also significantly more likely than men to say equal for both men and women (40.3% of women vs. 23.1% of men) or based on merit (20.5% of women vs. 18.9% of men). Rural or urban residency is also a significant factor, with 41.2% of rural respondents saying political leadership positions should be mostly for men, compared to 31.4% of urban respondents, and 10.6% of rural respondents saying mostly for women, compared to 6.4% of urban respondents.

Overall, people in rural areas are more likely to prefer political leadership of their own gender, and urban respondents are more likely to choose equal or merit-based leadership. While 29.5% of rural respondents prefer leadership that is equally men and women, 38.2% of urban respondents do so. Just 18.3% of rural respondents prefer merit-based leadership, compared to 23.8% of urban respondents. Education is not a strong factor, although with more education respondents are more likely to favor merit. Similar to responses about political representation, ethnicity is a significant factor. Pashtuns are more likely than all others to say leadership should be mostly for men (52.6%), compared to 33.3% of Tajiks, 28.6% of Uzbeks, and 17.7% of Hazaras. Hazaras are more likely than all other ethnicities to prefer leadership that is equally men and women (43.9%) or merit based (28.0%).

The *Wolesi Jirga*, parliament, consists of 249 seats (not to exceed 250), out of which the constitution reserves at least 68, or 27%, for women. Women representatives do not always vote to safeguard the rights of Afghan women, however, as was apparent when forcing the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law into parliamentary debate endangered its existence.¹⁹ And while some question the legitimacy of seats filled in part by quotas, women parliamentarians have been a forceful presence this year.²⁰

The *Survey* asks respondents if they think women should have the right to vote in elections, and if they think women should make their own voting decisions or get advice from a man. This year, coming on the heels of last year's parliamentary elections and looking ahead to this year's presidential elections, the question has immediacy. An overwhelming majority of Afghans (89.3%, up from 87.7% in 2018) say that women should have the right to vote in elections, while just 10.2% say no, they should not, the lowest since the question was first asked.

An overwhelming majority of Afghans (89.3%, up from 87.7% in 2018) say that women should have the right to vote in elections.

Interestingly, more women say no than men (10.5% vs. 9.9%). More rural respondents than urban respondents say no (11.9% vs. 5.2%). By a 25 percentage point margin, respondents in the South West region (34.4%) are significantly more likely than respondents from all other regions to say no. Hazaras (3.7%) are less likely to say no than Tajiks (5.6%), Uzbeks (7.7%), or Pashtuns (17.4%). Education is not a very strong factor, so while saying that women should have the right to vote becomes more likely as education levels rise, even at the lowest education level (no formal education) only 12.7% of respondents say no, very close to the national average.

SHOULD WOMEN BE ABLE TO VOTE? BY GENDER




FIG. 8.11: Q-92. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*

Respondents are also asked how women should decide to vote: should they choose for themselves, have men choose for them, or choose in consultation with men? This year, 59.2% of Afghans say that women should decide who to vote for on their own, 16.9% say men should decide for them, and 23.2% say women should decide in consultation with men (see figure 8.12). This question has been asked since 2008, and there are no clear trends, but rather gentle increases and decreases in each choice, with little overall variance.

HOW WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE WHO TO VOTE FOR




FIG. 8.12: Q-93. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men.*

Gender is a slight factor, with 59.6% of men and 58.9% of women saying women should decide, 18.3% of men and 15.4% of women saying men should decide, and 21.1% of men and 25.3% of women saying women should decide in consultation with men (see figure 8.13).

HOW WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE WHO TO VOTE FOR, BY GENDER




FIG. 8.13: Q-93. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men.*

As in previous years, rural and urban residency is significant, with urban respondents significantly more likely than rural to say that women should decide for themselves (70.9% urban vs. 55.3% rural), and rural respondents significantly and equally more likely to say that men should decide (18.9% rural vs. 10.8% urban) or that women should consult with men (25.0% rural vs. 17.8% urban). Education is also a factor. Respondents with no formal education (54.9%) are significantly less likely than those with 12 or more years of education (72.8%) to say that women should decide on their own. Income is not a clear factor, although those in the lowest income bracket are more likely than those in all others to say that women should decide on their own.

Ethnicity has been a factor every year, with similar trends seen throughout. Hazaras (72.2%) are more likely than Tajiks (68.8%), Uzbeks (53.4%), or Pashtuns (47.8%) to say that women should decide for themselves. Pashtuns (23.8%) are more likely than Uzbeks (18.1%), Tajiks (11.8%), or Hazaras (10.3%) to say that men should decide. Uzbeks (28.2%) are more likely than Pashtuns (27.4%), Tajiks (18.8%), or Hazaras (17.2%) to say that women should decide in consultation with men.

WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 8.14: Q-93. *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men. (Percent who say women should decide for themselves.)*

8.4 EDUCATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-83. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat?*

Q-84. *And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat? (a) Islamic madrasa education. (b) Primary school. (c) High school. (d) University in your province. (e) Studying in another province. (f) Studying abroad on scholarship.*

Girls' education and equal access to schooling for all children has been a focus of international donor funding in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. Community-based education models are showing promise,²¹ even as the Taliban increases its attacks on girls' schools in 2019.²² The *Survey* asks respondents generally about women's educational opportunities, and approval for women's education has continued

to climb this year, to 86.5%, up from 84.0% in 2018 (see figure 8.15). To the proposition that women should have the same educational opportunities as men, women are more likely than men to strongly agree (50.6% vs. 40.3%), much like last year, and men are more likely than women to somewhat agree (44.1% vs. 38.3%). The percentage of men who strongly disagree has dropped from 6.5% in 2018 to 3.5% this year. Women have remained steady, with just 2.7% strongly disagreeing.

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION




FIG. 8.15: Q-83. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

Looking at combined numbers of those who strongly or somewhat agree, urban respondents (92.2%) are more likely than rural (84.7%) to support women’s equal access to education, and women (88.8%) are more likely than men (84.4%). Those in the Central/Highlands region (95.9%) and the Central/Kabul region (91.9%) are the most likely to support equal access, and those from the South West (67.1%) are less likely than any other region by an 18-percentage point margin (see figure 8.16). Residents of Zabul (34.6%) and Helmand (62.6%) are the least likely to strongly or somewhat agree with equal education for women, and residents of Bamyan (96.8%) and Samangan (95.9%) are the most likely. Hazara respondents (92.3%) are more likely to strongly or somewhat agree with women’s equal access to education than Tajiks (91.1%), Uzbeks (84.3%), or Pashtuns (80.6%).

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION, BY REGION




FIG. 8.16: Q-83. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

Respondents are asked about their support for specific levels of education for women, including Islamic madrasa education, primary school, high school, studying at a university in one’s province, studying in another province, and studying abroad on scholarship. Overall levels are similar to last year. Some 94.3% of all respondents agree with equal access to madrasa education, men more supportive than women by 2 percentage points. For primary school education, the overall approval rate is 89.7%, with men more supportive than women by 4 percentage points.

The same proportion of men and women support women’s equal access to high school, with 86.8% of all respondents approving. At the levels above high school, women are more likely than men to support equal access for women. Some 75.1% of all respondents agree with women’s access to a university in their own province, with women more supportive than men by 6 percentage points. Women are 9 points more supportive than men when it comes to access to university in another province, with an overall approval rate of 48.1%, and women are 11 points more supportive than men when it comes to studying abroad on a scholarship, which only 36.6% of all respondents support.

As the level of education of respondents rises from madrasa through primary school and high school, the urban-rural divide grows wider, with urban respondents more likely than rural to support women’s equal access to higher levels, but when the levels in question reach “university in your province,” “university outside your province,” and studying abroad, the gap narrows again, and while urban

respondents are more likely than rural to support all levels of education for women, the margin is smaller at the highest levels.

Support for successively higher levels of education for women declines steadily in all regions, but those in the South West are the least likely to approve of any level. Support for lower levels of schooling is higher in the Central/Kabul region, but it declines more steeply for higher levels of education than the Central/Highlands region, where close to three-quarters of respondents (73.4%) agree that women should be able to study abroad on scholarship, almost twice the level of the Central/Kabul region (41.0%).

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION, BY REGION




FIG. 8.17: Q-84. And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat? (a) Islamic madrasa education. (b) Primary school. (c) High school. (d) University in your province. (e) Studying in another province. (f) Studying abroad on scholarship. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

Ethnicity is a strong factor in support for women’s access to education, with Hazara respondents more likely than all others to approve of each level of schooling for women, mirroring some of what is seen in the Central/Highlands region. However, Pashtun respondents, by a margin of 2 to 4 percentage points, are more likely this year than last to support each level of schooling except studying abroad, whereas other ethnicities’ support has declined or stayed the same as last year.

8.5 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-85. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?*

Q-86. *(If Q-72 answer is “women should not be allowed to work outside the home.”) Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?*

Q-87. *For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernmental organizations. (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Coed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room.*

D-8. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household’s income, or not?*

Since its inception, the *Survey* has asked if women should be allowed to work outside the home. This year, a record high number of Afghans support women working outside the home, with 76.0% saying they agree, up from 70.3% in 2018 (see figure 8.18). While it is tempting to see this as a sign of growing support for women’s rights, approving of women’s employment may be a measure as much of economic hardship as of support for women’s rights and autonomy.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME




FIG. 8.18: Q-85. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?

Male approval of women working outside the home has risen 8 percentage points, from 60.8% in 2018 to 68.8% this year. Female approval has also risen slightly, from 79.8% to 83.1%. Urban respondents (85.3% this year, 80.5% in 2018) are still more likely than rural respondents (72.8% this year, 66.9% in 2018) to approve of women working outside the home, and younger people are more likely to approve than older people. Disaggregating by income suggests that this growing approval for women working outside the home is related to the economy as much as to women's rights. Respondents earning less than AFN 2,000 per month are the most likely to approve of women working outside the home, and the rate of approval among this cohort has increased 8 percentage points since last year, from 74.6% to 82.1%.

Respondents who say women should not be allowed to work outside the home are asked why, and, like last year, the most common reasons are worries about uncertain conditions (23.4%), the sentiment that women are not needed outside the home (18.7%, up 6 points from last year), that it is against Islamic law (17.4%), and worries about security (11.3%).

WHY SHOULDN'T WOMEN WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME?




FIG. 8.19: Q-86. (If Q-72 answer is “women should not be allowed to work outside the home”) Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?

Respondents are also asked more specifically if they think it is acceptable for women to work in particular kinds of jobs, including female-only schools, hospitals or clinics, government offices, coed schools, private companies outside the home with female-only staff, coed private companies outside the home, NGOs, and the army/police. Approval for women working in each position has increased since last year (see figure 8.20). The highest rate of approval, as in all previous years, is for women working in female-only schools (88.7%) and women working in hospitals/clinics (87.5%), unsurprising given the attention paid to the education and public health sectors by the Afghan government and the international donor community. The proliferation of girls’ schools and women’s clinics (particularly maternal health clinics) has increased demand for women employees in these settings, which are considered culturally appropriate and safe for them. There is also high approval for women working in government offices (71.0%) and coed schools (69.1%), with slightly less approval for women working in female-only private companies (52.9%), nongovernment organizations (52.2%), coed private companies (39.0%), and the army/police (38.8%).

ACCEPTABLE PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN




FIG. 8.20: Q-87. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernmental organizations. (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Coed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

Urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to approve of each job category by 9- to 15-point margins (see figure 8.21). While some of this can be attributed to more conservative cultural values in rural areas, there are also very different work place logistics for many of these positions in a rural setting, including long distances to the workplace. Women’s mobility is more limited in rural areas, due not only to cultural values but also to security concerns, and this can be a factor in employment decisions.

ACCEPTABLE PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN, BY URBAN AND RURAL

EMPLOYMENT TYPE	URBAN (% STRONGLY AGREE)	RURAL (% STRONGLY AGREE)	MARGIN OF DIFFERENCE (URBAN MINUS RURAL, PERCENTAGE POINTS)
GOVERNMENT OFFICE	82	67	15
NGO	62	49	13
HOSPITAL OR CLINIC	95	85	10

FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOL	95	86	9
COED SCHOOL	81	65	16
ARMY/POLICE	47	36	11
FEMALE-ONLY PRIVATE COMPANY	64	49	15
COED PRIVATE COMPANY	50	35	15

FIG. 8.21: Q-87. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernmental organizations. (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Coed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room. (Urban and rural respondents.)

Typically, women are more likely than men to approve of most employment options for women, but men are more likely than women to support women in the army or police (39.9% of men vs. 37.6% of women).

Overall, respondents in the South West are the least likely to support women working in any position, but there has been a moderate increase this year in approval for women working in most positions. For instance, approval for women working in nongovernmental organizations rose from 29.4% in 2018 to 36.0% this year in the South West. Support in other regions has either fallen, stayed the same, or increased less than in the South West.

The *Survey* asks respondents if female members of the family contribute to the household income. Overall, 18.6% of respondents say that a female family member contributes, and 81.3% say that no female family member contributes. The factors determining whether women contribute to household income are complex, involving not just approval to work outside the house or time spent towards money-making activities, but the availability of work, demand and supply-chain resources for products women make at home, and the financial state of the household. These factors can determine the economic necessity of women working, and perceptions of security. Because of this, these numbers do not correlate straightforwardly with attitudes towards women's rights and empowerment more generally.

Some of the most significant variation in women working is by region, with respondents in the Central/Highlands region (45.4%) significantly more likely than respondents in all other regions to say that a woman contributes to the household income. Respondents in the Central/Kabul region (11.7%) are the least likely.

WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY REGION




FIG. 8.22: D-8. Do female members of the family contribute to this household's income, or not?

8.6 GENERAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

This chapter highlights factors that indicate support among Afghans for the rights of girls and women. Figure 8.23 shows the demographic factors most robustly associated with support for women's rights. These are strong correlations, but they are not necessarily causal, so they cannot in themselves explain attitudes towards women's rights in Afghanistan. Overall, Afghans who support women's rights have many of the following characteristics: they are female, say they have no fear for their personal safety, are better educated, live in an urban area, feel safe participating in sociopolitical activities, use the internet, want to leave Afghanistan, are single, and have a higher level of confidence in the Afghan National Security Forces.²³

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

AFGHANS WHO SUPPORT WOMEN'S RIGHTS, ON AVERAGE, ARE:	AFGHANS WHO DO NOT SUPPORT WOMEN'S RIGHTS, ON AVERAGE, ARE:
MORE LIKELY TO BE WOMEN	MORE LIKELY TO BE MEN
MORE LIKELY TO SAY THEY HAVE NO FEAR FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY	MORE LIKELY TO SAY THEY FEAR FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY
MORE LIKELY TO BE EDUCATED	LESS LIKELY TO BE EDUCATED
MORE LIKELY TO LIVE IN URBAN AREAS	MORE LIKELY TO LIVE IN RURAL AREAS
MORE LIKELY TO FEEL SAFE PARTICIPATING IN SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES	LESS LIKELY TO FEEL SAFE PARTICIPATING IN SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES
MORE LIKELY TO BE INTERNET USERS	LESS LIKELY TO BE INTERNET USERS
MORE LIKELY TO WANT TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN	LESS LIKELY TO WANT TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN
MORE LIKELY TO BE SINGLE	MORE LIKELY TO BE MARRIED OR P REVIIOUSLY MARRIED
LIKELY TO HAVE A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ANSF	LIKELY TO HAVE A LOWER LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ANSF

FIG. 8.23: Factors associated with support for women's rights, using OLS regression analysis on an 11-item scale for women's rights.²⁴

Each year, the *Survey* asks respondents if they fear for their personal safety, and if so, do they fear always, often, or sometimes. This year, more Afghans express fear for their personal safety than any year since the *Survey* began, with 74.5% saying they are afraid always, often, or sometimes. Gender makes no difference in this overall rate of fear, but urban respondents are more likely than rural to report fear (80.0% urban vs. 72.7% rural), perhaps due to increased Taliban attacks on cities in the capital and the provinces. Respondents in the West (82.4%) are significantly more afraid than those in the Central/Highlands region (35.6%). Respondents are also asked if they or a family member have experienced violence or a criminal act in the past year, and the most commonly cited forms of violence remain similar to last year: physical beatings or attacks, extortion, burglary, pickpocketing, stolen livestock, murder, and suicide attacks. Male and female respondents report similar levels of crime, with the exception that men report significantly more extortion (see figure 8.24).

EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE OR CRIME

	MALE	FEMALE
	%	%
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	38	34
RACKETEERING/EXTORTION	25	19
BURGLARY/LOOTING	12	14
PICKPOCKETING	20	20
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT / PROPERTY TAKEN FROM VEHICLE OR PARTS OF THE VEHICLE STOLEN	9	8
KIDNAPPING	8	11
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	17	18
MILITANTS / INSURGENT ACTIONS	7	6
POLICE ACTIONS	7	6
ARMY ACTIONS	3	1
FOREIGN FORCES ACTION (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	5	3
MURDER	10	12
SUICIDE ATTACKS	9	11
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	1	2
SMUGGLING	4	4

FIG. 8.24: Q-30. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year? Q-31. (If Q-30 answer is yes) If it is okay to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

The *Survey* also asks Afghans to identify the two biggest problems facing women in their area. Lack of educational opportunities is the most commonly cited problem (43.2%), followed by lack of rights/

participation/justice (34.1%), lack of employment opportunities (24.1%), violence (18.1%), lack of services/infrastructure (13.7%), economic concerns (9.6%), security (4.6%), and personal/health issues (2.8%). A small portion of respondents (3.3%) say that nothing is a problem for women in their area. Women are slightly more likely than men to cite lack of educational opportunities (44.9% of women vs. 41.6% of men) and lack of rights (36.0% of women vs. 32.1% of men), and men are more likely than women to cite lack of services/infrastructure (16.5% of men vs. 10.9% of women). Full discussion of this question can be found in chapter 1.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN, BY GENDER




FIG. 8.25: Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem? :*

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- 24 OLS regression is used to regress women’s rights (scale) to various demographic and attitudinal factors including gender, education, place of residence, marital status, having an activity to earn income, fear (scale), watching TV, intention to leave the country, and confidence in Afghan National Security Forces (scale). The whole model describes 20.1% of the variation in the independent variable (women’s rights).



9 MIGRATION

Despite the difficult and often dangerous circumstances facing those who migrate to a new country, significant numbers of Afghans continue to leave Afghanistan and relocate elsewhere. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Afghans constitute the second-largest refugee population in the world, with 2.5 million registered refugees. Afghan migrants are the second-largest group arriving in Europe, and their migration is mostly driven by war.¹ According to Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, 43,800 Afghans lodged asylum claims in the EU in 2017, and 41,000 in 2018. These figures may be repeated in 2019, as more than 20,000 Afghans were reported to have applied for asylum in the first half of the year.²

This year, while 56.5% say they would not leave the country even if given an opportunity, 37.9% say they would leave Afghanistan.

Conflict and insecurity are significant factors driving Afghans to leave the country.³ Each year, the *Survey of the Afghan People* asks respondents whether they would leave if given the opportunity, and why. This year, while 56.5% say they would not leave the country even if given an opportunity, 37.9% say they would leave Afghanistan, a slight increase from 36.8% in 2018. Growing insecurity, uncertain peace talks, problems with presidential elections, and other forms of political uncertainty may constitute push factors persuading Afghans to migrate. A poor economy and rumors of the potential withdrawal of international security forces may also contribute to migration.^{4,5} For those who choose to stay, a majority give reasons relating to Afghan identity and a sense of connection to Afghanistan.

Survey findings show that, among those who express a desire to leave, the most common reason is insecurity (77.7%). The conflict in Afghanistan is now reported to be the most lethal in the world for battle-related deaths, and United Nations data shows that more civilians are killed or injured by armed conflict in Afghanistan than anywhere else in the world.⁶ Civilian casualties reached nearly 11,000 in 2018, an 84% increase from a decade ago.⁷ When asked what the government could do to make them stay in Afghanistan, 75.1% of respondents to this year's *Survey* say "improve security."

The ongoing violence also contributes to internal displacement, forcing Afghans to abandon their homes to seek refuge elsewhere. In March 2019, for instance, clashes between ISIS/Daesh and the Taliban displaced 21,000 Afghans in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces.⁸ In Nangarhar, intra-insurgent clashes in two districts, Khogyani and Sherzad, resulted in 56,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from April

22 to 30, 2019. The IDPs fled to nearby, more secure areas, where they lacked clothing, shelter, and hygiene facilities, putting pressure on resources.⁹ According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 110,000 Afghans were displaced as a result of conflict between January and May 2019.¹⁰

Security is not the sole reason why Afghan migrants desire to leave, however. According to UNAMA, ongoing drought conditions have reduced the supply of seed, compromising the 2019 planting season and leaving the year's main harvest short of staple crops.¹¹ The country's economy,¹² which has posted the slowest growth rate since 2001, and unemployment, particularly among youth, are also factors causing people to leave.¹³ The Asian Development Bank adds that, "high youth unemployment also creates a pool of young people who are vulnerable to recruitment for the insurgency."¹⁴

More than half of respondents in 2019, 54.9%, report that the employment situation among members of their household is getting worse. According to the *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey*, more than half of Afghans live below the poverty line,¹⁵ and the pursuit of better economic opportunities in foreign host countries continues to be a factor in the decision to migrate.¹⁶ There is a positive correlation between the size of a country's gross domestic product and the number of Afghan asylum seekers it attracts.¹⁷

An additional challenge is the burden of accommodating returnees from abroad. Between January 21 and April 30, 2019, nearly 140,000 undocumented returnees arrived in Afghanistan, including more than 7,000 from Pakistan, 127,500 from Iran, and 3,800 from Turkey and Europe.¹⁸ Accommodating the influx of returnees, continues to be a challenge for the Afghan government, the international community, and humanitarian organizations.

This chapter explores Afghans' perceptions regarding migration, including Afghans who say they would not leave the country even if given the opportunity. It also explores reasons Afghans leave the country, and what, if anything, the government can do to make people want to stay.

9.1 WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE

KEY QUESTION

Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

The *Survey* measures the willingness of Afghans to leave the country and live somewhere else if given the opportunity. In 2011, when this question was first asked, 33.8% replied that they would leave the country if given the opportunity. This number increased to a high of 39.9% in 2015 after the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG), dropped to 29.6% a year later, then rose again in 2017 to 38.8%. After a small decline to 36.8% in 2018, there was an upward tick in 2019, to

37.9%. At the same time, in 2011, 64.9% of those surveyed said they would not leave Afghanistan; in 2019 56.5% say this.




FIG. 9.1: Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.) (Note: gaps represent years the question was not asked.)*

DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MIGRATION

Overall, male respondents continue to be more likely to say they would leave Afghanistan (39.6%, up from 38.4% in 2018), than females (36.2%, up from 35.3% in 2018). Among urban respondents, however, this trend is reversed, with females (43.8%) more likely than males (41.5%) to say they would leave the country.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY LOCATION, GENDER, AGE, AND MARITAL STATUS




FIG. 9.2: Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

The *Survey* points to a relationship between the age of respondents and their willingness to leave. This year, 41.9% of those 18 to 25 years old are willing to leave if given the opportunity, compared to just 30.1% of those over 55.

Urban residents (42.5%) are more likely to leave the country than rural residents (36.3%), figures comparable to 2018 (urban 40.4%, rural 35.7%).

There is also a relationship between marital status and the willingness to migrate: 44.9% of single Afghans say they would leave given the opportunity, compared to 36.5% of married respondents.

ETHNICITY AND GEOGRAPHY

By ethnicity, Hazaras have consistently expressed a greater willingness to migrate than other ethnic groups, and they again lead the field in 2019, at 47.3%, followed by Tajiks (41.0%) and Uzbeks (41.0%). Pashtun respondents (30.8% this year) have consistently expressed the least willingness to leave Afghanistan.




FIG. 9.3: Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

DESIRE TO LEAVE BY REGION




FIG. 9.4: Q-96a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

By region, the proportion of respondents who would leave the country if they had a chance has grown continuously since 2016 in the Central/Kabul region, increasing by 5 percentage points since 2016. The willingness to leave is highest this year in the West (42.1%), followed by Central/Kabul (41.0%) and the South East (40.9%). Afghans in the South West are the least willing to leave the country, at 18.8%, down slightly from 20.3% last year.

By province, respondents in Ghazni (59.9%), Badghis (52.6%) and Kunar (52.5%) are most likely to leave if given the opportunity. Ghazni province has experienced the most warfare and insecurity over the years,¹⁹ which may explain this greater willingness to leave among Ghazni respondents. On the other hand, respondents in Helmand (13.0%), Kandahar (18.7%), Zabol (22.0%), and Wardak (22.6%) are least willing to leave the country, which is surprising given the volatile and insecure conditions in those provinces.

The most notable increase is in Badghis province, where willingness to leave jumped from 30.6% in 2018 to 52.6% in 2019. Drought,²⁰ and the recent surge in violence and insecurity in the province,²¹ may underly this increase.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY YEAR




FIG. 9.5: Q-96a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

The ability to generate an income is not significantly correlated with Afghans’ willingness to migrate; however, those who have a higher annual household income are less willing to do so. Of those who report improvement in their household financial situation in 2019, 30.5% say they would leave the country if given the opportunity, compared to 42.5% of those who report a worse financial situation in their household.

Levels of happiness also predict less willingness to migrate. In 2019, 33.2% of those who are “very happy” say they would leave Afghanistan, compared to 45.0% of those who are “not happy at all.”

The willingness to leave Afghanistan increases with educational attainment. Those who have some formal education (41.0%) are more likely to leave the country than those with no education (34.1%).




FIG. 9.6: Q-96a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.) D-10. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa?

9.2 REASONS FOR LEAVING

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-96c. (If Q-96a answer is yes) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

Q-98. Do you have a family member or close relative who lives abroad?

Q-99a. (If Q-98 answer is yes) In what countries do they live? (List up to two countries.)

Q-99b. (If Q-98 answer is yes) Have these relatives helped you financially, such as by sending money?

The *Survey* asks respondents who are willing to leave to explain their reasons why. For ease of reporting and interpretation, their answers are aggregated thematically. However, specific variables within those themes are cited when appropriate. (Please see appendix 3 for a complete list of all responses.)

PUSH FACTORS

DOMESTIC INSECURITY

Insecurity is a strong motivating factor for Afghans willing to leave the country. In 2019, domestic insecurity is the most commonly cited reason. Of the 37.9% of respondents who say they would leave Afghanistan, over three quarters (77.7%) identify insecurity as their principal reason.

MOST-CITED REASONS FOR LEAVING, BY YEAR




FIG. 9.7: Q-96c. (If Q-96a answer is yes) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

The most common reasons for leaving vary by demographic.

Female respondents (81.2%) cite domestic insecurity more frequently than male respondents (74.5%), and urban respondents (79.3%) cite domestic insecurity more frequently than rural respondents (77.1%).

By age, respondents older than 55 are less likely than any other age group, at 74.0%, to say they would leave because of insecurity.

By ethnicity, Hazaras (81.7%) are significantly more likely to cite insecurity as a reason for leaving than are Uzbeks (72.3%), Tajiks (77.6%), or Pashtuns (77.7%).

Survey data shows that willingness to migrate is associated with higher levels of fear. For example, 41.1% of respondents who say they “always” fear for their personal safety also say they would leave the country if given the opportunity, compared to 34.0% of those who “never” experience fear for their personal safety.

Similarly, Afghans who have “a lot of fear” while encountering the Taliban or ISIS/Daesh are somewhat more likely to leave the country (38.9% and 35.8%, respectively) than those who have no fear while encountering the Taliban or ISIS/Daesh (35.5% and 33.7%, respectively).

Those who have “a lot of fear” while traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another are more likely to say they would leave Afghanistan than those who have no fear while traveling (40.2% vs. 34.3%).

There is a positive correlation between confidence in the Afghan National Defense Security Forces and the intention to migrate. Those who say the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are getting better at providing security are less willing to leave the country (35.7% and 34.5%, respectively) than those who say the ANA and ANP are getting worse at providing security (40.1% and 41.5%, respectively).

Those who have a lot of sympathy with the Taliban are less willing to leave than those with no sympathy at all (29.8% vs. 38.7%). The results are similar for those who have sympathy with ISIS/Daesh.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY SYMPATHY WITH THE TALIBAN & ISIS/DAESH




FIG. 9.8: Q-96a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.) **Q-66a.** Thinking about the reasons why the Taliban have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the Taliban? **Q-70a.** Thinking about the reasons why Daesh have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for Daesh?

UNEMPLOYMENT

Among the 37.9% of respondents who say they would leave Afghanistan, 51.6% cite unemployment as one of two main reasons they would leave, which is similar to 2018 (51.5%). Men cite unemployment more frequently than women (59.6% vs. 43.0%), which is consistent with previous years.

The *Survey* also explores the impact of employment opportunities on respondents' desire to migrate. Those who say employment opportunities for their household have gotten worse are more willing to migrate (41.1%) than those who say those opportunities have gotten better (30.7%). As can be seen in figure 9.9, the difference in willingness to migrate between those who say employment opportunities have gotten worse and those who say they have gotten better continues to grow each year.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES




FIG. 9.9: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (b) Employment opportunities. **Q-96a.** Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

WEAK GOVERNANCE

After insecurity (77.7%) and unemployment (51.6%), weak governance (including corruption, injustice, and high prices) is the third most cited reason for leaving the country, at 28.4%, nearly identical to 2018 (28.0%). There is little difference by gender (male 27.0%, female 29.8%); however, rural respondents (30.4%) are more likely to cite weak government as a reason to leave the country than urban respondents (23.2%).

Survey data continues to show that Afghans who have more confidence in the government have less desire to leave the country than do those who have less confidence in the government. For example, 32.3% of those who say the NUG is doing a very good job are willing to leave Afghanistan, compared to 44.5% of those who say the NUG is doing a very bad job.

Among the 69.3% of respondents overall who say the government has had success (a lot or a little) in improving people’s living conditions, 35.4% say they would leave if given the opportunity. However, among the 30.1% of Afghans who say the government has not had success in improving living conditions, 43.6% say they would leave if given the opportunity.

Respondents who say corruption is a problem—major or minor—in Afghanistan as a whole are more likely to say they would leave than those who say it is not a problem (38.1% vs. 34.1%).

The *Survey* asks respondents to indicate their confidence in various government institutions, including the Independent Election Commission (IEC), parliament as a whole, provincial councils, members of parliament, and government ministers. The data shows that a higher level of confidence in these institutions can predict lower levels of intention to migrate.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS




FIG. 9.10: Q-96a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.) **Q-57.** I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (c) Independent Election Commission (IEC). (f) Government ministers. (j) Parliament as a whole. (k) Provincial councils. (m) Your member of parliament.

NATIONAL MOOD

Each year, *Survey* findings show that Afghans who have a pessimistic view about the future of the country are more likely to say they would leave. So it is this year, as 41.9% of respondents who say the country is moving in the wrong direction are willing to migrate, compared to 33.0% of those who say the country is moving in the right direction. Last year's results were a very similar 40.2% and 32.5%, respectively.

PEACE AND ELECTIONS

Afghans who say reconciliation between the government and the Taliban is impossible are more willing to leave than those who say it is possible (40.3% vs. 36.9%).

Meanwhile, respondents who strongly support peace are less likely to say they would leave Afghanistan than those who strongly oppose peace talks (36.8% vs. 40.0%).

Those who feel that they are not sufficiently represented in the peace efforts are more willing to leave the country (40.7%) than those who say that they are sufficiently represented (36.0%).

Respondents who say they did not vote in the October 2018 parliamentary election are more likely to say they would leave Afghanistan (40.9%) than those who say they voted (35.9%). This year's survey was conducted just prior to the 2019 presidential election. At that time, those who responded they did not plan to vote in the 2019 presidential election were more likely to say they would leave than those who did plan to vote (45.5% vs. 35.9%).

Intention to migrate is also correlated with the perception of free and fair presidential elections. Those who responded the presidential election will be free and fair are less likely to want to leave than those who think the election will not be "free and fair" (37.5% vs. 42.3%). However, satisfaction with the way democracy works in Afghanistan continues to have little association with the intention to migrate. Among respondents who are very dissatisfied with the way democracy works, 37.8% say they would leave country if given chance, compared to 36.1% of those who say they are very satisfied with democracy.

Those who say a democratic system is "very important" to protect in peace talks with the Taliban are more likely to desire to leave (39.9%) than those who say it's "not too important" (35.3%).

There is variation in the desire to leave between those who say that protecting the current constitution is "very important" and those who say it's "not too important" (39.6% vs. 33.9%).

The *Survey* asked Afghans whether they agree that antigovernment elements who lay down their arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should receive government assistance, jobs, and housing. Those who strongly or somewhat disagree are more likely to wish to leave the country than those who say they strongly or somewhat agree (40.5% vs. 37.5%).

EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN

The *Survey* indicates that those who support women's rights are more likely to say they would leave the country than those who do not. Those who believe women should work outside the home are more likely to say they would leave the country (39.3%) than those who say women should not work outside the home (33.8%).

Afghans who are more supportive of equal access to education for women are significantly more likely to say they would leave the country than those who say women should not have equal access to education (41.9% vs. 26.2%).

Those who say women should be allowed to vote also express more willingness to migrate than those who do not (39.0% vs. 28.1%). Afghans who prefer a woman to represent them in the national parliament are more willing to leave the country than those who prefer a man (38.3% vs. 35.7%).

This year, the *Survey* asks Afghans how important it is to protect women's rights in peace negotiations with the Taliban. Those who say that it's "very important" to protect women's rights are more likely to leave the country than those who think it is "not important at all" (39.4% vs. 36.0%).

Finally, respondents who strongly disagree with the cultural practices of *baad* and *baddal* are more likely to say they would leave the country (37.4% and 38.0%, respectively) than those who say they strongly agree with *baad* and *baddal* (33.7% and 33.5%, respectively).

PULL FACTORS

RELATIVES ABROAD

Having a family member outside the country can also influence the decision to migrate. In 2019, 39.2% of Afghans say they have a relative or close friend living in another country, and 46.3% of those respondents express a desire to leave Afghanistan, compared to 32.6% of those who do not have friends or family abroad. But among respondents with friends or family abroad, those who receive remittances from those connections are marginally less likely to wish to leave (45.6%) than those whose friends or family abroad do not send remittances (46.7%).

ACCESS TO MEDIA

Survey data shows a positive correlation between use of social media, the internet, or television as a primary source of information and the intention to migrate. For example, 40.7% of those who use television to get news and information say they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity, compared to 36.0% of those who rely on radio, 38.4% of those who rely on community *shuras*, and 39.3% of those who rely on the mosque (*ulema*).

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY ACCESS TO MEDIA




FIG. 9.11: Q-96a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.) **Q-79.** (Ask all.) Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information? (a) Radio. (b) TV set. (d) The internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.

By type of media, the desire to leave is most common among internet users (46.4%), and, accordingly, the desire to leave Afghanistan is higher among respondents in areas with internet access (41.1%) than in areas without (34.6%).

9.3 PROMOTING DECISIONS TO STAY

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

Q-96b. *(If Q-96a answer is no) Why would you stay in Afghanistan?*

Q-97. *(If Q-96a answer is yes) What, if anything, could the government do to make you stay in Afghanistan.*

In 2011, when the *Survey* first asked respondents about their intention to leave the country, 64.9% say they would not leave Afghanistan. In 2019, 56.5% of respondents say they would not leave, down by 8.4 percentage points.

By gender, 57.3% of females and 55.7% of males say they would not leave.

By age, older respondents are more likely to say they would not leave. Just 53.6% of 18- to 25-year-olds say they would not leave, but this proportion grows with each successive age group until it reaches 62.8% of those over 55, a difference of 9 percentage points.

Married respondents are more likely to say they would not leave (57.6%) than unmarried respondents (51.2%).

Pashtuns are the most likely to say they would not leave (63.6%), and Hazaras are the least likely (48.2%). Differences emerge by region: respondents in the South West are more likely to say they would not leave (70.4%) than those in the West (50.3%) and the North West (51.5%). By province, the desire to stay is most widespread in Helmand (74.3%) and Wardak (71.7%) and least widespread in Ghazni (40.1%) and Farah (42.2%).

The *Survey* asks the 56.5% of respondents who say they would not leave to give two main reasons why they would stay in Afghanistan. The majority offer reasons that relate to Afghan identity and reflect a sense of connection to Afghanistan; for example, “It’s my country” (50.2%), “I love my country” (47.4%), and “I feel comfortable here” (11.7%). Another 16.9% of Afghans say they are restricted from leaving the country, and 12.5% say that “to serve Afghanistan” they would not leave the country,

Women are more likely to say they are restricted from leaving (female 19.0%, male 14.8%) while men are more likely to say they would stay to serve and improve the country (male 15.2%, female 9.9%).

REASONS FOR STAYING, BY GENDER




FIG. 9.12: Q-96b. (If Q-96a answer is no) Why would you stay in Afghanistan?

REASONS FOR STAYING, BY REGION




FIG. 9.13: Q-96b. (If Q-96a answer is no) Why would you stay in Afghanistan?

The *Survey* also asks respondents what, if anything, the government could do to make them stay in Afghanistan. A majority suggest improving the security situation (75.1%), followed by improving opportunities for things like employment and education (61.4%).

A smaller proportion of respondents say improving the economy (12.2%) or infrastructure improvements (6.6%). The overall pattern of these responses is similar to 2017 and 2018.

WHAT COULD THE GOVERNMENT DO TO MAKE YOU STAY? BY YEAR



FIG. 9.14: Q-97. (If Q-96a answer is yes) What, if anything, could the government do to make you stay in Afghanistan.

Men (66.3%) are more likely than women (56.0%), and urban respondents (68.0%) are more likely than rural (58.8%) to suggest that the government could “improve opportunities for participation.”

A greater proportion of respondents in the Central/Highlands region say the government could “improve security” (81.4%) than in the East (68.9%). In the East, respondents are more likely to say “improve infrastructure” (21.6%) than those in the West (2.8%).

WHAT COULD THE GOVERNMENT DO TO MAKE YOU STAY? BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
IMPROVE SECURITY	79	69	73	73	78	72	81	73
IMPROVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTICIPATION	65	61	59	54	57	65	59	60
IMPROVE THE ECONOMY	10	15	14	10	12	13	13	13
IMPROVE INFRASTRUCTURE	5	13	9	7	3	5	5	9

FIG.9.15: Q-97. (If Q-96a answer is yes) What, if anything, could the government do to make you stay in Afghanistan.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DESIRE TO LEAVE

AFGHANS WILLING TO LEAVE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE:	AFGHANS UNWILLING TO LEAVE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE:
MALE	FEMALE
URBAN RESIDENT	RURAL RESIDENT
SINGLE	MARRIED
YOUNGER	OLDER
UNHAPPY	HAPPY
INTERNET AND TV USERS	RADIO USERS
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY	OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT RECONCILIATION AND PEACE	OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RECONCILIATION AND PEACE
FEARFUL FOR PERSONAL SAFETY	NOT FEARFUL FOR PERSONAL SAFETY
MORE SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS	LESS SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Fig 9.16: Factors associated with willingness to migrate, using Probit regression analysis.

ENDNOTES

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APPENDIX 1 METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The Asia Foundation’s *Survey of the Afghan People* is Afghanistan’s longest-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and opinions of Afghan adults. Since 2004, over 129,800 Afghan men and women have been surveyed, representing more than 400 districts, city *nahias* (municipal districts), and towns and villages in all 34 provinces. All data is public and free for immediate download at <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey>.

In total, a national sample of 17,812 Afghan citizens was surveyed face-to-face across all 34 provinces. Of these respondents, 15,930 (89%) were randomly selected, while 1,882 were intercept interviews (11%). The 2018–2019 population estimates provided by the National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA), formerly the Afghan Central Statistics Office, provided accurate estimates for urban and rural populations at the district level of Afghanistan. Respondents were 18 years and older, 51% male, and 49% female. The final unweighted sample consisted of 18% urban households and 82% rural households. Interviews ranged in duration from 17 to 115 minutes, with the average interview taking 41 minutes.

In addition to the Main Sample of 13,280 respondents, two oversamples were fielded as well and are included in this year’s data: one was fielded in 10 districts of interest around the country, with an emphasis on local cooperation, reconciliation, and prospects for a peace agreement, referred to as the “Peacebuilding Oversample”; the other focused on civic engagement and agricultural economies—referred to as the “CEAE Oversample”—and was fielded in 12 districts of interest. All respondents in all three samples received the main substantive portion of the questionnaire, but respondents in Peacebuilding or CEAE target districts received additional modules of questions. Due to the difference in districts of client interest, no respondent was asked both oversample modules. The sample size for the Peacebuilding Oversample was 2,047 respondents, while the sample size for the CEAE Oversample was 2,485 respondents.

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in this appendix. Some highlights are presented below:

1. The *Survey of the Afghan People 2019* includes a sample of 17,812 men and women above 18 years of age residing in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Of these, 1,104 men and women in Balkh, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Nangarhar provinces were interviewed using mobile

devices loaded with Research Control Solutions (RCS) survey software, while the remaining 16,708 respondents were interviewed using paper questionnaires.

2. The main sample was stratified by province and urban/rural status using population data released by the NSIA (2018–2019 estimates).

If a selected district was not accessible for interviewing, *intercept* interviews were conducted with male residents of that district in nearby districts. Sampling points that were planned for interviews with women but could not be covered by female interviewers were replaced with female interviews from within the same strata (same province and urban/rural designation).

3. Considering the survey design of disproportionate stratification and two levels of clustering, district and sampling point, the complex design and weighting should be taken into account when determining the margin of error (MOE). For the binomial question, “Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” the estimated design effect is 2.475.¹ Using this estimate of a design effect, the complex margin of error at the 95% CI with $p=.5$ is $\pm 1.2\%$ for the probability sample.²
4. Disposition outcomes for all interviews were tracked using the standard codes of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), which have been adapted to the Afghan context. For this sample, the *response rate 3* is 79.75%, the *cooperation rate 3* is 93.78%, the *refusal rate 2* is 3.81%, and the *contact rate 2* is 86.09%.
5. There were some provinces where security, transportation, and other circumstances affected field work. These events are described in detail in this report. These types of events are common in Afghanistan, and the safety of field teams is always a primary concern.
6. Fieldwork was conducted from July 11 to August 7, 2018. The field team consisted of 1,276 trained interviewers and 35 supervisors.
7. Several quality-control procedures were employed throughout the project.
 - a. During fieldwork, interviewers were observed by supervisors or by a third-party validator. Field supervisors and third-party validators also conducted back-checks of interviews. In total, 34% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control. Three interviews were rejected due to field-level quality-control and validation feedback.
 - b. During the data entry phase, approximately 20% of interviews conducted underwent double data entry, and resulting discrepancies were resolved.
 - c. Finally, during the data cleaning phase, D3’s Hunter program was used to search for patterns or anomalies in the data that might indicate an interview was not properly

conducted by an interviewer. For this survey, 18 cases were deleted for having high overall similarity to other cases done by the same interviewer (i.e., failing the equality test), 271 cases were deleted from the data set for having over 95% similarities in responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test), and five were deleted from the data set for having high nonresponse rates (over 40% “don’t know” or refused).

- d. Subsequently, a further 291 cases were deleted through client logic checks, and 40 were deleted as a result of other quality-control measures. A total of 644 cases were deleted at all stages of cleaning and quality control.
 - e. Additional quality-control checks were also conducted. These checks included:
 - i. Duplicate interviews: interviews with high overall similarity
 - ii. Pattern responses: interviewers with a high percentage of cases with identical responses across a battery of items
 - iii. Substantive response bias: high overall similarity across an interviewer’s cases
 - iv. High nonresponse (“don’t know” or refused)
 - v. Productivity in field: unusually high or low interview lengths or number of completions per day
8. To verify that fieldwork was conducted at the correct locations specified in the sampling plan, GPS coordinates were collected for 2,376 sampling points in all 34 provinces: 2,253 in the paper sample and 185 in the Research Control Solutions (RCS) / Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) sample. These were compared to GPS coordinates for selected villages drawn from NSIA lists.
9. The questionnaire addresses infrastructure and development, rule of law, development and provision of services, governance, security, corruption, elections, reconciliation, women’s issues, and social issues. The questionnaire included 33 management questions, 21 demographic questions, and 139 substantive questions. Of the substantive questions, 19 were new, and one was modified from a previous wave. The Peacebuilding Oversample included 17 questions, while the CEAE Oversample included 23 questions.
10. The average interview length was 41 minutes, with a range of 17 to 115 minutes.

2 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

Each year, The Asia Foundation’s staff reviews the questionnaire using statistical and cognitive testing, and questions yielding less analytical value are removed from the questionnaire. Questions were reviewed in order to ensure that they met international standards, which included ensuring that questions were not double-barreled or overly complex, did not contain double negatives, and were not threatening or

leading and that response scales matched question wording. In total, the questionnaire went through nine iterations before being approved for translation.

Using this method, this year’s *Survey* consisted of 139 substantive questions and 21 demographic questions, as well as 33 survey-management and quality-control questions. Of these questions, 19 substantive questions were considered new questions, and one question was a modified version of a question fielded in previous waves of the *Survey*. The demographics section contained no new questions, but one modified question.

The Peacebuilding Oversample included 17 questions, while the CEAE Oversample included 23 questions.

3 SAMPLE DESIGN

The sample was allocated disproportionately by strata and was drawn using a multistage systematic sampling approach. The 2018–2019 updated figures provided by the NSIA were used to draw this.

TARGET POPULATION:	AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES
TARGET SAMPLE	<p>17,410 TOTAL AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAIN SAMPLE: 13,010 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES • CEAE OVERSAMPLE: 2,400 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 12 TARGET DISTRICTS • PEACEBUILDING OVERSAMPLE: 2,000 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 10 TARGET DISTRICTS
ACHIEVED SAMPLE	<p>17,812 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAIN SAMPLE: 13,280 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES • CEAE OVERSAMPLE: 2,485 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 12 TARGET DISTRICTS • PEACEBUILDING OVERSAMPLE: 2,047 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 10 TARGET DISTRICTS

DETERMINING THE SAMPLE FOLLOWED SIX STEPS:

Step 1: For the Main Sample, a base sample was first stratified disproportionately by province based on client specifications, desired MOE, and power estimates. A minimum of 270 interviews were carried out in each province. Within each province, the sample was then stratified by urban and rural population figures from the 2018–2019 NSIA estimates.

Each of 60 strata⁴ was allocated at least one primary sampling unit (PSU) to ensure that the entire target population had a probability of selection. After the urban and rural strata of each province received a cluster, the remainder of the province’s sample was allocated proportionally. The oversample districts were removed from the frame prior to the main draw so that no district would be sampled in both the main and oversample draws.

For the two oversamples, the base sample was stratified disproportionately by district, with each district as its own stratum.

Step 2: *Districts* were selected via probability proportional to size (PPS) *systematic sampling*. Districts served as the PSU. Each PSU contained at least two sampling points, one of male respondents and one of female respondents. This was done to allow for gender-matched interviewing, which is a cultural requirement of working in Afghanistan. Each PSU was chosen via PPS sampling within its stratum.

- a. Inaccessible Districts: In order to obtain some information on the perceptions of those living in insecure areas that were not accessible to enumerators conducting a random walk, *intercept* interviews were held with people coming out of these areas to towns, bazaars, bus depots, or hospitals in more secure areas. For the 2019 *Survey*, 10.6% of the interviews (n=1,882) were intercept interviews. Intercept interviews were done in 136 districts across 30 provinces.

These intercept interviews are identified by the variable “Method1” in the data set. All intercept interviews were in the Main Sample: the oversamples did not require any intercepts to complete. However, due to their non-randomized sampling, the intercept interview data is not included in the Main Sample analysis. Rather, the intercepts data is used only where indicated in the text.

Step 3: The *settlements* within districts were selected by simple random sampling. These served as the secondary sampling unit (SSU). Within urban strata, we used neighborhoods (called *guzars* in towns, cities, and metros), while in rural strata we used villages. As population data for settlement sizes does not exist, a simple random selection among all known settlements was used to select locations. In this *Survey*, six interviews were conducted per sampling point.

- a. The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces could cause a sampling point to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence.
 - i. For the Main Sample, a total of two replicate draws were provided to the field team prior to the launch of fieldwork. In cases where the replicates were exhausted, replacements at the settlement/*nahia* level were done in the field by supervisors, choosing neighboring accessible settlements as replacements whenever possible.
 - ii. For the Oversamples, only a single round of replacements was provided, due to a limited number of municipal districts/*nahias*/villages in some of the target districts.
- b. In conformity with Afghan culture, interviewing was gender-specific, with female interviewers interviewing only females and males interviewing only males.
- c. Some districts with significant insurgent activity, military operations, or lack of transportation had male-only samples, depending on conditions. If a sampling point designated for female interviews was only accessible to male interviewing, it was replaced with a female sampling point from within the same strata (same province and same urban/rural status). All other strata had an even gender split.

Step 4: Field managers then used maps generated from several sources to select starting points within each SSU.

- a. In rural areas, we used a system that requires interviewers to start in one of five randomly selected locations (northern, southern, eastern, or western edges of the rural settlement, and center).
- b. In urban areas, where it is more difficult to differentiate neighborhood borders, a random location (northern, southern, eastern, western, or center) was provided to the interviewer, and they were to start from an identifiable landmark in the vicinity (e.g., a school, mosque, etc.).

Step 5: To bolster the randomization process, each sampling point was also randomly assigned a different first-contacted house, either the first, second, or third house the interviewer arrived at following the start of the random walk. After approaching the first-contacted house, the interviewer then followed a set interval to select all other households for inclusion in the sample—for example, selecting every third house on the right in rural areas and every fifth house on the right in urban areas.

Step 6: After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a *Kish* grid for randomizing the target respondent⁵ within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and their ages in descending order, and then the respondent was selected according to the rules of the Kish grid.

WEIGHTING

Six weights were created for the *Survey of the Afghan People 2019*, including two for the Main Sample and two each for the Peacebuilding and CEAE Oversamples. Each was calibrated to strata and gender targets. For each of these weights, an adjustment due to response rates was performed according to AAPOR's Response Rate 3.

The base weight, also referred to as the *probability-of-selection* weight or *design* weight, was computed simply as the inverse of the probability of selection for each respondent. However, a few assumptions were made in the sampling design that resulted in treating the sample as approximately EPSEM (equal probability of selection method).

Assumptions were as follows:

1. **ALL SETTLEMENTS ARE OF EQUAL SIZE.** Since population estimates at the settlement level are unavailable and/or unreliable, the sample design drew settlements using a simple random sample (SRS). By assuming the settlements are of equal size the SRS condition of equal probabilities of selection holds true.
2. **THE RANDOM ROUTE PROCEDURE IS EQUIVALENT TO AN SRS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND RESPONDENTS.** Household enumeration is too time consuming, cost prohibitive, and dangerous to be completed in Afghanistan. Random route and Kish grid procedures were used instead for respondent selection. We assume that these procedures are equivalent to performing an SRS of households and respondents at the settlement level.

A post-stratification adjustment was performed on the resulting adjusted base weight to match the target population's geographic distribution in Afghanistan. The only targets used for the raking were province by urban/rural status,⁶ and gender.

4 PROVINCIAL POPULATION

Below are the population percentages for each province as supplied by the NSIA, the unweighted sample, and the weighted sample.

	PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION	PERCENTAGE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (INCLUDES INTERCEPT INTERVIEWS AND OVERSAMPLE DISTRICTS)	PERCENTAGE IN WEIGHTED SAMPLE WITHOUT INTERCEPTS (MERGEWGT10) ⁷
BADAKHSHAN	3.5%	1.6%	3.4%
BADGHIS	1.8%	1.5%	1.8%
BAGHLAN	3.3%	3.1%	3.2%
BALKH	4.9%	2.9%	4.8%
BAMYAN	1.5%	3.5%	1.6%
DAIKUNDI	1.7%	2.8%	1.7%
FARAH	1.9%	2.5%	1.8%
FARYAB	3.7%	2.3%	3.5%
GHAZNI	4.5%	1.6%	4.4%
GHOR	2.5%	1.6%	2.4%
HELMAND	3.4%	4.3%	4.6%
HERAT	6.9%	7.4%	6.8%
JAWZJAN	2.0%	1.6%	1.9%
KABUL	16.1%	7.9%	16.4%
KANDAHAR	4.5%	6.7%	4.5%
KAPISA	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%
KHOST	2.1%	2.8%	2.0%
KUNAR	1.7%	1.6%	1.6%
KUNDUZ	4.3%	3.1%	3.6%
LAGHMAN	1.6%	3.9%	1.6%
LOGAR	1.4%	1.5%	1.4%
NANGARHAR	5.6%	7.8%	5.4%
NIMROZ	0.6%	1.6%	0.6%
NURISTAN	0.5%	1.6%	0.5%
PAKTIA	2.0%	2.8%	2.0%

	PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION	PERCENTAGE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (INCLUDES INTERCEPT INTERVIEWS AND OVERSAMPLE DISTRICTS)	PERCENTAGE IN WEIGHTED SAMPLE WITHOUT INTERCEPTS (MERGEWGT10) ⁷
PAKTIKA	1.6%	1.6%	2.5%
PANJSHIR	0.6%	1.5%	0.5%
PARWAN	2.4%	3.9%	2.4%
SAMANGAN	1.4%	1.6%	1.4%
SAR-E-PUL	2.1%	1.5%	2.0%
TAKHAR	3.6%	2.8%	3.5%
URUZGAN	1.3%	2.6%	1.4%
WARDAK	2.2%	3.2%	2.1%
Zabul	1.1%	1.6%	1.2%
TOTAL	100%	100.0%	100.0%

5 MARGIN OF ERROR AND DESIGN EFFECT

Focusing on the portion of the sample that is probability based (excluding intercept interviews), the added variance from a multistage stratified cluster design can be estimated via design effect estimates for the *Survey's* variables and, in turn, used to estimate the complex margin of sampling error. Design effect estimates provided in this section account for both the complex sample design and the weights.

- The sample was stratified by urban/rural status and province with two stages of clustering: district and settlement. For purposes of design effect estimation, only one stage of clustering is specified. Most of the additional variance is accounted for in the initial stage of clustering, resulting in a negligible increase in design effect when two stages are defined.
- The design effect, for reporting purposes, was estimated for a key question of interest: “In your opinion, are things in our country generally going in the right direction, or the wrong direction?” In the following table, we provide design effect estimates for each response category of this key variable through the survey module of the R statistical software package.
- In an effort to provide a survey-wide design effect, a “weighted mean” design effect was calculated as the average across each response category of the variable when weighted by frequency of response.

DESIGN-EFFECT ESTIMATION USING Q1

	PROPORTION	COMPLEX SE	DESIGN EFFECT	SRS BOOTSTRAPPED SE
RIGHT DIRECTION	35.04%	0.5714%	2.5552	0.3588%
WRONG DIRECTION	59.13%	0.5758%	2.4437	0.3715%
REFUSED VOL.	0.38%	0.0592%	1.6590	0.0447%
DON'T KNOW VOL.	5.46%	0.2613%	2.3574	0.1679%
WEIGHTED MEAN			2.4751	

Assuming a simple random sample with $n=17,812$ and $p=.5$ at the 95% CI level, the margin of error for the *Survey* is 1.0%. However, when accounting for the complex design through the design effect estimate of 2.475 and $p=.5$ at the 95% CI level, the complex MOE is 1.16%.

In addition to this conservative⁸ estimate of MOE, statistic-specific standard errors are provided using bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a resampling method which does not rely on assumptions about the distribution of the variable of interest. These estimates are calculated with the weighted data and can be multiplied by the square root of the design effect in order to achieve a standard error that takes the design into consideration. These estimates take the actual responses into consideration during calculation (as opposed to the conservative setting at $p=.5$).

6 INTERVIEWERS

The number of supervisors and male and female interviewers, by province, appears in the table below.

	NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS	NUMBER OF FEMALE INTERVIEWERS	NUMBER OF MALE INTERVIEWERS	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS
BADAKHSHAN	1	13	10	23
BADGHIS	1	18	20	38
BAGHLAN	1	19	17	36
BALKH	1	24	22	46
BAMYAN	1	17	15	32
DAIKUNDI	1	18	19	37
FARAH	1	14	13	27
FARYAB	1	23	24	47
GHAZNI	1	14	18	32
GHOR	1	18	18	36
HELMAND	1	20	33	53
HERAT	1	21	25	46

	NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS	NUMBER OF FEMALE INTERVIEWERS	NUMBER OF MALE INTERVIEWERS	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS
JAWZJAN	1	12	12	24
KABUL	1	41	45	86
KANDAHAR	1	25	26	51
KAPISA	1	16	16	32
KHOST	1	15	16	31
KUNAR	1	13	11	24
KUNDUZ	1	23	21	44
LAGHMAN	1	26	25	51
LOGAR	1	18	16	34
NANGARHAR	1	36	44	80
NIMROZ	1	11	11	22
NURISTAN	2	6	14	20
PAKTIA	1	14	18	32
PAKTIKA	1	10	18	28
PANJSHIR	1	12	13	25
PARWAN	1	22	21	43
SAMANGAN	1	9	10	19
SAR-E-PUL	1	10	13	23
TAKHAR	1	20	19	39
URUZGAN	1	10	32	42
WARDAK	1	24	23	47
ZABUL	1	12	17	29
TOTAL	35	604	675	1279

7 SAMPLING REPLACEMENTS

In studies prior to 2014, if a sampling point was inaccessible, the replacement of this sampling point was left to the discretion of field supervisors and managers. Recognizing the need to limit systematic bias of field supervisors selecting replacement sampling points, the system for assigning replacements to inaccessible sampling points was updated in 2013 to provide a total of two replicate sample draws to the field team prior to the launch of fieldwork.

For this wave of the *Survey of the Afghan People*, the fieldwork partner, ACSOR, continued to use this replacement protocol. The first draw served as the initial list of sampling points where fieldwork was to be conducted. If the sampling point was inaccessible, field supervisors informed the central office of

the reason for inaccessibility. The field supervisor then used the first preassigned replicate, which was always a different village within the same district. If this village was also inaccessible, the process was repeated, and a second preassigned replicate was tried. If the second replicate was also inaccessible, the next selection of a village was left to the discretion of the field managers and supervisors. In cases where replacements at the settlement/*nahia* level were done in the field by supervisors, neighboring accessible settlements were chosen as replacements whenever possible.

As of June 2019, when the sample was drawn for the July survey, 66% of the population lived in districts accessible to all interviewers, while 11% lived in districts accessible only to male interviewers, and 23% lived in totally inaccessible districts. This means that, in total, 34% of women and 23% of men were inaccessible to random walk interviewing. Of 3,074 sampling points selected, a total of 1,006 villages from the main draw had to be replaced for a variety of reasons. This represents a total replacement rate of 32.7% for original sampling points.

REPLACEMENT RATE, BY YEAR

YEAR	NUMBER OF SAMPLING POINTS (TOTAL)	NUMBER OF REPLACED SAMPLING POINTS	REPLACEMENT RATE
2008	762	52	6.8%
2009	961	208	21.6%
2010	825	214	25.9%
2011	825	166	20.1%
2012	1,436	341	23.7%
2013	1,568	267	17.0%
2014	1,628	460	28.3%
2015	1,684	482	28.6%
2016	2,262	800	35.4%
2017	1,728	668	38.7%
2018	2,614	950	36.3%
2019	3,074	1,006	32.7%

Of the 1,006 villages replaced in the first draw, 813 of these were in the Main Sample, which had two full replicate draws. Only one replicate draw was provided for the CEAE and Peacebuilding Oversamples, because of a limited number of settlements (municipal districts/*nahias* or villages) in some target districts relative to the sample size.

Of the 855 sampling points replaced in the first draw, 327 (33%) were again replaced in the second draw, 273 (27%) were replaced yet again in the third draw, and 406 (40%) were replaced by the supervisor. The primary reason for replacement was Taliban presence in the village, military operations, or other security issues.

Reasons for all replacements are summarized in the table below.

VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS

REASON	INITIAL DRAW		SECOND DRAW		THIRD DRAW	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / TALIBAN	611	69.8%	486	71.6%	289	71.2%
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	176	15.7%	119	17.5%	75	18.5%
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	122	9.1%	56	8.2%	32	7.9%
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	24	3.5%	11	1.6%	4	1.0%
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	4	0.5%	5	0.7%	3	0.7%
OTHER	13	1.4%	2	0.3%	3	0.7%
TOTAL	950	100%	679	100%	406	100%

Female sampling points had a slightly higher rate of replacement: 28.3% of male sampling points (444 out of 1,567) were replaced, compared with 37.3% of female sampling points (562 out of 1,507).

VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS, BY GENDER

REASON	MALE SAMPLING POINTS		FEMALE SAMPLING POINTS	
	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / TALIBAN	307	69.1%	395	70.3%
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	72	16.2%	86	15.3%
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	42	9.5%	50	8.9%
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	17	3.8%	18	3.2%
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	3	0.7%	2	0.4%
OTHER	3	0.7%	11	2.0%
TOTAL	444	100%	562	100%

Reasons for all replacements over the years are summarized in the table below.

REASONS FOR VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS, BY YEAR

REASON	2008		2009		2010		2011	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	17	32.7%	104	50.0%	140	65.4%	99	59.6%
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	10	19.2%	45	21.6%	40	18.7%	29	17.5%
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	23	44.2%	53	25.5%	34	15.9%	31	18.7%
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	0	0.0%	5	2.4%	0	0.0%	7	4.2%
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	2	3.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	0	0.0%	1	0.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TOTAL	52	100%	208	100%	214	100%	166	100%

REASON	2012		2013		2014		2015	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	191	56.0%	144	53.9%	298	64.8%	332	68.9%
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	96	28.2%	61	22.8%	113	24.6%	110	22.8%
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	39	11.4%	45	16.9%	46	10.0%	35	7.3%
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	9	2.6%	13	4.9%	3	0.7%	2	0.4%
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	6	1.8%	4	1.5%	0	0.0%	3	0.6%
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TOTAL	341	100%	267	100%	460	100%	482	100%

REASON	2016		2017		2018		2019	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	561	70.1%	491	73.5%	611	64.3%	702	69.8%
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	178	22.3%	105	15.7%	176	18.5%	158	15.7%
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	42	5.3%	60	9.0%	122	12.8%	92	9.1%
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	11	1.4%	9	1.3%	24	2.5%	35	3.5%
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	4	0.5%	3	0.4%	4	0.4%	5	0.5%
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	4	0.5%	0	0.0%	13	1.4%	14	1.4%
TOTAL	800	100%	668	100%	950	100%	1006	100%

CONTACT PROCEDURES

After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and ages in descending order. The Kish grid provides a random selection criterion based on which visit the household represents in the enumerator's random walk and the number of inhabitants living in the household. Column numbers in the Kish grid that accompanied the questionnaire were precoded in order to help prevent fraud or convenience selection based on available people.

Under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after two callbacks, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

Typically, interviewers were required to make two callbacks before replacing the household. These callbacks were made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period in order to provide a broader schedule within which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force had difficulty meeting the requirement of two callbacks prior to substitution in many rural areas.

In this *Survey*, while interviewers were able to complete some callbacks, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt:

- First contact 98.6%
- Second contact 1.2%
- Third contact 0.2%

Due to the high rate of unemployment and the choice of appropriate times of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

8 FIELD QUALITY CONTROL

Thirty-five supervisors observed interviewers' work in the field. Approximately 36% of the interviews were subject to some form of back-check.

The back-checks consisted of:

- Direct observation during the interview (882 interviews, 5.0%);
- A return visit by the supervisor to the residence where an interview took place (3,902 interviews, 21.9%);
- Back-check from the central office (41 interviews, 0.2%); or
- Quality control by an external validator (1,182 interviews, 6.6%).

As with previous studies since 2014, the *Survey of the Afghan People* included third-party validation. Field supervisors provided the fieldwork schedule to the validation team following the training briefings. Asia Foundation personnel also participated in validation for some sampling points. Validators and/or Asia Foundation personnel met with interviewers during the field period and observed fieldwork to verify the correct administration of the survey, including the starting point, the random walk, and the use of the Kish grid to select respondents at 216 sampling points. They also conducted back-checks of selected interviews. In total, three interviews were rejected due to field-level quality control.

9 GPS COORDINATES

In order to improve accuracy and verify fieldwork, interviewers collected GPS data using phones in 2,672 out of 3,074 sampling points (87%). While GPS coordinates in all 34 provinces were collected, we were unable to collect GPS coordinates at all sampling points due to security concerns. As an extra level of verification, GPS coordinates were then compared to the GPS coordinates of villages provided by the NSIA. For this study, the median distance from the selected villages was 1.27 km.

10 CODING, DATA ENTRY, AND DATA QUALITY CONTROLS

When the questionnaires were returned to the central office in Kabul, they were sorted, and open-ended questions were coded by a team of coders familiar with international standards for creating typologies for codes. During data entry, five cases were removed because of missing or misprinted pages.

The questionnaires were then sent for data entry. This process was conducted on site to protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the keypunching team utilized logic checks and verified any errors inadvertently committed by interviewers.

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, a program called Hunter was used to search for additional patterns and duplicates that might indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer. A total of 40 cases were removed as a result of this stage of data cleaning.

The Hunter program includes three tests:

1. Equality test—looks for similarities in interviews done by the same interviewer, done within the same sampling point, done within the same province, or sharing any other variable. Typically, interviews with an interviewer average of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
2. Nonresponse test—determines the percentage of “don’t knows” and refusals for each interviewer’s cases. Typically, interviews with 40% or more “don’t know” responses are flagged for further investigation.

3. Duplicates test—compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any cases that have a similarity of 95% or higher are flagged for further investigation.

Any interview that did not pass Hunter was pulled out for additional screening. If the interview did not pass screening, it was removed from the final database.

During the data entry process, as entry of questionnaires was completed, 20% of all paper questionnaires (2,988 out of 17,308) were randomly selected for reentry. These questionnaires were then given to a different team for reentry. Data results from this independent entry were then compared to the primary data set. Discrepancies and errors were identified by data coders. Key-punchers with high error rates were disciplined and given additional training. For all errors, questionnaires were then reviewed, and the correct data was included in the final data set. The error rate for data entry for the *Survey of the Afghan People 2019* was 0.14%, which is, acceptable for quality control standards and slightly lower than the 0.18% error rate for the 2018 *Survey*.

For the final layer of quality control, the Foundation used a multifaceted series of logic checks to test data for interviewer error and logical consistency and to detect any possible patterns of falsification or poor performance.

Based on the results of these tests, a total of 641 cases were removed from the data set for failing more than two logic tests across multiple interviews, particularly in areas where field validation noted suspected problems with fieldwork. If an interviewer was flagged multiple times, all interviews conducted by this interviewer were then removed from the data.

In total, 3.5% of all successful interviews (those in the initial data file prior to quality control) were removed at some stage of the quality control process.

SUMMARY OF REMOVED CASES

	N-SIZE AT EACH STAGE OF QC	TOTAL REMOVED	PERCENTAGE REMOVED AT EACH STAGE
TOTAL SUCCESSFUL INTERVIEWS	18,453	--	NA
N-SIZE POST-ACSOR QC	18,103	350	1.9%
N-SIZE POST-ASIA FOUNDATION QC	17,812	291	1.6%

ENDNOTES

- 1 The design effect estimate is a weighted average across individual response option design effects for this key question of interest.
- 2 The probability sample excludes intercept interviews from variance estimation.
- 3 The target n -size for this survey was 17,410. The initial data set, after data processing but before quality-control removals, had an n -size of 18,453 (not counting the three rejected due to field-level quality control). A total of 641 interviews were removed as a result of quality control by logic checks, which reduced the total n -size in the final data set to 17,812.
- 4 Normally, there are 65 strata in Afghanistan, but all urban areas in Khost, Farah, Paktia, Kandahar, and Laghman were included in oversample districts, so these areas were removed from the main sample draw.
- 5 Interviewers were not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the respondent selected by the Kish grid. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, then the interviewer had to move on to the next household according to the random route.
- 6 The urban centers of some of the more rural provinces were included as their own strata and represent very small segments of the target population. As a result, cases from these strata have very small weights. The samples within these strata were allocated to ensure everyone in the target population had a probability of being selected. Trimming was not done with these small weights, in order to maintain a proportional-to-population-estimates-by-strata weighted sample.
- 7 “MergeWgt10” is a variable in the data set: post-stratified weight by strata without intercepts. Distribution of the weighted sample by province is approximately the same for both weights. When accessing *Survey of Afghan the People* data, use variable MergeWgt10 to weight the data and replicate results.
- 8 The MOE for a binary response is maximized when the proportions are set equal to each other ($p=.5$)



APPENDIX 2 SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

M-4. Region

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
CENTRAL/KABUL	21%
EAST	9%
SOUTH EAST	14%
SOUTH WEST	10%
WEST	11%
NORTH EAST	17%
CENTRAL/HIGHLANDS	7%
NORTH WEST	10%

M-6a. Geographic code

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
VILLAGES	75%
TOWNS	5%
CITY	6%
METRO (KABUL)	14%

M-7. Province

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
KABUL	16%
KAPISA	2%
PARWAN	2%
WARDAK	2%
LOGAR	1%
GHAZNI	4%
PAKTIA	2%
PAKTIKA	2%
KHOST	2%
NANGARHAR	5%
LAGHMAN	2%
KUNAR	2%
NURISTAN	1%
BADAKHSHAN	3%
TAKHAR	3%

BAGHLAN	3%
KUNDUZ	4%
BALKH	5%
SAMANGAN	1%
JAWZJAN	2%
SAR-E-PUL	2%
FARYAB	4%
BADGHIS	2%
HERAT	7%
FARAH	2%
NIMROZ	1%
HELMAND	5%
KANDAHAR	4%
ZABUL	1%
URUZGAN	1%
GHOR	2%
BAMYAN	2%
PANJSHIR	1%
DAIKUNDI	2%

D-1. Gender

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
MALE	50%
FEMALE	50%

D-2. How old are you?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
18–31 YEARS OLD	50%
32–44 YEARS OLD	28%
45–57 YEARS OLD	16%
58–70 YEARS OLD	6%
71–83 YEARS OLD	1%

D-14. Which ethnic group do you belong to?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
PASHTUN	39%
TAJIK	37%
HAZARA	11%
UZBEK	8%
TURKMENI	1%
SADAT	1%
ARAB	1%
PASHAYE	1%
NURISTANI	1%
BALOCH	<0.5%
KIRGHIZ	<0.5%
AIMAK	<0.5%
QEZELBASH	<0.5%
GUJAR	<0.5%
TEMORI	<0.5%
JAMSHIDI	<0.5%



APPENDIX 3 INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

MAIN SURVEY QUESTIONS

Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
RIGHT DIRECTION	36%
WRONG DIRECTION	58%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-2. (Ask if answer to Q-1 is code 1, "right direction.") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q-2a. First mention _____

Q-2b. Second mention _____

BASE: RIGHT DIRECTION	5,849
RECONSTRUCTION/REBUILDING	32%
PEACE/END OF THE WAR	26%
GOOD SECURITY	25%
DON'T KNOW	15%
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	11%
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	10%
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEM	9%
REDUCTION IN LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	7%
DEMOCRACY/ELECTIONS	6%
ROAD RECONSTRUCTION	5%
GOOD GOVERNMENT	5%
HAVING ACTIVE ANA AND ANP	5%
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE	3%
MORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY THAN BEFORE	3%
MORE JOB OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE	2%
WOMEN CAN NOW WORK	2%
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE	2%
NATIONAL UNITY	2%
REMOVING TALIBAN	2%
DISARMAMENT	2%
FREEDOM / FREE SPEECH	1%

CLEAN DRINKING WATER	1%
HAVING LEGAL CONSTITUTION	1%
CLINICS HAVE BEEN BUILT	1%
IMPROVED JUSTICE	1%
PREVENTION/ELIMINATION OF CRIMES	1%
GOOD COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	1%
REDUCTION IN POPPY CULTIVATION	1%
WOMEN HAVE MORE FREEDOM	1%
RESPECTING WOMEN RIGHTS	1%
FOREIGN FORCES LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	1%
DECREASE IN CRIMES	1%
PREVENTION/ELIMINATION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%
DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM IN GENERAL	1%
REMOVING TERRORISM	1%
HAVING PARLIAMENT	1%
MORE ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS	1%
BETTER RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH
DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM IN GENERAL	1%
FOREIGN FORCES LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	1%

Q-3. (Ask if answer to Q-1 is code 2, “wrong direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Q-3a. First mention _____

Q-3b. Second mention _____

BASE: WRONG DIRECTION	9,142
INSECURITY	54%
THERE IS UNEMPLOYMENT	27%
CORRUPTION	15%
BAD ECONOMY	13%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	11%
BAD GOVERNMENT	6%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	5%
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	5%
HIGH PRICES	4%
INJUSTICE IN THE COUNTRY	4%
POOR LEADERSHIP	4%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	3%

INCREASE IN LEVEL OF DRUG TRADE	3%
NO RECONSTRUCTION HAS HAPPENED	3%
POOR EDUCATION SYSTEM	3%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	2%
INCREASE IN CRIMES	2%
TOO MANY FOREIGNERS ARE GETTING INVOLVED	2%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CAUSE PROBLEMS	2%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	2%
PRESENCE/INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%
LACK OF AID / NO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	1%
LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW	1%
PRESENCE OF ISIS	1%
LACK OF UNITY	1%
PEOPLE DISENCHANTED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	1%
WATER AND POWER PROBLEMS	1%
WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1%
LACK OF SHELTER	1%
INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY'S MILITARY MATTERS	1%
THEFT	1%
UNFAIR ELECTIONS	1%
FOREIGN AID CAUSES PROBLEMS	1%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-4. (Ask all.) In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)

Q-4a. First mention _____

Q-4b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
DON'T KNOW	33%
DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE/IRRIGATION/LIVESTOCK	23%
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION	18%
BUILDING ROADS AND BRIDGES	16%
NOTHING	15%
DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY	12%
GOOD SECURITY	10%
BUILDING WATER DAMS	8%

AVAILABILITY OF DRINKING WATER	8%
BUILDING CLINICS	4%
UNITY AMONG PEOPLE	4%
BUILDING MOSQUES	3%
AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	3%
TRADING AND BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT	3%
BETTER ECONOMY	1%
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND ORDER	1%
PUBLIC SERVICES	1%
ESTABLISHMENT OF PEOPLES' COUNCIL	1%
CLEANER ENVIRONMENT	1%
AVAILABILITY OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	1%
FIGHTING CORRUPTION	1%
PEACE	1%
REFUSED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH
REFUSED	1%

Q-5. (Ask all.) In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)

Q-5a. First mention _____

Q-5b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
UNEMPLOYMENT	31%
VIOLENCE / INSECURITY / ATTACKS	26%
ELECTRICITY	18%
ROADS	16%
DRINKING WATER	16%
EDUCATION/SCHOOLS/LITERACY	10%
HEALTHCARE / CLINICS / HOSPITALS	9%
POOR ECONOMY	7%
HIGH PRICES	6%
POVERTY	6%
CRIME	5%
CORRUPTION	4%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	2%
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	2%
TALIBAN	2%

POLLUTION	2%
DRUGS SMUGGLING	2%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	2%
INJUSTICE	2%
WATER FOR IRRIGATION	1%
THEFT	1%
LACK OF AGRICULTURAL TOOLS / EQUIPMENT	1%
ADDICTION TO DRUGS	1%
GOVERNMENT / WEAK GOVERNMENT / CENTRAL AUTHORITY	1%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	1%
NO PROBLEMS	1%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	1%
LACK OF (PROPER) SHELTER	1%
MUNICIPALITIES NOT DOING THEIR JOB WELL	1%
DIKES AND DRAINS AGAINST FLOOD	1%
DON'T KNOW	12%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-6. *(Ask all.) In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem?*

Q-6a. *First mention* _____

Q-6b. *Second mention* _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
UNEMPLOYMENT	70%
ILLITERACY	29%
BECOMING DRUG ADDICTS	18%
POOR ECONOMY	13%
INSECURITY	8%
NO HIGHER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH	7%
LACK OF SCHOOLS	3%
ABANDONING COUNTRY	3%
COSTLY MARRIAGES	2%
INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES	2%
TAKING REFUGE IN IRAN	2%

LACK OF SPORT FIELDS	2%
CORRUPTION	1%
MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
HIGH COST OF LIVING	1%
LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	1%
LACK OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE	1%
INJUSTICE	1%
LACK OF YOUTH'S RIGHTS	1%
TRIBAL PROBLEMS	1%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	1%
LACK OF PARKS	1%
KILLING THE YOUTH	1%
CAMPAIGN AMONG YOUTH FOR TALIBAN ENROLLMENT	1%
FORCED MARRIAGES	1%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS	1%
JOINING ANTI GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS DUE TO UNEMPLOYMENT	1%
CHANGING THEIR IDEOLOGY FOR WAR	1%
LACK OF HEALTHCARE	1%
NO PROBLEM	1%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-7. (Ask all.) What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today?
What is the next-biggest problem?

Q-7a. First mention: _____

Q-7b. Second mention: _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
EDUCATION/ILLITERACY	35%
LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN	24%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	17%
LACK OF RIGHTS / WOMEN'S RIGHTS	14%
FORCED MARRIAGES / DOWRY	12%
POVERTY	9%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL COURSES	7%
NO HOSPITALS/CLINICS	6%
SECURITY	4%
BAAD	3%

NOTHING	3%
UNDER CONTROL OF MEN / MEN HAVE POWER	3%
GENERAL HEALTHCARE	3%
NOT GIVING THE PART IN HERITAGE	2%
LACK OF SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS	2%
CAN'T LEAVE HOMES	2%
BADDAL	1%
MISBEHAVING / MISTREATMENT OF WOMEN	1%
NOT LETTING WOMEN GET HIGHER EDUCATION	1%
LACK OF FEMALE DOCTORS	1%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DOCTORS	1%
INJUSTICE	1%
PREGNANCY-RELATED HEALTHCARE	1%
GOVERNMENT NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO WOMEN	1%
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	1%
CULTURAL PROBLEMS	1%
LACK OF MARKETS FOR CRAFTS	1%
FORCING WOMEN TO WORK	1%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

SERVICES AND HEALTH

Q-8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	BETTER	THE SAME	WORSE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD	21%	48%	31%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	9%	36%	55%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET	14%	54%	32%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) QUALITY OF FOOD IN YOUR DIET	18%	51%	30%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF YOUR HOUSE / DWELLING	17%	56%	26%	1%	<0.5%
F) HEALTH/WELL-BEING OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS	22%	53%	25%	1%	<0.5%
G) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	20%	47%	32%	1%	<0.5%
H) QUALITY OF SCHOOL SERVICES	23%	54%	23%	1%	<0.5%
I) ACCESS TO ROADS	25%	45%	29%	1%	<0.5%
J) ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER	24%	48%	28%	<0.5%	<0.5%
K) ACCESS TO IRRIGATION FACILITIES	14%	58%	26%	1%	<0.5%

Q-9a. What is the main source of electricity in this household?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	13,943
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
POWER FROM THE GRID / CITY POWER	44%
SOLAR PANELS	41%
THERE IS NO ELECTRICITY IN THIS HOUSEHOLD	6%
BATTERY	5%
COMMUNITY GENERATOR	3%
GENERATOR OWNED OR RENTED BY THIS HOUSE	2%
HYDRO POWER	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	<0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%

Q-9b. (Ask if response given to Q-9a.) On a typical day, how many hours do you have access to electricity in this household?

BASE: THOSE WHO HAVE ELECTRICITY IN HOUSEHOLD	14,876
24	14%
12	9%
8	7%
20	7%
10	7%
6	6%
4	6%
5	6%
3	5%
22	4%
18	4%
7	4%
23	3%
2	3%
9	2%
15	2%
21	2%
16	2%
14	2%
11	1%
13	1%

19	1%
17	1%
1	1%
0	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-9c. (Ask if response given to Q-9a.) What are the main uses of electricity?

Q-9c_a. First mention: _____

Q-9c_b. Second mention: _____

BASE: THOSE WHO HAVE ELECTRICITY IN HOUSE	14,876
LIGHTING	73%
TV	28%
FAN OR AC	24%
CHARGING MOBILE	18%
WATER PUMP	12%
REFRIGERATOR	10%
IRONING CLOTHES	5%
HEATING WATER	4%
WASHING MACHINE	4%
POWERING OTHER ELECTRONIC MACHINES	4%
COOKING	1%
LISTENING TO RADIO	1%
USING ELECTRIC BROOM	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-10. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months.

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) RECONSTRUCTION/BUILDING OF ROADS OR BRIDGES	38%	62%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) NEW GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OPENING	18%	81%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) NEW PRIVATE SCHOOL OPENING	18%	81%	1%	<0.5%
D) NEW PRIVATE UNIVERSITY	8%	92%	1%	<0.5%
E) DRINKING WATER PROJECT	29%	70%	1%	<0.5%
F) IRRIGATION PROJECT	20%	79%	1%	<0.5%

G) GOVERNMENT-SUPPLIED ELECTRICITY	22%	78%	1%	<0.5%
H) HEALTHCARE	25%	74%	1%	<0.5%
I) RECONCILIATION WITH ANTIGOVERNMENT ELEMENTS	12%	87%	1%	<0.5%
J) PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE	26%	73%	1%	<0.5%
K) NEW FACTORIES OPENED	6%	93%	1%	<0.5%
L) BUILDING NEW MOSQUES	30%	69%	1%	<0.5%

Q-11. *How many school-age children are there in this household? How many are boys and how many girls? (Write number.)*

Q-11a. *(Girl)*

BASE: HAVE SCHOOL-AGE GIRL	15,930
0	22%
1	25%
2	30%
3	14%
4	6%
5	2%
6	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	= <0.5% EACH
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-11b. *(Boy)*

BASE: HAVE SCHOOL-AGE BOY	15,930
0	16%
1	26%
2	30%
3	17%
4	7%
5	2%
6	1%
7	0%
8	0%
9	0%
REFUSED	0%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-12. Do all of them, some of them, or none of them attend school? (Write number.)

Q-12a. (Girl)

BASE:	12,336
ALL OF THEM	75%
SOME OF THEM	11%
NONE OF THEM	15%

Q-12. Do all of them, some of them, or none of them attend school? (Write number.)

Q-12b. (Boy)

BASE:	13,308
ALL OF THEM	82%
SOME OF THEM	10%
NONE OF THEM	6%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-13. (Ask if code 2 or 3 at Q-12.) Why don't the children go to school?

a) Response: _____

BASE: GIRLS DON'T GO TO SCHOOL	3,471
GIRLS DO NOT NEED EDUCATION	20%
TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES	17%
THEY NEED TO WORK	12%
QUALITY OF EDUCATION IS BAD	12%
CANNOT AFFORD TUITION AND/OR SCHOOL SUPPLIES	9%
DON'T SEE THE POINT IN EDUCATION	8%
THERE IS NO SCHOOL IN OUR AREA	6%
SCHOOL TEACHES IMMORAL THINGS	3%
NOT YET OF SCHOOL AGE	3%
FAMILY DO NOT ALLOW THEM	2%
INSECURITY	1%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	= <0.5% EACH

Q-13. (Ask if code 2 or 3 at Q-12.) Why don't the children go to school?

b) Response: _____

BASE: BOYS DON'T GO TO SCHOOL	2,184
THEY NEED TO WORK	38%

TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES	16%
QUALITY OF EDUCATION IS BAD	13%
CANNOT AFFORD TUITION AND/OR SCHOOL SUPPLIES	7%
DON'T SEE THE POINT IN EDUCATION	5%
NOT YET OF SCHOOL AGE	4%
THERE IS NO SCHOOL IN OUR AREA	3%
BOYS DO NOT NEED EDUCATION	2%
SCHOOL TEACHES IMMORAL THINGS	2%
FAMILY DOES NOT ALLOW THEM	1%
DON'T KNOW	8%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-15. *(Ask if there are children attending school, code 1 or 2 at Q-12a or code 1 or 2 at Q12b.)
How many minutes of walking does it take your child to reach the closest school?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
30 MINUTES	65%
1 HOUR	16%
2 HOURS	17%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-16. *(Ask if there are children attending school, code 1 or 2 at Q-12a or code 1 or 2 at Q12b.)
Is the school public or private?*

BASE (THOSE WHOSE CHILDREN ATTEND SCHOOL)	10,537
PUBLIC	91%
PRIVATE	5%
BOTH (VOL.)	2%
MADRASSA	<0.5%
TUITION/TUTORING (STUDY AT HOME)	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q-17. *In the past 12 months, have you or has anyone in your household visited a public hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	60%
NO	39%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-18a. *(Ask if Q-17 answer is code 1 yes.) What type of services did you receive at the public hospital or clinic?*

Q-18a_1. *First mention:* _____

Q-18a_2. *Second mention:* _____

BASE: VISITED PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC	9,835
GOOD QUALITY MEDICINE	37%
BETTER EXAMINATION	26%
HEALTH SERVICES	20%
VACCINATION	18%
EXTENSIVE CARE	9%
BLOOD PRESSURE CHECK AND TREATMENT	8%
MIDWIFE ADVISORY	7%
LABORATORY TESTS	6%
GENERAL SURGERY	3%
BETTER ATTENTION FROM DOCTORS	3%
GASTRIC TREATMENT	3%
ULTRASOUND	3%
TREATMENT OF ANEMIA	3%
TREATMENT OF DIABETES	2%
PEDIATRICS	2%
X-RAY	2%
GETTING A PRESCRIPTION	2%
GENERAL EXAMINATION	2%
DENTIST SERVICES	2%
ORTHOPEDIC	2%
TREATMENT OF EYE DISEASES	1%
KIDNEY TREATMENT	1%
TREATMENT OF MALARIA	1%
TREATMENT OF HEART DISEASE	1%

TREATMENT OF ENT (EAR, NOSE, AND THROAT)	1%
TREATMENT OF DIARRHEA	1%
BACK TREATMENT	1%
NONE	1%
TREATMENT OF PNEUMONIA	1%
TREATMENT OF MENTAL PROBLEMS	1%
FEMALE HEALTH SERVICES	1%
TREATMENT OF SKIN DISEASES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-18b. (Ask if Q-17 answer is code 1 yes.) How satisfied were you with the services you received at the public hospital or clinic?

BASE: VISITED PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC	9,835
VERY SATISFIED	29%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	49%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	14%
VERY DISSATISFIED	7%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-18c. (Ask if Q-17 answer is code 1 yes.) How many minutes did it take you to reach the public hospital or clinic from your home?

BASE: VISITED PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC	9,835
1–20 MINUTES	28%
21–40 MINUTES	42%
41–60 MINUTES	19%
61–80 MINUTES	4%
81–98 MINUTES	2%
OVER 100 MINUTES	5%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	2%

Q-19. In the past 12 months, have you or has anyone in your household visited a private hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	41%

NO	59%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-20a. (Ask if Q-19 answer is code 1 yes.) What type of services did you receive at the private hospital or clinic?

Q20a_1. First mention: _____

Q20a_2. Second mention: _____

BASE: VISITED PRIVATE HOSPITAL	6,338
GOOD QUALITY MEDICINE	37%
BETTER EXAMINATION	27%
HEALTH SERVICES	19%
EXTENSIVE CARE	9%
LABORATORY TESTS	8%
BLOOD PRESSURE CHECK AND TREATMENT	7%
ULTRASOUND	6%
MIDWIFE ADVISORY	5%
VACCINATION	5%
GENERAL SURGERY	5%
X-RAY	4%
GASTRIC TREATMENT	4%
BETTER ATTENTION FROM DOCTORS	3%
DENTIST SERVICES	3%
TREATMENT OF DIABETES	3%
TREATMENT OF ANEMIA	3%
KIDNEY TREATMENT	2%
TREATMENT OF EYE DISEASES	2%
TREATMENT OF HEART DISEASE	2%
ORTHOPEDIC	2%
PEDIATRICS	2%
TREATMENT OF ENT (EAR, NOSE, AND THROAT)	2%
TREATMENT OF MENTAL PROBLEMS	2%
TREATMENT OF MALARIA	1%
BACK TREATMENT	1%
GETTING A PRESCRIPTION	1%
GENERAL EXAMINATION	1%
TREATMENT OF DIARRHEA	1%
TREATMENT OF PNEUMONIA	1%

TREATMENT OF CHOLESTEROL	1%
TREATMENT OF SKIN DISEASES	1%
TREATMENT OF HEPATITIS C	1%
AMBULANCE SERVICES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-20b. *(Ask if Q-19 answer is code 1 yes.) How satisfied were you with the services you received at the private hospital or clinic?*

BASE: VISITED PRIVATE HOSPITALS OR CLINIC	5,178
VERY SATISFIED	38%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	46%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	11%
VERY DISSATISFIED	5%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-20c. *(Ask if Q-19 answer is code 1 yes.) How many minutes did it take you to reach the private hospital or clinic from your home?*

BASE: VISITED PRIVATE HOSPITALS OR CLINIC	5,178
1–20 MINUTES	31%
21–40 MINIUTES	35%
41–60 MINUTES	17%
61–80 MINUTES	5%
81–99 MINUTES	2%
OVER 100 MINUTES	9%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

SECURITY

Q-21. Which group would you say is most responsible for providing security in this village/ gozar? And the second-most?

Q-21a. First mention: _____

Q-21b. Second mention: _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
NATIONAL POLICE	58%
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES	39%
NATIONAL ARMY	38%
LOCAL POLICE	26%
LOCAL COMMANDERS	8%
ARBAKAI	6%
NO ONE	3%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY–TERRITORIAL FORCE (ANA–TF)	2%
TALIBAN	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	<0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-22. Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	GETTING BETTER	GETTING WORSE	NO DIFFERENCE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) ANA	58%	18%	24%	1%	<0.5%
B) ANP	44%	27%	28%	1%	<0.5%
C) ALP	31%	29%	34%	6%	<0.5%

Q-23. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	46%	38%	9%	6%	1%	<0.5%
B) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	41%	40%	12%	6%	1%	<0.5%
C) AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE	32%	36%	17%	10%	5%	<0.5%

Q-24. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response, and then ask) Would you say strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE ANA IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	60%	32%	5%	2%	1%	<0.5%
B) THE ANA HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	53%	36%	8%	3%	1%	<0.5%
C) THE ANA PROTECTS CIVILIANS	52%	35%	9%	4%	1%	<0.5%

Q-25. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response, and then ask) Would you say strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE ANP IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	41%	44%	11%	4%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) THE ANP HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	36%	46%	13%	4%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) THE ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES	32%	44%	17%	7%	1%	<0.5%

Q-26a. *Would you agree or disagree with a family member's decision to join the Afghan National Police?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
AGREE	73%
DISAGREE	26%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-26b. *(Ask if Q-26a answer is code 2 «disagree» or 99.) Why would you disagree with their decision?*

Q-26b_a. *First mention: _____*

Q-26b_b. *Second mention: _____*

BASE: RESPONDENTS WHO DISAGREE	4,229
THE DEATH TOLL IS HIGH	43%
LOW SALARY	23%

INSECURITY	19%
LACK GOOD LEADER/GOVERNMENT	18%
THERE IS CORRUPTION	13%
FEAR OF TALIBAN / AL QAEDA	11%
IT'S A HARD JOB	6%
NOT INTERESTED	5%
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW	4%
CONDITIONS ARE NOT GOOD	3%
LACK OF EQUIPMENT FOR WOMEN	3%
LACK OF RULE OF LAW	3%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	3%
LACK OF RESPECT TOWARDS PEOPLE	2%
LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG ANDSF	2%
LACK OF TRAINING	1%
ALREADY HAVE A JOB	1%
FEAR OF ENMITY	1%
EXISTENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%
THEY ARE ADDICTS	1%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	1%
THEY ARE THIEVES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	3%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-27. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
ALWAYS	13%
OFTEN	27%
SOMETIMES	34%
RARELY	15%
NEVER	10%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%

Q-28. *In your view, does any group currently pose a threat to the security of this local area?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	36%
NO	62%
REFUSED	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q-29. *(Ask if Q-28 answer is yes.) Who do you think poses a threat to the security of this local area? (Ask open-ended, record up to two mentions.)*

Q-29a. *First mention:* _____

Q-29b. *Second mention:* _____

BASE: THOSE WHO SEE A THREAT TO SECURITY	5,583
TALIBAN	69%
CRIMINALS/THIEVES	38%
DAESH/ISIS	12%
IRRESPONSIBLE ARMED MEN	9%
ANTIGOVERNMENT ELEMENTS	8%
UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE	6%
WARLORDS	5%
SMUGGLERS	4%
DRUG ADDICTS/USERS	3%
LOCAL MILITIA	2%
POLICE	2%
AL QAEDA	2%
HAQQANI NETWORK/GROUP	1%
PAKISTAN	1%
GOVERNMENT	1%
NATIONAL ARMY	1%
AMERICA	1%
COMMANDERS	1%
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES	1%
SECURITY FORCES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-30. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	18%
NO	82%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-31. *(Ask if Q-30 answer is code 1 yes.) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

Q-31a. *First mention:* _____

Q-31b. *Second mention:* _____

BASE: EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE	2,938
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	36%
RACKETEERING / EXTORTION	22%
PICKPOCKETING	20%
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	18%
BURGLARY/LOOTING	13%
MURDER	11%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	10%
KIDNAPPING	9%
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT / PROPERTY TAKEN FROM VEHICLE OR PARTS OF THE VEHICLE STOLEN	9%
MILITANTS / INSURGENT ACTIONS	6%
POLICE ACTIONS	6%
FOREIGN-FORCE ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	4%
SMUGGLING	4%
ARMY ACTIONS	2%
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	2%
FIGHTING BETWEEN TALIBAN AND GOVERNMENT FORCES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-32. (Ask if Q-30 answer is code 1 yes.) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family, or not?

BASE: SUFFERED FROM CRIME AND VIOLENCE	2,938
YES	60%
NO	38%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q-33. (Ask if Q-32 answer is code 1 yes.) Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?

Q-33a. First mention: _____

Q-33b. Second mention: _____

BASE: RESPONDENTS WHO REPORTED THE CRIME	1,765
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	48%
SHURA/ELDERS	36%
TRIBAL LEADER / MALIK	26%
DISTRICT GOVERNOR / WOLESWAL	18%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	16%
MULLAH SAHEB	11%
PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY	9%
JUST MY FAMILY	6%
COURTS	3%
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR	2%
TALIBAN	2%
LOCAL MILITIA (ARBAKAI)	2%
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	2%
LOCAL COMMANDER OR WARLORD	1%
NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	<0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-34. (Ask all.) If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the government law-enforcement organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE	10%
A FAIR AMOUNT	47%
NOT VERY MUCH	29%

NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	14%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

JUSTICE

Q-35. *(Ask all.) How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the available dispute-resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
VERY SATISFIED	17%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	52%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	22%
VERY DISSATISFIED	8%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-36. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the the state court, Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	21%
NO	79%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-37. *(Ask if Q-36 answer is code 1 yes.) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single response. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one.)*

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,432
DISPUTE OVER LAND	49%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	18%
DISPUTE OVER PROPERTY OTHER THAN LAND	11%
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE	9%
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT	8%
DIVORCE	3%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	<0.5%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-38. (Ask if Q-36 answer is code 1 yes.) Were you fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,432
FULLY	22%
SOMEWHAT	47%
NOT SATISFIED	21%
NOT FINISHED YET / STILL IN PROCEEDINGS	8%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%

Q-39. (Ask if Q-36 answer is code 1 yes.) Where have you taken this case or dispute?

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,432
HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	25%
STATE COURT	42%
VILLAGE / NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SHURA/JIRGA	47%
OTHER	2%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-39. (Ask if Q-36 answer is code 1 yes.) Where have you taken this case or dispute?

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,432
HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	25%
STATE COURT	42%
VILLAGE/NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SHURA/JIRGA	47%
OTHER	2%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-40. (Ask if Q-39 answer is 1 "Huquq Department.") And now let's turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO HUQUQ DEPARTMENT (828)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) LOCAL HUQUQS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	27%	45%	18%	8%	1%	0%
B) LOCAL HUQUQS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	20%	43%	27%	9%	1%	0%

C) LOCAL HUQUQS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	19%	43%	24%	12%	2%	0%
D) LOCAL HUQUQS RESOLVE CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY	15%	39%	27%	17%	1%	0%
E) LOCAL HUQUQS TREAT MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY.	20%	41%	24%	12%	2%	0%

Q-41. (Ask if Q-39 answer is 2 “state courts.”) Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO STATE COURT (1,427)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) STATE COURTS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	22%	45%	19%	12%	3%	<0.5%
B) STATE COURTS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	19%	38%	25%	15%	3%	<0.5%
C) STATE COURTS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	18%	35%	28%	17%	3%	<0.5%
D) STATE COURTS RESOLVE CASES TIMELY AND PROMPTLY	13%	33%	31%	20%	3%	<0.5%
E) STATE COURTS TREAT MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY	15%	39%	29%	13%	4%	<0.5%

Q-42. (Ask if Q-39 answer is “shura/jirga.”) And now let’s turn to village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas?

BASE: REFERRED CASE TO JIRGA (1,563)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	33%	48%	10%	3%	6%	<0.5%
B) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	33%	41%	16%	4%	5%	<0.5%
C) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	32%	42%	16%	4%	6%	<0.5%
D) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS RESOLVE CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY	29%	45%	15%	6%	5%	<0.5%
E) THERE SHOULD BE LOCAL WOMEN’S JIRGAS AND SHURAS	30%	37%	18%	8%	6%	<0.5%

CORRUPTION

Q-43. *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	IN ALL CASES	IN MOST CASES	IN SOME CASES	IN NO CASES	HAD NO CONTACTS	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICT OFFICE	3%	9%	11%	23%	53%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	3%	7%	11%	22%	57%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) CUSTOMS OFFICE	4%	6%	8%	17%	65%	1%	<0.5%
D) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	3%	8%	13%	33%	42%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	2%	5%	9%	34%	49%	1%	<0.5%
F) JUDICIARY/COURTS	4%	9%	12%	22%	52%	1%	<0.5%
G) DA AFGHANISTAN BRESHNA SHERKAT (STATE ELECTRIC SUPPLY)	2%	7%	12%	29%	50%	1%	<0.5%
H) HOSPITALS/CLINICS	3%	10%	18%	48%	21%	<0.5%	<0.5%
I) WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	4%	9%	13%	27%	47%	<0.5%	<0.5%
J) ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY	2%	6%	10%	39%	42%	<0.5%	<0.5%
K) WHEN RECEIVING OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY	2%	6%	11%	32%	48%	<0.5%	<0.5%

Q-44. *Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	MAJOR PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	NOT A PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) IN YOUR DAILY LIFE	68%	23%	8%	1%	<0.5%
B) IN AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE	81%	16%	3%	<0.5%	<0.5%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Q-45. *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	40%

RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	57%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-46. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and Parliament by voting, rather than by appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you ...*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
VERY SATISFIED	17%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	48%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	24%
VERY DISSATISFIED	11%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-47. *Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear or a lot of fear?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	NO FEAR	SOME FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) VOTING IN A NATIONAL/PROVINCIAL ELECTION	36%	46%	18%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	24%	42%	33%	1%	<0.5%
C) RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	27%	44%	27%	2%	<0.5%
D) ENCOUNTERING ANP	56%	30%	13%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) ENCOUNTERING ANA	61%	27%	11%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	20%	47%	33%	<0.5%	<0.5%
G) ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY ONLY)	20%	44%	35%	1%	<0.5%
H) ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	6%	20%	73%	1%	<0.5%
I) ENCOUNTERING ISIS/DAESH	3%	12%	83%	2%	<0.5%

Q-48. *In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government, while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. Thinking back to a year ago, how safe did you feel expressing your opinions about the government in public?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
VERY SAFE	12%
SOMEWHAT SAFE	46%
SOMEWHAT UNSAFE	30%

VERY UNSAFE	11%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-49. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions: a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
A LOT	9%
SOME	45%
VERY LITTLE	25%
NONE AT ALL	19%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-50a. *Did you vote in the parliamentary elections held in October 2018?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	59%
NO	41%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-50b: *(Ask if Q-50a answer is code 2 no.) Why didn't you vote? (Allow two responses.)*

Q-50b_a. *First mention:* _____

Q-50b_b. *Second mention:* _____

BASE: THOSE WHO DIDN'T VOTE	6,426
BECAUSE OF INSECURITY	30%
BECAUSE OF FRAUD	20%
IT IS NOT BENEFICIAL	19%
INJUSTICE	16%
DO NOT HAVE A TAZKIRA (NATIONAL ID CARD)	12%
NOT INTERESTED	12%
DO NOT HAVE PERMISSION	12%
DON'T HAVE A VOTING CARD	12%
LACK OF POLLING STATIONS	10%
BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION	9%
BECAUSE OF FEAR OF TALIBAN	9%

DO NOT HAVE TIME	4%
BECAUSE OF BAD LEADERSHIP	3%
NOT ELIGIBLE TO VOTE BECAUSE OF AGE	1%
INTERFERENCE BY AMERICA	1%
I WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-51a. *(Ask all.) Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	81%
NO	19%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-51b. *(Ask if Q-51a answer is code 1 yes.) What type of election is the upcoming election? Is it a presidential election, a parliamentary election, a provincial council election, or something else?*

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE AWARE OF THE ELECTION	12,430
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION	96%
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION	1%
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTION	1%
SOMETHING ELSE (NOT FURTHER SPECIFIED)	<0.5%
DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-52. *(Ask if Q-51a answer is code 1 yes.) What was your main source of information about the elections?*

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE AWARE OF THE ELECTION	12,430
TV	56%
RADIO	23%
FRIENDS, FAMILY, AND NEIGHBORS	8%
VILLAGERS	6%
VILLAGE CHIEF / COMMUNITY LEADERS	3%

NEWSPAPER	2%
FACEBOOK	1%
RELIGIOUS LEADER	1%
SCHOOLTEACHER	<0.5%
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	<0.5%
PAMPHLETS	<0.5%
MESSAGES VIA MOBILE	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-53a. (Ask if Q-51a answer is code 1 yes.) When people talk about elections, they often use the term “free and fair.” By “free,” they generally mean that all people have the chance to vote as they wish. By “fair,” they generally mean that all candidates/parties follow the rules and are given equal access to the public, and votes were counted correctly and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair,” in general, do you think the next election in Afghanistan will be free and fair, or not?

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE AWARE OF THE ELECTION	12,430
YES	52%
NO	41%
DON'T KNOW	7%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-53b. (Ask if Q-53a answer is code 2 no.) What makes you think this election will not be free and fair?

BASE: THOSE WHO SAY ELECTION WILL NOT BE FREE AND FAIR	4,702
FRAUD	50%
CORRUPTION	15%
BAD SECURITY	9%
INTERFERENCE OF AMERICA	7%
INTERFERENCE OF WARLORDS	4%
BAD LEADERSHIP	3%
LACK OF JUSTICE	2%
INTERFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	1%
LACK OF ATTENTION DURING COUNTING VOTES	1%
LACK OF INTELLIGENT AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE IN THE ELECTION COMMISSION	1%
EXISTENCE OF BIAS	1%
PEOPLE VOTE FOR THEIR PRIVATE BENEFIT	1%

INTERFERENCE OF PAKISTAN	1%
PRESENCE OF CRIMINALITY AND ROBBERY	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-54. (Ask if Q-53a answer is code 1 yes, 98, or 99.) Have you registered yourself for the elections?

BASE: THOSE WHO SAY ELECTION WILL BE FREE AND FAIR	7,728
YES	75%
NO	20%
HAVE NOT YET REGISTERED BUT PLAN TO REGISTER	3%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-55a. (Ask if Q-54 answer is code 1 yes.) Do you plan to vote in this election?

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE REGISTERED	5,739
YES	96%
NO	3%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-55b. (Ask if Q-55a answer is code 2 no.) Why don't you plan to vote in this election? (Record first mention.)

BASE: THOSE WHO DON'T PLAN TO VOTE	199
BECAUSE OF INSECURITY	34%
IT IS NOT BENEFICIAL	17%
BECAUSE OF FRAUD	16%
BECAUSE OF FEAR OF TALIBAN	10%
DO NOT HAVE PERMISSION	5%
INJUSTICE	4%
BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION	4%
BECAUSE OF BAD LEADERSHIP	2%
NOT INTERESTED	2%
LACK OF POLLING STATIONS	2%

DON'T HAVE A VOTING CARD	1%
INTERFERENCE OF AMERICA	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	4%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-56a. (Ask all.) In your opinion, what are your most important criteria for an ideal president? Anything else? (Allow two mentions.)

Q-56a_a. First mention: _____

Q-56a_b. Second mention: _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
SHOULD BE AN HONEST, JUST, AND FAIR PERSON	36%
SHOULD NOT BE A TRAITOR	26%
SHOULD BE PATRIOTIC	24%
SOMEONE WHO SERVES THE PEOPLE	23%
NOT CORRUPT	19%
SOMEONE WHO FULFILLS THEIR PROMISES	18%
SHOULD BE A PIOUS, DEVOUT MUSLIM	16%
SOMEONE WHO IS WELL-EDUCATED	16%
SHOULD BE INTELLIGENT AND EXPERIENCED	9%
SHOULD MAKE COMMITMENTS TO INCLUDE ALL ETHNIC GROUPS IN GOVERNMENT	5%
SOMEONE FROM MY ETHNIC GROUP	2%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-56b. When thinking about who to vote for in the upcoming election, would you definitely vote for, probably vote for, or definitely not vote for...

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	DEFINITELY VOTE FOR	PROBABLY VOTE FOR	PROBABLY NOT VOTE FOR	DEFINITELY NOT VOTE FOR	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED (VOL)
A) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION EVEN IF PEOPLE CLOSE TO HIM ARE INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION	43%	29%	13%	15%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL GET A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE TALIBAN, EVEN IF WOMEN ARE NO LONGER ALLOWED TO GO TO SCHOOL	13%	21%	28%	37%	<0.5%	<0.5%

C) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL GET A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE TALIBAN, EVEN IF WOMEN NO LONGER WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	12%	22%	28%	37%	1%	<0.5%
D) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL GET A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE TALIBAN, EVEN IF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LOSES TERRITORY	10%	24%	30%	36%	1%	<0.5%
E) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL GET A PEACE AGREEMENT THAT ALLOWS THE TALIBAN TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT	27%	38%	22%	12%	1%	<0.5%
F) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL GET A PEACE AGREEMENT THAT ALLOWS THE TALIBAN TO JOIN THE ANDSF	32%	37%	19%	10%	1%	<0.5%
G) A PRESIDENT WHO WILL KNOW HOW TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY	59%	26%	11%	4%	1%	<0.5%

GOVERNANCE

Q-57. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. (Interviewer code 99, "don't know," if they have no opinion.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	A LOT OF CONFIDENCE	SOME CONFIDENCE	NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE	NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE PRESIDENT (ASHRAF GHANI)	31%	32%	19%	16%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) THE CEO (DR. ABDULLAH ABDULLAH)	10%	33%	32%	24%	1%	<0.5%
C) INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION	9%	33%	33%	24%	1%	<0.5%
D) COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	18%	41%	27%	12%	2%	<0.5%
E) COMMUNITY SHURAS/JIRGAS	26%	41%	22%	10%	1%	<0.5%
F) GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	10%	34%	36%	18%	2%	<0.5%
G) INTERNATIONAL NGOS	12%	36%	32%	18%	3%	<0.5%
H) MEDIA SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	30%	39%	21%	9%	1%	<0.5%
I) NATIONAL NGOS	14%	40%	32%	13%	2%	<0.5%
J) PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE	12%	35%	31%	21%	1%	<0.5%
K) PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	16%	39%	28%	15%	2%	<0.5%
L) RELIGIOUS LEADERS	34%	37%	18%	10%	1%	<0.5%
M) YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT	15%	38%	28%	18%	1%	<0.5%

Q-58. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	VERY GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT BAD JOB	VERY BAD JOB	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT	20%	46%	21%	13%	1%	<0.5%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	17%	47%	25%	9%	1%	<0.5%
C) MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES (ASK URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY)	16%	44%	22%	12%	6%	<0.5%
D) DISTRICT GOVERNMENT (ASK RURAL RESIDENTS ONLY)	14%	45%	25%	7%	9%	<0.5%

RECONCILIATION

Q-59. *Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan Government and the Taliban is possible, or impossible?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
POSSIBLE	64%
IMPOSSIBLE	31%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-60. *In your opinion, what is the main reason why the Taliban are fighting against the Afghan government?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
TO GAIN POWER	26%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS / INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	19%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY PAKISTAN	11%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED/MOTIVATED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	4%
FOR THEIR PERSONAL BENEFIT	3%
TOO MUCH CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT	3%
TO SUPPORT ISLAM	2%
FOR MONEY	2%
THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	2%
UNEMPLOYMENT/POVERTY	1%
TO CREATE INSECURITY	1%

TO KILL INNOCENT PEOPLE	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEMOCRACY	1%
THEY WANT TO OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN	1%
INJUSTICE	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST ISLAM	1%
ILLITERACY	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY	1%
SUPPORT OF IRAN	1%
TO ESTABLISH SECURITY	1%
THEY ARE BRUTAL/CRUEL	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	9%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-61. *Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	77%
NO	21%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-62. *Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
STRONGLY SUPPORT	56%
SOMEWHAT SUPPORT	33%
SOMEWHAT OPPOSE	6%
STRONGLY OPPOSE	4%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%

Q-63. (If Q-62 answer is code 3 «somewhat opposed» or 4 «strongly opposed.») Why are you opposed to efforts to negotiate with the Taliban? (Open ended, allow two responses.)

Q-63a. First mention: _____

Q-63b. Second mention: _____

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS	1,704
WAR WILL GET WORSE AND MORE	32%
MORE PEOPLE WILL DIE	17%
IT'S USELESS	16%
TALIBAN ARE CRUEL	15%
TALIBAN ARE CORRUPT	14%
PAKISTAN DOES NOT WANT PEACE	11%
TALIBAN DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY	9%
TALIBAN ARE SPIES	6%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST THE COUNTRY	6%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	4%
TALIBAN SHOULD BE PUNISHED	4%
TALIBAN WILL CLOSE THE SCHOOLS	4%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S RIGHTS	3%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS	2%
TALIBAN ARE NOT MUSLIMS	1%
DON'T KNOW	7%
REFUSED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-64. (Ask all.) Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	49%
NO	46%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-65. *Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that those antigovernment elements who lay down their arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should receive government assistance, jobs, and housing?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
STRONGLY AGREE	34%
SOMEWHAT AGREE	47%
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	13%
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-66a. *Thinking about the reasons why the Taliban have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the Taliban?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
A LOT OF SYMPATHY	4%
A LITTLE SYMPATHY	9%
NO SYMPATHY AT ALL	85%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-66b. *(Ask if Q-66a answer is code 1 "a lot" or 2 "a little" sympathy.) You said that you have sympathy. Why do you say that?*

BASE: THOSE WHO HAVE A LOT OR A LITTLE OF SYMPATHY FOR THE TALIBAN	2,268
THEY ARE AFGHANS	47%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	5%
THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	2%
THEY ARE MUSLIM	2%
THEY ARE BEING KILLED IN WAR WITH GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	1%
THEY ARE IMPLEMENTING ISLAMIC LAW	1%
THEY ARE REMOVING MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
THEY ARE ELIMINATING WAR	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	1%
BECAUSE INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED	1%

THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1%
THEY ARE MADE TO DO SO	1%
THEY WORK FOR PAKISTAN	1%
THEY WANT TO FIGHT A HOLY WAR (JIHAD)	1%
THEY ARE GOOD PEOPLE	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	29%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-67. (Ask all.) It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement all sides will have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say each is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT TOO IMPORTANT	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION	55%	32%	9%	3%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM	39%	34%	19%	7%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) FREEDOM OF SPEECH	46%	34%	14%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) FREEDOM OF THE PRESS	46%	33%	15%	5%	1%	<0.5%
E) A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	54%	30%	12%	3%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) THE CURRENT JUDICIAL AND COURT SYSTEM	37%	35%	19%	8%	1%	<0.5%
G) WOMEN'S RIGHTS	46%	33%	15%	5%	1%	<0.5%
H) EQUALITY AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PEOPLE (REGARDLESS OF ETHNICITY, CLASS, ETC.)	42%	37%	16%	4%	<0.5%	<0.5%
I) THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN	17%	29%	28%	25%	1%	<0.5%
J) FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN	39%	35%	17%	9%	0%	0%

Q-68. If formal peace negotiations begin, who do you believe must be most trusted to defend your needs and interests at the negotiating table?

Q-68a. First mention: _____

Q-68b. Second mention: _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
ASHRAF GHANI	38%
THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT	34%

RELIGIOUS LEADERS	22%
HAMID KARZAI	21%
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT	13%
ABDULLAH ABDULLAH	11%
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	10%
THE UN	9%
ZALMAY KHALILZAD	8%
SAUDI ARABIA	4%
QATAR	4%
TALIBAN	3%
NATO	2%
AMERICA	2%
RUSSIA	1%
NO ONE	1%
HEAD OF SHURA OR COUNCIL	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	3%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-69. *In your opinion, what is the main reason why ISIS/Daesh is fighting against the Afghan government? (Open ended, write down first answer.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
TO GAIN POWER	16%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS / INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	14%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED / MOTIVATED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	6%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY PAKISTAN	6%
THEY ARE AGAINST ISLAM	5%
FOR THEIR PERSONAL BENEFIT	4%
TO KILL INNOCENT PEOPLE	3%
FOR MONEY	3%
TO CREATE INSECURITY	2%
TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY	1%
THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	1%
TO SUPPORT ISLAM	1%
TOO MUCH CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY WANT TO OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN	1%
THEY ARE ISIS	1%
TO ESTABLISH SECURITY	1%

UNEMPLOYMENT/POVERTY	1%
INTERFERENCE OF RUSSIA	1%
SUPPORT OF IRAN	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEMOCRACY	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
FIGHTING IS THEIR WAY OF LIFE	1%
THEY ARE BRUTAL/CRUEL	1%
THEY ARE SLAVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	18%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-70a. *Thinking about the reasons why Daesh have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for Daesh?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
A LOT OF SYMPATHY	<0.5%
A LITTLE SYMPATHY	1%
NO SYMPATHY AT ALL	97%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-70b. *(Ask if Q-70a answer is code 1 "a lot" or 2 "a little.") You said that you have sympathy. Why do you say that?*

BASE: HAVE A LOT OR A LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR DAESH	210
THEY ARE AFGHANS	18%
THEY FIGHT INFIDELS	5%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	4%
DAESH IMPLEMENTS ISLAMIC LAW	3%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	3%
BECAUSE OF OPPRESSION / THEY ARE BEING OPPRESSED	3%
THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	2%
DAESH ARE ELIMINATING WAR	2%
INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED	2%
THEY ARE MADE TO DO SO	2%
ISLAMIC LEADERS ARE USING THEM	2%
BECAUSE THEY ARE REMOVING DAESH	1%
BECAUSE THEY ARE BEING KILLED IN WAR WITH GOVERNMENT	1%

THEY WORK FOR PAKISTAN	1%
REMOVING MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
THEY ARE EXTREMIST	1%
ISIS IS A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM	1%
EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	1%
THEY WORK WITH TALIBAN	1%
I AM AFRAID OF THEM	1%
FOR PERSONAL REASONS	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	45%
REFUSED (VOL.)	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND MEDIA

Q-71. *Do you listen to radio programs?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	59%
NO	41%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-72. *(Ask if Q-71 answer is code 1 yes.) You said you listen to the radio. How many hours do you listen to it on an average day when you listen to the radio?*

BASE: LISTEN TO RADIO	9,650
LESS THAN 30 MINUTES	25%
31 MINS TO 1 HOUR	39%
1 HOUR TO 2 HRS	26%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS A DAY	9%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-73. *(Ask all.) Do you watch television programs?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	68%
NO	32%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-74. (Ask if Q-73 answer is code 1 yes.) You said that you watch television. How many hours do you watch it on an average day when you watch television

BASE: WATCH TV	9,333
LESS THAN 30 MINUTES	7%
31 MINS TO 1 HOUR	26%
1 HOUR TO 2 HRS	36%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS A DAY	31%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-75. (Ask if Q-73 answer is code 1 yes.) Which TV show/program do you watch most often?

BASE: WATCH TV	9,850
NEWS AT 6	40%
SERIALS	14%
COMEDY SHOWS	5%
SHABAKA-E-KHANDA	5%
RO DAR RO	3%
SPORTS	3%
SONGS ON DEMAND	2%
RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS	2%
QEYAM DRAMA	2%
BAMDAD KHOSH	2%
DARYA-E-SEYAH DRAMA	1%
POLITICAL SHOWS	1%
SHAB MOSIQI	1%
HEALTH PROGRAMS	1%
CHUQUR DRAMA	1%
TAWDE KHBARE	1%
SHABKHAND	1%
COOKING SHOWS	1%
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS	1%
RAZ RAZ PAKHLE	1%
LEMAR MAKHAM	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	4%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-76. (Ask all.) Do people in this area have access to the internet, either through a cable connection, a wireless/wifi connection, or cellular data (e.g., 2G or 3G)?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	52%
NO	46%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-77. (Ask if Q-76 answer is code 1 yes.) Do you personally have access to the internet?

BASE: HAVE ACCESS TO THE INTERNET IN THE LOCAL AREAS	7,648
YES	30%
NO	70%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	0%

Q-78. (Ask if Q-77 answer is code 1 yes.) Why do you use the internet? Anything else? (Record up to two mentions.)

Q-78a. First mention _____

Q-78b. Second mention _____

BASE: HAVE ACCESS TO THE INTERNET PERSONALLY	1,944
USE FACEBOOK OR OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA SITES	71%
FOLLOW NEWS	41%
WATCH VIDEOS	24%
FOR WORK	15%
SEND AND RECEIVE EMAIL	14%
LISTEN TO MUSIC	12%
ACCESS RELIGIOUS CONTENT (LISTEN TO SERMONS OR QU'RAN RECITATION, READ QU'RAN, ETC)	8%
ONLINE SHOPPING	2%
FOR ENTERTAINMENT	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%

Q-79. (Ask all.) Do you use any of the following to obtain news and information?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) RADIO	57%	42%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) TV SET	66%	34%	<0.5%	<0.5%

D) THE INTERNET	14%	85%	1%	<0.5%
E) MOSQUE	45%	54%	1%	<0.5%
F) COMMUNITY SHURAS	39%	60%	1%	<0.5%
G) FRIENDS AND FAMILY	87%	13%	<0.5%	<0.5%

WOMEN'S ISSUES

Q-80. *In your area, is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	22%
NO	75%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-81. *(Ask if Q-80 answer is code 1 yes.) What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

BASE: KNOWS AN ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION, OR AUTHORITY	3,575
DIRECTORATE OF WOMEN AFFAIRS	42%
DISTRICT OFFICE	14%
QAWM ELDERS	7%
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL	7%
LOCAL COUNCIL	7%
POLICE	4%
WOMEN'S SHURA	3%
VILLAGE SHURA / ELDERS SHURA	2%
THE COURT	2%
CHIEF OF POLICE	1%
RELIGIOUS ULEMA	1%
LOCAL JIRGAS	1%
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM / CITIZEN'S CHARTER	1%
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN GENERAL	1%
SAFE HOUSE	1%
PROVINCIAL OFFICE	1%
LACK OF MASJID/MADRASSA	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%
REFUSED (VOL.)	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-82. (Ask all.) Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE PRACTICE OF BAAD IS ACCEPTABLE	3%	7%	15%	75%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) THE PRACTICE OF BADDAL IS ACCEPTABLE	7%	20%	23%	49%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) A DAUGHTER IS ENTITLED TO PART OF HER DECEASED FATHER'S INHERITANCE (MIRAS)	68%	22%	5%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%

Q-83. (Ask all.) Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
STRONGLY AGREE	45%
SOMEWHAT AGREE	41%
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	10%
STRONGLY DISAGREE	3%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-84. And for EACH of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION	75%	20%	4%	2%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) PRIMARY SCHOOL	67%	23%	7%	3%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) HIGH SCHOOL	63%	24%	9%	4%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) UNIVERSITY IN YOUR PROVINCE	47%	28%	15%	10%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) STUDYING IN ANOTHER PROVINCE	22%	26%	25%	26%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) STUDYING ABROAD ON SCHOLARSHIP	17%	19%	24%	39%	<0.5%	<0.5%

Q-85. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
WOMEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME.	76%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME.	23%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-86. *(Ask if Q-85 answer is code 2 "women should not be allowed to work outside the home.") Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?*

BASE: WOMEN SHOULD NOT TO BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME.	3,839
UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS	23%
THEY ARE NOT NEEDED OUTSIDE THE HOME	19%
ITS AGAINST ISLAMIC LAW	17%
BAD SECURITY	11%
IT PREVENTS MORAL CORRUPTION	6%
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW	5%
IT'S CONSIDERED A SHAME	3%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT WORK ALONGSIDE MEN	2%
CRIMINALS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THEM	2%
THEY NEED TO HELP WITH KIDS	1%
THEY DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT	1%
THEY DON'T RESPECT HIJAB	1%
FEAR OF TALIBAN/ISIS	1%
LACK OF EXPERIENCE	1%
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	7%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-87. *And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) GOVERNMENT OFFICES	40%	31%	16%	13%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)	23%	29%	25%	23%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	64%	23%	8%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	69%	20%	7%	4%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) CO-ED SCHOOLS	39%	30%	17%	13%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) ARMY/POLICE	14%	24%	29%	31%	1%	<0.5%
G) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY	25%	28%	22%	24%	<0.5%	<0.5%
H) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) WHERE MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES WORK IN THE SAME ROOM	14%	25%	28%	33%	<0.5%	<0.5%

Q-88. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	33%	38%	16%	12%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	25%	30%	26%	18%	1%	<0.5%
C) CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	25%	32%	23%	19%	1%	<0.5%
D) MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	24%	32%	24%	19%	1%	<0.5%
E) RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	22%	27%	25%	25%	1%	<0.5%

Q-89. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the national parliament?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
A MAN	44%
A WOMAN	17%
NO DIFFERENCE	38%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (Interviewer: Show respondent the card and circle the number that corresponds to the picture the respondent points to.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
WOMAN 1 (BURKA)	32%
WOMAN 2 (NIQAB)	28%
WOMAN 3 (CHADOR)	14%
WOMAN 4 (FORM-FITTING HIJAB)	18%
WOMAN 5 (LOOSE HIJAB)	8%
WOMAN 6 (NO HEAD COVERING)	1%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%

Q-91. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone, based on merit?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
MOSTLY FOR MEN	39%
MOSTLY FOR WOMEN	10%
EQUAL FOR BOTH MEN AND WOMEN	32%
ANYONE BASED ON MERIT	20%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-92. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	89%
NO	10%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-93. (Ask all.) If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES	59%
MEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR WOMEN	17%
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES BUT IN CONSULTATION WITH MEN	23%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-94. What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
12	<0.5%
13	<0.5%
14	1%
15	2%
16	7%
17	5%
18	31%
19	8%
20	27%
21	3%
22	6%
23	2%
24	2%
25	5%
26	1%
27	<0.5%
28	<0.5%
29	<0.5%
30	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%

Q-95. What do you think is the best age for a man to get married?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
14	<0.5%
15	<0.5%
16	1%

17	1%
18	9%
19	3%
20	24%
21	4%
22	11%
23	5%
24	6%
25	21%
26	4%
27	2%
28	3%
29	1%
30	5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

MIGRATION

Q-96a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	38%
NO	57%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	5%

Q-96b. *(Ask if Q-96a answer is code 2 no.) Why would you stay in Afghanistan?*

Q-96b_1. *First mention: _____*

Q-96b_2. *Second mention: _____*

BASE: WOULD STAY IN AFGHANISTAN	9,215
IT IS MY COUNTRY	50%
I LOVE MY COUNTRY	47%
I FEEL COMFORTABLE HERE	12%
MY FAMILY DOES NOT ALLOW ME	11%
FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY	8%
I DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO LEAVE	6%

THERE ARE NO EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	5%
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE COUNTRY	4%
THIS IS AN ISLAMIC COUNTRY	3%
TO SERVE PEOPLE	3%
OTHER COUNTRIES DO NOT ACCEPT REFUGEES	3%
GOING THERE IS A RISK	2%
I WILL STAY DUE TO MY LANDS	2%
BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN TRADITION	1%
TO DEVELOP EDUCATION	1%
DON'T HAVE ANYONE ABROAD TO INVITE OR SPONSOR ME	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-96c. (Ask if Q-96a answer is code 1 yes.) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

Q-96c_1. First mention: _____

Q-96c_2. Second mention: _____

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN	5,767
INSECURITY	74%
UNEMPLOYMENT	52%
BAD ECONOMY	20%
FOR EDUCATION	5%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	4%
CORRUPTION	3%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	3%
TALIBAN ARE KILLING PEOPLE	3%
INJUSTICE	2%
WEAK GOVERNMENT	2%
FOR MY CHILDREN'S BETTER FUTURE	1%
VACATION	1%
HIGH PRICES	1%
MORE FACILITIES	1%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' INTERFERENCE	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
LACK OF FREEDOM FOR WOMEN	1%
LACK OF CLINICS/HOSPITALS	1%
EXISTENCE OF CRIMINALS	1%
FAMILY PREFERS TO	1%

ILLITERACY	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-97. (Ask if Q-96a answer is code 1 yes.) What, if anything, could the government do to make you want to stay in Afghanistan? (Write response.)

Q-97a. First mention: _____

Q-97b. Second mention: _____

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN	5,767
MAINTAIN SECURITY	71%
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	58%
GOOD ECONOMY	12%
IMPROVING EDUCATION	5%
REMOVING CORRUPTION	4%
NOTHING	4%
JUSTICE	3%
BUILD FACTORIES	3%
MAKE PEACE WITH THE TALIBAN	2%
RECONSTRUCTION	2%
REMOVING THE TALIBAN AND ISIS	2%
ASSISTING PEOPLE	2%
PREVENTING SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%
REMOVING NATIONALISM	1%
ATTENTION TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1%
IMPLEMENTATION OF ISLAMIC LAWS	1%
IMPROVING AGRICULTURE	1%
REMOVING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE	1%
NEW FACILITIES ARE PROVIDED	1%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	= <0.5% EACH

Q-98. Do you have a family member or close relative who lives abroad?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	39%
NO	60%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-99a. (Ask if Q-98 answer is code 1 yes.) In what countries do they live? (List up to 2 countries.)

Q-99a_1. First mention: _____

Q-99a_2. Second mention: _____

BASE: HAVE A FAMILY MEMBER ABROAD	5,854
IRAN	45%
TURKEY	25%
GERMANY	23%
PAKISTAN	13%
USA	11%
SAUDI ARABIA	7%
UK	6%
CANADA	5%
FRANCE	4%
DUBAI (UAE)	4%
AUSTRALIA	4%
SWEDEN	3%
INDIA	3%
RUSSIA	2%
AUSTRIA	2%
HOLLAND	1%
BELGIUM	1%
NORWAY	1%
SWITZERLAND	1%
TAJIKISTAN	1%
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	1%
DENMARK	1%
KUWAIT	1%
NOWHERE	1%
CHINA	1%
GREECE	1%
OTHER	2%
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-99b. *(Ask if Q-98 answer is code 1 yes.) Have these relatives helped you financially, such as by sending money?*

BASE: HAVE A FAMILY MEMBER ABROAD	5,854
YES	37%
NO	63%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q-100. *How successful do you think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in your area: a lot, a little, or not at all?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
A LOT	15%
A LITTLE	55%
NOT AT ALL	30%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

DEMOGRAPHICS

D-3. *Do you yourself do any activity that generates money?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	46%
NO	54%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-4. *(Ask if D-3 answer is code 1 yes.) And what type of activity is that?*

BASE: HAVE AN ACTIVITY THAT GENERATES MONEY	6,738
FARMER (OWN LAND / TENANT FARMER)	28%
SKILLED WORKER / ARTISAN	12%
INFORMAL SALES / BUSINESS	12%
SMALL BUSINESS OWNER	9%
FARM LABORER (OTHER'S LAND)	8%
LABORER, DOMESTIC, OR UNSKILLED WORKER	7%
SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL	7%
SCHOOL TEACHER	6%
GOVERNMENT OFFICE-CLERICAL WORKER	5%
PRIVATE OFFICE-CLERICAL WORKER	2%
MILITARY/POLICE	2%
GOVERNMENT OFFICE-EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	1%
PRIVATE OFFICE-EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	<0.5%
UNIVERSITY TEACHER	<0.5%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

D-5. *How many of the following does your household have?*

ITEM	BASE	MEAN	STD.DEV.	MIN	MAX	MEDIAN
B) MOTORCYCLE	15,922	0.53	0.62	0	8	0
C) CAR	15,919	0.29	0.50	0	8	0
D) TV	15,919	0.90	0.79	0	8	1
H) JERIBS OF LAND	15,825	5.49	57.39	0	5000	2
I) LIVESTOCK (NOT POULTRY)	15,894	3.98	8.25	0	200	1

D-6. *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? (Interviewer: If respondent can only tell you their annual family income, divide this by 12.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
LESS THAN 2,000 AFS	3%
2,001–3,000 AFS	2%
3,001–5,000 AFS	8%
5,001–10,000 AFS	24%
10,001–15,000 AFS	13%
15,001–20,000 AFS	8%
20,001–25,000 AFS	2%
25,001–40,000 AFS	3%
MORE THEN 40,000 AFS	1%
DON'T KNOW	34%
REFUSED	2%

D-7. *(Ask if D-6 answer is 98 refused or 99 «don't know.») If you are unsure of the actual monthly amount, what's the general range? Again, this is for your whole household.*

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE UNSURE OF THEIR MONTHLY INCOME	6,003
LESS THAN 2,000 AFS	4%
2,001–3,000 AFS	7%
3,001–5,000 AFS	20%
5,001–10,000 AFS	28%
10,001–15,000 AFS	20%
15,001–20,000 AFS	10%
20,001–25,000 AFS	5%
25,001–40,000 AFS	2%
MORE THEN 40,000 AFS	1%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-8. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household's income, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	19%

NO	81%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-9. *How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
0 YEAR	49%
1 YEAR	10%
2 YEARS	18%
3 YEARS	11%
4 YEARS	4%
5 YEARS	3%
6 YEARS	2%
7 YEARS	1%
8 YEARS	1%
9 YEARS	<0.5%
10 YEARS	1%
MORE THAN 11 YEARS	1%

D-10. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa? (Calculate the highest level in years.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
0 YEAR	45%
1 YEAR	1%
2 YEARS	2%
3 YEARS	3%
4 YEARS	3%
5 YEARS	3%
6 YEARS	5%
7 YEARS	2%
8 YEARS	3%
9 YEARS	3%
10 YEARS	4%
11 YEARS	2%
12 YEARS	15%

13 YEARS	<0.5%
14 YEARS	5%
15 YEARS	<0.5%
16 YEARS	4%
17 YEARS	<0.5%
18 YEARS	<0.5%
19 YEARS	<0.5%
20 YEARS	<0.5%
NO FORMAL SCHOOL	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-11. Which languages do you speak?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
DARI	78%
PASHTO	50%
UZBEKI	10%
ENGLISH	5%
TURKMENI	2%
URDU	2%
ARABIC	1%
PASHAYEE	1%
NURISTANI	1%
BALOCHI	1%
HINDI	<0.5%
RUSSIAN	<0.5%
SHIGNEE	<0.5%
GERMAN	<0.5%
FRENCH	<0.5%
PAMIRI	<0.5%

D-12. Are you married, or single?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
SINGLE	17%
MARRIED	80%
WIDOWER/WIDOW	2%

D-13. (Ask if D-12 answer is 2 “married” or 3 “widower.”) How many children do you have?

BASE: MARRIED OR WIDOWED	13,308
0	5%
1	8%
2	17%
3	20%
4	17%
5	14%
6	9%
7	5%
8	3%
9	1%
10	1%
MORE THAN 11	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-15a. Do you personally use a mobile phone, or not?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	66%
NO	34%

D-15b. How many people live here in this household?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
1-5 PEOPLE	12%
6-10 PEOPLE	53%
11-15 PEOPLE	26%
> 16 PEOPLE	9%

D-15c. How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
0 PEOPLE	9%
1 PEOPLE	20%
2 PEOPLE	30%

3 PEOPLE	19%
4 PEOPLE	11%
5 PEOPLE	5%
6 OR MORE THAN 6 PEOPLE	7%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-15d. (Ask if 1 or more mobile phones in D-15c.) And how many members of your household own mobile phones that can access internet, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?

BASE: HAVE MOBILE PHONE	14,449
0 PEOPLE	53%
1 PEOPLE	24%
2 PEOPLE	14%
3 PEOPLE	5%
4 PEOPLE	2%
5 PEOPLE	1%
6 OR MORE THAN 6 PEOPLE	1%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-16. (Ask all.) In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
VERY HAPPY	35%
SOMEWHAT HAPPY	46%
NOT VERY HAPPY	15%
NOT AT ALL HAPPY	3%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

D-17. (Interviewer code. Record the number of people present for the interview, excluding the interviewer.) Please record the number of people present from each of the three generational categories listed below. If nobody was present from a particular category, enter 0.

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (15,930)	NONE PRESENT	AT LEAST ONE PRESENT
A) JUNIORS (CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE)	19%	81%

B) ADULTS (PEERS, FRIENDS)	28%	72%
C) ELDERS	37%	63%

D-18. (Interviewer code.) Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THE QUESTIONS	69%
THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF THE QUESTIONS	27%
THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF THE QUESTIONS BUT WITH SOME HELP.	3%
THE RESPONDENT HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, EVEN WITH HELP FROM ME	<0.5%

D-19. (Interviewer code.) Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE (AT EASE) WITH THE ENTIRE QUESTIONNAIRE	69%
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MOST OF THE QUESTIONS	27%
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH ONLY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS	3%
THE RESPONDENT WAS GENERALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE	<0.5%

D-20. Was the interview subject to quality control / back-check?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
YES	39%
NO	61%

D-21. Method of quality control / back-check

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	15,930
DIRECT SUPERVISION DURING INTERVIEW	5%
BACK-CHECK IN PERSON BY SUPERVISOR	25%
BACK-CHECK FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE	<0.5%
QUALITY CONTROLLED BY NON-ACSOR MONITOR	9%
NOT APPLICABLE	61%



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